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This thesis seeks to give a comprehensive account of the development of Protestant
Christianity in North Korea, with special reference to issues of church and state. The
development of Protestant Christianity in Korea as a whole is deeply connected to these issues.
This is particularly the case in North Korea where Christianity since 1945 has existed within a
Communist state. The particularities of culture, religious tradition, temperament and socio-
historical experience will be studied in relation to the socio-political stance of North Korean
Protestantism.
The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part traces the history of northern
Protestantism before the partition of 1945. The main argument in this part is that the northern
minjung, who had a strong antipathy to the southern-centered political power and the
discriminatory social structure of the Chosun Dynasty, accepted Protestant Christianity as an
alternative religion which could provide a new hope for social equality. During the period of
Japanese colonialism, northern Protestantism resisted Japanese rule and organized the March
First Independence Movement and opposition to Shinto Shrine worship. The thesis
demonstrates that Protestant engagement with the socio-political context of the northern
minjung was the major factor in the growth of Christianity in the North. A minjung-centered
opposition paradigm in church-state relations was developed through this engagement.
Part Two examines the history of North Korean Christianity during the time of its
ideological struggle with Communism. This covers the period from the establishment the
Communist regime in 1945, through the Korean War and into the post-war period. It will be
shown that after the liberation from Japanese colonial rule, the northern churches mainly
repeated the paradigm of opposition and competed for political power with the Communists,
on the understanding that Christianity could not coexist with an atheistic regime. On the other
hand, a cooperation paradigm also emerged through the leaders of the North Korean Christian
Association, which recognized that the reforms initiated by the Communists were necessary in
North Korea. It will be argued that both paradigms, the one cooperating with the regime and
the other opposed to it, failed because neither of them was genuinely based on the context of
the northern minjung. During the Korean War, the majority of northern Christians supported
the Allied Army and continued to resist the Communist regime in the post-war context. This
resistance brought about the "Anti-Religious Campaign" of the Communists. The result was
that Christianity in North Korea suffered severe losses religious life from 1958 to 1972, and the
number of Christians was greatly diminished.
Part Three examines the revival of northern Protestantism since 1972, after the winter of
the Anti-Religious Campaign. The remnant Christians reopened house churches and a seminary,
and established the Korean Christian Federation as their national ecclesiastical structure.
Institutionally revived northern Protestantism also sought to renew its theological and diaconal
identities. It will be argued during this period that Protestant Christianity undertook authentic
renewal of its mission in the Communist context. This renewal emphasized the notion of the
church being a church for the minjung through the development of dialogue between
Christianity and Juche Idea and the Social Diakonia Mission. The church-state relations in this
period will be described and analyzed as a minjung-centered cooperation paradigm. With a
summary and assessment of the various historical paradigms of the church-state relations in
North Korea, the thesis concludes that the revival and renewal of northern Protestantism was
not a compromise with the Communist government; rather, it was an effective articulation of a
minjung-centered approach to church-state relations in the Communist context.
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Edinburgh, World Missionary Conference, 1910. Plate 9,
1 For the place-names during the early Protestant mission period before 1910, see this map.
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Taken from: B. turnings, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History,
New York, W. W. Norton, 1997, 145
2 This map shows the traditional boundaries of provinces before the establishment of two
Koreas.
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TSto front: Clark, A, D.,A history ofthe Church in Kama, Seoul, CLS, 1971, 8
3 This map shows the allocation of territory among the western mission boards in Korea. This
allocation also influenced the theological characteristics of each provincial church.
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Taken from: B. Comings. Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History.
New York, W. W. Norton, 1997. 18
4 This map shows the partition line, the 38th parallel, of the Korean peninsula from 1945-1950
and the ceasefire line after the Korean War in 1953 which is the current division line between
North and South Korea.
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REMNANTS AND RENEWAL:
A HISTORY OF PROTESTANT CHRISTIANITY IN NORTH KOREA,WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ISSUES OF CHURCH AND STATE, 1945-1994
INTRODUCTION
The issue of church and state takes us to the heart ofmission because the Gospel is the
good news in every part of human life and society. Throughout the history of the Church
in Korea, the issues of church and state, religion and society have been deeply
connected to the development of the Korean churches. Indeed, an important factor in
Christianity's success in Korea has been its frequent identification with political
movements promoting Korean nationalism, independence, democracy, and Korean
reunification. Especially in Northern Korea before the division of the peninsula in 1945,
and in North Korea after it,1 the church-state relationship has been one of the crucial
issues determining the fate of the churches.
Before the partition of the Korean peninsula in 1945, the majority of Christians in Korea
lived in Northern Korea. Pyongyang, the capital city of North Korea, was referred to as
• • • .9...
the "Jerusalem of East Asia" by missionaries, indicating that Northern Korea was the
• • • . • T
vibrant center of, in particular, Protestant Christianity. In contrast, however, the
Protestant church in North Korea was officially closed down, and virtually ceased to
exist from 1958 to 1972. After the partition in 1945, the Protestant Christians in North
' The terms 'Northern Korea' and 'Southern Korea' will be used as shortened names for 'the
northern region of the Korean peninsula' (Whanghae, Pyongan, and Hamkyung province) and
'the southern region of the Korean peninsula' (Kyungsang, Chulla, Kyungki, Choongchung
and Kangwon province) before the partition in 1945. The terms 'North Korea' and 'South
Korea' will be used where appropriate in place of the official names, 'Democratic People's
Republic ofKorea' and 'Republic of Korea,' for the period after 1945.
2 A. Clark, A History ofthe Church in Korea, Seoul, CLS, 1971,159
About 65% of the total number of Protestant Christians in Korea prior to 1945 was in the
northern part. In the Presbyterian church, the majority of the Korean Church, the figure was
even higher, at 75%. These percentages are based on statistics given for Korean Christianity
in the years 1941-1942 by the Institute for Korean Church History (IKCH). See, 1KCH ed.,
Hankuk Kidokyo eui Yoksa ( A History of Christianity in Korea), vol. 2, Seoul, Kyomunsa,
1990, 261, which indicates that 223,339 of 351,222 Protestant Christians in Korea were in the
northern part, and that, within that figure there was a total of 256,575 Presbyterians, ofwhom
1
Korea collided with the Communist regime in a brief competition for political
hegemony.4 This collision resulted in the persecution of Christianity in North Korea,
and most Christians evacuated to South Korea during the Korean War. There were only
about 50,000 'remnant' Protestant Christians and about 20 ordained ministers left
behind the Iron Curtain after the war.6 There is some evidence that these remnant
Christians in North Korea continued in conflict with the Communist government even
in the post-war context.6 Because of this conflict, the Communists did not allow any
religious freedom for the Christians from 1958 to 1972, during which they operated a
hostile religious policy known as the "Anti-Religious Campaign."7
In 1972, the North Korean government lifted its ban on Christianity and the Protestant
church in North Korea started to revive. Instead of entering into conflict with the
government, the North Korean church now worked within its Communist context. Old
churches reopened, new churches were built, the theological seminary reopened for
ministry training, and the Bible and hymnbook were again printed. Christianity, which
had been considered as "anti-revolutionary social opium,"8 was re-evaluated as "a
partner of the reconstruction of socialist fatherland and the reunification of Korean
peninsula"9 by the Korean Worker's Party (KWP). This change in the state's
understanding of Christianity brought widened religious freedom allowing worship,
191,25d were in the northern part.
4
See, S. Masahiko, "Christianity in North Korea after the Liberation, 1945-1950", in Heung-
soo Kim ed., Haebang hu Bukhan Kyohoe Sa, (A History of the North Korean Church since
1945), Seoul, Dasan Kulbang, 1992, 36-40.
5 Rev. Ki-jun Koh, the former general secretary of KCF, reported these statistics to the WCC
delegation. See, E. Weingartner, "Confidential Report: CCIA/WCC Delegation to the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 9-16 November 1987." In South Korea, In-chul
Rang claims that about 120,000-170,000 Christians evacuated to the South during the war.
In-chul Kang, "A Recognition of Modem Religious History in North Korea", in Heung-soo
Kim ed., Ibid., 1992, 172-173.
6
See, S. Masahiko "Christianity and North Korean Society after Liberation", in Samuel Lee ed.,
Pyunghwa Toil Yonku Mom Jaryojip (The Proceedings of Colloquium on Peace and
Reunification in Korea), vol.1, Seoul, Sungsil University Press, 1987, 20-42.
7
See, Ha-chul Chung, Urinun Woai Jongkyo rul Bandae Hanunga?, (Why Do We Oppose




Sung-duk Park, "A New Perspective of the Juche Idea on Christianity" in The Association of
Korean Christian Scholars in North America ed., Christian Faith and Juche Philosophy,
Seoul, Sinang kwa Jisung Sa, 1993, 86.
2
Eucharist, baptism and restricted church planting.
1. Necessity for Research
In spite of this revival of the Protestant church in North Korea, the history of Protestant
Christianity in North Korea has been little known to the outside world. Church
historians in South Korea justified their lack of attention to the North Korean church in
various ways. Some of them emphasized the difficulties and limitations of undertaking
historical studies of North Korean Christianity. These were enumerated as 1) the
oppression of the former military government and its negative effects on North Korean
study; 2) the conservative resistance among South Korean churches against research on
North Korean Christianity; and 3) the difficulty of accessing the primary sources on
North Korean Christianity.10
Nevertheless, in South Korea there have been marvelous achievements in other fields of
North Korean studies. Scholars of North Korean studies in the fields of sociology,
Korean literature, Korean history, politics and economics have all continued
independently, in spite of the "government-controlled Cold War ideology."11 The
absence of theological studies on North Korea is the more evident in view of continued
research in the other fields. There were 138 PhD theses on North Korean studies in
South Korean universities from 1970 to 1998, but not a single one of these was in the
field of religion.
Table 1) Distribution of PhD Theses on North Korean Studies in South Korea, 1970-1998
12
Field PL IR EC ML SC RU LW AD ED KW OT RL
Theses No. 37 16 14 11 7 12 10 10 12 5 5 0
10
Seong-Min Ryu, "A Study of Religion in North Korea", in Society ofNorth Korean Studies
ed. Bimdan Banseki Bukhan Yeongusa, (A History of North Korean Studies during the Half
Century of Division), Seoul, Hanul, 1999, 483.
11
Ibid., 14.
12 The list of theses is from Seong-Yun Kang, "The Situation and Tasks of North Korean
Studies" in Ibid., 19-24.
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PL: Politics, IR: International Relations, EC: Economics, ML: Military, SC: Sociology, RU:
Reunification, LW: Law, AD: Administration, ED: Education, KW: Korean War, OT: Others, RL:
Religion
The excuses of the church historians in South Korea are not sufficient to explain the gap
in achievement between theology and other fields, because scholars in other fields were
faced with similar limitations.
Besides these external limitations there were also internal ones. Most historians focused
their questions on whether or not the revival of Protestant churches in North Korea was
a simply matter of political propaganda. Their attitude was colored by anti-Communism
in the Cold War context. It was very difficult to arrive at an objective academic
statement or a new insight within the context of the South Korean churches at that time.
However, the situation has now changed and the democratic government in South Korea
has allowed free research on North Korea, and it is therefore necessary that we research
Protestant Christianity in North Korea from a new and properly academic perspective.
2. Rationale of Research
2.1 Research Questions
The aim of this thesis is to offer an interpretation of the history of the North Korean
Christians' response to their Communist context. In order to discover the true nature of
this response, we will have to analyze in depth the church-state relations in North Korea.
The church-state relationship, it must be emphasized, is the starting point of the
criticisms launched by Christians from the South against the North Korean Church. It is
also a crucial actor in both the disappearance and, later, the revival of the Protestant
church in North Korea. By focusing on the church-state relationship, the thesis will
pursue two core questions, and several sub-questions, as follows:
• Core Question: How can we understand and interpret the experience of Protestant
Christianity in North Korea in regard to the issues of church-state relations? And
4
what are the historical paradigms and missiological implications of the church-state
• • 1 T
relations practiced by northern Protestantism, in its context?
• Sub-questions:
What was the socio-historical background of the revival of Protestant Christianity
in North Korea? What were the internal changes affecting this revival? What were
the external influences affecting it?
What has been the relationship between Christianity and Communism in North
Korea?
What activities have the Korean Christian Federation (KCF) and the house
churches carried on since the revival? Were their activities mere political
propaganda, or real religious activities?
How do North Korean Christians understand their own identity in their Communist
context?
How has the North Korean church understood Christian mission in her context?
Does a scientific study of the Protestant church in North Korea produce a new
understanding of her role within Korean church history as a whole? What new light
does its experience shed on Christian socialism, Christianity and nationalism, the
ideological interface with Communism and church-state relationship issues in
Korea?
2.2 The Argument of Thesis
This study will attempt to show that the revival of the Protestant Christianity in North
Korea was not the result of a compromising accommodation with the Communist
government, but the consequence of its effective articulation of a minjung-centered
approach to the church-state relationship in the Communist context.
• It will be argued that the revival of Protestant Christianity in North Korea was due
to sustained efforts by the North Korean Christians to articulate their Christian
13 'Northern Protestantism' means Protestant Christianity in Northern Korea prior to the
5
identity within the Communist context.
• It will be argued that the KCF's self identity included a specific understanding of
Christian witness in relation to the Jnche ideology of the KWP.
• It will be argued that the theological foundation of North Korean Christianity, and
its missiological identity, lay in its continuing adherence to the minjung-centered
tradition of Korean Protestant Christianity through the Christian-Juchean
Dialogue during the 1980s, and the Social Diakonia Mission during the 1990s.
• It will be argued that one ofmain reasons for the Christian evacuation to the South
during the Korean War was that the great majority of North Korean Christians
supported the invasion of the North, by the USA and the South Korean military.
• It will be argued that the persecution which North Korean Christians experienced
(1948-1953) was contingent upon issues of land reform and political power, and
one of reasons that brought about the "Anti-Religious Campaign" was the
Christian boycott of the general election in 1957.
3. Periods and Organization of Research
This thesis will be divided into three periods:
• Part One (1874-1945) will examine the oppositional paradigm of church-state
relations in Northern Korea before the partition.
• Part Two (1945-1972) will demonstrate how this pre-1945 paradigm influenced
the persecution and suppression of churches in North Korea in the period
following partition, and indicate what alternative paradigms emerged.
• Part Three (1972-1994) will examine the new paradigm of church-state
relations that has developed since 1972, and show how this influenced the
revival and renewal of the churches in North Korea.
The main focus of this research is found Parts One and Two, from the establishment of
North Korea in 1945 to the end of the Kim Il-sung regime in 1994. For this period the
research is based as far as possible on primary sources. However, it is important to
partition of the Korean peninsula and in North Korea after it.
6
understand the socio-historical background of northern Protestantism, which had
distinctive characteristics in the field of church-state relations. Part One, therefore, will
examine aspects of the history of Christianity in Northern Korea from 1874, when John
Ross began his work with Koreans in Manchuria, until 1945, when Korea was divided.
Chapter I (1874-1910) will examine the history of the early Protestant mission and its
socio-political influences in Northern Korea. It will also examine the relationship
between the north-centered Protestant Christianity and the south-centered Confucian
monarchy.
Chapter II (1910-1945) will recount the history of witness of northern Protestantism
during the period of Japanese colonial occupation of Korea, and its relationship with the
Japanese colonial state.
Chapter III (1945-1949) will examine the impact of the Cold War in the Korean
Peninsula on the churches in North and South Korea. Attention will be given to the
ideological struggle between Christianity and Communism in North Korea.
Chapter IV (1950-1953) will demonstrate how this struggle developed during the
Korean War, when the Northern churches gave their support, along with the churches of
the South, to the Allied Army led by the United States.
Chapter V (1954-1972) will show how Korean War affected church-state relations in the
North, with the rise of the Anti-Religious Campaign that resulted in the "winter" of
Christianity in North Korea.
Chapter VI (1972-1988) will give an account on the context and content of the external
revival of Protestant Christianity in North Korea, with reference to institutional aspects
of the life of the churches, and the restoration of international ecumenical relations.
Chapter VII (1988-1994) will examine the internal renewal of the northern churches,
with special reference to their dialogue with the Juche Idea and their social diaconal
7
works.
Chapter VIII will offer a theoretical summary of the historical development of the
church-state relations in North Korea by developing a series of paradigms that
triangulate the relationship through the inclusion of the third and vital element of the
minjung.
It is recognized that Catholic Christianity also has an important history in Northern
Korea, but this will not be included in this research for three reasons. Firstly, it would
increase the scope of the study beyond the statutory limitations of space. Secondly, the
Catholic church did not develop the same pattern of church-state relations as their
Protestant counterparts, and did not revive in the post-1972 context. It is this revival that
is the main focus of our research. It is only very recently that a Catholic cathedral
opened in Pyongyang. Thirdly, even before partition the Catholic Church tended to
isolate itself from interaction with developments in Korean political society, and it is
this aspect that constitutes the primary point of reference in this thesis.
4. Methodology
4.1 Criterion of Language
In collecting, analyzing and evaluating primary sources from North Korea, the author
has taken into account three points about language. Firstly, in analyzing the official
documents and announcements of the North Korean government, or of its political party,
it will be argued that they were often influenced by 15 years of anti-Japanese guerrilla
struggle. The political culture in North Korea has been influenced by its military
establishment, and the ever-increasing tension and continuous guerrilla-style struggle
with what it perceives as US imperialism, rather than by the civil network of technocrats
and intellectuals. Therefore, in North Korean sources most political language was
militarized, and needs to be evaluated with care.14
14
A. Hunter and K. K. Chan also suggested this approach in their book, Protestantism in
8
Secondly, it is necessary to remember that there are influences from the official
guidelines of the KWP's propaganda scheme in the official statements, in the
expressions used, and even in some of the sermons of the KCF and its members. In the
political system of North Korea, the KCF is regarded as a small, minor and subordinate
religious cooperative organization of the KWP. Therefore, many official statements of
the KCF begin and end with expressions drawn from the publicity of the KWP's policy.
KCF and KWP documents are therefore written in the language of ideological protocol.
In examining the KCF sources, the author has tried to draw out political and religious
concepts from the protocol language that pervades these, as well as KWP documents.
The last point relates to the Juche Idea.15 It will be shown that the Juche Idea contains
significant elements of religious discourse. The KCF has limited freedom of expression,
being obliged not to collide with and damage the ideological system of the Juche Idea.16
On the other hand, the KCF has tried to find a "common ground" between Christianity
and the Juche Idea through a process of dialogue. This situation should always be
considered in any interpretation of the KCF sources.
The spellings of place-names in this thesis are in most cases those approved by the
Committee of Romanization, Department of Culture and Tourism in South Korea. The
Romanization of the title of sources in Korea is based on the New Revised Principle of
Romanization approved on 4th July 2000 by the Committee. The names of political
organizations and leaders in Northern and North Korea have been taken from Young Jo,
Jo Young Sajeon (North Korean-English Dictionary), published in North Korea in 1999.
The names of Korean authors writing in English are spelled as given, and in the order of
Contemporary China, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, 10.
15 The Juche Idea is the official ideology of the North Korean state. For details, see, Chapter V,
Section 1.3 and Chapter VII, Section 2.1.
16
For example, Young-Sup Kang, the keynote speaker in the Macao meeting, started his talk by
1.Praising God 2.Introducing the excellent leadership of Kim Jong-Il 3.Excellency of the
Juche Idea. Some South Korean participants immediately raised a "propaganda" argument.
Flowever, in an academic approach, 2 and 3 would be regarded as a fixed formal discourse in
North Korean society. See, Young-sup Kang, "Task of Mission for Peace in Northeast Asia",
manuscript, International Ecumenical Consultation on Solidarity for Peace in North East Asia,
9
given name and surname. However, some well-known and ancient names, such as Kim
Il-sung and Yi Sung-kye will be kept in the Korean order of surname and given name, to
avoid confusion.
4.2 Theological Criteria for the Analysis of Church-State Relations
In this thesis, the history of Protestant Christianity in North Korea will be re-examined
not simply chronologically, but interpretively through the filter of church and state.
Three approaches will be used in the analysis of church-state relations. Each approach
has its own justification.
Firstly, a minjung-centered approach, arising from the liberation of the oppressed, will
be justified by the historical evidence that Northern Korean Protestantism is
characteristically the 'church for the minjung.,xl A minjung perspective precludes a
privileged focus on elites in writing a history of the Korean church. Rather, it pays
attention to the struggle of the minjung for the transformation of history. Minjung
... . *11*18 * *
theologians insist that "minjung are the subject of social history," and their story is
viewed as the center of history in minjung theology.
Secondly, a post-Cold War approach will be justified on the basis that Christian
socialism was an influential movement among Northern Korean Protestants during the
period of Japanese colonial occupation of Korea. This has not yet received an objective
assessment due to subsequent Cold War confrontation between South and North Korea.
There is evidence that most Korean history writing, including ecclesiastical history, has
served to emphasize the legitimacy and superiority of each one side over against the
other, promoting one of the two systems, or ideologies, and attacking its opposite.
Church history written from the perspective of South Korea demonstrates a tendency
29th January 1996, Macao
17
Chai-yong Choo insists that it is necessary to re-write the history of the Korean church from
a minjung perspective. Chai-yong Choo, A History ofChristian Theology in Korea, Seoul,
CLS, 1998, 8-10.
18
Yong-bock Kim, "Theology and Social Biography of the Minjung", CTC Bulletin, vol. 5,
No.3, 1984, 67.
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toward anti-Communism, sometimes resembling McCarthyism.19 This is used to justify
the division of the Korean peninsula and keep the North Korean Church and South
Korean Church separate. This thesis will attempt to develop a post-Cold War
perspective in writing a history of northern Protestantism that strives for the
reconciliation and reunification of the two Koreas.
Lastly, a post-colonial approach will be adopted in order to overcome the academic
legacy of Japanese colonialism. For example, Korean mainline churches still keep
silence on the issue of Shinto shrine worship. It is a responsibility of church historians
to criticize the mistakes of churches in the past, so that they will not be repeated.
Of these three approaches, the minjung-centered approach is the most important filter
that will be used to understand church-state relations, as applied to Protestant
Christianity in North Korea. The struggle of the North Korean Church for the minjung
in the process of the revival will be clarified. Moreover, it will be shown that the
minjung-centered approach is a criterion for understanding the proper relationship
between church and state in each historical context ofNorth Korea.
This approach links up with the way church-state relations were conceptualized as an
important ecumenical agenda, as far back as the Oxford Conference on Church,
• 90 •
Community, and State in 1937. Rather than addressing church-state relations on a
19
"McCarthyism means a fanatical opposition to elements held to be subversive (e.g. members
of Communists parties), typically accompanied by the use of tactics involving personal
attacks on individuals by means of widely publicized indiscriminate allegation, especially on
the basis of unsubstantiated charges". Longman Dictionary ofthe English Language, 1984.
20 The official report of the Conference on Church, Community, and State held at Oxford in
July 1937 was J. H. Oldham ed., The Churches Survey their Task: Report of the Oxford
Conference, London, G. Allen & Unwin, 1937. The seven volumes of reference books were
also published in the same publishing company. See, W. A. Visser't Hooft and J. H. Oldham,
The Church and Its Function in Society; T. E. Jessop et al., The Christian Understanding of
Man; C. H. Dodd et al., The Kingdom ofGod andHistory; R. Niebuhr et al., The Christian
Faith and the Common Life; E. E. Aubrey et al., Church and Community; J. H. Oldham ed.,
Church, Community, and State in Relation to Education; J. F. Dulles et al., The Universal
Church and the World ofNations; about the observations and findings of the conference, see
G. K. A. Bell, Christianity and world Order, Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1940; see also, E.
Fenn, That They Go Forward: An Impression ofOxford Conference on Church, Community
and State, London, SCM Press, 1938; R. Rouse and S. C. Neill ed., A History of the
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bilateral axis, the conference "triangulated" the issue by re-conceiving it in terms of
church-community-state relations.21 Community did not mean "national community" as
99 •
a structural and legal element of the nation-state. Rather, the conference considered
• . • • • 99
grassroots communities in approaching the church-state relations. There was a strong
intention to construct the issue from a grassroots people's perspective. This thesis will
apply the same triangular approach to the analysis of the characteristics of the church-
state issue of Protestant Christianity in North Korea, so as to include the minjung
perspective as a dynamic element of the relationship.
This unique triangular approach of Oxford was a result of the concern of the ecumenical
movement for suffering people. It is of interest that the notion of "community" was
brought into the question of the relationship between church and state at the moment
when the ecumenical movement was confronted with the totalitarian claims of the Nazi
Third Reich.24 In this context, the Oxford conference deliberately intended to clarify
church-state relations for the sake of the church's witness for "people". Oxford did not
restrict its attention to traditional legal problems, but concentrated primarily on the
witness and service of the church in society. The reasoning behind taking church,
community and state together was clearly that the church's first concern should be how
the Christian community can best serve suffering people in the wider community, not
how it can secure its own institutional rights within the political system. The conference
called all Christians "to a more passionate and costly concern for the outcast, the under¬
privileged, the persecuted, the despised in the community and beyond the
EcumenicalMovement, 1517-1948, 4th Edition, Geneva, WCC, 1993, 587-592.
21
N.B., Originally, the theme of Church, Community and State of the Oxford Conference was
proposed by J. H. Oldham in 1934 at the request of the Universal Christian Council. See, J. H.
Oldham, Church, Community and State: A World Issue, London, SCM Press, 1935.
22 i • •
See, G. K. A. Bell, Christianity and World Order, 54-56. Bell, who was Bishop of Chichester,
particularly criticized the German understanding the notion of "community" as "national
community" ( Volk) in relation to nationalism. In fact, German theologians translated the
"community" in Oxford as Volk. See, P. Althaus et al., Kirche, Volk und Staat: Stimmen aus
der Deutschen Evangelischen Kirche zur Oxforder Weltkirchenkonferanz, Berlin, Furche-
Verlag, 1937.
23 E. Barker clearly stated this intention of the Oxford conference. See, "Church and
Community", E. E. Aubrey et ah, Op. Cit., 21-60.
24 About this confrontation, see, Oldham, Church, Community and State: A World Issue, 8-14.
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community."25 The Oxford approach therefore refuses to divorce the church's relation
to the state from its service to the community and its social responsibility.
The Oxford conference recognized the dual citizenship of Christians to church and state
9 f\
and "the dual loyalty to God and Caesar." However, it affirmed, "It is God who
declares what is Caesar's. Therefore, whatever the choice may be, the Christian must,
whether as a member of the church or as a citizen, obey the Will of God."27 The
conference understood that Caesar (the state) is "ordained by God" as "servant of
• • 98
justice" for His people, but still stands under God's authority and judgment:
We recognize the existing States as historically given realities, each of which in
the political sphere is the highest authority, but which, as it stands itself under the
authority and judgment of God, is bound by His Will and has the God-given aim
of upholding law and order, of ministering to the life of the people united within it
or the peoples or groups who are so united, and also of making its contribution to
9Q
the common life of all peoples.
The Oxford Conference acknowledged the authority of the state, but recognized it as
relative not ultimate, an authority that can only legitimately be for the God-given
purpose of serving the "welfare" and "life of people." The Oxford Conference declared
that the state is not the ultimate source of law, "not the lord, but the servant" of the
people. In spite of this God-given purpose, the conference recognized that in reality,
"often the state becomes an instrument of evil,"30 which oppresses the people.
Therefore, the Oxford Conference concluded, "The church in differing historical
situations may be called to take differing positions either of co-operation, criticism, or
• • 31 • •
opposition." It is significant that the Oxford Conference recognized all possible
relationships between church and state according to socio-historical contextuality.
However, what was important was that within the triangular relationship between the
25 J. H. Oldham ed., The Churches Survey their Task, 74.
26 E. Fenn, Op. Cit., 65.








church, the community and the state, the notion of the "community of grassroots
people" was the crucial criterion determining whether the church's proper relationship
to the state was one of cooperation, criticism, or opposition. If a state acts as the
servant of the community of grassroots people, a church may cooperate. However, when
the tyrannical state oppresses the people against the Will of God, the church has to
oppose the state. Indeed, this triangular approach of Oxford was a remarkable
development in the ecumenical debate on church-state relations, affirming people-
centered or community-centered criteria over against legal or bureaucratic
considerations.
Applied to the Korean context, the Oxford notion of "community" can be replaced with
the Korean notion of minjung, which means the community of marginalized people in
Korean society. Therefore, in this thesis, the Oxford approach will be applied to the
North Korean context as a triangular filter of "Church, Minjung and State". This
triangular relationship of church, minjung and state will be used as an analytical tool in
order to ascertain what the proper relationship between the church and the state ought to
be in North Korea
4.3 Research Methodology
The study has utilized a socio-historical methodology within a missiological perspective.
This task has been accomplished through the use of archival sources, interviews, and a
survey of relevant published literature, both in North and South Korea. It is impossible
to study separately the historical life and witness of the Protestant Christianity in North
Korea without exploring the history of its interface with North Korean Communist
society. To interpret this experience, the socio-historical approach is a proper method of
analyzing the internal and external actors of change influencing the revival and
subsequent activity of the North Korean Protestant Church.
This method is employed not only in order to clarify the social factors affecting this
31 Ibid.
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issue, but also to discover the subjective effort made by the North Korean Church in her
revival. The study will use recently uncovered historical archives that the author has
been able to access. The existing historical data have also had to be critically
reinterpreted. The outcome is that the thesis stands in contrast to the existing
TT
# #
understanding of northern Protestantism in South Korea. The interviews provide
qualitative evidence that takes us behind the written sources and references, allowing us
to judge the validity, or otherwise of the documentary sources.
The missiological perspective enhances our understanding of the church's theology and
strategy of mission, both in the South and in the North. This includes some
missiological reflection on, and analysis of the interface between Christianity and
Communism in the North Korean context. Special attention is given to Christian
socialism in Korean Christianity, Christianity and nationalism, and the Christian
ideological struggle with Communism.
In addition, both a socio-political analysis and theological methodology have been
utilized to examine the context of northern Protestantism in each period of research and
to illustrate the theological issues involved in, for example, Shinto shrine worship and
the Christian-Juchean dialogue.
5. Information on Sources
5.1 Archival Sources
The search for archival sources was conducted mainly in North and South Korea, USA,
Canada, and Switzerland. The archival sources comprise letters, telegrams, minutes,
reports, statements, memoranda, and articles in newspapers kept in various archives and
32
Ibid., 77-80.
33 In the tradition of sociology of religion, especially in the UK, historical data is widely used
by revisiting existing historical evidence. Northcott shows the following examples. C. Brown,
The Social History ofReligion in Scotland since 1730, London, Methuen,1987; H. McLeod,
Religion and the People of Western Europe 1789-1990, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1997; R. Gill, The Myth ofthe Empty Church, London, SPCK, 1993.
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special collections.
In South Korea, the author collected the official governmental documents of North
Korea at the archive of the Ministry of Unification in Seoul. The archives provided
useful information on the confrontation between church and state in North Korea,
especially from the aspect of the North Korean government. The author also accessed
the archive of the Institute for Korean Church History, which kept ecclesiastical reports
and records ofNorth Korean churches before 1953.
In the USA, the J. F. Dulles file in Princeton University Library was accessed in relation
to Dulles' role in the outbreak of the Korean War and the WCC Toronto Statement. The
North Korean section of the Yenching Institute Library at Harvard University provided
useful information on the politics and economy of North Korea. The author collected
some US governmental documents in relation to North Korea and the Korean War in the
US National Archives at College Park, Maryland. In Los Angeles, Rev. Dr. Dong-kun
Hong provided highly valuable ecclesiastical documents and data of the KCF, especially
after 1972, from his private collection.
In North Bay, Canada, Mr. Eric Weingartner, the former executive secretary of WCC-
CCIA and head of the UN Office in Pyongyang, allowed the author to make copies of
personal archives on North Korean Christianity that he (Weingartner) collected during
his days in the WCC and in Pyongyang.
The author also dug through the entire North Korean files of the CCIA, Asia Desk and
General Secretariat of WCC in Geneva, since the establishment of the WCC. In the
basement of Ecumenical Building, the author found - and was allowed to consult -
many uncatalogued archives that contained detailed information on North Korean
Protestantism. These were particularly illuminating of the intense argument among the
world churches on the issue of faith and ideology in regard to the Korean War. They
also provide much detailed information and statistics on Protestant Christianity in North
Korea since the post-1972 revival. It was an extra benefit to copy a considerable number
of early UN documents on the issue of partition ofKorean peninsula from the CCIA file.
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The archive of WARC provided considerable information on the Social Diakonia
Mission of the North Korean Church.
When the author began this research project, visiting North Korea for academic research
was not allowed by either the North or South Korean governments. However, the
situation has rapidly developed since the establishment of Kim Dae-jung's regime in
South Korea. The author was therefore allowed to visit North Korea for two weeks, by
invitation of the KCF, in the spring of 2001. Most of his time was given to visiting the
KCF, house churches and individual Christians for cross-checking the contextual
validity and credibility of his research hypotheses. In addition, the author succeeded in
collecting the statements, documents, and letters of the KCF in its central office in
Pyongyang. In the Revolution Museum, important archival sources showing the
Christian background of Kim Il-sung and his family were collected.
5.2 Interviews
In the study ofWorld Christianity, oral sources are becoming more and more important
as a research resource. This is an especially effective way of examining church history,
particularly where a context may not easily permit the collection of written sources.
Therefore, the interview method was also used in this research, especially for the years
of the Anti-Religious Campaign in North Korea when the government prohibited the
production of any written materials by Christians. With the post-1972 revival of
Christianity in North Korea documentary sources re-appeared, but the politically
circumspect nature of the material requires that it is cross-checked against the memory
and interpretation of those who were involved at the time.
The interviews were conducted with three groups of interviewees: KCF leaders, local
church pastors and church members, and specialists on North Korean Christianity. The
first group of interviewees was the current KCF leadership, who have knowledge both
of the history of the post-1972 revival nation-wide, and of the current situation of
Protestant Christianity in North Korea. They were:
17
• Rev. Young-sup Kang, Chairperson of the KCF, 13th December 2000, Fukuoka,
Japan; 5th-6th April 2001, Pyongyang.
• Rev. Kyung-woo Chang, General Secretary, 7th April 2002, Pyongyang.
• Rev. Choon-ku Lee, Executive Secretary for Mission and Lecturer in
Systematic Theology, Pyongyang Theological Seminary, 3rd April 2001,
Pyongyang.
• Mr. Jong-ro Lee, Executive Secretary for International Relations, 13th
December, Fukuoka, Japan.
• Mr. Soo-ik Lee, Assistance for Mission, 12th December 2000, Fukuoka, Japan.
In contrast to the first group, the second group was local church pastors and members,
who were interviewed for their own historical experiences in their local contexts. It is of
regret that the number of interviewees was limited because the author was allowed only
two weeks for his fieldwork in North Korea. However, the following interviewees
provided vivid accounts of their experiences:
• Rev. Sung-bok Chang, Pastor, Bongsu Church, 4th April 2001, Pyongyang.
• Rev. Kun-young Kim, Associate Pastor, Chilgol Church, 4th April 2002,
Pyongyang.
• Elder Se-yong Kang, Okryu House Church, 6th April 2001, Pyongyang.
• Evangelist Sung-sil Lee, Okryu House Church, 6th April 2001, Pyongyang.
• Evangelist Bong-il Paik, Nominee for Ordination, 5th April 2001, Pyongyang.
The third group were internationally recognized specialists on North Korean
Christianity. Most of them visit North Korea frequently, or have lived there for several
years after the revival of Protestant Christianity. They provided not only practical
information but also valuable academic studies ofNorth Korean Christianity.
• Prof. Kyung-seo Park, Former Asia Secretary of the WCC, 28th November 2000,
Seoul.
• The late Rev. Dr. Dong-kun Hong, Former Lecturer in Religious Studies, Kim II
Sung University, 13th April 2001, Los Angeles.
18
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• Rev. Dr. Insik Kim, Coordinator for Asia and Pacific, PCUSA, 13 December
2000, Fukuoka, Japan.
• Mr. Eric Weingartner, Former Executive Secretary for WCC-CCIA and Flead of
the UN Office in Pyongyang, 12th April 2001, North Bay, Canada.
• Rev. Dr. Seong-won Park, Executive Secretary for Witness and Cooperation,
WARC, 17th January 2001, Geneva.
• Rev. Young-il Kang, Former General Secretary of Korean Christ Church in
Japan, 5th December 2000, Seoul.
• Rev. Dwein Epps, Former Director ofWCC-CCIA, 15th January 2001, Geneva.
• Dr. Flan Wen Zao, Former President of China Christian Council, 19th March
1999, Nanjing.
5.3 Secondary Sources
While primary sources for this research comprise archival sources and interviews,
secondary sources comprise published and unpublished materials such as books, articles
in journals and church magazines, dissertations and theses in relation to North Korea
and North Korean Christianity.
6. Survey of Literature
As has been pointed out, there has not been a single PhD research on Christianity in
North Korea. However, there are some published books and articles on the topic. The
literature concerning Protestant Christianity in North Korea and its approach can be
categorized as follows:
• History ofChristianity in North Korea from a Cold-War Perspective
• Ecumenical Approaches for Reunification
• Historical Materials
• Studies from Sociology ofReligion Perspective
• History ofChristianity in North Korea from a Post Cold-War Perspective
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Wan-shin Park, who is known as a specialist on the North Korean administration,
published a detailed study of The Policy ofChristianity and the Reality ofthe Church in
North Korea after the Liberation. In this he discusses differences between church-state
relations in South and North Korea, and argues that in contrast to the situation in the
South, the North Korean church has allowed its ecclesial character to be diminished
through excessive subordination to the state. He explored a wide range of government
documents and information in South Korea concerning North Korean Christianity, and
examined the political relationship between the KCF and the KWP. He concluded by
characterizing Protestant Christianity in North Korea as follows:
For political propaganda, the New Testament and hymnal book was published in
1983. However, that does not mean there is religious freedom. It is just an
exhibition for showing to overseas countries. The Korean Christian Federation is
not Christ's church. It is an imitation controlled by the Communist party for its
political propaganda.'4
This view has widely influenced the South Korean churches. Park's research is a
significant criticism of Christian co-operation with Communism. It is true that the
or
revived KCF has been politically active and has been subordinated under the political
power. However, Park bases his conclusion on too little evidence. The fact that a church
chooses to co-operate with the political powers of the day does not necessarily imply




Kyung-bae Min is one of the most distinguished historians in the South Korean
church. He has dug out much important primary historical material on Korean church
history with academic rigor. In his study of Christianity in North Korea, he and his
34 Wan-Shin Park, "The Policy on Christianity and the Reality of Church in North Korea after
the Liberation", in PCK Reunification Committee ed., Bukhan Kidokyo Chonram, 1985-1995,
(A Collective Study ofNorth Korean Christianity, 1985-1995), Seoul, PCK , 1995, 31-32. See
also, Wan-sin Park, Bukhan Jongkyo wa Sunkyo Tongilron, (Mission, Reunification and
Religion in North Korea), Seoul, Jigumunhwasa, 1994
'5
For instance, the KCF sent a letter to the WCC claiming suspension of 'Team Spirit 86'
military training by South Korea and the U.S. army. KCF Central Committee, "From the
Central Committee of Korean Christian Federation to WCC", 23rd January, 1986.
36
He studied ecclesiastical history at London and Aberdeen Universities.
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followers, Sawa Masahiko and Jong-min Suh, made a significant contribution. In his
book, Kyohoe wa Minjok (Church and Minjok:37), he gives us his view of the history of
North Korean Christian persecution and resistance:
Now the KCF is doing outward political propaganda for the KWP...but the real
church has disappeared. The resistance of Rev. Man-Wha Lee to the general
election of the Communist party at Yongchon, Pyungbuk in 1957 is an excellent
example of religious struggling against Communist dictatorship in North Korea.38
In this view, particularly, he is emphasizing that the Christian resistance to the
Communist regime in North Korea is a continuation of the tradition of struggle that
Korean Christians developed against the political oppression of Japanese colonialism.
However, it is difficult to generalize the Christian boycott in 1957 as "an excellent
example" of Christian witness in North Korea because this resistance was a direct cause
of bringing in the Anti-Religious Campaign.
Furthermore, Min started his work from a faulty hypothesis, which led him to the
conclusion comparable to that ofWan-shin Park. He maintains that Kim Il-Sung's anti-
Japanese guerrilla story was invented as a myth by Kim. He goes on further to state that
• . . • • • 2Q
Kim persecuted Christians because the Christians resisted his self-deification.
However, at present in the Korean historical field, Kim's leadership of the guerrilla
movement is widely recognized.40 Moreover, the persecution began in November 1946,
even according to Min himself,41 while the deification process did not begin until
37 The word Minjok is difficult to define in English. Min defined "Minjok" in his view of
history in contrast to "Milling". He understands that minjung is a socio-classical expression
but minjok is a wider concept including common historical experience. (Kyung-Bae Min,
1981, 3-6) In literary usage, minjok is a compound word; min (people) and jok (ethnos). It has
a similar meaning to "nation and ethnos" but is widely used in a Northeast Asian context to
mean the independence of a suffering nation and ethnos.
38
Kyung-bae Min, Kyohoe wa Minjok, (Church and Nation), Seoul, CLS, 1981, 443.
39
Ibid., 440-442.
40 The South Korean democratic government officially recognized in 2000, "Kim was a leader
of independence guerrilla army, and his army contributed noticeably to the independence
struggle under Japanese rule". It was the first official recognition of the Kim's leadership in
South Korea. Ministry of Unification ed., 2000nynn Bukhan Gaeyo (A General Introduction




1970.42 It is reasonable to suppose that the persecution was brought about by Christian
participation in the competition for political power and their opposition to the land
reform before the Korean War, and ongoing collision with the Communists after it. Min
successfully recounted the history of persecution and resistance on the part of Christians
in North Korea, but it seems that he failed to examine the causes.
One of the problems of Park and Min was that they worked from the biased hypothesis
of a Cold-War perspective. They believed that authentic Christian churches were not
able to survive in North Korea, and attempted to prove it. Another problem was that
both scholars made uncritical use of South Korean governmental sources in writing
their histories of Christianity in North Korea. For example, they often quoted The
Naewei Tongshin (F]7f;Mfs), the news agency of the Korea Central Intelligence
Agency. This is not an adequate substitute for primary sources.
Kyung-seo Park43 approaches the North Korean church from an ecumenical standpoint,
especially in regard to the reunification issue. He has put together a documentary
history of the ecumenical effort to cooperate with the KCF in his book Reconciliation,
Reunification. As he himself says, he is neither a theologian nor a historian but a social
scientist. His work displays these limitations. It is not a complete historical account, and
his concern is specifically with the issue of social integration and reunification of Korea.
Although he is a sociologist, he approaches the KCF with an ecumenical ethos
promoting both the unity of the Korean churches and the reunification of Korea. He also
emphasized mission and evangelism in a Kingdom of God perspective.
Heung-soo Kim should be remembered as the first scholar to attempt an approach to
Christianity in North Korea from a post Cold-War perspective. He edited the book,
Haebang hu Bukhan Kyohoe Sa, (A History of the North Korean Church after the
Liberation), and criticized the "one sided South Korean-centered" interpretation of the
42
Sung Choi, Bukhanhak Gaeron, (Introduction to North Korean Studies), Seoul, Pulbit, 1997,
137.
42
He visited North Korea 23 times as the executive secretary for the Asia Desk, WCC. He was
the professor of Sociology, Seoul National University.
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history of Christianity in North Korea. He attempted to interpret the causes of the
persecution from within the North Korean socio-political context, rather than accepting
uncritically perspectives that concentrated only on the persecution itself.44 However,
although providing much valuable information about North Korean Christianity before
the Korean War, he failed to collect primary sources after the Korean War.
Recently, In-chul Kang, a sociologist of religion, made a distinct contribution to
scholarly studies of North Korean Christianity. He pointed out the limit and prejudices
of South Korean historical studies of Christianity in North Korea, using the
methodology of sociology of religion. Kang analyzed the various changes that took
place in the social and religious status of the North Korean Church during the history of
Communist rule in North Korea. His work demonstrated that the religious status within
North Korean society has not always been weakened, despite what the majority of
South Korean scholars have alleged.44
The first attempt at a full history of Protestant Christianity in North Korea to be
undertaken from a post Cold-War perspective was a collective effort by historians
belonging to the Institute for Korean Church History. After several years of research,
the institute published Bukhan Kyohoe Sa (A History of Church in North Korea) in
1996. However, the quality of their work is impaired by the lack of primary sources
used in their account of the revival. The book focuses mainly on the history of the
northern churches during the Japanese period, and on Protestant Christianity in North
Korea before the Korean War.
44
Hung-Soo Kim ed., Haebang hu Bukhan Kyohoe Sa, (A History of the North Korean Church
after the Liberation), Seoul, Dasan Kulbang, 1992, 53.
45
See, Kang, In-chul, " The Role of Religion in the Development ofAnti-Communism during
the Korean War", The Sociology Society of Korea ed., Hankuk Junjaeng kwa Sahoe
Byundong, (The Korean War and Social Changes), Seoul, Pulbit, 1992, 182-222; "A
Recognition of Modern Religious History in North Korea", in Hung-Soo Kim ed., Haebang
hu Bukhan Kyohoe Sa, (A History of the North Korean Church after the Liberation), Seoul,
Dasan Kulbang, 1992, 131-249; "Church and State under the USAMGIK and Syngman Rhee
Regime", in Kyung-hwan Oh et al., Church and State, Inchon, Inchon Catholic University
Press, 1997, 625-640; "The Root of the Fled Christianity: The Revolution and Christianity in
North Korea after Liberation", Yoksa Bipyung, (Journal of Historical Criticism), Summer,
1992, 124-135.
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7. Theology of the Remnants
Three theological terms have been chosen to characterize the North Korean Christians
in this thesis. The first, "Remnants", echoes the Biblical reference to the Israelites who
remained faithful to their covenant with God in Babylon. The history of Israel begins
with the Exodus of Hebrews. Yahweh chose the Hebrew slaves in Egypt as the people
of God and made a Covenant with them. However, the Covenant community divided
into North Israel and South Judah in Canaan because of their disobedience to God.
Ezekiel proclaimed that if divided Israel and Judah repent their sin, Yahweh would
reward them with the gift of reunification.46 However, because of unjustness,
corruption and ceaseless power struggle,47 they remained divided kingdoms and were
enslaved by foreign powers. In this context, Isaiah spoke of the ""remnants" among the
• • 48
exiles in Babylon who preserved faith to Yahweh. Even when the world is like a "cut-
down tree" and there seems to be no hope, God still preserves "the remnants" as "the
stump" and "the holy seed" in order to work through them.49
The liberation of Korea after thirty-six years of Japanese occupation seemed like the
experience of Exodus event for the Korean Christians. However, it also resulted in
division. The Korean peninsula was divided into North and South Korea by foreign
powers. In the North, the conservative Christians competed with the Communists for
political power and the progressive Christians cooperated with the Communists as a
means of securing ecclesiastical power. In this context, the worst tragedy in Korean
history, the Korean War, was fought in the name of reunification. When the war ceased,
most church leaders and ordained ministers evacuated to the South, with only a small
minority of lay Christians remaining behind. In this thesis, these remnant Christians in
46 "Son ofman, take a stick of wood and write on it, 'Belong to Judah and the Israelites
associated with him.' Then take another stick ofwood, and write on it, 'Ephraim's stick,
belong to Joseph and all the house of Israel associated with him.' Join them together into one








the North are considered theologically, on an analogue with the "remnants" in Isaiah, as
a "holy seed" for the revival and renewal of Christianity in North Korea.
The second term, "Revival", echoes Isaiah promise the remnants would return to
Jerusalem for a God-given purpose after the exile in Babylon.30 They "will no longer
rely on" secular power, "but will truly rely on the Lord, the Holy One of Israel."51 This
message was eventually concretized in the reconstruction of the second Temple by Ezra
and Nehemiah. The restoration of the Temple was a symbol of the revival of faith in
Yahweh.
Protestant Christianity in North Korea was internally "exiled" for one and a half
decades during the Anti-Religious Campaign. But after 1972, the remnant Christians
revived the North Korean church. In this thesis, the concept of "revival" is used as an
external reference, denoting the institutional growth of Protestant churches in North
Korea, with analogues with the revival of the remnants in Israel. In the evangelical
movement, "revival" often means spiritual awakening. However, in this thesis, "revival"
refers to the KCF's constructive theological and ethical dialogue with the KWP, as a
result of which there has been an increase in the number of house churches to 511.
These churches provide the backbone of the "renewal" of Christian confidence in the
public life ofNorth Korea.
The third term, "Renewal", echoes another important message proclaimed by Ezra and
Nehemiah, themselves part of the remnant community; namely, that the remnant
community had to undergo social transformation for the establishment of a fair, just and
equal society." While the reconstruction of the Temple symbolized the "revival" of
faith in Yahweh, social transformation marked the "renewal" of the community of Israel.
In the North Korean context, while "revival" expresses the quantitative and institutional




See, Ezra, Chapter 1-6; Nehemiah, 1:1-7:3.
53
See, Ezra, Chapter 7-10; Nehemiah, Chapter 11-13.
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growth of northern Protestantism after 1972, "renewal" means the development of the
minjung-centered approach of northern Protestantism. This brought about qualitative
growth and missiological development. The concept of "renewal" is an internal
reference, denoting the theological, diaconal identity ofNorth Korean Christianity.
It is in the above senses that the terms "remnants", "revival" and "renewal" are used in




Protestant Christianity in Northern Korea
prior to the Partition of the Korean Peninsula, 1874-1945
Introduction
The aim of Part One is to give a comprehensive account of the development of Protestant
Christianity with special reference to church-state relations in Northern Korea before the
partition. It is important to examine the Protestant church in Northern Korea as distinct from
the church in the South even before the establishment of two Koreas. There were unique
characteristics not only of geography, culture, religious tradition, custom, temperament and
socio-historical experience but also of Christianity in Northern Korea. These particularities
will be studied in relation to the socio-political stance of northern Protestantism, in order to
elucidate the socio-historical context of northern Protestantism before the establishment of
North Korea. It will be argued that the issue of church and state had a decisive influence on
the growth of the churches in Northern Korea prior to the partition.
It will be shown that in this period of the history of the Northern Korean Church,
Protestantism opposed the Confucian social order and the centers of political power. These
latter were located exclusively in Southern Korea. This oppositional paradigm appeared again
in the Japanese colonial times. The northern church was an important center of the anti-
Japanese independence movement.1
It will be argued that the paradigm of church-state relations in Northern Korea prior to the
partition of the Korean peninsula emphasized the distinction between the two entities. The
church grew among and identified with the people, the minjung, in opposition to traditional
• • • 9
social, economic and political elites that prospered in late Chosun. It will be also argued that
Christianity in Northern Korea was fundamentally committed both to social equality, which
meant it was in conflict with the elites, and to national independence against Japan. It is of
1 A Japanese police report ofOctober 1928 indicated, "the Christian churches virtually control the
national independence movement". Archives of the Government-General of Korea, Kei Ko Hi, No.
8036, 27th October 1928.




interest to note that Christian theologians in Northern Korea, like Chang-joon Kim,
advocated Christian socialism even before the establishment of Communist rule in North
Korea. While the study of Christianity in Northern Korea prior to the partition is important in
itself, it also provides essential background information for understanding the role of the
Protestant Church in Communist North Korea.
3
Concerning Christian socialism in Northern Korea and Kim Chang-joon, see, Heung-soo Kim ed.,




Equality and Enlightenment: Protestant Mission and the Socio-Political Awakening of
the NorthernMinjung, 1874-1910
Politically, North Korea was born on 15th August 1945 when Korea was liberated after thirty-
six years of Japanese colonial occupation. The Korean peninsula was divided by the 38th
parallel according to a secret agreement made between the USA and the former USSR as part
of the Yalta Treaty. This was drawn up just before the liberation of Korea.4 The USA and
USSR justified the partition as a means of disarming the Japanese forces in Korea. What
began as a provisional partition for immediate purposes was continued long afterwards, for
the geo-political benefit of the USA and the USSR in the Cold War. Two years after the
liberation, in 1947, a break-away government was established to the south of the parallel with
the support of the USA military, and in cooperation with Koreans who had been pro-Japanese
during the colonial times. Just after this, Kim Il-sung's guerrilla army built the Communist
regime in the North, with the support of the USSR Army.
After the Korean War, the UN and North Korea agreed the truce that established the 'de¬
militarized zone (DMZ),' which was similarly in the latitude to the 38th parallel. This was the
origin of the geographical division, and the setting-up of two Koreas.3 However, even before
the establishment of the North Korean government in 1946, there had been cultural, social,
political and geographical distinctions between the North and South. It is with these factors
that this chapter is concerned, the aim being to illustrate the different ways in which
Protestant Christianity took root in Northern and Southern Korea.
1. Environmental Setting
North Korea is situated between the 38th and 43rd latitudes, and the 130th and 124th longitudes.
The area of land is 122,762 square kilometers, which represents 55% of the Korean
peninsula.6 It comprises the Pyimgan, Hamkyung, Whanghae provinces that traditionally
4 B. Cumings, The Origins ofthe Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence ofSeparate Regimes,
1945-1947, vol. 1, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1981, 109-110.
5
Concerning the history of division, see, D. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History,
London, Little, Brown and Company, 1998, 1-26.
6
KWP, Chosun Jungang Nyungam, (The Yearbook ofNorth Korea), Pyongyang, KWP Press, 1998,
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constituted Northern Korea; at the time of partition, the smaller regions of Kyungki and
Kangwon were added. In geographical terms, Northern Korea forms a bridge between the
Korean peninsula and China, and has therefore been an important place of passage. For
instance, all historical religions in Korea, except the Tonghak (an indigenous religion) came,
through the Northern route. This is also true for Christianity.
North Korea is predominantly mountainous in contrast to the 'lowland' of South Korea's
..7 . . 1**18fertile plain land. Because the arable land in the North is narrow and the climate is cold,
agricultural production is very poor. Cattle-breeding, forestry and mining were therefore
developed. Before partition the Northern Korean economy depended largely upon the
production of ginseng and silk that were traded in China. This trade route was used for the
early spread of Protestant Christianity into Korea. W. Blair, a missionary in Pyongyang,
argued that Japan invaded Korea because of its abundant natural resources in the North.9 The
Japanese exploitation of labor in Northern Korea was stronger than that in the South, with the
Japanese colonialists putting Northern Koreans to work in the mines in order to prepare Japan
for the Second World War.10 This economic exploitation explains why Christian nationalism
and Communism were strong in Northern Korea during the Japanese occupation times.
2. Socio-Historical Setting
2.1 A Brief History of Northern Korea before the Partition"
Northern Korea's history can be traced back through about 5,000 years. Dangun established
Kochosim (-&I0JP), ancient Chosun, in Northern Korea in B.C.2333. From the ancient times,
there was a long history of socio-political discrimination against Northerners by Southerners
7 There are about 60 mountains which height is more than 2,000 meters. Ministry of Unification ed.,
Introduction to North Korea in 2,000, Seoul, Ministry of Unification, 2000, 32
8 Cf. Annual Average Temperature of the South: 14 degrees centigrade
Annual Average Temperature of the North: 4 degrees centigrade.
Average Temperature of the Hamkyung province in January: minus 25 degrees centigrade.
Jang-ho Chung, Hankuk Giri, (Geography of Korea), Seoul, Woosung, 1986, 378-379.
9
W. Blair, Gold in Korea, Topeka, H. M. Ives & Sons, 1946, 2.
10 P. Duun well argued the history behind the annexation of Korea and its relation to the
industrialization of Japan, in his book, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of
Korea, 1895-1910, California, California University Press, 1998.
1'
For standard works on Korean History in English, see, Ki-back Lee, A New History ofKorea, tr. E.
Wagner, Seoul, Ilchokak, 1991.
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in Korea. However, we will concentrate on the Chosun Dynasty in this chapter because it was
the direct socio-historical setting when Christianity first came into Northern Korea.
General Yi Sung-kye established the Chosun (i|lfff, 1392-1910) Dynasty through a military
coup d'etat which overthrew the Koryu (MWL, 918-1392) Kingdom, setting himself up as
King Taejo. Although he was from Hamkyung province in the North, he cooperated with the
Sadaebu class (literary Yangban class) from the South to strengthen his political power. He
moved the capital from Kekyung (now Kyesung) in Northern Korea southward to Hansung
(now Seoul), in Southern Korea. In place of Buddhism, neo-Confucianism was introduced as
a sort of new 'state ideology,' and the whole of Chosun society was soon shaped by it. The
whole social and political system was thus established on the basis of a Confucian
understanding of social structure, which was highly hierarchical and oppressive.
Neo-Confucianism was developed by Chu-His (^-f1), a Chinese Confucian scholar in the
twelfth century, as a systematised philosophy of government with a sophisticated
metaphysical base. Later, however, neo-Confucianism declined into empty formalism and
concern for ritual trivialities, which only put burdens on the people instead of giving them any
real benefit. In the eighteenth century, neo-Confucianism was challenged by a new school
called Sirhak Practical Learning), the main concern of which was to illuminate the
historical and contemporary workings of political, economic and social institutions, in order
1 9
to improve the real life of the Baeksung (people). However, the Shirak movement was
persecuted by the neo-Confucians. Chosun, and lost a significant opportunity for social
reformation.
The internal decline of Chosun was paralleled by its resistance to all external influences in a
"Closed Door" policy (iMMBtM) that developed in the 19lh century. However, under
increasing foreign pressure, Chosun was eventually forced to open its doors. In 1871, it lost
an important naval confrontation with the US {Shin Mi Yang Yo, }#, The Naval War).
12 The "BaeksungCSI&y'a. compound word of "baeiC and "sung". "Baek{fa )" literally means "one
hundred"; "sung{W)" means "surname." Baeksung signifies all common people excluding the upper
class. During Yi-dynasty (Chosun, 1392-1910), Baeksung meant the common people who were
oppressed by the Yangban class. The concept of Baeksung generally implies the masses who are
obedient to their upper class. For details of the Shirak thought, see, Moonjang Lee, "The Historical
Jesus and Mokmin Hermeneutics with Reference to the Description of Jesus in Minjung Theology in
Korea", PhD thesis. The University of Edinburgh, 1996.
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Later, Japan emerged as victor over China in the Sino-Japanese War (1894) and over Russia
in the Russo-Japanese War (1904), managing to neutralise Great Britain by means of the
Treaty in Portsmouth (1905). Japan then struck the secret Taft-Katsura Agreement (1905)
with the United States by which each power had agreed to tolerate the colonial expansion of
• IT
the other, Japan in Korea and the US in Philippines and Hawaii. Korea therefore fell into the
hands of Japan and became its de facto colony. The Japanese police killed the Queen of Korea
(Corea14) for her anti-Japanese leadership, and the country was officially colonized in 1910.
Korea was a colony of Japan for thirty-six years, until it was liberated in 1945.1?
2.2 Socio-Political Discrimination against Northerners
To study the history of Northern Korea, both secular and Christian, it is essential to take into
account the tradition of discrimination against Northerners. This has influenced socio-political
attitudes toward Northerners, and provides the sociological background of conversions to
Protestant Christianity.
Regional discrimination against Northerners already emerged during the unified Silla (f/rlB,
667-918) times. Gung Ye, who led a revolt in Northern Korea against Silla, in the early 10th
century, justified his uprising as follows: "Silla, the southern dynasty, unified the Korean
peninsula with the support of foreign power, T'ang (0) and gave Kokuryu (ftLjM, BC 3C-
667), the northern dynasty, to them. Here are only wild grasses in the former capital,
Pyongyang. We need to recover our lost dynasty, Kokuryu" This first revolt in Northern
Korea was directed against the Southern oppression of the people ofKokuryu.
Even when Wang Gun, a general from the North, established Koryu (i§5§i, 918-1392) in
succession to Kokuryu, he chose to site his capital in the South. The North was only
considered good for defence. Central political power was dominated by the political elites of
13 Ki-back Lee, Op. Cit., 394-396.
14 The name of Corea had been officially used from 1897 instead of Chosun. However, there is a claim
that during the Japanese colonization, "C" was altered to "K" by Japan because "C" ofCorea is
prior to "J" of Japan. In this dissertation, the current name, 'Korea' will be used except quotations,
which use 'Corea'.
13
See, D. McNamara, The Colonial Origins ofKorean Enterprise, 1910-1945, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1990.
16
Quoted from Institute for Korean History, Chosun Tongsa, (A History of Chosun), Pyongyang,
Institute for Social Science Press, 1987, 170.
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the South. When an attempt was made to re-locate the capital in the North, civil conflict
ensued. This is evidence of the tensions between North and South, between the military
leaders (North) and the educated intellectuals (South), between Buddhist power (North) and
Confucian power (South), between the anti-Chinese North and the pro-Chinese South.17
Discriminating attitudes toward the North were on occasion perpetuated by Northerners
themselves. For Example, Lee Sung-kye, the founder of Chosun was from the North, but he
joined hands with the Southerners in order to create a political base for his dynasty. To this
• 18
end he ordered: "Do not appoint the Northerners to the higher posts of central government".
Eventually, after several unsuccessful revolts among governors of the northern provinces,19
discrimination was legalized in Kyung Kuk Dae Jeon (SPIAA, The Great Ruling Law)
promulgated by King Sejo in 1467.20 Further restrictions against Northerners were introduced
in the Sok Dae Jeon (fit A ft, The Revised Great Law) of 1746 which prohibited the
• 91
appointment ofNortherners to positions in the central government.
Thus Ewha Lee reports, "There was not a single minister in the central government from the
99
North and military generals were replaced by the Southerners in Chosun". A representative
Shirak scholar, Lee Ik, noted this as a cause of growing Northern resentment:
The Personnel Department is busy to oppress the Northern elites. Even though there
are excellent intellectuals in the North, their future would be blighted. There has been
increased social anger in the North.23
The tradition of legal and political subordination of the North was formalized in the
instruction to new appointees to official positions. For example, Ahn Jung-bok's 1m Kwan
Jeong Yo or Introduction to the Appointment of Officials makes the following distinction
between the North and South:
17 Ewha Lee, Hankuk eui Pabul, (Regionalism in Korea), Seoul, Yeokang Publishing Co., 1991, 119.
18 Yi Chung-whan, TakRi Gi (3A-A jft £H Ira, Introduction to Eight Provinces), 1453.
19
E.g. The attempt of military coup d'etat of Lee Jing-ok(1453), governor ofHamkil province (now
Hamkyung); the uprising of Lee Si-ae(1467) in the same province
20 Ewha Lee, Op. Cit., 125
21 Sok Dae Jeon (IftAft, The Revised Great Law, 1746), Article Jesu, (Ktfil, Restrictions of
Personnel)
22 Ewha. Lee, Op. Cit., 127
23 Lee Ik, Seong Ho Sa Seol You Sun, (M Selective Writings of Lee Ik), "An Article on
Personnel Policy and the Human Resources in Northern Korea", 18C.
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Northern Korea
Ham-kyung province is the fighting dog;
Pyung-an province is the tiger jumping out of forest;
Hwang-hae province is the cattle tilling the stone field.
Southern Korea
Kang-won province is the old Buddha under a rock;
Kyung-ki province is the beautiful lady in a mirror;
Kyung-sang province has great loyalty like the pine tree and bamboo.24
Ahn went on to describe the people in the northern provinces as animals while the people in
the southern provinces were the epitomes of civility. He even suggested, "It is necessary to
civilize the Northerners with some punishment because the customs in the North are
wicked".25
These recurrent examples of historic discrimination against Northerners must be understood
in the context of the Confucian social order that was established by the Chosun dynasty.
Chosun society was divided into four classes. The upper class comprised the Yangban (SBf),
a term that denotes "two orders'-i.e. the Dongban (jKffi:) or East Order that comprised civil
officials, and the Seoban (ffiffi) or West Order that denoted military officials. These formed
the ruling class. They were educated in Chinese, and their culture was permeated by Chinese
social values.26 After the Yangban came the Jnng-in (AA), the middle class that provided a
second tier of social and administrative manpower: interpreters, astrologers, medical doctors,
accountants, transcribers, lawyers and artists in the royal court. Beneath this administrative
class came those who were involved in production, the Pyungmin (A JA) class that comprised
farmers, artisans and merchants. Beneath them were the Chunmin (IjtA) class that comprised
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dancers, singers, slaughterers, butchers, shamans, and slaves.
The majority of Northerners belonged to the Pyungmin class, engaged in cattle breeding,
forestry, trade, mining and peasant farming. They were considered inferior by the Yangban
24 Ahn Jung-bok, Im Kwan Jeong Yo (Ellfjfcic, An Introduction to Appointment of Officials), "Pung
SokJang"(fAA, Chapter of Folklore), 17C; quoted, IKCH ed., Bukhan Kyohoe Sa (A History of
North Korean Church), Seoul, IKCH, 1996, 31.
25
Ibid., 29
26 The other classes used the Hangul, Korean. See, J. Ross, "The Christian Dawn in Korea", The Korea
Mission Field, vol. 33, No. 7, 1937, 134.
27
For details, see, Sung-il Choi, "John Ross (1842-1915) and the Korean Protestant Church: The First
Korean Bible and its Relation to the Protestant Origins in Korea", PhD Thesis, University of
Edinburgh, 1992, 12-18.
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and Jung-in classes. Even those Northerners who did belong to these ruling and
administrative classes identified with their own class, and adopted its social and cultural
attitudes, and not with fellow-Northerners of lower standing. There was much social antipathy,
therefore, among these different classes in the North and between the Yangban elite of the
South and the northern minjung. The latter raised frequent revolts against the central
government and the Confucian social order.
2.3 'Closed Door' Policy and 'Openness' of Northerners
Against this social background, it is understandable that the Northerners were more open to
foreign cultures because the domestic socio-political and economical situation of Chosun
seemed hopeless to them. For example, John Ross stated that some Northerners visited him
and wanted to learn what they could about western countries.29 In the 19th century many poor
TO
peasants in Northern Korea fled to Manchuria or to Russian territory across Korea's border.
Northern merchants extended their trade northwards in order to overcome marginalization in a
Korean economy dominated by the South. From the mid 17th century, Northern Korean
traders traveled in China and Japan, and regular markets were developed near to the northern
borders and harbors. The northern traders exported ginseng, silver, paper, silk thread, and
T1
leather and imported medicine, jewels, glass, stationery etc. For these reasons, Northerners
developed a pioneer spirit, and were generally much more open to engagement with foreign
• • 32civilization than were the Southerners.
The central government closed the borders of Chosun, especially after the Opium War, 1839-
1842. In addition to Western colonial competition in China, the spread of Catholicism in
Chosun made the government fearful of the Western colonial powers and so it developed the
'Closed Door' policy as a means of protecting Chosun from the Westerners who
28
Minjung theologians interpret these revolts from the perspective of economic exploitation. See,
Kwang-sun Suh, The Korean Minjung in Christ, Hong Kong, CCA, 1991; Yong-bock Kim, Messiah
andMinjung, Hong Kong, CCA, 1992. C.f. K. Wells, South Korea's Minjung Movement: The
Culture andPolitics ofDissidence, Hawaii, University of Hawaii Press, 1995.
29
J. Ross, "The Christian Dawn in Korea", The Missionary Review of the World, 1890, 241.
30 Manchuria was considered as the land of Chosun before the Sino-Japanese War (1894). There were
28 Chosun towns in Manchuria under the administration of the governor of Kangkye. Sung-je Koh,
"A Socio-historical Analysis of Agricultural Migration to Manchuria", Baeksan Hakbo, vol. 10,
173-175.
31
See, 1KCH ed., Bukhan Kyohoe Sa, (A History of Church in North Korea), 32-33.
32 Southerners gave them the nickname of "misers".
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continuously asked to open the market of Chosun. Backed up by warships, these approaches
resulted in several naval collisions. Finally, the government locked its door. The 'Closed
Door' policy was an economic blow to Northern Korea, destroying its prospects for
international trade. It is a further example of how central government policy was set with
disregard for its consequences upon Northern interests.
From the above research, it is possible to draw three conclusions about the socio-historical
temperament of the Northerners: firstly, Northerners are marked by the spirit of resistance to
the oppressive power; secondly, they are open to foreign culture; and lastly, they have a
strong pioneer spirit.34 These characteristics proved fertile for the rapid acceptance of
Protestant Christianity in Northern Korea in the 19th century.
3. The Religious Setting of Northern Korea
3.1 Traditional Religions
In the eyes of 19lh century western missionaries, the traditional religions (Buddhism,
Confucianism and Shamanism) of Chosun seemed to have lost their spiritual vitality and
dynamic. To the missionaries they seemed disconnected from the reality of people's life. K.
TS ...
Gutzlaff, who traveled through Chosun in 1832, maintained, "Koreans are not interested in
religion".36 P. Lowell, who stayed in Korea from 1883-1884, similarly observed that there
were no regular religious ceremonies in Seoul. Noting that there were lots of temples and
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totems in the city, he concluded that Koreans had not developed a form of higher religion." I.
Bishop, who had comparatively wide knowledge of Korean religions, took the view that the
TO
Korean people were merely interested in the ritual of ancestral worship.
33
E.g. In 1866, A. Roze, the commander of French Asiatic Squadron, invaded the west coast of
Chosun.
34 J. Ross stated that when he invited Yi Ung-chan as a language teacher: "If it were known in his
native country that he had gone to serve the foreigner, all his relatives would be thrown into prison,
and principal man among them probably beheaded". J. Ross, Op. Cit., 242
35
See, H. Gensichen, "Gutzlaff, Karl Friedrich August", in G. H. Anderson ed., Biographical
Dictionary ofChristian Missions (BDCM), New York, Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1998, 272.
36
See, K. Gutzlaff, The Journal ofThree Voyages along the Coast ofChina in 1831, 1832, & 1833,
with Notices ofSiam, Corea, and the Loo-Choo Islands, London, Frederick Westly & A. H. Danis,
1834,239.
37 P. Lowell, Chosen the Land ofMorning Calm, Boston: Ticknor & Co., 1886, 183
'8 1. Bishop, Korea and her Neighbours, London, John Murray, 1898, 399.
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These criticisms have two edges. In the case of Buddhism, its religious activity was banned
and the temples were banished to the mountains as a result of the Sung Ryu Uk Bui
Admiring Confucianism and Oppressing Buddhism) policy of the Chosun Dynasty. Therefore,
it was difficult for Buddhism to relate closely to the lives of ordinary people. In the case of
Korean Confucianism, it was difficult to describe it as a religion in the western sense due to
the fact that it expresses itself mainly in the field of ethics and politics. As such it was the
preferred tradition of the Yangban class of rulers. Shamanism was the religion of the minjung
but it did not develop as a higher religion. It was the foundational worldview of the people.
Shamanism had limitations in providing a new vision of life for the minjung among the
radical social changes in the 19C Chosun. Therefore, from the perspective of religion and
society, the criticism ofwestern missionaries was reasonable.
Table 2) Correlations between the Religions and the Class Structure of Chosun Society
Classes \ Religions Traditional Religions New Religions
Yangban Confucianism Roman Catholicism
Jung-in Confucianism Roman Catholicism
Pyungmin Shamanism, Buddhism Protestantism, Tonghak
Chunmin Shamanism, Buddhism Protestantism, Tonghak
However, this does not mean that the Korean people are irreligious as Gtitzlaff had thought.
The western missionaries understood the religions in North East Asia from the perspective of
institutionalized and ritualized religion in the West. From this standpoint, it was difficult to
perceive the existence of internalized factors of traditional religions among the Korean
people.39 J. Gale, the dean of the Pyongyang Theological Seminary in the early 20th century,
argued that if Koreans superficially seemed to have no interest in religion, they were in fact
highly religious people with a long history of traditional religion.40
It was indeed true that Koreans were highly religious people and religious culture and
philosophy was well developed in Chosun. However, the traditional religions failed to meet
39 At the Yale-Edinburgh Group on the History of the Missionaries Movement and Non-Western
Christianity, 6-8 July 2000, K. Lodwick also pointed out a similar misunderstanding of the western
missionaries in China. See, K. Lodwick, "Representing and Mis-representing the China Missions:
The Chinese Recorder, 1867-1941", unpublished paper.
40
See, J. Gale, Korea in Transition, New York, Young People's Missionary Movement of the United
States and Canada, 1909, 67-70.
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the real needs of the minjung, who desired a new religious dynamic at the end of the old
dynasty. This desire was especially strong among the oppressed people in Northern Korea.
An examination of the Tonghak movement and its explosive expansion will make this clear.
3.2 Tonghak
The Tonghak or "Eastern Learning," was founded by Choi Jae-woo (1834-1863) in
the South and developed as a revolutionary movement in the 1890s. Its aim was to strengthen
an eastern tradition of learning against Seohak (S^P), or the "Western Learning," that was
advocated by Roman Catholic elites. As a religious discourse, Tonghak combined a form of
Korean messianic Buddhism known as Mirk and Christian theism. Its main ideas were the Hu
Chon Gae Byuk ((J?AI^Sl), "the coming of heavenly Utopian kingdom" and In Nae Chon (A
lbA), "Humanity is heaven".41 These two doctrines expressed strong socio-political desire of
the minjnng who dreamed of a new society based on equality, as opposed to the
discriminatory class system of Chosun. The main idea of the two doctrines was to provide a
Utopian vision of an equal society, emphasizing the dignity of human beings. Sociologically,
it developed a close identification with the minjung, and in cultural-political terms it
represented a movement of opposition to the intervention of foreign powers. The Tonghak
peasant's army purged the corrupt local officials and attacked Seoul to break down the
monarchy system for the Hu Chon Gae Byuk. However, the Tonghak army was defeated by
Japanese forces in 1895.
The Tonghak was rapidly popularized among the minjung in the late 19th century. However, it
was not strong in Northern Korea because its peasant army was defeated in central Korea by
the Japanese Army. However, it did succeed in beginning a movement of social and religious
change, giving a new socio-religious vision to the minjung, upon which Protestant
Christianity could build. R. Speer observed:
The Tonghak Rebellion, instead of supplanting Christianity with the religion which
Ch'oi had devised as superior to it, or driving our of the country all foreigners who
were propagating it, gave to Christianity both a powerful impulse and the way for its
41
For details Concerning Tonghak, see, Yong-bock Kim, "Historical Transformation, People's
Movement and Messianic Koinonia: A Study of the Relationship of Christian and Tonghak
Religious Communities to the March First Independence Movement" PhD thesis, Princeton
Theological Seminary, 1969.
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wider dissemination. In the first place the conditions of discontent out of which the
Tonghak Movement rose were favourable to the consideration of the message of
Christianity. . . and when the Tonghak Movement failed, it left multitudes more ready
than ever to listen to the missionaries. . . The people are now asking, what is the true
way to worship God?42
The serious social fragmentation in 19th century Chosun, which was the cause of the Tonghak
Rebellion, was a fertile soil for Protestant mission in Korea.
3.3 Roman Catholicism
As stated in the introduction of this thesis, Roman Catholic Christianity will not be included
in this thesis. However, in order to illustrate further the way in which Northern Korea was
fertile ground for the growth of Protestant Christianity, it is instructive to contrast it with the
state of Roman Catholicism in 19th Century Chosnn. The Roman Catholic mission started one
hundred years earlier than the Protestant mission in Korea. It was initially accepted by elites
from the Yangban class, for whom it represented an alternative intellectual option. Therefore,
Roman Catholic Christianity was strong mainly as a phenomenon of the South. At the same
time, it was vulnerable to persecution in the South for being too closely tied to foreign armed
forces. Its rejection of ancestral worship also gave it the character of being a foreign religion.
As Tonghak had challenged these characteristics of a religious option for the changing social
conditions of the 19th century, it was necessary for Protestantism to develop a very different
image from Roman Catholicism in Northern Korea.
From the above survey of the religious context of Northern Korea, it can be concluded that
both the traditional religions and Roman Catholicism had been unable to renew themselves as
vehicles of transformation in the changing socio-cultural-political conditions of 19th century
Korea. It was into this situation, Protestant Christianity arrived in Northern Korea from
Manchuria.
42
R. Speer, Mission and Modern History: A Study ofthe Missionary Aspects ofSome Great
Movements ofthe Nineteenth Century, vol. 2, New York, Fleming H. Revell, 1904, 387.
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4. The Protestant Mission in Northern Korea, 1874-1910
4.1 Pre-History
The first missionary to visit Northern Korea was Karl F. A. Giitzlaff (1803-1851), who sailed
from China down the western coast of Northern Korea in 1832 as a chaplain of the warship,
Lord Amherst. He asked the Chosun government to open its door for international trade and
Protestant mission. However, the government refused, doubting Gtitzlaffs real intention
because the Lord Amherst was armed and the crew was interested in the suitability of the
North-West coast for a military base.43 Therefore, Giitzlaff and Lord Amherst were forced to
leave after one month. Later, Gutzlaff wrote a book entitled, The Journal of Three Voyages
along the Coast ofChina in 1831, 1832, & 1833, with Notices ofSiam, Corea, and the Loo-
Choo Islands,44 in which he made the case for Protestant mission to Korea.45
It was the Scottish missionary, Alexander Williamson (1829-1890), a member of the London
Missionary Society (LMS) and the first overseas agent of the National Bible Society of
Scotland in China,46 who was the first Protestant to undertake evangelism in Korea. Through
his close contact with Korean Catholic refugees in China, he became interested in Korea. He
visited Korean towns and the 'Corean Gates' in Manchuria for evangelism. He even met the
Korean Special Ambassador to China, Yi Poong-ik, to ask his co-operation.47 Furthermore, he
sent R. J. Thomas, another LMS missionary, and A. Douthwaite, a China Inland Mission
(CIM) missionary to Korea. Later, John Ross and John Maclntyre were introduced to Korea
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Giitzlaff, The Journal ofThree Voyages along the Coast ofChina in 1831, 1832, & 1833, with
Notices ofSiam, Corea, and the Loo-Choo Islands, London, Frederick Westly & A. H. Danis, 1834,
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Concerning his journey, see, A. Williamson, Journeys in North China, Manchuria, and Eastern
Mongolia with Some Account ofCorea, 2 vols., Smith, Elder & Co., London, 1870.
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by Williamson. Lak-joon Paik stated that "Williamson had a wide understanding and a calling
for mission to Korea".48
The first stage of Protestant mission in Korea ended in tragedy. Robert J. Thomas (1839-
1866) was the first missionary appointed to Korea.49 He was born in Wales and educated at
New College, London University. He became a LMS missionary in China in 1863. However,
when his lack of success in China was criticized by the LMS, Williamson introduced him to
Kim Ja-pyung and Choi Sun-il who were Korean Catholic refugees in China. Enthused by
what he learned from them, Thomas decided to travel to Korea in 1865. He stayed two and
half months at Jarari, Northern Korea, where he distributed Chinese bible and tracts, and
learned the Korean language. The following year, he was on board a heavily armed American
trading ship, General Sherman, as an interpreter as well as a sub-agent of the National Bible
Society of Scotland.?0 Seeking to open trade with Korea, the General Sherman sailed up the
Taedong River to Pyongyang. When the ship became stuck in a shallow stream, she was set
afire and finally all the crew were massacred. Thomas himself was killed by the sword of a
Korean soldier on 2nd September 1866.51 Even though his intention had only been to engage
in evangelizing mission, his presence on board the heavily-armed General Sherman caused
• • • 52further misrepresentation of Protestantism by the Chosnn government. This affair might
possibly have influenced J. Ross' mission method of self-propagation, using indigenous
human resources in Northern Korea for evangelizing purposes.
It is significant that all three of these early missionaries contacted Northern Korea. That
shows that the northern route of Protestant mission was established prior to the southern route,
later opened up by American missionaries. At this point, it is important to argue the
particularities of the two routes.
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Lak-joon Paik, The History ofProtestant Missions in Korea, Yonsei University Press, 1970, 49.
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4.2 John Ross and the 'Northern Route'
The attempts of the first three Protestant missionaries to Korea failed because their
methodology of mission was in the imperialistic mode. This failure motivated John Ross to
seek a different approach, and in so doing he influenced the characteristics of Protestantism in
Northern Korea. It is not the purpose of this section to give a comprehensive account of Ross'
work. Instead, we will analyze the characteristics of the 'Northern Route' of Protestant
mission in Korea" from the perspective of church and state, religion and society.
Ross was appointed to Manchuria by the United Presbyterian Church in Scotland in 1872. At
this time Korea was closed to foreigners, and it maintained a strict proscription against
Christianity. Ross soon discovered, however, that many Korean traders traveled to Funghwan
(now Kaolimen) in Manchuria, "The Corean Gate", where a market was held four times each
year.34 In 1874, a few of these visitors from the North33 were converted to the Christian faith
and were trained by Ross as teachers, evangelists and colporteurs. With the help of these early
converts Ross began to translate the Bible into Korean. The first part of the Bible translation
(Luke) was published in 188256 and a complete New Testament in 1887. Between 1883 and
1886 colporteurs distributed 15,690 copies of the Ross translation and Koreans were led to
faith in Christ as a result.37 The distribution of Bibles and subsequent conversions were
concentrated in the North because the hometowns of the Korean colporteurs were in
Whanghae province and Pyongyang. At the same time, the colporteurs began building
churches in the North by themselves. In 1886, the Sorae church, the first church in Korea, was
c o
organized by 70 members in Whanghae."
53 The Northern Route means the route of Protestant mission from Manchuria to Northern Korea,
followed especially by the Scottish missionaries, J. Ross and J. Macintyre. The Southern Route
means the route from America to Korea, followed especially by H. Underwood and H. Appenzeller.
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4.2.1 Presbyterianism and the Bible in Vernacular
As has already been noted, the Catholic mission in Korea started one hundred years before the
arrival of the first Protestants. However, due to its close identification with the scholarly elites
among the Yangban Class, Roman Catholics used the Chinese-language Bible, Chinese being
the language of the upper class. Among Catholic Christians, the Chinese Bible was considered
the authentic translation. As a result, the majority of the population, comprising the Pyungmin
and Chunmin classes, could not access the Bible. The same had been true of the sacred books
of the traditional religions in Korea, none of which existed in Hangul translation - Hangul
being the language of the minjung. In this respect Catholicism adopted and confirmed
traditional linguistic modes, and failed to offer a transformative option that could appeal to the
lower classes.
Ross' choice ofHangul as the language of translation was both radical and far-reaching in its
efforts. As a Gaelic speaker in his native Scotland, he had a strong personal sense of the
importance of the language of the people.59 He justified his choice of Hangul on the grounds
that "every person in Korea could read their own language"60; also that the alphabet ofKorean
was "phonetic" and "so beautifully simple" that anyone could "easily and speedily master
it".61
As Ross intended, his translation, known as "The Ross Version," brought a fundamental
change in the religious and social life of the minjung.
This translation is to Corea what Wickliffe's was to England...The Chinese Bible is to
Corea what the Latin was to "Old England"...It goes to women of that country, and to
the lowliest and illiterate poor, to speak to them plainly, in language which all
understand and employ in daily life.62
The suffering people, the minjung, now had a means of becoming self-aware by identifying
themselves with the suffering people of God in the Bible. This gave the minjung a new vision
59
Ross was a bilingual minister. In the early stage of his ministry, he served at Gaelic speaking
parishes in the Highlands. During his work in Manchuria, he wrote several books on linguistics,
such as Corean Primer, Shanghai, American Presbyterian Press, 1877; Mandarin Primer, Shanghai,
American Presbyterian Press, 1876.
60 J. Ross, "The Corean Version ofNew Testament", Op. Cit., 208.
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of the Kingdom of God, in which every human being is equal through knowing the scripture
in their own language. For the first time in Korean history the culture of the people assumed a
dignity, as their oppressed language, Hangul, was elevated to the status of a sacred language.
Sung-il Choi has summarized the influence of the Ross Version upon vernacular language in
Korean Christianity as follows: firstly, "it created the Korean Protestant church as a Bible-
centred, lay-oriented and self-supporting church", and secondly, it contributed to "the
renaissance of the Korean vernacular". Choi also makes some criticisms of the Ross
Version: that it used the Pyongan dialect in Northern Korea and therefore reflected some
factors of Northern "provincialism".64 While these observations are accurate, the present
writer would contest Choi's conclusion that they weaken the value of the Ross Version.
Looked at from a minjung perspective, these factors are more significant because Northern
Korea was the most discriminated, marginalized and oppressed region in the Korean
peninsula. Moreover, they clearly demonstrate that the Ross Version was exactly targeted at
the minjung class, as Ross himself intended.65 By using the northern minjung language, the
Ross Version effectively articulated the socio-historical 'Han'66 of the northern minjung as
the dynamic for the expansion of Protestantism. The Yi dynasty regarded this as a dangerous
socio-religious phenomenon in the state.67 Our point here is that the presentation of the
Christian message was to the lower class of the Korean people, not to the Yangban class, and
the language was also the language of the ordinary people, both written and spoken.
In addition to the translation of the Bible, Presbyterianism was also a distinctive factor of the
'Northern Route.' This influenced the issue of church and state in Northern Korea. Ross
68
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The history of Reformed tradition has been distinguished by a commitment to social reform.
Especially in Calvinism, public and political life are just as important as personal and
ecclesiastical life, in contrast to Luther's "Two Kingdoms" theology. This tradition provided
Presbyterians with a dogmatic basis for rejecting any political claim to an absolute authority.
Only the authority of God is absolute, by comparison to which the authority of the state is
always relative. If the secular state attempted to be absolute, the Reformed church would
resist its absolutizing powers. In Scotland, "John Knox developed Calvin's doctrine of
resistance so to lay responsibility for overthrow of tyranny not only on duly constituted
officials, but on all people of God".69
Ross was grounded in this tradition as a Presbyterian minister. In addition, as a Scotsman he
was particularly influenced by John Knox's understanding of church and state. It is significant
that this was the form of Presbyterianism introduced to Korea, especially to the northern
minjung though the 'Northern Route'.
It justifies the conclusion that the Ross Version, a 'minjung Bible' and Knoxian
Presbyterianism played a role among the northern minjung comparable to the Tonghak among
the southern minjung.
4.2.2 Mission by Korean Colporteurs
Another distinguishing feature of Ross' method was his training of Korean traders as
colporteurs to Northern Korea. They traveled widely through Northern Korea, distributing
Bibles and preaching the Gospel.70 They organized several faith communities in the Yalu
River region.71 This methodology developed as a self-propagation model in Korea.
Ross wanted to work in Korea. However, he heard of the failure of Thomas from Williamson.
Therefore, he created his own mode of mission using the indigenous leadership which was
different to Thomas' imperialistic mode. In-soo Kim argues that Ross developed indirect
69 K. Ross, Presbyterian Theology and Participatory Democracy, Edinburgh, St. Andrews Press, 1993,
9.
70 In 1896, an edition of 26,500 volumes of the Gospels and Acts was published by the western bible
societies and distributed by the colporteurs. Annual Report of the British and Foreign Bible Society,
1897,242.
71
Concerning the communities, see, J. Ross, "A Bright Light in Northern Korea", Foreign Missionary,
September 1886, 151-152.
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ways using Korean traders for mission in Korea to overcome the 'Closed Door' policy. "This
79
was one reason why he trained the colporteurs and translated the Bible". In one sense it was
true, but there were more fundamental reasons for Ross' distinct way of doing mission. He
had a strong independent consciousness as a Gaelic-speaking Highland minister,73 and had
been introduced to the Three Self Policy in China. Lastly, he had wide knowledge of the
suffering minjung in Northern Korea. In this context, Ross developed his distinctive
methodology, 'Korean mission by Koreans'.
His method was very successful because the colporteurs succeeded to organize the Protestant
churches in Northern Korea by themselves. The northern minjung were evangelized by the
northern Christian minjung, with the Bible translated into their own northern minjung
language.
4.2.3 Sorae Church: The First Korean Church
After the publication of the Gospels of Luke and John (1883), Ross sent Seo Sang-ryun, an
evangelist and colporteur, with these texts to Korea. Seo settled in his hometown, Sorae,
Whanghae Province, Northern Korea. He traveled distributing the scriptures and preaching
the Gospel. After two years (1885), he reported to Ross that there were seventy-nine persons
waiting for baptism, and he was going to build a church at Sorae.74 Ross desired to visit Korea
to conduct the baptisms but it was not allowed by the Board of the United Presbyterian
Church. Finally, the Sorae people decided to build the first Korean Protestant church by
themselves (1886).7 ' This was a very special experience in missionary, a vernacular Bible and
an indigenous church already being in existence before any missionary had ever set foot in the
place.
12 In-soo Kim, Hankuk Kidok Kyohoe eui Yoksa, (A History of Korean Christian Church), Seoul,
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conducting baptisms, Underwood stated that "they were examined before the whole Mission, and
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their faith..." H. Underwood, The Call ofKorea, New York, Fleming H. Revell Co.,1908, 107
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4.3 H. Underwood and the 'Southern Route'
4.3.1 Presbyterianism and the Bible
In 1882, Lee Soo-jung76, an official of the Chosun government, visited Japan to study modern
civilization, and became a Christian under the guidance of his supervisor. He then evangelized
some Korean students and built the first Korean church in Japan (1883). H. Loomis, an agent
of National Bible Society in the USA asked him to translate the Bible into Korean in Japan.
Lee completed translating the Gospel of Mark in 1884 and about 6,000 copies were published
in 1885.
There was a contrast in what happened on the Northern from what happened on the Southern
Route, particularly concerning Bible translation. The Ross Version only used Korean and
targeted the minjung class. However, Lee mixed Chinese and Korean. The important concepts
in the Bible were translated into Chinese and the adjectives, adverbs, conjunctions and
prepositions were in Korean. Lee maintained, "It is impossible to deliver exact meaning
without usage of Chinese".77 It is widely recognized that Lee's translation was more precise
than that of Ross among Korean biblical scholars. Lee, a Yangban, emphasized rigor of
• 78
translation for the literary elites in Chosun. When Horace G. Underwood (1859-1916) and
Henry G. Appenzeller (1858-1902)79 came to Korea in April 1885, they received the 'Lee
Soo-jung Version' for their work in Korea.
As we analyzed the theological background of the Northern Route, it is of interest to discuss
that of the Southern Route. Even though the Methodist Episcopal Church also sent
missionaries to Korea, Presbyterianism dominated the Southern Route because the
OA
Presbyterian Church in the USA sent far more missionaries to Korea. Both Ross and
Underwood were Presbyterian ministers. However, they and other Presbyterian colleagues
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were more conservative on the issue of religion and society than Ross had been in the
Northern part.
This difference must be understood in the theological context of the American Presbyterian
church in the 19th century. Church and state were strictly separated in America, by the
Constitution. This tended to produce a dualistic understanding of church and state among
conservative Christians, who believed that the church had no mission responsibility in the
socio-political realm. The early American Presbyterian missionaries to Korea, including
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Underwood, were puritans and conservative, and reflected this theological position. They
were trained in conservative theological seminaries: Underwood at the New Brunswick
Theological Seminary, and other early Presbyterian missionaries, S. Moffett, C. Clark, W.
Baird and G. Lee at the McCormick Theological Seminary, the so-called "cradle of
conservatism". Most American seminaries in the second part of the 19th century placed a
profound emphasis on personal piety. In that sense, the early American Presbyterian
missionaries also emphasized personal piety rather than social responsibility in Korea. This
resulted in a significantly different theological approach to mission between the American
Presbyterians in Southern Korea, and those from Scotland in the North.
4.3.2 Mission by Foreign Ministers
The theological difference between South and North was compounded by the difference
between indigenous (North) and foreign (South) leadership. Lee Su-jung wrote a letter, in the
name of "A Macedonian from Corea", to American Protestant mission boards asking them to
• • 8T
send missionaries to Korea. As a result of his appeal, the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.
81 "It (church) has no commission to construct society afresh, to adjust its elements in different
proportions, to re-arrange the distribution of its classes, or to change the forms of its political
constitutions". J. Thornwell, Report on the Subject ofSlavery: Presented to Synod ofSouth Carolina
at their Sessions in Winnsbrough, November 6, 1851, Columbia, Steam-Power Press ofA. S.
Johnston, 1852, 4.; "Leave it (slavery system)...as God has dealt it", Ibid, 8.
82 "The typical missionary of the first quarter century after the opening of the missionary work was a
man of the Puritan type. He kept the Sabbath as our New England forefathers did a century ago. He
looked on dancing, smoking, and card playing as sins in which no true follower of Christ should
indulge. In theology and biblical criticism he was strongly conservative, and held as a vital truth the
premillerian view of the Second Coming of Christ". A. Brown, The Mastery ofthe Far East,
London, G. Bell and Sons, 1919, 540.
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decided to send H. Allen, a medical missionary and H. Underwood , an ordained missionary
84
to Korea (1884). The Methodist Episcopal Church sent W. Scranton and H. Appenzeller.
4.3.3 Saemoonan Church: The First Church in Southern Korea
Unlike the establishment of the Sorae Church in Northern Korea, the first church in Southern
Korea, the Saemoonan Presbyterian Church, was started by a foreign missionary, H.
85
Underwood in 1887. " Underwood organized the church with two Korean elders at his house
in Seoul. At the inaugural worship Ross and Seo were invited from Manchuria and Northern
Korea. On that occasion, Seo pointed out two important points: firstly, "most members of the
or
Saemoonan church were baptized before Underwood's work", and secondly, "there had
been the Sorae church and several worship communities in Northern Korea before the
87 88
Saemoonan Church". There was no tension between Seo and Underwood. However, it was
clearly Seo's intention to remind Underwood that the Korean mission was started from
Manchuria, and that the first Protestant church had been established by Koreans in Northern
Korea.
4.4 The Awakening of Christian Nationalism and the Great Revival Movement
Protestantism came to Korea when the country was just about to be taken over by Japan. This
was a historical kairos in which Protestantism was called to witness to the liberating Gospel.
Protestantism introduced the idea of democratic structures to Korean society, whose political
institutions were traditionally bound to the monarchy. Some Korean Christians, inspired by
the democratic structure of Protestantism, took the initiative of organising the Tok Rip Hyup
Hoe Independence Association) which launched a political reform movement in
1895. Their ideal was the formation of a national state and the realisation of an egalitarian
84 D. Davis insists that King Kojong requested the American government to send missionaries. D.
Davis, "The Impact of Christianity upon Korea, 1884-1910: Six Key American and Korean
Figures", Journal ofChurch and State, vol. 35, 808.
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society based on Western democracy. First they advocated a republican polity, and then a
constitutional monarchy, as the political platform of their Independence Association. The
Christian message that all nations, all people and every member of society are equal before
r* • • OQ
God greatly influenced the formation of their democratic idea. However, the Chosun
government saw their republican polity as a revolutionary political idea that threatened the
monarchy.
When the Japanese removed the monarch's powers after the Russo-Japanese war in 1904,
democratic republicanism was embraced as part of Korean nationalism. The Christian leaders
of the Independence Association recognized that the only hope of the country lay in the power
of Christianity and Christian education. These men saw Christian mission as a vehicle of
national independence and social transformation. The Independence Association was
considered by the Christianized northern minjung as an organization in keeping with their
socio-political aspirations.
However, the pietistic, non-political theological orientation of the foreign missionaries in
Korea regarded these issues as non-essential. They sought the expansion of the Church in
Korea through the spiritual power of the Gospel itself.90 To this end they programmed the
Great Revival Movement (1907). This nationwide effort for the evangelization of the country
was also known as "The Million Movement." This catch-phrase expressed the missionaries'
ambition to "conquer the people with the Gospel," to win one million converts in a year.
In one sense this initiative was based on a shrewd reading of the political situation and
conditions of the people. The missionaries realized that political and social conditions had
produced despair and hopelessness among the people, and they offered a spiritual answer to
these problems.91
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90 "In Korea...the causes that have been mentioned need to be supplemented by the fact that no one of
them, nor all of them combined, fully account for such triumphs of the Gospel as Korea has
witnessed. They undoubtedly prepared the way for the missionaries; but the best soil in the world
will produce nothing of value unless the right seed is sowed and properly cultivated. We must,
therefore, include in our survey the inherent character of the Gospel, its satisfaction of the hunger of
the soul, and its mighty expansive power under the divine influence". A. J. Brown, Op. Cit., 566.
91 "If it had not been the Japanese, certainly the twentieth century single-handedly would have crushed
the old emperor (of Korea) and all he represented out of existence. Evidently the purpose of this
plan ofGod was to bring Korea to a place where she would say, "All is lost, I am undone". ...
Nothing remained for the people but to commit the whole burden to the Lord himself. .. .The
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However, the expected response was not forthcoming. Granted, evangelistic meetings
attracted huge gatherings, and many people expressed a desire to become Christians. But the
net result was not what had been expected. Certainly this was a blow to the missionaries'
over-zealous ambition. There were 113,457 Protestant Christians in Korea in 1907.92 The
missionaries planned to evangelize about ten times more in a year. This was an impracticable
plan.
A more fundamental reason for the failure may be the fact that the Christian message of
evangelism was not geared to the social and national crisis of the Korean people, but was
limited to a rigid and narrow definition of the salvation of souls. The Korean Christians'
aspirations for national "salvation" were completely ignored. Seong-won Park argues, "The
missionaries' intention to de-politicize the Korean church lay behind the 1907 revival".93
Korean Christians, however, understood the Gospel in their socio-historical context.
Protestant Christianity succeeded to grow roots through the articulation of the socio-cultural
and socio-political context of the minjung in Korea. However, this context was ignored in the
Great Revival Movement of 1907. Only twelve years later, this was to be dramatically
demonstrated in Korean Christian support for the March First Independence Movement.
From the above study on the early history of Protestant Christianity in Northern Korea, 1874-
1910, it can be concluded that the conversion of the northern minjung to Protestant
Christianity expressed two key hopes: national independence against the colonialism of
Japanese state, and social equality against the 'Confucian feudal social order' of the Yi
Dynasty.
Korean says: 'I have no countiy, no citizenship, no flag, no land that is my own...". Under such
circumstance, the poor Koreans would really and truly have possibility of knocking at the palace
gates of heaven and making application for citizenship in the name of Jesus." J. Gale, Op. Cit., 39-
44.
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The Witness ofNorthern Protestantism during Japanese Rule, 1910-1945
"When a people saturated in the Bible comes into touch with tyranny, either one of two things
happens, the people are exterminated or tyranny ceases." So argued F. McKenzie in his book,
Korea's Fightfor Freedom, which analyses the March First Independence Movement (MFIM)
of 1919, and the Korean churches' participation in it. This is something of an over¬
simplification, for it is not clear that either of these alternatives - the extermination of the
people or the end of tyranny - resulted from the MFIM. The quotation serves to remind us,
however, that the proclamation of the liberating Gospel certainly provokes reaction from a
tyrannical regime. This is the context of the present chapter, which will examine the
development of the church-state relations in Northern Korea under Japanese rule from 1910-
1945.
1. Beginning of Japanese Occupation and Response of'Northern Church'
Japan forced an unequal treaty on Korea in 1876, which was a kind of repetition of what
Japan had experienced at the hands of the U.S. in 1854. The Japanese policy was one of dual
penetration through economic activities and military presence. They acquired an almost
complete monopoly over trade on the basis of their military power, and began to manipulate
the Korean political scene. From the time of the Imo Military Rebellion in 1882,94 Japan
maintained a military force in Korea. In 1894 Japan sent troops to suppress the Tonghak
Revolution, and emerged victorious from the Sino-Japanese War. In 1895 Japan even
eliminated the Korean monarchy by murdering Queen Min, who represented the anti-Japanese
political power, close to Russia.9"3 After Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese war in 1904,
Korea was forced to sign a treaty that made her the protectorate of Japan. Internationally
Japan was determined to isolate Korea, so that she (Japan) would become the sole power in
Korea: This was achieved through the Portsmouth Treaty, whereby Korea lost her right of
independent action in the conduct of international relations. Under the protectorate a Japanese
94 The conservative Yangban group broke the rebellion to re-establish the 'Closed Door' policy. They
believed that the policy was the only way to protect Yi Dynasty.
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Resident-General took control of the conduct of international affairs, as well as of economic96,
administrative, and judicial affairs.97 Finally, in 1910, Korea was annexed to Japan as a
permanent colony under the authority of a Resident-General.
This caused the rise of the massive guerrilla-style resistance movement known as the Eui
Byung (JiJA, Righteous Army),98 throughout Korea. The movement continued until 1911."
Ki-back Lee reports that in 1908, there were 1,976 combats with the Japanese Army and
82,767 soldiers of the Righteous Army, mostly from the minjung.m
Korean Christians also did not remain silent. They responded to the fall of the nation on the
basis of their Christian faith. The churches in Korea, maintaining close contacts with one
another, held prayer services all over the country.101 When colonial rule began to be brutal,
the Christians' patriotic movement gradually switched from prayer to active anti-Japanese
struggle.102 Christians organised the various underground political organisations like the Shin
Min Hoe (f/rS#, New People's Association)103 to struggle for national independence.
96
Economically, Korea became the supplier of food to Japan; all the main industries were controlled
by the Japanese, and Korea became a market for Japanese goods. The Japanese pursued a very
aggressive land policy to claim new land as government land, through surveys and land registration
laws. In agricultural sections, companies such as the Oriental Development Company were
established to occupy extensive areas of land; such commercialization of land created the situation
in which large numbers of the peasant population were turned into tenant farmers or became
migrants to places like Manchuria. At the same time laws were created which helped the Japanese to
establish companies in Korea and hindered the business activities of Korean businessmen. See,
Man-kil Kang, Iljesidae Binmin Saenghwalsa Yonku, (A Socio-historical Study of the Poor under
the Japanese Rule), Seoul, Chang Jak Sa, 1987.
97 After Annexation the Governor-General issued various security-related laws such as the National
Security Law (July, 1907), Order to Control Assembly (August, 1910), Firearms Control Order
(September, 1912), and other criminal codes. They maintained an extensive gendarme network and
police apparatus throughout the country. Ki-byuk Cha, Ilje eui Hankuk Sikmin Tongchi, (Japanese
Colonial Rule in Korea), Seoul, Jung Eum Sa, 1985.
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CLS ed., Hankuk Yoksa wa Kidokyo, (Korean History and Christianity), Seoul, CLS, 1983, 168-171.
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Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History, 139-184.
100 Ki-back Lee, A New History ofKorea, 405.
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See, H. Hulbert, The Passing ofKorea, 1906, reprinted, Seoul, Yonsei University Press, 1969, 463-
466.
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Compare the experience ofChinese Christianity facing the reactions from the nationalists and that
of Japanese Christianity, which cooperated with imperialism, 1920-1930s. K. Ting in his book, No
Longer Stranger, 1989, 150, states that the Chinese Church seemed not to be patriotic in these times,
therefore, the church was isolated from people. However, S. Masahiko, in his book, A History of
Christianity in Japan, 1979, 101, maintains that the Japanese Church eagerly expressed her royalty
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101 Shin Min Hoe was an underground organization of the independence movement. It managed mass
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Before the emergence of MFIM as the first national scale independence movement, most
Christian independence movements were located in Northern Korea. For a representative
example, the Shin Min Hoe, which was the largest underground organization struggling for
independence, was started in Northern Korea. According to a Japanese police report, the
headquarters of the Shin Min Hoe was in Sacramento, California and had overseas branches in
Hawaii and Vladivostok. The total membership including mass organization was 220,000 in
1911.104 When the police arrested 123 leaders of the organization, 118 leaders were from the
Protestant church in Northern Korea and only five leaders were from the South, two Catholic,
two Tonghak and one non-religious.1(b According to Hyung-suk Kim, these northern Christian
nationalists were the dominant group in designing the MFIM.106
Japanese security police were therefore particularly vigilant in respect of the northern
Protestant church. According to an official Japanese report, most ofNorthern Korean converts
to Protestant Christianity had a socio-political motive: "A motive of conversion to
Christianity is mostly to resist Japanese rule..."107 This shows that the Japanese regarded the
Protestant church as a front for Korean nationalism.
The following table represents a statistical survey of the growth of Protestant Christianity
between 1900 and 1930. It provides clear evidence of the preponderance of Protestantism in
Northern Korea over Southern Korea. The remainder of this chapter will examine the
relationship between the growth of Northern Korean Protestantism and the nationalist
movement.
organizations, schools, companies and bookstores. See, Chi-joon Noh, A Study ofthe Korean
Protestant Nationalistic Movement under the Japanese Rule, Seoul, IKCH, 1993, 48-50; Yong-ha
Shin, "Establishment of the Shin Min Hoe and its Contribution to National Independence
Movement", Journal ofKorean Studies, vol. 8, vol. 9, 1977.
104 IKCH ed, HankukKidokyo eui Yoksa, (A History ofChristianity in Korea), 298.
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Hyung-suk Kim, "Korean Christianity and the March First Independence Movement", Man-ryul
Lee ed., Hankuk Kidokyo waMinjok Undong, (Korean Christianity andNationalMovement), Seoul,
Jongro Seojuk, 1986, 337.
107 Record of Japanese Embassy in Corea, 1st November 1909
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108Table 3) Distribution of the Baptized according to Provinces
Samples:
1) North Pyungan (Northern Korea)
2) South Pyungan (Northern Korea)
3) North Kyungsang (Southern Korea)
4) Kyungki (Southern Korea)
Number of the baptized
2. The March First Independence Movement, 1919
Yong-bock Kim states that the "March First Independence Movement is recognized by
minjung theologians in Korea as an Exodus event for the Korean People, as an intervention of
the Messianic Reign."109 The MFIM was not only an important experience of the Korean
independence movement but has become a key event in the study of church-state relations in
Korea. It is at the root of Korean political theology, influencing both the democracy
movement in its conflict with the military dictatorship in the South, and the Christian conflict
with Communism in the North. Therefore, it is important to examine the MFIM and its
relation to northern Christianity in detail.
108 The numbers are from R. Shearer, Wildfire, Church Growth in Korea, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans,
1966, tr. S. Lee in Korean, Hankuk Kyohoe Sunjangsa, Seoul, CLS, 1966, 98-99.
109
Yong-bock Kim, Messiah and Minjung, 169
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2.1 Rise of the Movement
The failure of the Shin Min Hoe taught the northern Christian nationalists that an
independence movement centered in Northern Korea was too limited as a basis for a full-scale
nationalist struggle. Therefore, they aimed to organize a 'national-scale mass struggle' that
would include Christianity in Southern Korea and other religions."0
The direct cause of the MFIM was the death of King Kojong. King Kojong, the last King of
the Yi Dynasty, passed away unexpectedly on 22nd January 1919. Although he probably died
of natural causes, most Koreans believed that he was poisoned by the Japanese authorities.
News of the king's death spread and people gathered in Seoul to mourn. Leaders of the
independence movement also secretly gathered for the mourning. This was an opportunity for
them to study President Wilson's recently proclaimed Doctrine of Self-Determination1" for
the colonized nations. They were also encouraged by the desire for independence
112* •demonstrated by Korean nationals living abroad, especially when Korean students in Japan
held a rally at the Korean YMCA in Tokyo on 8lh February 1919, and read a Declaration of
Independence. This event prompted a decision by the leaders at home to declare the
independence of Korea on 1st March, two days before the funeral of King Kojong.
At two o'clock a crowd gathered in Pagoda Park in the heart of Seoul and heard the
Declaration of Independence.113 Then the crowd began to march through Seoul, waving
Korean flags and shouting "Tokrip Mansei !Sc)," Long live Korean independence!
Concurrent demonstrations took place in Pyongyang and Haeju, Northern Korea. Although
the Seoul demonstration was a peaceful rally, Japanese forces opened fire against
demonstrators."4 7,509 people were killed, 45,552 were injured, and 49,811 were arrested.
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Hyung-suk Kim, Op. Cit., 344
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Wi-jo Kang, Christ and Caesar in Modern Korea: A History ofChristianity and Politics, New York,
State University ofNew York Press, 1997, 51.
112 For instance, Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 15lh December 1918 reported that Koreans in San Francisco




E.g. On Thursday, April 15, early in the afternoon some soldiers had entered the village (Cheamri)
and given orders that all the adult male Christians were to assemble in the church as a lecture was to
be given them. In all some twenty-three men went to the church as ordered and sat down wondering
what was to happen. They soon found out the nature of the plot as the soldiers immediately
surrounded the church and fired into it through the paper windows. When most of them had either
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Ceremonies announcing the Declaration of Independence were organized in 212 out of the
218 counties in Korea. In spite of Japanese efforts to suppress it by armed force, the
movement continued for over a year. According to the report of the Japanese authorities
themselves, 3,120,000 people took part in the movement from March to May 1919.115
2.2 Christian Participation
After the MFIM, it becomes difficult to examine separately the issue of church and state
solely in Northern Korea until the liberation because the independence movement now
embraced Christians throughout the whole Korean peninsula. However, the Northern Korean
situation continued to influence the nationalist movement as a whole. At this time Christians
in Korea represented 1.5% of the total population. The majority of Korean Christians were in
the North, and Northern Christians played a leading role in the direction of the MFIM. The
northern paradigm of church-state relations, in which Christianity was identified with the
people as an indigenously-led movement with a strong socio-political identity, shaped the
independence movement in the rest of century.116
During the MFIM, 1919, the Christian community, together with the Tonghak, and the
Buddhists, all called the people to stand up against Japanese colonial rule. The Christians
participated actively in promoting the movement, and various groups in the church were
instrumental in spreading it on a national scale. Sixteen of the thirty-three people's
representatives in the MFIM leadership were Protestant Christians. The following table
represents the distribution by religion of Korean participants in the MFIM who were arrested
by the Japanese:
been killed or wounded, the Japanese soldiers cold-bloodedly set fire to the thatch and wooden
building which readily blazed. Some tried to make their escape by rushing out, but they were
immediately bayoneted or shot. Six bodies were found outside the church, these having tried in vain
to escape. Two women whose husbands had been ordered to the church being alarmed at the sound
of firing went to see what was happening to their husbands, and tried to get through the soldiers to
the church. Both were brutally murdered. One was a young woman of forty who was shot. Both
were Christians. The soldiers then set the village on fire and left. This is the brief story of the
massacre of Cheamri. See, Duk-joo Lee, "March First Independence Movement and Cheamri",
Journal ofHistory ofChristianity in Korea, vol. 7, 1997, 39-71.
115
Man-yol Lee, "March First Independence Movement and Christian Participation", Ibid., 16.
116 "The leaders of the independent movement are Christians... Therefore, there is need to prepare a
special treat." The Society of Imperial Administration ed., The Secret ofGoverning Chosen, 1937,
290.
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Table 4) Distribution of Religion of the Arrested in the MFIM, 1919 117







Of the 324 women arrested, 310 were Christians - 233 Presbyterians, 42 Methodists, 34 other
Protestants and 1 Catholic.119 17.6% of the total number of people arrested were Christian.
This was a considerable percentage, because the Christian population formed only 1.5% of
• 190
whole population at that time.
According to the 81'1 General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Korea (PCK), lay
people played a dominant role in the MFIM demonstrations:
Arrested Lay People: 3,804
Arrested Ministers and Elders: 134
Arrested Teachers in Mission School: 202
Lay Men in Jail (in September): 2,125
Lay Women in Jail (in September): 531




Destroyed Mission Schools: 8
199
When we focus on the actual leadership of the MFIM, the northern Protestant Christian
contribution becomes clear. According to Hyung-suk Kim and Man-yol Lee, MFIM
originated with discussions in two centers: one was in Pyong-an Province, where the leading
nationalist figure was the Presbyterian Elder Lee Seong-hun, a businessman and educator, and
117 The numbers are from Sung-tae Kim, Op. Cit.,22-24
1,8 This percentage is calculated from the total number of the arrested (19,523 people, 100%) from
March to May in 1919.
'19
See, Man-yol Lee, "March 1 Independent Movement and Korean Church", in Journal ofHistory of
Christianity in Korea, vol. 7, 1997, 7-20.
120
Sung-tae Kim, "The March 1 Movement and the Role ofChurch", Journal ofKorean Church
History, vol.25, 22.
121 "The Report of Casualties", General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Korea, September
1919.
122 This actual leadership does not mean the 33 national leaders of the MFIM; rather, the leadership
prepared the MFIM and invited the 33.
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former leader of the Shin Min Hoe; the other center was in Seoul, where Methodists took
the lead. There was also a decision made among the students to launch a movement for
independence, under the leadership of Rev. Pak Hi-do, general secretary of the YMCA.124
A statistical analysis by region of those arrested in March, 1919 clearly shows that the MFIM
had its widest support among Protestant Christians in Northern Korea, especially among the
Presbyterians in Pyongyang, Pyongan province.
Table 5) Distribution of the Arrested in March 1919 due to Provinces and Denominations 123










556 165 9 730 2,453 29.8%
Hwanghae
(NK)
131 75 6 212 945 22.4%
Hamkyung
(NK)
101 18 4 123 808 15.2%
Kyungki
(SK)
86 144 29 291 1,978 14.7%
Kangwon
(SK)
Nil Nil 6 6 105 5.7%
Choongchung
(SK)
1 36 2 39 601 6.5%
Chunra
(SK)
234 Nil 3 237 618 38.3%
Kyungsang
(SK)
340 Nil 49 389 2,028 19.2%
Total 1,411 438 153 2,032 9,059 22.4%
P: Provinces, D: Denominations, NK: Northern Korea, SK: Southern Korea ST: Sub Total, T: Total
From the above research, it can be concluded that Protestant Christians led the MFIM with the
co-operation of other religions, and that, secondly, the MFIM was largely indebted to the
contribution of Presbyterians in Northern Korea.
123 •
Hyung-suk Kim is a representative historian, who insists on this place. See Hyung-suk Kim, Op.
Cit., 344-358.
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Man-yol Lee maintains this place. Man-yol Lee, The Cultural History ofChristian Movement in
Korea, Seoul, CLS, 1987, 239.
125 The numbers are quoted from Hyung-suk Kim, Op. Cit., 359.
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According to Yong-bock Kim, 80% of the participants of the MFIM were farmers and
peasants,126 and Christian participation reflected this same characteristic. This is why the
MFIM must be understood from the perspective of the minjung who committed themselves to
the movement, in order to change and shape history.
We make this proclamation, having in (the) back of us a history of forty-three
centuries and 20,000,000 united, loyal people. We take this step to insure to our
children for all time to come, life and liberty in accord with the awakening conscience
of this new era. This is the clear leading of God, the moving principle of the present
age, the just claim of the whole human race. It is something that cannot be stamped
197
out, or stifled, or gagged, or suppressed by any means.
Yong-bock Kim claims that the text of the MFIM Declaration makes clear that the Exodus
story did not remain solely a story of the Israelites, but that the Korean Protestant saw it as a
real story, which was actually taking place in the Korean political context. They interpreted
the liberating stories of the Bible analogically in their own context. Kim thus reads the
198
declaration as the expression of a "messianic vision" of the Korean people. Indeed, for
Koreans, the independence movement was their Exodus process: Japanese colonialism was
their Egyptian bondage, and Denno (the Japanese Emperor) was their Pharaoh. This is why
the reading and preaching of the Exodus from the pulpit was forbidden by the Japanese rulers
after the MFIM.129
Why then, did Protestant Christianity in Northern Korea exercise such dominant leadership
within the MFIM? Firstly, as we have seen, the Protestant Christians had a strong socio¬
political awareness that identified Christianity as a religion of the oppressed. This constituted
the ideological background of Christian participation in the MFIM. Secondly, the northern
church had developed the leaders of the Christian independence movement through the
experience of the Tok Rip Hyup Hoe (Independence Association) and Shin Min Hoe (New
People's Association). Lastly, the Protestant church was the only national network, which
could provide communication and networking between Christians in Korea and other parts of
the world. The Seoul Press, March 1919, a mouthpiece of the Government-General, reports:
126
Yong-bock Kim, "The Language of the March First Independence Movement", in CLS ed., Op. Cit.,
237.
127 The March First Independence Declaration, 1st March 1919.
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Yong-bock Kim, Messiah andMinjung, 169.
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"In addition to "Exodus", the book of "Revelation" was prohibited to be preached in Korean
churches by Japanese ruler." Seong-won Park, "Protestantism in China, Japan and Korea: Church
and State, Gospel and Culture", International Consultation on Protestantism in the Contemporary
World, Siena, Italy, 13-14 February 1997, 6.
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Also there is no doubt that many Christians, who have come under the direct
influence of American missionaries, have learned something of the world situation
and been seized with aspiration for the independence of their country. It is an
undeniable fact that agitation has been started by these students and men, but it is
wrong to think that they represent the Korean people.
After annexation by the Japanese, no one was allowed to organize a national scale society or
association, except for a religious purpose.
2.3 Attitude of Missionaries
A. Clark's History of the Church in Korea is recognized as a representative work of Korean
church history in English. However, we find that in it the MFIM was dealt with only as a
i • 1 TO
relatively small sub-chapter while the Great Revival Movement is discussed at length in a
ni
main chapter. General histories of the Korean church by Korean authors, on the other hand,
normally highlight the MFIM with extensive discussion. This difference illustrates a general
difference of perspective between the missionary-centered and the indigenous-centered
historical viewpoint. Therefore, it is significant to reflect critically on the attitude of
missionaries to the MFIM and Japanese rule.
Seong-won Park argues, "while the Korean Christians were struggling for their freedom, the
missionaries tried to prevent the Korean churches and Christians from participating in the
I "3 'J
anti-Japanese struggles." Most of them believed that the Christian faith should be separated
from the political matters.133 They were also worried that the pietistic faith of the Korean
Christians which they had cultivated might be transmuted. Instead of being in solidarity with
struggling Koreans, the majority of them were supportive of the colonial ruler or neutral.134
When an article criticising missionaries appeared in the Japan Times, M. Harris, a Methodist
Bishop, wrote a rebuttal in the May 7th, 1907 issue of the Yomiuri Shinbun, a Japanese
newspaper. He argued:




Seong-won Park, Op. Cit, 10
133~ A. Brown, The Mastery ofthe Far East, 566-567.
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Only Prof. E. Mowry, Dr. F. Scofield, Dr. S. Maffet, Dr. G. McCune Rev. W. McKenzie, Rev. J.
Thomas, Miss Davis and Miss Hocking out of 382 missionaries supported the MFIM. In-soo Kim,
Op. Cit., 411-414.
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Our three leading missionaries (Johns, Scranton and Harris) were threatened to
death after we rejected the Koreans' request for assistance in their campaign to
oppose the Japanese protectorate of Korea... Please understand that missionaries
are not the enemy of the Japanese people. Rather we, as the most faithful friends of
Japan, work in concert to promote the well-being through Christian reconciliation
between the Japanese and Korean people.... I would like to confess that I am the
staunchest supporter of the resident-general's rule of Korea.
As a result, Sung-tae Kim argues, "Korean Christianity, which was under the leadership of
missionaries and pro-missionary Koreans, was gradually driven to an ahistorical, de-
1 T S
politicized fundamentalist faith".
It is true, as Clark argues, that membership in the Korean church was greatly increased
through the Great Revival Movement.136 Korean Christians experienced the communion of
the Holy Spirit. They repented of their wrongdoings; they confessed even their hostile feeling
against the Japanese and some missionaries. However, it is highly important that they also
i nn
believed and confessed that the fall of the nation was due to their sins. Clark overlooks this
important point in describing the Great Revival Movement solely in terms of a spiritual
rebirth of the Korean people. From a Korean perspective, however, the connection between
personal sin and the fate of nation was, for most Korean Christians, a reason to identify with
the movement for national renewal and support the MFIM. As Bishop Welch recognized at
the time, "They (missionaries) had not been consulted as to the inauguration of the movement
(MFIM)."138
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However after the failure of the MFIM, as the missionaries sought "to protect the church" ,
the nature of Korean Christianity switched to a 'revival passion'.140 Although the political
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Sung-tae Kim, "A Study ofAttitudes of Missionaries on the Korean Independent Movement",
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136 A. Clark, Op. Cit., 176. However, G. Brown argues that the movement for nationhood, for
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vol. 22, 1994, 83.
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not in 1919 (MFIM). H. Welch, "The Last Ten Years in Korea", IRM, vol. 20, 1922, 345; M. Harries,
Yomiuri Shinbun (The Yomiuri), 7th May 1907.
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Korea, 1832-1910, Seoul, Yonsei University Press, 1971, 438.
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implication of faith had been demonstrated through the MFIM, this aspect of Christian
witness was weakened after the failure of the independence struggle, when the Korean church
was put under heavy pressure by Japan to worship at the Shinto shrine.
2.4 Results
In-soo Kim summarizes the results of the MFIM under four headings: firstly, it linked the
whole nation in the independence struggle; secondly, a government-in-exile was organized in
Shanghai as a result of the MFIM; thirdly, the failure of MFIM allowed the Japanese to
introduce a repressive "cultural policy";141 and lastly, Christianity was considered as a
patriotic religion among Koreans.142 While Kim accurately summarizes the results of the
MFIM, there is need for a more balanced assessment of its impact in terms of the church and
state issue.
The government-in-exile was important not only for the independence movement but also for
Christian participation in the development of the modern state in Korea. As we have seen, the
MFIM declaration stressed the liberation and equality of people in terms of biblical paradigms.
In the spirit of the MFIM, the government-in-exile was organized and the Constitution of
Taehan Minguk (Af$KH3, Republic of Korea) articulated the principle that the sovereignty
of the State resides in the people, not in the monarch. It is telling in this regard that Christians
filled seven of the eight government-in-exile posts, including the presidency,143 and that five
of these Christians were from Northern Korea.144
However, the establishment of the government-in-exile led to a critical assessment of the
MFIM. It was argued that the MFIM methodology of peaceful resistance and appeal to
foreign countries failed to achieve the goal of independence. The Christian leaders of the
MFIM were vulnerable to criticism from both nationalists and Communists, who demanded a
more radical independence movement.
Church in Korea", 72.
141 The imperial "cultural policy" encouraged modern educational and cultural development in Korea.
It used a reconciliation gesture to Koreans. The new governor, Saito relaxed restrictions on
Koreans' freedom of speech and assembly to organize a variety of nationalist and Communist
groups. B. Commings, Koreas Place in the Sun, 156.
142 In-soo Kim, Op. Cit., 414-419.
143 "Korea Ready to Become Christian", The Missionary Review ofthe World, July 1919, 551.
144 In-soo Kim, Op. Cit., 415.
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Christians responded to this criticism in two ways. Firstly, there was the second revival
movement, which emphasized a transcendental mysticism that combined healing and miracle
experience.14:1 The first revival movement of 1907 had been led by missionaries, but the
second was led by indigenous leaders with the support of the missionaries. Positively, the
second movement played a healing role for the defeated and wounded heart of the Korean
people in the aftermath of the MFIM. Flowever, it also caused the "anti-Christianity
movement" of Communists during the 1920s because the revival movement advocated the
"de-politization" of Christianity, emphasizing the eternal "other-world" rather than the
suffering colonized fatherland.
Secondly, most Christian independence leaders aligned themselves with Korean
nationalists.146 This resulted in a shift of emphasis from Christianity in Northern Korea being
'the church for the minjung' to a new emphasis as 'the church for the fatherland'.
As a result of the MFIM, Korean people began to think that Christianity could become one of
their own religions, and the Protestant churches in Korea started to grow dramatically. G.
Brown reported that the number of new members of the Protestant church per year after the
MFIM greatly exceeded that that of the three years before the MFIM came into existence.147
3. Christianity and Marxism: Two Hopes for Independence
Through the MFIM, Protestant Christianity in Northern Korea emerged as a sign of hope for
national independence. In the same period, Communism was introduced to Korea through the
148
'Northern Route' from China and Russia. As Protestant Christianity was attractive to the
suffering Korean people, Communism was also rapidly spreading among them. Both of them
were considered as two ideological hopes for national independence and the modernization of
Korea among the minjung.
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Although Christianity and Marxism did not intend to collide at the first, ideological
competition arose between them after the failure of the MFIM. The way in which Christianity
and Marxism encountered each other in colonial Korea was a forerunner of the interface that
would follow between them in North Korea, after the liberation.
3.1 The 'Anti-Christianity Movement' and Response ofChristianity
After the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, General Dong-hui Lee,149 who had been the
evangelist of the missionary Grison, in Northern Korea, organized the Korean Socialist Party
in Khabarovsk,150 in Russia, in 1918. He met Lenin and was impressed by the Russian
leader's anti-imperialism. As he converted to Christianity in the belief that "Christ will save
Korea", he accepted Marxism as an ideology of national liberation.151 However, he did not
give up his Christian faith. Rather, he tried to integrate the two in the struggle for
159 •
independence. In 1920, Lee was appointed the prime minister of the government-in-exile in
Shanghai and met other Korean Communists in China. They organized the Korean
Communist Party. As Dong-kun Hong points out, "most leaders of the early Korean
• • 153Communist Party in China were Christians".
In this early history of Communism in Korea, two things are clear: firstly, there was no major
conflict between Christian and Communist at this stage; secondly, some Northern Korean
Christians like Lee were attracted to the Marx's ideas on social equality and to Lennin's anti-
imperialism.
However, in the mid-1920s, there were radical changes both in Christianity and Marxism in
Korea. As a result of the second revival movement, the majority of Christians became
progressively de-politized. At the same time, the emergent Chosun Communist Party in Korea
(1925), espoused a very dogmatic interpretation of Communism.134 Most Communists in this
149
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period were atheists and took the Marxist view that "religion is the opium of the people." This
reflected the anti-Christianity emphasis ofCommunism in China.1:15
As a result, a serious anti-Christianity movement was organized from 1924 onwards. On the
occasion of the assembly meeting of Seoul Communist Youth Association (Kyungsung
Shinhung Chungnyun Dongmaeng Hoe), the delegates officially announced their anti-
Christian position. 156 In 1925, the Young Communists organized a program of anti-
Christianity lectures throughout the whole year. The National Conference of Sunday School
Leaders in Korea, Seoul, 22nd-28lh October 1925, was confronted by a counter-conference, the
Communist Conference on Anti-Christianity.137 Amidst a heightening of tensions between
Christians and Communists, the latter announced 25th December as the "Anti-Christian
Day".158
As a result of this polarization, most Christians, already influenced by the non-political
emphasis of American missionary Christianity, opposed Communism and ignored its
challenge to Christianity. Others, as Kwon-jung Kim points out, engaged with the Communist
challenge by developing their own criticism of the trend to de-politicize Christianity and
arguing for a Christian Socialism that could interface with Marxism.139 Korean Christianity
which had been so powerfully united in the MFIM movement was now beginning to be
divided by different opinions concerning political participation, and the ideological attack of
Communists.
3.2 Christian Socialists in Northern Korea
Just as Protestant Christianity in the 19th century, Marxism now proved very attractive to the
northern minjung. It is not unimportant that most Christian Socialists during the 1920s were
Northern Koreans. Dong-hui Lee, from Northern Korea, should be remembered as the first
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Christian Socialist in Korea. However, the development of Christian Socialism largely
depended on the contribution ofRev. Chang-joon Kim,160 also from Northern Korea.
Kim was one of the 33 national leaders of the MFIM during the 1910s. After his
imprisonment (1919-1922), he argued for an interface between Korean Christianity and
Korean Communism, promoting the idea of "Jesus-Socialism". Kim took the view that
"Marxism is a social science and uses a scientific methodology for analyzing social
phenomena,"161 whereas Christianity has a transcendental epistemology which is based in
faith in God and deals with issues such as 'sin and death', 'conscience' and 'soul' etc. These
two different ways of thinking are liable to collide and cause tensions. On the other hand,
162"there is a necessity of interface for mutual correspondence". Each should be aware of the
different role of other. Marxism should recognize the positive role of religion, while
Christianity should listen to Marxist criticism. Marxism could contribute to socio-historical
development, especially, through its focus on the oppressed, while Christianity can tackle the
ontological dilemma ofwhat it means to be human.
160
Here is a summary of chronology of Kim's life.
1890: Born in Pyungnam, North Korea.
1907: Baptized by Rev. John Moore.
1913: Graduated the Sungsil University in Pyongyang (BA).
1915: Graduated the Aoyama Gakuin University in Tokyo.
1917: Graduated the Methodist Theological Seminary in Seoul (BD).
1919: Led the MFIM as one of 33 national leaders.
1921: Released after two and half years imprisonment.
1922: Ordained as a Methodist minister.
1926: Graduated the North Western University in Chicago (BA, MA).
1927: Appointed as a part-time lecturer in the Methodist Seminary.
1931: Elected as an honorary officer of the Methodist church and YMCA.
1933: Appointed as a professor in the Methodist Seminary
1935: Served as a short-term missionary in Manchuria
1940: Opposed the Shinto worship and disappeared. Lost his son and his student.
1947: Joined the NDF and organized the CDA.
1948: Moved to North Korea.
1953-1958: Participated the CPC conferences.
1957: Elected a vice-chairperson of the Supreme National Confederal Assembly in North
Korea
1959: Died from cerebral hemorrhage
Jooseop Keum, "Across the River of Division: A Re-evaluation of the Life and Thought of Chang-
Joon Kim (1890-1959) from a Post-Cold War Perspective," unpublished research paper, University
of Edinburgh, 2000.
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In addition to Kim, Rev. Dae-wi Lee was another important Christian Socialist in Northern
Korea.163 He was a leader of the Shin Min Hoe and became a political refugee in China. He
studied politics in Beijing University where he was influenced by Communism. He became
deeply involved in the YMCA in Korea and in China where a strong argument on Christian
socialism was taking place in the 1920s. He had a similar ideas to those of Kim, who was a
close friend. He understood that Marxism provided an idea of social reformation, especially
for peasants and workers, and maintained that national independence should be accompanied
with a social reformation. Christianity needed to accept this idea to realize the Kingdom of
God.164
Even though those three representative Christian socialists in Northern Korea were highly
respected within the Korean church, due to their leadership of the independence movement
and their highly educated background,165 their arguments were largely ignored by their fellow
Korean Christians. This was partly the consequence of the aggressive attitude of Communists
toward Christianity at this time. But in part it was also due to the fact that they expressed their
ideas of Christian Socialism in rather theoretical terms, through articles in theological journals,
and failed to develop practical programs for the interface of their two ideological hopes for
the independence.
3.3 Shin Gan Hoe: The First United Front
Evidence of this failure on the part of the Christian socialists is found in the fact that the first
United Front for independence was forged between Korean nationalists, most of whom were
Christians, and Korean Communists, rather than between Communists and Christian
socialists.166 Nevertheless, by the end of the 1920s, Korean Communists had changed their
attitude to Christianity in so far as it was identifiable with nationalism, just as in China a
United Front was formed between the nationalist Kuomintang and the Communists in the
struggle against colonialism.
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1923,51-62.
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In this new situation, a secret political front for independence, the Shin Gan Hoe or
'New Branch' Association was established in 1927.167 Christians numbered 12 of the 51
• 168 ...
central committee members, and 255 ordained ministers were included in the full
membership in 1928.169 There were 143 local branches, 39,000 memberships in 1929. Once
again the Shin Gan Hoe was especially strong in Northern Korea, especially the Hamkyung
province, where local labor involved in the mining industry was heavily exploited by the
Japanese.170
However, Japanese authorities were astonished by the unity of the two major forces of the
independence movement; Christian nationalists and Communists. From 1928, the Japanese
police massively arrested the members of the Shin Gan Hoe, and most of the arrested were
sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. Internally the movement was divided by serious
conflicts over organization and strategy which tended to polarize nationalists and
•171 • ••Communists. For these reasons, the first experiment at creating a United Front in Korea
was unsuccessful, and the Shin Gan Hoe ceased to exist in the early 1930s.
The failure of the Shin Gan Hoe impeded further attempts at cooperation between Christian
nationalists and Communists.
4. Idolatry and Identity, 1930-1945
From about 1930, the political situation in Japan, Korea and East Asia dramatically changed.
The ultra-conservative military wing of the Japanese political group created the puppet
kingdom of Manchukuo, in Manchuria (1932),172 with a descendant of the last Emperor of
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China as nominal ruler. The militarists provoked the Sino-Japanese war (1937) and the Pacific
war (1941), propagating the idea that this was a Holy War aiming at the 'Co-Prosperity
Sphere ofGreat Eastern Asia'.
From 1930-1945, Korea and the Korean church faced the most menacing crises of their
national and Christian identity as a result of the assimilation policy of the Japanese colonial
government. Its aim was to eradicate Korean culture and history, and annihilate the Korean
identity. In the remainder of this chapter, we will examine this Japanization policy and the
response of the Protestant church in Northern Korea.
4.1 Japanization Policy and National Identity
The international and domestic situation in Japan after the outbreak of the "Machurian
1 "71
incident" resulted in an intensification of the policy of "Japanization" in Korea. This policy
was called the Whang Guk Shin Min Wha (MSfSJsiHb), literally meaning "transforming
Koreans into a loyal vassal people of the Empire". The establishment of the puppet state of
Machukuo placed Korea in a significantly new position of strategic value for the defense of
the Japanese Empire. As Sung-gun Kim has argued, "Japan needed not only the material
resources and strategic position of Korean peninsula but also the 'native manpower' for
conscription. Thus, the need for the loyalty and devotion of the Korean people to the Empire
became more urgent than ever before."174 Japanese ultra nationalists forced the Korean people
into becoming second-class Japanese who would devote themselves to the Holy War.
The "Japanization" policy strengthened the Nae Sun II Che (RJ#— ti) policy of "unity
between Korea and Japan". The whole history of Korea was re-written from this perspective
to assert the historical characteristics of unity between the two states.175 This revisionist
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4.1.1 Chang Ci Gae Myung (Changing to Japanese Names)
After the MFIM, Japan changed its governing style in Korea. The new governor, Saito
Makoto, realized that a high-handed policy would provoke mass resistance among the Korean
people, especially the Protestant Christians. Therefore, he developed the so-called "Cultural
Governing Policy" which encouraged education and modernization. However, with the
beginning of the ultra-conservative militarism in Japan, General Ugaki Kazunari was
appointed Korea's governor-general. He was an advocate of the Japanization policy in Korea.
Ugaki stated that the Nae Sun II Che does not mean mixing two cultures but forming a
1 7f\
complete whole. He even insisted that Koreans and Japanese have the same blood and
ancestors (Iftl'TiS.lb]®.). With this justification, he ordered the Chang Ci Gae Myung (illfieBk
iB)177 which required all Koreans to change their names. This was an indelible disgrace to
Koreans and a fundamental menace to Korean identity, which traditionally stressed the honor
of family and of the family name in East Asian culture.
4.1.2 Dong Bang Yo Bae (Bowing to the East)
The second program for the Japanization policy was the Dong Bang Yo Bae (jjf or
"Bowing to the East". This introduced Shinto ritualism into Korea, although the Japanese
colonial government argued that it was a patriotic, not a religious, ceremony which should
therefore be conducted in all public sectors. Every public organization - such as school,
company, offices, hospitals, and trade unions - had to start everyday of life by bowing to the
East, where the Japanese Emperor (Denno) lived. It was also compulsory to recite the Whang
Guk Shin Min Seo Sa (MSERS I4l), the Pledge of Vassals of the Empire, on this
178
occasion.
Suk-hee Han has argued that the Dong Bang Yo Bae was intended as a first step in the policy
of enforcing Shinto worship.179 In September 1932, the mission schools in Pyongyang were
In-soo Kim, Op. Cit., 496.
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asked to participate in the Shinto worship in memory of the Japanese soldiers who lost their
lives in the Manchuria incident. However, the schools refused on religious grounds. This
rejection provoked a confrontation between the Presbyterian churches in Northern Korea and
the Japanese colonial government. Consequently, the government developed a simplified
patriotic national ceremony, the Dong Bang Yo Bae, and at the end of 1932 ordered all
schools and organizations to participate in this patriotic ceremony.
4.1.3 Japanese Language Policy and Korean Bible
When Ugaki was appointed as governor of Korea, he also prohibited the teaching of Korean
language and history in schools, in favor of Japanese language and history. He even ordered
officials to use only Japanese in public offices.180
The church was the only place where Korean, Hangul, could be used because it was the
language of the Bible. As a result, non-Christians as well as Christians sent their children to
Sunday School to learn the Hangul. In the Sunday School, Christian teachers taught their
pupils how to read the Bible and write prayers in Korean. They were also able to refer to
Korean history when treating the history of Israel. When people read the story of the Exodus
181 •
of the Hebrews they clapped, and prayed for a similar event in Korea. It was for this reason
that the Japanese prohibited the preaching of the Exodus from the Korean pulpit.
Thus, the Christian mission schools in Northern Korea functioned as effective institutions for
the preservation of national identity. There were 565 mission schools (71%) in Northern
Korea out of 801 mission schools all. These 801 represented 90% of all schools in Korea.
Interestingly, 53 mission schools in Pyungan province alone were established by Christian
nationalists such as Ahn Chang-ho and Lee Sung-hun, the former Shin Min Hoe leaders. By
• 182
contrast, not a single school was established by Korean Christians in Southern Korea. The
• 183teachers and students arrested during the MFIM were mostly from these 53 schools. Under
the Japanization policy, it was these schools that refused to follow the order of Ugaki and
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continued to teach Korean language and history, and to worship in Korean using the
vernacular bible. Eventually they were forced to close from 1937-1938 due to their opposition
to the enforcement of Shinto worship.
4.2 Shintoism and Christian Identity
The "Japanization" policy targeted especially Protestant Christianity and Tonghak in the
religious field, because both of them had been the religious forces leading resistance to
Japanese rule in Korea. Wi-jo Kang criticizes most traditional religions in Korea (Buddhism,
Confucianism, and Shamanism) for enjoying the protection of the colonial authorities.184 By
contrast, Protestant Christianity and Tonghak suffered from Japanese oppression "because of
(their) strong nationalist orientation and messianism."18:1 We can therefore see why, in
religious Japanization policy, Shintoism targeted both of them. We will now examine
Shintoism and the response of Protestant Christianity in Northern Korea in this sub-chapter.
4.2.1 Shinto
Shinto is a Japanese indigenous religion, which worships the Sun-goddess (Amaterasu-
omikami) and the spirits of the departed emperors. From 1868 on, state Shinto, which was
restored by the Meiji (Bfitn) government demands that the living emperor also be worshipped
as an incarnate god. The worship includes the spirits of national heroes who sacrificed their
1 O/"
lives for the nation.
Shinto begins with mythological stories about the origin of the world. In the beginning the
greatest deity, Mid-Sky-Master, and other primeval deities appear by name, but mythology
does not attribute any creative activities to them. In old Shinto, there are many nature-gods,
and among them the Sun-goddess is the highest, the center of the mythological thought of the
Japanese people.187 In the 4th Century, when the Yamado clan assumed power, Shinto became
184
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de facto a national religion, the Sun-goddess being presented as the ancestress of the ruling
family.188 Thereafter, the emperors (Mikado or Denno) claimed to be the direct descendants
and lineal successors of the Sun-goddess. Shintoism also has some strong syncretistic features
1 8Q
with borrowings from Buddhism and Confucianism.
Under the Meiji emperors, from 1868 onwards, Shinto became more then ever a political
religion. The Meiji government set up the old Shinto as the state religion, giving it its modern
form in order to make the authority of the emperor (Denno) sacred, and to encourage national
unity under his authority.190 When this revival was unsuccessful, the Meiji government
separated Shinto into two parts, State Shinto and Religious Shinto, claiming that State Shinto
is not a religious but a patriotic ideology. In this way, the Meiji government legitimized its
authority.191 "The State Shinto was claimed as a super religion over all other religions, and the
core of State Shinto is worship of emperors who are deified under the nimbus of the Sun-
goddess".192
4.2.2 Shinto Shrine Worship and the Korean Church
Emperor worship based on State Shinto led to the belief that the emperor was, by his divine
authority, the ruler of the universe. Japan, therefore, had a sacred mission. The expansionism
of the Meiji imperial government was therefore divinely inspired, and its divine mission was
pursued, if necessary by military force, through Holy War. It should be noted that this
imperial expansionism received strong support from an amalgam of forces, ultra nationalist
1QT
groups based on Shinto ideology, capitalist plutocracy and bellicose militarists. The
Japanese historian, K. Masahiko, points out, "According to the logic of the police and
prosecutors who interrogated the Christians refusing Shrine worship, it was demonstrated that
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the Japanese colonial rule over Korea was a part of an expansionist policy based on Japanese
emperor worship".194
For this purpose, the Japanese colonial government established Shinto shrines all over Korea.
The central Shinto shrine (Chosun Shinkung, ^1=5") was erected in 1925, and by 1945,
1,141 shrines had been set up in most of the villages throughout the country.19:1 People,
particularly students, were forced to attend the Shinto ceremony. By the 1930s the Korean
churches were being pressed by the Japanese authorities to worship the Shinto Shrine {Shin Sa
Cham Bae, tf^/ltf#^).196 The first pressure was put upon the schools run by the Protestant
churches in Pyongyang on the occasion of the memorial ceremony for the victims of the
Manchuria incident. However, three missionary presidents of the schools, and Korean
nationalist presidents in the Korean-founded mission schools, refused to engage in Shinto
worship on the grounds that this would violate God's commandment.
Japanese authorities in Pyongyang tried to persuade the Korean Christians that the worship
which the government required was not religious, but patriotic. The Japanese even used a
foreigner, Mr. Mcfee, the chief government official for the internal affairs of Pyongan
province, to argue its case. Mcfee claimed that the fundamental idea differs from that of
religion because the required worship was an expression of patriotism based on the moral
virtues of the nation. Therefore, "all people, both from the standpoint of citizenship in the
empire and from that of the education of the people of the empire, should yield obeisance".197
However, G. McCune, who was president of Sungsil University in Pyongyang and highly
respected among Protestant nationalists in Northern Korea,198 theologically affirmed, "Since
the Shinto shrine is the place where the spirit of the Sun-goddess and Meiji are enshrined, to
bow to the shrine would be violating the God's commandment for me as a Christian".199 He
was finally forced to resign from his post, but his theological affirmation not only encouraged
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Protestant nationalists but also influenced other missionaries who were in a dilemma in
Northern Korea. As a result, the Sinsa Pul-Chambae Undong (,#fiT2Hff illWj) or the non-
Shrine Worship Movement started in the mission schools in Northern Korea. Japanese
authorities feared that the spread of this movement could develop nationwide and create
another MFIM. Therefore, the Japanese government-general decided to close most mission
schools in Pyongyang in 1937, and appointed Japanese to all leadership positions. In 1938, the
Presbyterian mission schools in Northern Korea finally came under the government-general,
and the following year this policy was extended to all mission schools in Korea.200
201
Table 6) Distribution of Mission Schools in Northern Korea














Hwanghae Nil 133 Nil 37 5 4 4 Nil 183
South
Pyongan
Nil 159 Nil 78 9 8 6 1 261
North
Pyongan
53 42 Nil 9 1 Nil 16 Nil 121
South
Hamkyung
Nil 16 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 16
North
Hamkyung
Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil
Total 403 124 30 26 1
584
(73%)
C.f. S. Korea 98 34 16 60 4
217
(27%)
In the end, the Japanese authorities began to enforce the Shinto worship on the churches.
According to Sung-gon Kim, the Roman Catholic Church and Methodist Church, which were
stronger in Southern Korea, agreed to participate in the worship, accepting the Japanese
argument that it was a national patriotic ceremony.202 The Methodist church, on 29th January
1936, the Superindependent Joo-sam Ryang (southern Methodist) agreed to comply with the
Japanese governor-general.203
1KCH edA History ofChurches in North Korea, 322-333.
201 The numbers are from Ibid., 322.
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evidence of the Korean Roman Catholic church's "collaboration" with the Japanese colonial power.




Sung-gun Kim maintains that Northern Methodists supported the Presbyterian non-Shrine
Worship Movement, until they were forbidden to do so by the Methodist leadership in
Southern Korea.204 He argues that Northern Methodists were more influenced by the
theological stance of Korean Presbyterianism, which was marked by a "strict exclusivism"
towards other faiths, while Korean Methodism and Roman Catholicism were more tolerant in
this respect.205 It is true that conservative Presbyterian missionaries, with their emphasis on
individual piety and separation between church and state, were adamantly opposed to Denno
worship due to their religious conservativeness.
But the present author would argue that opposition to Shinto worship in the North was an
expression of the socio-political characteristics of Northern Protestantism, more than of
theological conservatism in respect of other faiths. This explains why the theologically-liberal
Northern Methodists made common cause with the theologically-conservative Northern
Presbyterians. Both were equally part of the non-Shrine Worship Movement that was opposed
to Japanese colonialism and Japanization policy in particular. This was part of Northern
Christianity's identification with nationalism, not simply a theological option in respect of
inter-religious relations.
The Japanese authorities increased their systematic pressure to the last remaining anti-Shinto
force, the Presbyterian churches in Northern Korea. Two weeks before the 27th General
Assembly meeting held on 9th September 1938 in Pyongyang, the chief of police ordered the
missionaries to approve the Shinto worship. The police arrested the key delegates who would
definitely be opposed. On the second day of the meeting at Seomunbak church, the church
was surrounded by the Japanese soldiers and the 193 delegates were inspected by the 97
Japanese policemen. High-level police officers were seated at the front facing the
commissioners. A prepared statement was read by the head of police in Pyongyang and
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submitted, voted and approved in what can only be described as a manipulated scenario.
Some delegates protested against the unlawful procedure, but their protests were ignored by
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passed by force. As soon as the resolution was passed the moderator was brought to the shrine
to bow down. In this way the Presbyterian Church also was forced to capitulate.
Despite the humiliating nature of this event, according to In-soo Kim Presbyterian opposition
to Shinto worship continued in local congregations.208 This is where the strength of Northern
Presbyterianism lay, and when the General Assembly was coerced into submission to the
colonial power, as had occurred after the failure of the MFIM and again with the Sinsa Pul-
Chambae Undong, local congregations continued in opposition.
4.2.3 Religious or Patriotic?
The key argument between the Japanese authorities and Presbyterians was the issue of
whether Shinto shrine worship was a religious ritual or a patriotic ceremony. It had also been
a burning issue for Christianity in Japan.209 The constant argument of the Japanese authorities
was that it was not a religious act but an expression of patriotic loyalty to the empire.
However, the text of the Japanese order to the 1938 General Assembly makes the issue
ambiguous. It reads as follows:
Direction and facilities for promotion
1) To erect a tower for raising the national flag in the yard of churches.
2) To encourage churches to perform the salutation to the national flag and
obeisance towards the East where the Emperor and Ise Shrine are located.
3) For the mission school students, the Shinto shrine worship is required as an
obligation.
4) To instruct churches not to follow the solar calendar (but to follow the Emperor
calendar).210
A Shinto leader at this time affirmed that the worship was religious.
2US In-soo Kim, Op. Cit., 510-523.
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To argue that the services of the shrine are non-religious is an irresponsible disregard
of facts. The shrines are religious. They are real religion. They are perfect religion.
Christianity and Buddhism are side movements in religion. They are incomplete
religions.211
The 'patriotic' conception of Shintoism in Korea was invented for the Japanese policy, which
was primarily a strategy for unifying Korea and Japan. The Shinto leader is making a different
point - i.e. that Shrine worship cannot be defined as only patriotic since it is full of religious
ritualism. W. N. Blair observed that the actual performance of the patriotic ceremony was full
919 • •
of religious Shinto practices. This argues that it is impossible to draw a distinction between
patriotism and religion in Shinto. Thus, despite their attempts to distinguish the two as a
colonial strategy in Korea, the Japanese were actually imposing a religio-political system on
the Koreans. The Presbyterians recognized this, and opposed the imposition on both
theological and socio-political grounds.
In fact, the Japanese militarists used their state religion, Shintoism, as the ideological means
for justifying the colonial war and for demanding obedience of the people in the colony. This
ideological intention clearly appeared in the argument of Genchi Kato, the best-known
contributor to the modern Shinto revival. He wrote, "In Japan, the emperor is identical with
Ten (Heaven) and Totei (Emperor in Heaven) among the Chinese or Jehovah among the
91 o t > j
Jews". In his argument, the emperor was deified in order that Japanese colonialism could
claim the sacred purpose of creating the so-called "holy Co-Prosperity ofGreat Eastern Asia".
Therefore, we can conclude that Shintoism was an imperial religion justifying colonial war
and Erne-Japanese in Asia. 214 Protestant churches in Northern Korea, especially the
Presbyterian Church, resisted the worship to protect Christian identity as well as Korean
identity.
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4.3 Sinsa Pul-Chambae Undong: status confessionis
Refusal of worship at the Shinto shrine meant police detention, duress, threats of deprivation
of livelihood, resignation from positions, beatings, ruthless torture and even martyrdom. S. A.
Moffet reported that about 2,000 Presbyterians were arrested, 200 churches were closed, and
91 S
50 were martyred because of their refusal of the shrine worship.
Yong-bock Kim identifies this as "a situation of status confessionis" because it was "a matter
916
of being faithful to God or denying God". The Northern Korean Protestant church faced the
imperial power of Japan with its religious and absolute claims. What followed was a
confrontation between the sovereignty of God and that of the Japanese Emperor. When this
confessional affirmation rapidly spread, the Japanese authorities started to persecute the
resisting Christians. The Pyongyang Theological Seminary and Sungsil Christian University
established by the Presbyterians, the only two higher education institutions in Northern Korea,
and other leading schools of the movement closed. The national youth and women association
of the PCK were banned in 1938. From 1937-1941, all mission schools were closed and all
missionaries, except Germans, were banished from Korea. Finally, in 1940, all Korean
churches, which by this time numbered 27 denominations, were forcibly united as a synod of
the Japanese church, Kyodan (The United Christ Church in Japan).
4.3.1 The First Commandment vis-a-vis Emperor Worship
The clearest reason for refusal, particularly among the Presbyterian Christians in Northern
Korea, was that the Shinto shrine worship was idolatry, and was therefore a violation of the
First Commandment. Dae-wi Lee, a Christian socialist in Northern Korea stated in his trial,
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"the worship at the shrine means idolatry which violates the Mosaic Ten Commandments".
Martyr Rev. Yang-won Sohn from a Presbyterian church in Pyongyang gave a succinct
statement of the theological position of the church. Arguing in the classic style of Reformed
215 S. Moffet, The Christians ofKorea, New York, Friendship Press, 1962, 75.
216
Yong-bock Kim, Messiah andMinjung, 171.
17IKCH ed., A History ofChurch in Korea, vol. 2, 331-338.
218 Committee for Editing History of Independence Movement, A Collection ofResources of the
Independence Movement, vol. 12, Seoul, Committee for Editing History of Independence
Movement, 1977, 1143.
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theology, he cited Scripture as the Word of God and the supreme authority over Christian
doctrine, and continued.
All things were predestined by God. Truth written in Scripture is God's eternal truth.
All Human beings should obey the Word of God. Jehovah God alone is the Creator
and living God. Worship of Sun-goddess (Amaterasu-omikami) is idolatry. She may
be ancestor-goddess of Japanese Imperial House, but Christians are the children of
God and not hers. Therefore, Christians should not worship her. Shinto shrine
(Shinsa) is a place where Amaterasu-omikami, the spirit of departed emperors, and
national heroes are enshrined. Worship at the shrine, therefore, means committing
idolatry against God's law.219
It is clear that for Northern Presbyterians, the shrine worship meant disloyalty to God and
disobedience to God's authoritative word in the Bible.
4.3.2 Sovereignty of God and Sovereignty of the Emperor
For Korean Christians Presbyterians, therefore, the issue of the shrine worship was a question
of confession about which there could be no compromise.
Here is a series of questions posed by a Japanese authority interrogating a Korean Christian,
and the answer the Christian made. The questionnaire was distributed by Japanese police in
Pyongyang on the occasion of the 27th General Assembly meeting of the PCK, and the
answers were given by the martyr, Elder Kwan-Joon Park to the Government-General.
Questionnaire
1. Who is higher, Jehovah God or Amaterasu-omikami (Sun-Goddess)?
2. Who is greater, Christ or Denno (the Emperor)?
220
3. Is Denno a sinner and shall be judged in the last day?
In response, Park confessed his faith to God in his letter to the Government-General and
chose the way ofmartyrdom.
Answers
1. Jehovah is the only true God.
2. He rules over all things in heaven and earth. Human history is under his
providence.
Keun-sam Lee, Op. Cit., 179.
220 Hoon Choi, "A Study on Shinto Shrine Worship and the Renovation Movement", Sung-tae Kim ed.,
Op. Cit., 122.
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3. Those countries who serve God will be blessed, but those countries who serve not
will perish.
4. It is sin against God to coerce Korean Christians to worship Shinto shrine.
5. Therefore, do not impose shrine worship upon Korean Christians.
6. Release the detained Korean Christians.
7. If Japan does not obey God's will, God will soon make Japan perish.
8. Let us test who is the true God, Jehovah or Amaterasu-Omikami. 221
This exemplifies the nature of the choice that Korean Christians were required to make
between the Sovereignty of God and Sovereignty of the Emperor. Korean Christians,
especially northern Presbyterian, chose resistance against absolutism and totalitarianism based
upon an eschatological understanding on the Sovereignty of God. They believed that God will
liberate Korea, like Israel, from the hand of the Japanese Pharaoh, Denno, in his time (kiros).
Park points out that for the same reason, the Japanese authorities forbade Korean Christians to
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talk or preach the doctrine of the Second Coming of Christ. Martyr Shon, whom we have
already quoted, also discussed Christ's Second Coming with his inquisitor.
Police: Let us suppose Christ will return as you believe. How will he be able to
destroy Japan which is well equipped with modern military arms? What will be the
means of destruction?
Sohn: Yes, Jesus will return one day with his power, but without military weapons.
Weapons are for the use of human beings, but when there is no one who intends to
use weapons it is useless power. When, through Christian evangelization, the
Christian church is increased and many more become the children of God, it is not
necessary to fight with weapons. Further, by Christ's power, the Japanese national
999
structure based on Shinto mythical faith will be changed.
4.3.3 Peace of God and War of the Emperor
Shintoism is a religion, which justifies colonial war as Holy War and heroic death for the
empire as sacred devotion. This is the religious background that led Japanese Kami-Kaze
pilots to sacrifice their lives in the Pacific War, by using their aircraft as missiles to attack
American warships. It was the way that Japanese authorities justified their conscription of
about two million Koreans as soldiers, workers and 'comfort women'224 for the so-called
221
Yang-sun Kim, Hankuk Kidokyosa Yun Ku, (A Study of History of the Korean Church), Seoul,
Christian Literature Press, 1971, 35.
222
Seong-won Park, Op. Cit., 129.
22, Protocol on Yang-won Sohn, Kwangju District Court, 1941.
224 The 'comfort women' means Korean girls who were used as sexual slaves of Japanese soldiers
during the Pacific War. Japanese authorities conscripted by force more than two hundred thousand
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Holy War.225 It was against this Shinto doctrine of Holy War that the Korean Christians,
especially Presbyterians, were challenged to proclaim an entirely different understanding of
the Peace of God.
Rev. Sun-ju Kil, who was one of the 33 national leaders ofMFIM, from a Presbyterian church
in Pyongyang stated an apocalyptic theological position against the Shinto doctrine of Holy
War. He argued:
As evidenced by the wars, a people shall rise to conquer other people; and nation will
rise against the nation. All people hate war and demand peace. They call for peace
among the nations as well as among peoples. They declare that war is evil and peace
is the only way building paradise... They (Japanese) have guns and swords in their
hands. They assert the peace of the world while hiding guns behind their slogan.226
He understood that the non-Shrine Worship Movement, as status confessionis, was not merely
an anti-colonial struggle for protecting the religious and national identity of Korea. He argued
that the anti-Japanese movement should be understood theologically within the eschatological
vision of the Book of Revelation, in which the righteous struggle for justice defeats the
unrighteous use ofwar, and brings about the eternal peace ofGod which he wished for Korea.
This Christian understanding was a serious challenge to the Shinto doctrine of Holy War. The
Japanese government asserted that the Holy War was the good news for the minjung for
constructing the 'Co-Prosperity of Great Eastern Asia'. However, any news must be judged
by the people, the receivers of news, who will decide whether it is good or bad. For the
northern minjung, the war of the Emperor was the bad news and the peace of God was the
Good News.
The paradigm of opposition between church and state that had developed in Northern Korea
now led to the introduction of an the alternative Christian theology of peace in direct
opposition to the Shinto theology ofwar.
Korean unmarried young women as sexual partners of Japanese soldiers. The conscription of the
'comfort women' focused on mission school students. For details, see, Jung-sun Noh, Liberating
Godfor Minjung, Seoul, Hanul Academy, 1994, 45-46.
22:1 Ki-back Lee, Op. Cit., 448-449.
226
Quoted from, WARC ed., Testimonies ofFaith in Korea, Geneva, WARC, 1989, 104.
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Conclusion to Part One
What was unique in northern Protestantism from 1892 to 1945 was its engagement with the
socio-political context of the northern minjung. Through this articulation, Protestant
Christianity created a hope for social reformation in the late Chosun period, and for national
independence during Japanese rule.
The purpose of Part One of this thesis has been to give a comprehensive account of the
development of Protestant Christianity in Northern Korea, with special reference to the issue
of church and state, before the partition of Korean peninsula. The argument has been that the
development of the oppositional paradigm of church-state relationship during this period
decisively influenced the growth of the churches in Northern Korea among the northern
minjung.
Protestantism came through the 'northern route' into Korea. The northern minjung, who had a
strong antipathy to the southern-centered political power and the discriminatory social
structure of the Chosun Dynasty, accepted Protestant Christianity as an alternative religion
which could provide a new hope for social equality. Therefore, the Protestant church in
Northern Korea developed as a 'church for the minjung\ This characteristic was developed as
an idea of social reformation which stressed a polity of the people, not that of the monarch.
When Korea was occupied by Japan, Protestant Christianity in Northern Korea resisted
Japanese rule and organized the MFIM. Through this process, the church-state relations in
Northern Korea were shaped as a paradigm of opposition. This resulted in persecution of the
church by the state, in a manner reminiscent of the early church in the Graeco-Roman empire.
This oppositional paradigm was undergirded theologically by resistance against Shinto Shrine
worship. This was understood as an issue of status confessionis. Protestant Christianity in
Northern Korea first got into conflict with the state over issues of social reformation and
national independence, then collided with Japanese state on the fundamental question of the
confession, giving only to God the worship that God is due.
In its collision with the tyrannies of the Chosun monarchy and the Japanese colonial state,
Protestant Christianity in Northern Korea was highly respected by the minjung as a movement
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that sought equality among all the people, independence of the fatherland and the
development of both national and Christian identity. From the triangular perspective of church,
minjung and state, the church-state relations in Northern Korea before the partition can be
summarized as a minjung-centered paradigm of opposition. Indeed, this was one of the major
causes ofChristianity's success in Northern Korea.
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Part Two
Iron Curtain and the Isolation of the Churches:
The Christian Ideological Struggle with Communism in North Korea
after the Partition of the Korean Peninsula, 1945-1972
Introduction
The dialogue between faith and ideology in mission is not an unnecessary intellectual
practice; it is not merely a political agenda that demands sensitive handling. Rather the issue
of faith and ideology presents an opportunity to witness to a holistic mission because God
does not give us partial salvation.1 Especially, in a place where different ideologies seriously
confront each other, God calls his/her churches to witness to God's mission there. However,
the dialogue does not mean a compromising accommodation with ideology or an
imprisonment within it.
Korea's liberation from Japanese occupation was suddenly changed into partition by the
arrival of the Cold War order. The Korean peninsula was liberated after thirty-six years of
Japanese colonial occupation on 15th August 1945. However, the peninsula was divided along
the 38th Parallel due to a secret agreement made by the USA and the USSR as part of the
.9 . .
Yalta Treaty, which was drawn up just before the liberation. The territorial division brought
about a division in the areas of culture, family, politics, economy and even religions. Behind
• •• 7 • . . .
these divisions, ideologies served as the "emperor's new clothes" to justify two divided
Koreas. In the North, Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese guerilla army, supported by Soviet troops,
introduced Communism; while in the South, the U.S. Army established a military government
based on capitalism. Thus, from the partition of the Korean peninsula, Korea has been a
battlefield of two ideologies.
1 The Christian Conference of Asia (CCA) recently affirmed that the dialogue between faith and
ideology is one of the important theological agenda in Asia. See, Report of the Consultation on
Ideology, Faith and People's Movement, Faith, Mission and Unity Program, CCA, Chiang Mai,
Thailand, 8-11 December 2000.
2
See, B. Cumings, The Origins ofthe Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence ofSeparate
Regimes, 1945-1947, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1981, 109-110.
3
D. B. Forrester suggests that the theologian's task is to cry out "but the emperor's got no clothes". D.
B. Forrester, "Mission in the Public Square: Christian Political Discourse as Public Confession",
unpublished paper, 1999, 17.
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The partition also caused division between churches. As this division proceeded, the
ideological choice of churches became an unyielding belief system, which often seemed
stronger than their faith. The churches even stood in the frontline of the ideological struggle.
Because of this, when the Cold War developed into a real war, the majority of Christians in
North Korea fled to the South due to their ideological choice. The remnant Christians in the
North nevertheless continued to struggle with Communism in the post-Korean War context.
The aim of Part Two of this thesis is to examine the history of Protestant Christianity in North
Korea after the partition of Korean peninsula, with special reference to the issue of faith and
ideology, 1945-1972. It is important to study this history through the filter of the Christian
ideological struggle because the fate of the churches in North Korea in this period mainly
depended on this issue. We will explore the story of churches captured in ideology between
the Cold War and real war. It is of interest to research how the churches agonized, suffered,
struggled and witnessed in societies that were ideologically divided. If there were different
responses to this context, what were they? And how can we historically evaluate them? And
from what academic bases? Through the study of such questions, we hope to answer the
question of why the churches in North Korea were discriminated against, or persecuted up to
1972, and thus recover the forgotten history of Protestant Christianity in North Korea.
It will be argued that it has been the issue of faith and ideology that decisively influenced the
church-state relationship in North Korea, causing discrimination by the state against
Christians. It will be also argued that the isolation of the churches behind the Iron Curtain in
North Korea was mainly caused, and was certainly compounded, by a compromising
accommodation with anti-Communism, in which both Korean Protestant Christians and the
World Council of Churches (WCC) connived during and after the Korean War. Lastly, it will
be argued that the pre-1945 paradigm of opposition between church and state (examined in




Division of the Nation, Division of the Churches, 1945-1949
1. Partition of Korea: Political Context
1.1 The Origin of Partition
Korea was liberated from Japanese tyranny with the defeat of Japan at the end of the Pacific
War. It was an occasion of great rejoicing for the suffering minjung in Korea, especially for
those Christians who had identified themselves with the Hebrews in Egypt. However, the
superpowers, the USA, the USSR, China and Great Britain, decided to occupy Korea in order
to disarm Japanese troops in Korea. This was the ostensible reason for the partition of the
Korean peninsula.4
Behind the disarmament issue, however, the real intention behind the partition was the geo¬
political interest of the superpowers. The partition of the Korean peninsula had often been
considered as a solution when superpowers collided in the peninsula, even in past history.5
For instance, during the Im Jin Wei Ran or Japanese Invasion of 1592-1598,
Japan suggested to the Ming dynasty in China a partition of the peninsula as a way of
achieving an armistice. During the Russo-Japanese war (1904), Japan and Russia also made a
similar suggestion.6
In relation to what happened in 1945, the idea of partition originated when President
Roosevelt suggested a system of trusteeship over Korea at a meeting with the British Foreign
Secretary, A. Eden, in Washington on 24th March 1943.7 On 1st December 1943, the three
participants of the Cairo Conference, USA, Great Britain and China declared, "in due course
4
Concerning the process of the partition, see, H. Kim, The Division ofKorea andAlliance Making
Process: Internationalization ofInternal Conflict and Internalization ofInternational Struggle,
1945-1948, London, University Press of America, 1995.
5
K. Noh, "An Historical Study on the Issue of Partition of Korean Peninsula", in his book, Hankuk
Eoikyosa Yonku, (A History of Korean Foreign Policy), Seoul, Haemoonsa, 1967, 152-179.
6
For details, see, Man-kil Kang, "Historical Causes of the National Division", Man-kil Kang et. al.,
Bundan Hyunsil kwa Tongil Undong, (A Reality of Division and Reunification Movement), Seoul,
Minjungsa, 1984, 20-26.
7 The Secretary of State, USA, Cordell Hull wrote that Eden favored this idea. However, later Eden
wrote that he did not like the trusteeship idea. C. Hull, Memoirs, New York, Macmillan, 1948, 596;
A. Eden, Memoirs: The Reckoning, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1965, 595.
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Korea shall become free and independent". Koreans welcomed the pledge, but worried about
the proviso "in due course".9 This worry became a reality on 8th February 1945, during the
Yalta Conference. Roosevelt again asserted that Korea should have a trusteeship of twenty to
thirty years. However, Stalin replied that it should be shorter. Stalin only agreed to the
trusteeship on condition that there would be no foreign troops in Korea.10
However, this was an informal and secret agreement. Again, in May 1945, the new US
President, H. Truman, sent his advisor, H. Hopkins, to Moscow and urged a four-power
trusteeship for Korea for twenty-five years.11 Finally, the trusteeship was formally decided on
22nd July 1945 at the Potsdam Conference of the Allied heads of state.12 However, in practice,
only the USA and USSR could participate in the trusteeship.13
In this process, we can firstly note that the disarming of the Japanese was not the original
reason for the partition, or was only an excuse for sending troops into Korea. According to B.
Commings, the US needed a military base in the Far East Asia for "American
expansionism".14 Secondly, although Korea was a victim of World War II, unlike Germany,
and Koreans had fought against Japan for independence, the four powers decided on the
unjust trusteeship, instead of ensuring the independence of Korea, to keep their power balance
in the Far East. There was no historical justification for Korea's division. "If any East Asian
country should have been divided, it was Japan."13
At the Potsdam Conference, the USA asked for the USSR's entry into the war against Japan.
A document said, "with reference to clean-up of the Asiatic mainland, our objective should be
8 US Department of State, Foreign Relations ofthe United States, 1945, Washington D.C., 1969, 1098.
9 At the first draft, Roosevelt's and later Truman's advisor, H. Hopkins stated as "at the earliest
possible moment". Roosevelt changed it to "at the proper moment". Lastly, Churchill
suggested "in due course". US Department of State, Foreign Relations ofthe UnitedStates:
Diplomatic Papers, Conferences and Teheran, 1943, Washington D. C., 1951, 399-404.
10 At first, Stalin rejected the trusteeship. US Department of State, Foreign Relations ofthe United
States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, Washington D.C., 1955, 770; 984.
1'
B. Commings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, 111.
12
Concerning the Potsdam Conference, see, US Department of State, The Conference ofBerlin, 1945,
^ Washington D.C., 1960.13 For details on the trusteeship in Korea, see, W. Morris, "The Korean Trusteeship, 1941-1947: The
United States, Russia and the Cold War", PhD Thesis, University of Texas, 1974; D. Clemens, Yalta,
New York, Oxford University Press, 1970; Hak-joon Kim, HankukMunje wa Kukje Jungchi,
(Korean Issue in International Politics), Seoul, Bakyoungsa, 1976.
14 B. Commings, Op. Cit., 114.
15
B. Commings, Korea's Place in the Sim: A Modern History, 186.
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to get Russians to deal with the Japs in Manchuria (and Korea if necessary)."16 According to
this agreement, the Soviet army began to fight the Japanese in Korea on 8th August 1945.17
The Soviet troops carried out the occupation of Korea north of the 38th Parallel and stopped
there so that the Americans could come in from the South. However, Japan surrendered after a
week of the Russian attack on Korea and the US Army came into Seoul on the 9th September
1945, when the situation was already over. If necessary, the Soviets had a mandate to defeat
the Japanese in the whole of the Korean peninsula according to the Potsdam agreement. So,
why did they stop their march at the 38th Parallel? And why did the American Army come
into Korea after the surrender?
From the beginning of the international discussions on Korea, the USA was interested in
coming into Korea as part of the trusteeship because the Korean peninsula an important
strategic area in North East Asia, surrounded by superpowers. The USA war planners feared
that the Soviets would bring with them Korean Communist guerillas, who had been fighting
the Japanese in Manchuria, the numbers of which they grossly overestimated as up to thirty
thousand. "Afraid that a trusteeship might not work, various planners began to develop ideas
for full military occupation that would assure a predominant American voice in postwar
Korean affairs."18
For this purpose, the USA suddenly made a proposal to the USSR to divide Korea at latitude
38 North:
About midnight, August 10-11, 1945, Colonel Charles H. Bonnesteel and Major Dean
Rusk...began drafting part of a General Order that would define the zones to be
occupied in Korea by American and Russian forces. They were given thirty minute to
complete their draft, which a State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee was waiting for.
The State Department wished the dividing line to be as far north as possible, while
the military departments, knowing that Russians could overrun all of Korea before any
American troops could land there, were more cautious...Bonesteel noted that the 38th
Parallel passed north of Seoul and almost divided Korea into two equal parts. He
seized on it as the proposed zonal boundary. 19
16 Joint Chiefs of StaffMemorandum, 18th June 1945; in Potsdam Papers I, 905; recited from B.
Commings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, 117.
17 Reference Division, Central Office of Information, Korea, London, Quote No. R.3965,
Classification 1.2d, November 1958, 4.
18
B. Commings, Korea's Place in the Sim, 188.
19 J. Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessens ofKorea, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1969,25-26.
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American officials consulted no Koreans in coming to this decision, nor did they ask the
opinions of the British or the Chinese, both of whom, it had previously been agreed, would
take part in the planned trusteeship for Korea. The Russians accepted this decision, while
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demanding a Russian occupation of the northern part of Hokkaido in Japan.
The division of Korea, including the division of ten million families, a tragedy that would last
over half a century was designated at the hands of young American war planners within thirty
minutes.
1.2 The People's Committee and USAMGIK
As soon as Korea was liberated, the Kimguk Junbi Wuiwonhoe ( HL PI If ft If) or
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Committee for Preparation of Korean Independence emerged, and by September it was
becoming anchored and widespread in the Inmin Wuiwonhoe or "people's
committees'"22 in the countryside. Theses committees formed Chosun Inmin Konghwaguk
IfAK^fPlH) or Korean People's Republic (KPR) on 6th September 1945.23 In the Central
People's Committee of the KPR, all important independence movement leaders joined
together, bearing to one side their ideologies.24 Eun Huh maintains the KPR was an authentic
united front for national construction which covered all patriotic political powers from the left
9 S
to the right wing in Korea, and had wide support from the Korean people. The KPR
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governed Korea with the cabinet and police for a month before the arrival of the US army.
20
B. Commings, Op. Cit., 187.
21
Concerning the Committee, see, Dong-yup Lee, "The Establishment of the Kwiguk Junbi
Wuiwonhoe,\ in Kun-ho Song et. al., Haebang Jeonhusa eui Insik, (A Recognition of History
Before and After Liberation), vol. 1, Seoul, Hankilsa, 1979, 347-353.
22
Concerning the People's Committees, see, Yong-bock Kim, "The organization and Activity of the
People's Committee in North Korea after Liberation", in Nam-sik Kim et. al., Haebang Junhusa eui
Insik, (A Recognition of History Before and After Liberation), vol. 5, Seoul, Hankilsa, 1989, 203-
219.
23
Concerning the KPR, see, Eun Huh, "The Movement ofConstructing Nation-State after Liberation",
in Man-kil Kang ed., UriMinjok Haebang Undongsa, (A History ofNational Liberation Movement
of Korea), 307-324.
24 For instance, there were Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik as the representatives of the government-in-exile,
Kim Il-sung of the anti-Japanese Communist guerillas, Rhee Syngman of the exiled leadership in
the USA, Cho Man-sik and Kim Sung-soo of the domestic nationalists, Cho Dong-ho of the
domestic Communists, Mu Chung of the Yennan guerillas and Kim Kwan-sik of the Christians. The
President was Syngman Rhee, the Vice-President was Ryu Un-hyung, and the Prime Minister was
Huh Hyun.
25 Eun Huh, Op. Cit., 309-310.
26
See, The Platform of the KPR
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The Soviet Army supported the people's committee network but did not comment about the
activity of the KPR, because the headquarters of the KPR were in Seoul, outside their zone.
On 15th August, the liberation day, General I. Chistiakov of the Russian army made a
statement as follows:
Now, Chosun (Korea) is a free and independent country. This is only the first page of
a new Chosun history...The past which was a nightmare will disappear forever...For
the freedom and well-being of Chosun people, the Russian Army will be happy to
provide all of our supports...We did not come into Chosun as an occupier but we
came as a liberator. I promise that we will not force our order and confirm that your
people are the master of this nation.27
Of course, the Russians would want to be involved in the fate of post-war Korea. However,
they were confident of having the full cooperation of the Korean Communists. They fought
and came together with Kim Il-sung's guerillas, which was the only fully armed force in
Korea at that time. Therefore, the Soviets supported the Korean Communists helping them to
grasp political power rather than directly establishing a Russian military government in North
Korea.28
A. L. Strong gives a comprehensive account of the Russian policy in North Korea:
When the Red Army entered Korea in early August, 1945, heavy battles took place in
the North, but Japanese rule remained tranquil in the South, for the Russians stopped
at the 38th Parallel, while the Americans came three weeks after the surrender of
Japan and took over from the Jap officials, continuing much of the former apparatus
in power. Hence, all pro-Japanese Koreans, former police, Civil Servants, landlords
and any persons averse to change generally, naturally fled south to American zone.
The flight of these Right-wing elements simplified North Korean politics. The Russians
did not need to appoint a single official. They merely set free ten thousand political
- We will construct entire independent nation-state in politics and economy.
- We will clear Japanese and feudal remnants and establish an authentic democracy in order to
realize political, economical and social needs of all people.
- We will rapidly upgrade the quality of life ofworkers, farmers and the masses.
- We will have solidarity with world democratic countries to achieve world peace.
Quoted from Ibid, 308.
271. Chistiakov, "An Appeal to the Liberated Chosun People from the Commander of 25th Army, The
First Front of the Soviet Far Eastern Force", Chosun Choongang Nyungam, (Yearbook ofNorth
Korea), Pyongyang, KWP Press, 1949, 57-58, Archival no. 488, The Ministry of Reunification.
28
Myung-rim Park, The Korean War: The Outbreak and Its Origins, vol. 2, Seoul, Nanam, 1996, 83-
84; C.f. The British Central Office of Information reported, "When Soviet forces entered North
Korea in August 1945, they installed the 'peoples committees' in nominal control but under their
own unostentatious supervision." However, this was not true, because there were also a lot of pro-
American leadership within the KPR. Reference Division, Central Office of Information, Op. Cit., 6.
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prisoners and let them go home and organize things. "People's Committees" sprang
up by villages, counties and provinces, and coalesced into a Central People's
• 29
Committee.
However, Americans had a doubt fearing that the KPR was dominated by the Communists.
They were encouraged by the presence of the pro-American Christian conservatives educated
• • 30 •in America, such as Syngman Rhee. The Americans were impatient because they thought
that the Russians had already taken political hegemony in Korea. General D. MacArthur
announced the partition of the Korean peninsula and declared that "all power of government
over the territory of Korea south of the 38th north latitude, and the people thereof, will be for
the present exercised under my authority" in his General Order no. I.31 Also, when the 24th
Corps of the US Army landed in Inchon to begin the military government in Korea, its
commander, General J. Hodge, ordered Koreans not to engage in political activities,
especially any activities in opposition to the US military government. Added to the order
was a warning of severe punishment,33 and on 9th September 1945, the office of the US
Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) declared that English was to be the official
language of South Korea.34 Wi-jo Kang makes the criticism that these orders and declarations
were harsh, "seeking only to fulfill US policies and ignoring Korean interests in creating a
or
united, democratic, independent Korea."
Hodge thought Southern Korea would be "extremely fertile ground for the establishment of
Communism":
Communism in Korea could get off to a better start than practically anywhere else in
the world. The Japanese owned the railroads, all of the public utilities including power
and light, as well as all of the major industries and natural resources. Therefore, if
these are suddenly found to be owned by the "The People's Committee (The
Communist Party), they will have acquired them without any struggle of any kind or
any work in developing them. This is one of the reasons why the US should not waive
29 A. L. Strong, "North Korea", The New Statesman andNation, vol. 35, No. 880, 17th January 1948,
47.
30 Eun Huh, Op. Cit., 310.
31
Quoted from S. Cho, Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950, Berkeley, University ofCalifornia Press,
62-63.
32
Wi-jo Kang, Christ and Caesar in Modern Korea, 71.
33
Dong A Ilbo Sa ed., Hanmi Sugyo Baeknyunsa Kwankye Jaryo mit Nyunpyo, (One Hundred Years
History of Korea-US Relations: Documents and Chronology), Seoul, Dong A Ilbo Sa, 1982, 155.
34 Ibid., 116.
35
Wi-jo Kang, Op. Cit., 72.
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its title or claim to Japanese external asserts located in Korea until a democratic
(capitalistic) form of government is assured.36
Although the Central People's Committee of the KPR was a united front including pro-
Americans, Hodge defined it as a Communist party to develop an atmosphere of rivalry,
emphasizing the Communist versus the capitalist, in order to ensure "US prestige in the Far
East."37 For their own benefit, "the Americans would not turn Korea over to the Koreans;"38
rather they linked up with the Japanese:
Shortly after the surrender ceremony on September 9, Hodge announced that the
(Japanese) Government-General would continue to function with all of its Japanese
OQ
and Korean personnel, including Governor-General Abe Nobuyoki.
The Soviets were clever enough to use indirectly the orthodoxy of Kim Il-sung and the
popularity of the people's committee to enlarge their political influence over Korea. However,
the Americans made the mistake of suppressing the indigenous political movement, including
the people's committees, aiming at national construction. They even cooperated with their
enemy of three weeks before, the Japanese, in order to develop and to strengthen their military
government in South Korea with an ideological justification.
1.3 Emergence of Two Koreas
With the partition, the establishment of divided government proceeded rapidly. In the North,
the local people's committees formed the Provisional People's Committee as an interim
government in place of the Central People's Committee in the South, with the support of the
Soviet Army. Kim Il-sung was elected as Chairperson. On 3rd November, the People's
Committee in North Korea was established, through election, with full political power.
However, there was Christian resistance in establishing the Committee because of the Sunday
election and land reform.40 North Koreans did not yet establish a government in the proper
sense. The Committee was only given the role of an interim government because the majority
of Koreans still expected a united government between the North and the South.
36 United States, State Department, Foreign Relations of United States, Diplomatic Papers, vol. 8,
Washington D. C., 1946. 706-709.
37
Ibid., 1945, vol. 6, 1148.
38 B. Commings, Korea's Place in the Sun, 200.
39 B. Commings, The Origins ofthe Korean War, vol. 1, 138.
40
See, Part Two, Chapter I, Section 4.2.3.
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In the South, The American army dispersed the Central People's Committee and established
USAMGIK.41 However, from the beginning, the USAMGIK faced a series of anti-American
mass uprisings in Yusu, Taegu and Cheju.42 These rebellions were caused by American
cooperation with Japanese and pro-Japanese Koreans. As a result of colonial exploitation, the
Japanese and the pro-Japanese possessed almost 90 percent of land and industries in Korea.43
The masses expected that the USAMGIK would return, or redistribute the land to the Korean
people as North Korea did. However, the USAMGIK protected the pro-Japanese's properties
to use them as anti-Communist, American supporters.44 Even General Hodge recognized that
something was wrong: "the word pro-American is added to pro-Jap, national traitor, and
collaborator."45
Thus, the establishment of a pro-American Korean government in the South became intention
of the US, instead of governing directly through the USAMGIK. However, a majority of
Koreans still expected to eliminate the division along the 38th Parallel and bring about a
united independent government as soon as possible. As a matter of fact, efforts to reunite the
country were initiated immediately after its occupation by the Allied forces. In December
1945, foreign ministers of the US, the USSR and Great Britain agreed at the Moscow
Conference to structure an independent and united government under the trusteeship of the
US, the USSR, Great Britain and China, for a period of five years. The Korean Communists
thought that this proposal was an effective way to bring about national reunification. However,
others rejected it.46 To plan a united and independent government in Korea, the US and the
41
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USSR met twice in 1946 and 1947 (Joint US-Soviet Commission) in Seoul, but they failed to
reach an agreement.47
In 1947, the US brought up the Korean issue in the General Assembly of the UN. The UN
decided to have a free election in both sides of Korea under the supervision of the UN.
However, this decision was made in the absence of the USSR, who insisted on creating the
government in accordance with the agreement of the Moscow conference.48 The USSR and
Kim Il-sung strongly rejected the election because they believed the US altered the Moscow
agreement by using the UN. Therefore, the US proposed a unilateral election in the South to
the Interim UN Committee on Korea on 19th February 1948. However, Canada and Australia
rejected this idea because they believed this proposal could bring a permanent division of
Korea.49 The US reintroduced the proposal on the 26th, and it was approved to hold the
unilateral election before 10th May 1948.50
Koreans, who had divided into pro-trusteeship and anti-trusteeship groups, now divided
further into pro-unilateral and anti-unilateral election parties. Rhee and the pro-Americans
including pro-Japanese, supported the election. However, Kim Il-sung and the Korean
Communists, together with Kim Ku, the former president of Korean the government-in-exile,
and Korean nationalists rejected it.51 In spite of strong opposition in South Korea, the US and
Rhee carried on the election and the elected representatives chose the first president of
Republic. This was none other than Rhee himself. Finally, the independence of the Republic
of Korea (South Korea) was declared on 15th August 1948, in the southern half of Korea.
In response to the establishment of the ROK in the South, North Korea established its own
government as well. Although Kim Il-sung and the Soviets had insisted on a unified
47
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51 Kim Il-sung called a joint meeting of all political parties and organizations including those in South
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government, they must have been thoroughly prepared for the establishment a northern
government as well, because they elected the representatives of the Supreme People's
Assembly (SPA) within a month of the election in the South. In September 1948, the
Assembly declared the birth of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea),
and Kim Il-sung became the Prime Minister.?2
In this context, we will examine the way in which the Protestant Churches in North Korea
witnessed over the issue of the division of both the nation and the churches.
2. Liberation and the Reconstruction of Churches
2.1 Protestant Churches in Northern Korea before the Liberation
Many Korean Christians have heard about the churches in the 'Jerusalem of East Asia' from
their ancestors. However, little scientific research has been conducted on the characteristics of
Christianity in the North before the liberation. To start the research on Protestant Christianity
in North Korea after liberation and partition, it is necessary to survey how many Protestant
Christians there were when Korea was liberated. We can find reliable sources describing
North Korean Christianity in the documents of the Japanese Colonial Government in Korea
(JCGIK):
Table 7) Distribution of Christians, Churches and Ministers in Northern Korea before the
Liberation 53
No./De. PCK KMC KHC SDAC KAC SA Etc Total
Christians 191,245 23,265 5,452 2,665 1,810 713 3,189 228,339
Churches 1,507 284 58 78 44 27 99 2,097
Ministers 1,621 141 68 27 32 25 69 1,983
No: Number, De: denominations, PCK: Presbyterian Church of Korea, KMC: Korean Methodist Church, KHC:
Korean Holiness Church, SDAC: Seventh-Day Adventist Church, KAC: Korean Anglican Church, SA:
Salvation Army
The above figures indicate that there were about 230,000 Christians, 2,100 churches and
2,000 ministers in the North before the liberation. The JCGIK noted that about 45% of the
52 H. Kim, Tongil Munje eui Jongchaeksajok Gochal, (A Historical Study of the Korean Reunification
Policies), Pyongyang, Pyongyang Chulpansa, 1989, 81.
53
N.B., The author re-arranged the numbers of churches and ministers in JCGIK, Annual Statistical
Report, Seoul, JCGIK, 1942 and the numbers of Christians in JCGIK Public Security Unit, Godung
Woisa Wolbo (Journal of JCGIK-Public Security Unit), vol. 19, 1940, 38-41.
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Korean churches were in the North before the liberation/4 Why then, did Korean Christians
generally presume that the majority of Christians were in the North before the Liberation?
The JCGIK's figure can be misleading, and needs to be explained properly. Although the
percentage of churches was a bit smaller than that of the South, the percentage of the
Christian number was quite different. 65% of the total number of Christians was in the
North. 55 Especially when we focus on the Presbyterian Church, which was 84% of all
Christians in the North 75% (191,254) of all Presbyterians in Korea (256,575)56 were in the
North. From the results of the above analysis, it was clear that the majority of Protestant
Christians in Korea were indeed in the North before the liberation.
As we already noted, after opposing the Shinto Shrine worship, many Northern Korean
churches were abolished by the Japanese authorities, while other churches which cooperated
with colonial rule were absorbed to the Kyodan in 1942. Yang-sun Kim reported that in 1945,
the number of Protestant Christians had been reduced by the Japanese persecution to half the
total before the Shinto issue of 1937.717 Therefore, the reconstruction of churches was the most
urgent issue for Protestant Christians in North Korea after the liberation.
2.2 "Martyrs" vs "Lapsers" 8
The process of reconstruction focused on two directions. Firstly, it was necessary to recover
the church's orthodoxy and order, which had been manipulated by the Japanese. This required
the re-establishment of the separate denominations which had either been forcibly united in
the Kyodan or abolished by the Japanese; re-starting theological education; re-gathering
scattered members; and re-connecting with foreign missionary boards. Secondly, it was
necessary to clear the remains of Japanese colonial legacy within the churches, especially
~4 JCG IK-Public Security Unit, Ibid., 41
5 N.B. The author calculated this percentage by dividing the total number of Christians in Korea in
1941 (351,222) by that of Christians in the North in 1942 (228,339). The total number of Christians
in Korea in 1941 is quoted from 1KCH ed., Hank.uk Kidokyo eui Yoksa, vol. 2, 261.
56
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ecclesiastical power structure which had been dominated by pro-Japanese Christians after
1937.59
Seong-won Park argued that in the reconstruction process, the most serious issue was the
question of readmission of those who had capitulated to Shinto Shrine worship.60 Three
different approaches on how to purify "the lapsed churches" were put forward by the leaders
who had rejected the worship and were now released from from prison: 1) reconstruction
within the existing church, 2) reconstruction through an act of penance of the lapsed, and 3)
reconstruction of an entirely new church.
To resolve this issue, the released Christians gathered at Sanjunghyun Presbyterian Church,
where Rev. Chu Ki-chul,61 martyred by the Japanese because of his rejection of the Shrine
Worship, had been the pastor. This gathering was in Pyongyang because the North Korean
church was a center of the anti-Shinto movement, and most of the released Christians were
from the North. After two months of prayer and meeting, they announced the Five Basic
Principles to be followed in the reconstruction:
1. Since all the church leaders participated in Shinto Shrine worship, they have to purify
themselves through penance before engaging in church activities.
2. Penance will be performed through self-discipline or repentance, and ministers
undergo at least two months of penance and confession.
3. During this period, ministers and elders are not officiating; deacons or ordinary
believers will lead services.
4. The Basic Principles for church reconstruction must be delivered all over the country
so that they can be practiced simultaneously.
5. Seminaries should be restored and reconstructed to train clergy.62
However, this proposal was rejected by those who had participated in the Shinto shrine
worship. They justified their actions, saying they had cooperated with the Japanese to protect
churches and lay people. Rev. Tack-kee Hong, who was moderator of the 27th General
Assembly of the PCK (1938), which had approved the shrine worship, insisted as follows:
9IKCH ed., A History ofChurch in North Korea, 353.
60
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As far as suffering was concerned, the suffering of those in prison and those who had
been serving churches had been same and, moreover, that the decision of those who
had remained to bear on their shoulders the work of the church under Japanese
oppression was more commendable than that of those who had fled abroad or
withdrawn to some place of safety, even though the former might have compromised
because they could not help themselves. Furthermore, the matter of repentance or
discipline for shrine worship was a thing to be worked out directly with God by each
individual.63
This argument led to a sharp difference of opinions between the two groups, the released and
"the lapsers". In fact, two months penance was not severe punishment for "the lapsers."
However, the church leaders, who had worshiped the Shinto shrine, thought if they accepted
the penance, they would lose their ecclesiastical power. For the compromised leaders, the
power would have allowed them to secure their position in the church or presbytery as before.
For the released leaders, the power would have allowed them not only to purify the church but
also to expel the compromised leaders from the ecclesiastical power structure.64 Therefore,
these two groups could not reach a position of agreement.
In this conflict, the Five Province Joint Presbytery (FPJP), which acted provisionally in place
of the General Assembly of the PCK in the North, decided on a modest solution in which
every church would confess its past sin in relation to the Shinto shrine worship, and all church
officers would do penance for two months.65 This decision seemed somehow balanced and
reasonable. It, however, was vague and even unjust for those who were persecuted. Only
those who had cooperated with the Japanese needed to do penance, not everybody. Moreover,
in practice, the penance lost its meaning because it was difficult to minister to every
congregation for two months. Many congregations were without ministers.
2.3 The Process of Reconstruction and the Division of the Churches
Before the liberation, 84% of all Protestant Christians in Northern Korea were Presbyterian.
Methodists were 10% and the others were 6%. Here, we will examine the process of
reconstruction and the division into Northern and Southern churches that followed.
63 Ibid., 46.
64 See. Hee-mo Yim, Unity Lost-Unity to be Regained in Korean Presbyterianism: A History of
Divisions in Korean Presbyterianism and the Role of the Means ofGrace, Frankfurt, Peter Lang,
1996,75-76.
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2.3.1 The Five Province Joint Presbytery vs the Independent Presbytery
After the announcement of the Five Basic Principles on 20th September 1945, there were two
streams of argument between the released and "the lapsers". On 14th November 1945, the six
presbyteries in the Northern districts organized an annual closing conference ofministers for a
week at Wolkokdong Church, where Rev. Tack-kee Hong was the minister.66 The basic
67 •
purpose of this meeting was to discuss the reconstruction of churches. Invited as keynote
speakers, Rev. Ki-sun Lee gave witness to his Christian faith in jail and Dr. Hyung-nyong
Park reaffirmed the Five Basic Principles. Both of them intended to restructure the
ecclesiastical power in northern Presbyterianism, with support from their audiences.69
However, this intention could not be realized because of the counter argument of the group of
Tack-kee Hong, who had been pro-Japanese. This group insisted that the establishment of the
Five Province Joint Presbytery as a provisional assembly in North Korea was the most urgent
issue for the churches. They justified that the unity of Christians was needed rather than
division, to struggle with the Communists.70 Their proposal seemed to have more support
from the participants because there had already been several serious clashes between the
Christians and the Communists, such as the Ryongampo affairs.71 Finally, The conference
agreed to establish the FPJP and organized the preparatory committee.
On 1st December 1945, the inaugural synod meeting of the FPJP was held at the Jangdaehyun
Church in Pyongyang and approved six important decisions:
65
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1. The Five Province Joint Presbytery shall act as a temporary measure, in place of the
General Assembly, until the establishment of the united Assembly between the North
and South Presbyterian churches.
2. The constitution before 1938 (i.e. pre-Kyodan constitution) shall be used, but it will
not be revised until the united Assembly.
3. All churches confess their past sin in the matter of the shrine worship and the Church
officers do penance for two months.
4. The theological seminary shall be carried on under the direct management of the
Joint Presbytery.
5. Throughout the country, a massive evangelistic campaign will be undertaken to
Christianize the fatherland by organizing the Independence Memorial Evangelism
Society (Tokrip Kinyum Chundo Hoi).
6. The representatives of the Joint Presbyteries shall be sent to South Korea to present
our appreciations to the commander of the Allied Headquarters.72
This decision contains problems in relation to the future of the North Korean church. Firstly,
the division of the North and South churches was caused by establishing a separate governing
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body in the North, without discussion with the southern presbyteries. Secondly, the need of
penance was also downgraded. In fact, the main issue of the Five Principles was the
purification of churches from the legacy of colonialism within the churches. However, here,
instead of the purification, evangelism became an important agenda. Thirdly, the released
Christians were excluded from the church hierarchy. To avoid confrontation, the FPJP elected
officers only from middle line people, cutting out the two wings, "the lapsers" and the
released.74 However, this was again extremely unjust, because "the lapsers" were those who
needed penance and the released were those who had held to the orthodoxy of the church's
witness in its colonial context.77 Lastly, the FPJP had a biased view that was over-suspicious
towards the Communists. This will be importantly argued later.
In this context, the released Christians had a very limited choice. Finally, the released
Christians who had pursued reform in the existing church, began to think earnestly about their
position and their attitudes. They thought the FPJP merely gave indulgence to "the lapsers".
The persecuted initiated their own process for rehabilitation in North Korea. The group of Rev.
Ki-sun Lee organized the Independent Presbytery consisting of thirty congregations in
Pyungbuk province, North Korea.76 They called themselves the Hyuksin Pokku Pa or
72
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Reformed Restoration Group.77 This should be remembered as the first division of Korean
Presbyterianism.78
Indeed, the purification of pro-Japanese remnants from the period of Japanese institutional
order was an urgent issue for North Korean churches. However, the church was divided
because of the over-justification of "the lapsers," and the exclusive self-righteous approach of
the released.79
2,3.2 The South Division General Assembly
Meanwhile, in the South, the leaders of the Kyodan, the government-organized union created
by the Japanese, felt that this united church should be continued. Whatever their personal
reasons, they stated that, in as much as the new national leaders, Syngman Rhee, Kim Ku,
Kim Kyoo-sik, etc., were all Christians, it would be excellent for the Kyodan, to continue its
function "in order to provide a Christian ideology of national reconstruction and to cooperate
8f) • 81
with them," rather than to be divided again into denominations. However, the Kyodan was
a kind of anti-patriotic church, which supported Japanese imperialism. A. Clark argues that
the reconstruction of the National Council of Churches in Korea was a more historically
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legitimate means to meet this purpose.
On 8th September 1945, the former Kyodan leaders re-organized the Kyodan Synod under the
name of the Southern Synod. They assumed they could also re-establish a similar Kyodan
Synod in the North.83 For this reason, they called it the Nambu Daehoe or
Southern Synod. However, a number of the Methodist delegates declared the re-establishment
of the Methodist Church. In fact, "many Presbyterians also preferred to return to their own
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denominational status", not simply based on their denominationalism but in relation to the
pro-Japanese nature of the Kyodan. In the end, the Southern Synod proved a failure.
In spite of their ecumenical intention, the Southern Synod could not have support from
Christian masses, and merely provided an opportunity for a re-division of the churches in the
South.
After the failure of the Kyodan, by the spring of the 1946, all the South Korean presbyteries of
the Presbyterian Church had been re-organized and, on 12th June, a meeting of the South
Division General Assembly (SDGA) was held at the Seungdong Presbyterian Church in Seoul.
Four important decisions were approved at the inaugural meeting:
1. The church constitution would be used without revision.
2. The sinful action of the 27th General Assembly in regard to the Shinto Shrine worship
is rescinded.
3. The Chosun Theological Seminary will be the seminary of the General Assembly.
4. The issue of women's ordination will be postponed until the united General Assembly.
85
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"the lapsers," aimed at maintaining and managing their ecclesiastical power.
In April, the SDGA met at the First Taegu Presbyterian Church and decided that, since the
hope of reunification had become weaker, it would be better to continue as a formal General
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Assembly of Presbyterian Church of Korea. Finally, the meeting declared itself to be the
33 rd General Assembly.
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2.3.3 The Reconstruction of the Methodist Church
Before joining to the Kyodan in 1941, the West Conference of the Methodist Church had
existed in Northern Korea. However, the reconstruction of the conference was delayed in the
North after the liberation, because the majority of the Methodist Church was in the South.
When the Methodist representatives walked out of the meeting of the Kyodan Synod, on 8th
September 1945 in Seoul, they met together at the Dongdaemoon Methodist Church, and
OQ
formed the Central Rehabilitation Committee. This Committee then went on to organize
three Conferences and called for a General Conference on 14th January 1946 at the same
church in Seoul. This Conference approved the re-establishment of the Methodist Church and
the re-opening of the Methodist Theological Seminary.90
In-soo Kim states that at first, the Central Rehabilitation Committee group was a small
minority within the Korean Methodist churches. Only seventy churches joined to the
Committee.91 As we studied at Part One, on the issue of Shinto shrine worship, the Korean
Methodist Church understood the worship as a national ceremony. Therefore, the majority of
Methodists took part in the worship. This participation brought closer relationship with the
Kyodan in contrast to the Presbyterians. Finally, the Korean Methodist Church easily
absorbed into Kyodan in 1941.
However, there was a small minority of the Methodists, who rejected the worship, such as
Chang-joon Kim and Hong-kyu Byun. The people who walked out at the Kyodan Synod
Meeting in 1945 were the Methodists who rejected the Worship. They wanted to recover the
*
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Korean Methodist Church, quite apart from any Japanese-given ecclesiastical order. After a
while, the Korean Methodist Church divided into two General Conferences, the Rehabilitation
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When the Rehabilitation group organized the General Conference in January 1946, Rev. Yun-
young Lee was elected as the chairperson of the West Conference. However, the
Rehabilitation group could not carry on re-organizing the West Conference because of the
partition of the Korean peninsula. Rather, the Northern Methodists re-organized the West
Conference by themselves in October 1946.94
The first West Conference was held at Namsanhyun Church in Pyongyang and elected Rev.
Jung-kun Song as a chairperson. The important decisions approved at the inaugural
conference were as follows:
1. Until to hold a united General Conference with South Korean Methodists, we will not
hold a separate General Conference.
2. The Chairperson of the West Conference will act as an interim bishop to do the
ministry ordination and appointments until the united General Conference.
3. The district of West Conference is the whole of North Korea above the 38th parallel.
4. If they want, the pastors who were excommunicated under Japanese rule can
recover their original post. 9~
Here, we can find that, contrary to the argument within the Presbyterian Church in North
Korea, there was no serious argument on the Shinto issue at the inaugural Conference of the
West Conference of the Methodist Church in North Korea.96 Instead of the penance, the
Conference recognized the resumption of office for the persecuted Methodist pastors, if there
were any. Because North Korean Methodists also understood the shrine worship as a sort of
national ceremony and, most of them had participated in the worship, they considered it was
not a matter for penance.
The Korean Presbyterians defined Shinto worship as idolatry. Even some Presbyterian
theologians used the terminology of "martyrs" and "lapsers" due to distinguish those who one
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participated in the worship from those who were persecuted because of rejecting it.
However, we cannot find this kind of argument among the Methodists themselves. In this
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In spite of the different understanding of shrine worship, the Methodists might not want to be
reminded of their shameful history. It was a shameful history because firstly, there were also
Methodists who rejected the worship. Secondly, even a Japanese pastor, who had a special
mandate to persuade Korean Christians, recognized that the Shinto shrine worship in Korea
included some religious factors. Kosi Josi reported, "I think, it is unreasonable to force the
Christians who emphasize puritan faith to accept the religious factors of Shintoism."99 Lastly,
even if it was a national ceremony, bowing to the East and reciting the pledge of vassals of
Empire, which were compulsory in the ceremony,100 were considered anti-national behavior
to the Korean nationalists and the Communists who led the independence struggle, because it
involved praising the colonial occupier.
3. Political Engagement ofNorthern Protestantism
3.1 From Minjung to Elite: Class Changes among Protestant Christians
Protestant Christianity developed among the classes that had been discriminated against
socially and historically in Northern Korea. From the beginning, it deeply engaged with the
social context of the minjung class, quite different from the Yanghan-centered approach of
Roman Catholicism in Southern Korea. What was unique was that northern Protestantism was
a religion of the minjung class.
Throughout the Japanese colonial period, there had been radical class changes in Northern
Korea. The traditional Confucian feudal class system which was divided into four classes,
Yangban, Jung-in, Pyung-min and Chunmin,m collapsed due to the Korean enlightenment
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movement and Japanese rule. In the process of this fragmentation of the traditional class
99 Bokum Shinmoon, (The Good News), 8th September 1938.
100
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system, the Christian concept of the equality of all human beings emerged, providing a
philosophical background against which social change could take place.
The fragmentation of traditional class structures also gave opportunities for class change to
minjung Protestant Christians in Northern Korea. It was characteristic of mission policy in
Korea that missionaries tried to evangelize Korean people through educational and medical
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work. Korean Christian nationalists also strengthened education as a means of fostering
independence. According to In-chul Kang, Protestant churches and foreign missionary boards
ran 80% of all schools in Northern Korea before the liberation.104 In 1910, there were 581
mission schools, out of which 403 were Presbyterian, in Northern Korea.105 This means
Protestant Christianity in Northern Korea provided abundant educational opportunities to
Christian children, and sometimes to adults as well not only through the Sunday School but
also through regular education.106 It was natural that the majority of the students of the
schools were Christian, so it was especially the Christians who had the benefit of modem
education. These educated Christians started to form a new social elite group by getting jobs
in urban area in Northern Korean.107
In higher education, the Protestant Christian contribution was noticeable. Sungsil Christian
University was the first university in Korea, and the only one in the northern part of the
country before the liberation. The other two institutions which provided higher degrees, were
Pyongyang Theological Seminary of the Presbyterian Church and Sunghwa Theological
Seminary of the Methodist Church. To enter those higher education institutions, the
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endorsement of church leaders or missionaries was compulsory. At post-graduate level,
which had not existed in Korea before the liberation, foreign mission boards were virtually the
only channel to study in America and Europe, although other possibilities did exist to pursue
further education in Japan and China.109
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Several highly educated Christian leaders led the independence movement from a Christian
perspective, for instance President Elder Kim Ku of the government-in-exile, Elder Dr.
Syngman Rhee, the first president of South Korea, Evangelist Dr. Ryu Un-hyung, the
chairperson of the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence and Elder Dr. Kim
Kyu-sik, the vice-president of the government-in-exile. As we already noted in Part One,
seven out of the eight ministers at the beginning of the Korean government-in-exile, including
the presidency itself, were Christians, and five of them were from the North. Even the two
most important Communist leaders, Kim Il-sung and Park Hun-young, also had some
Christian background."0
The Protestant Christians in Northern Korea, who were originally minjung, had begun to
upgrade their social status through education. When Korea was liberated, they emerged as a
new elite group and led the colonized nation in its struggle for independence. In sociological
terms, they had formed a new petit bourgeois class in Northern society.
3.2 Politicized Protestantism and Its Ideological Choice
It was natural that the Korean Protestant leaders, a new social elite group in Korea who led
the independence movement, had deep concerns for reconstruction of the fatherland. They
believed that a new, unified and independent fatherland should be built in Korea, based on
Christian thought.111
Through the struggle between anti-Japanese and pro-Japanese attitudes during the colonial
period, Protestant Christianity in North Korea had been highly politicized. With the opening
of a new page of history, the Protestant Christian leaders immediately got involved in political
activity and played a more active role than other comparable social and political groups in
North Korea. It was through their leadership that the Gunkuk Junbi Wiwonhoe (H®
JtlH), the Committee for Preparation Korean Independence was organized. The central office
vol.26, 1930, 67-72.
110 Kim had grown up in a Christian family and Park was the assistant of H. Underwood. Kim was the
first Communists prime-Minister ofNorth Korea, and Park was his deputy.
111 "... to reform whole society based on Christian thought", The Platform of the Christian Social
Democratic Party, 1945 in Heung-soo Kim ed., A History of the Church in North Korea after the
Liberation, 54.
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of this organization was in Seoul, but the provincial committees in North Korea were
dominated by Presbyterian leaders. For instance, the chairperson of the Pyungnam Provincial
Committee was Elder Cho Man-sik, the Hanghae Committee was led by Rev. Ung-soon Kim
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and the Pyungbook Committee was headed by Elder Yu-pil Lee. At the county level,
Christian leadership in this Committee was even more noticeable. Christians did not want to
stay just as an advisor or cooperator but they expected to be leaders in the reconstruction of
the nation. This Committee emerged as a powerful political organization in North Korea.
In ideology, being opposed to the Communists, the Christian politicians kept to the right. We
can clearly read the ideological choice of Christians in the minutes of the inaugural assembly
of the FPJP. The FPJP decided that, "the representatives of the Joint Presbytery shall be sent
• 113
to South Korea to present our appreciation to the commander of the Allied Headquarters",
who had defeated the Japanese. However, they did not want to express the same sentiments to
the Russian commander, who had done same thing in their territory. The representatives, the
Very Rev. In-sik Lee and Rev. Yang-sun Kim, even met anti-Communist South Korean
political leaders, such as Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku, to discuss possibilities of political
cooperation with them.114
H. Benninghoff, who was the political advisor of the USAMGIK, describes the political
philosophy of protestant leaders in Korea in his report to Washington as follows:
Communists On the other hand, there is the so-called democratic or conservative
group, which numbers among its members many of the professional and educational
leaders who had been educated in the United States or in American missionary
institutions in Korea. In their aims and policies they demonstrate a desire to follow
western democracies. 115
Obviously, northern Protestant Christians chose anti-Communism and western capitalism as
the ideology on which to base the nation. There was a historical reason for this choice. As we
already noted, after the mid-1920s, there had been several serious conflicts between the
Christians and the Communists in Korea. North Korean Christians had been afraid of the
atheism of the Communists. Against this background, they believed in capitalism as a
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Christian political and economical idea, which had been given by the missionaries with
Gospel.116
Behind these historical causes, there were also economic reasons. S. Masahiko points out that
a majority of the Christians preferred a capitalist system because they were the emerging
elites, who owned lands in North Korea.117 In accordance with the above analysis of Christian
class changes during the Japanese rule, it is likely that the ideological choice of the Christians
was deeply connected to their economic interests, especially in regard to the issue of the land
reform in 1946. Even though the majority of minjung in North Korea welcomed land reform,
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Christians were often victims of the policy, because as a result of it they lost their land.
It is against this background that Christian participation in the Committee for Preparation of
National Foundation developed, with Christian parties being organized to compete for
political power with the Communists in North Korea.119
3.3 Christian Parties
3.3.1 Christian Social Democratic Party
After the liberation, Presbyterian Christians organized the first ever political party in Korean
political history, the Christian Social Democratic Party, in November 1945. Rev. Ha-young
Yun, the pastor of the First Shineuiju Presbyterian Church, and Rev. Kyung-jik Han, the
pastor of the Second Shineuiju Presbyterian Church, were the leaders of the party and the
members were mostly Christians in Pyungbuk Province. The political motto of the party was
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the establishment of democratic government on the basis of Christian thought.
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In each district, with the church as a center, a district branch was organized. These branches
became so strong that the Soviets soon became much concerned. Consequently, they brought
in Korean Communists from Hamkyung Province and got them to set about "buying up the
support of the common people of the area, the ignorant farmers and laborers".121 This led to
several conflicts between the Christians and the Communists. On the occasion of the inaugural
meeting of the Ryongampo branch of the Party on 16th November 1945, the Communists
stirred up the workers in a local factory to disturb the meeting. In the conflict that followed,
Elder Suk-hwang Hong was killed and others injured.122
After the Ryongampo incidents, about 5,000 Christian students from the local high schools in
Shineuiju and other towns demonstrated with anger for a week in front of the local office of
the Soviet Military Government. When the students tried to occupy the office, the soldiers
fired and twenty-three Christian students were killed.123 When the Soviets started to arrest the
party executive members, most leaders and members evacuated to South Korea. This should
be remembered as the first exodus ofNorthern Christians to the South.
Later, Rev. Han stated that he organized the party to struggle against the Communists.124 He
also preached that the purpose of the Party was to establish an anti-Communist Christian
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country like America, which had been blessed by God. Moreover, he emphasized that "to
prevent the dictatorship of the proletariat, we Christians should fight to break down
1 96
Communism in North Korea" . He even went further by claiming, "Communism is the Red
1 97
Dragon in the book of Revelation", and asked, "Who will suppress this evil?"
While acknowledging that there were unfortunate clashes, we can still say that Han had a
strong prejudice against Communism, judging negatively the Communist approach toward the
new nation too early. According to Dong-kun Hong, his Christian Social Democratic Party
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represented a highly limited number of Shineuiju people, who were mostly Christian
landlords.128
As a consequence of the experiment of the Christian Social Democratic Party, three negative
results entered into the relationship between the Christians and the Communists in North
Korea. Firstly, the Communists began to consider the Christians as an anti-revolutionary
group, who supported landlords. Secondly, anti-Communism among the Christians was
strengthened as a result of the conflicts. Lastly, the church leaders in Shineuiju gave up their
congregations and fled to the South. This flight allowed other Christians who had difficulties
in North Korea to follow their church leaders to the South, without considering their mission
in a Marxist land.
3.3.2 Christian Liberal Party
Meanwhile, in Pyongyang, a Christian Liberal Party was being organized by the Rev. Hwa-sik
Kim, the vice-moderator of the FPJP and the chair of the trustee board of the Pyongyang
Theological Seminary. It is significant that the leadership of the FPJP Assembly tried to
organize this party. Most executive members of the Party were honorary officers of the
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Assembly and its member presbyteries. According to Hwa-sik Kim, their political intention
• • •• 130*
was to restrain the development of the Communist party by organizing a counter party. This
party was secretly prepared by the Presbyterians from November 1945. Later, however, most
• • 1^1
leaders of the reconstructed Methodist Church joined as well.
The Christian Social Democratic Party had been locally based in Pyungbuk Province and
existed for a short period only. However, the Christian Liberal Party was prepared for full
cooperation with the FPJP of the Presbyterians and the Western Conference of the Methodists
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for the next two years. The preparatory committee of the Party also cooperated closely with
the Korean Independence Party in South Korea.
In May 1947, at the Pyongyang Theological Seminary, a meeting of the main promoters of the
venture was held and constitution and standing orders of the Party were drafted. However, the
day before the organizational meeting was to have taken place, Rev. Kim and some 40 others
were arrested. They therefore failed to establish the Party, and were accused on the charge of
attempting a rebellion.132 The Communists suspected them because the leaders had close
connections with the South Korean Government and Elder Hyun-suk Kim, the Chair of
Cooperation of the Party, had supported terrorists who had thrown a bomb at Kim Il-sung.
Besides the Christian Liberal Party, we should also mention the Chosun Democratic Party,
which was the biggest party until the end of 1946. Although it was not a Christian party, it
should be remembered that the majority of its leaders were Christian. The remaining members
of the Christian Democratic Party and the Christian Liberal Party joined the Chosun
Democratic Party because its leader was Elder Cho Man-sik, a Presbyterian.
3.3.3 A Critical Assessment
J. Hromadka maintains that the relationship between church and secular society should be
1
"unconfused and not yet indivisible", borrowing rhetoric from Chalcedon. When the church
participates in political issues, the term "unconfused" means she should keep a critical and
creative tension, not simply identifying with the state. Hromadka also emphasizes that the
church should not withdraw to an inner ghetto by dualistically separating herself from political
issues. Here the difficulty is to draw the borderline between mission to the public realm and
political accommodation.
According to K. Barth, church and state were not to be understood as separated realms. The
state is outside the church. However, it was not outside the range of Christ's dominion. Here,
proclaiming the Gospel is necessary even in the political arena. Nevertheless, he insists that
Christian should enter the political arena "anonymously," and not as a Christian party.1"'4 Barth
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suggests a borderline of "anonymousness." He might be afraid a so-called Christian party
might compromise in such a way that it can no longer be called Christian, when it aims at
achieving power and setting up a regime.
Protestant Christianity in North Korea was highly critical of the emerging Communist state
power and its ideology. They chose a counter ideology, and set up political parties to compete
for political power with the Communists. In this process, the Christians seemed to confuse the
mission of churches with the political arena. In the light of Barth, the attempt to form
Christian parties in North Korea can be regarded as an impatient and immature response of
Protestant Christianity to political issues. The "anonymousness" means developing an
approach to the political issues while keeping a distinctive Christian identity. However, the
leaders of the Protestant churches in North Korea approached the political issues with
secularized political parties, and confused the expression of Christian faith with the ideology
ofwestern capitalism.
A Korean theologian, Kyung-jae Kim evaluated the political engagement of the Protestant
leaders positively, claiming they suffered for their intention to construct a democratic
Christian nation in North Korea.I3? However, we must distinguish between the political
witness of Korean churches identified with the suffering minjung in the late Chosun period,
and the Christian attempt to win political power for the petit bourgeois in North Korea after
the liberation.
The Christian attempt to organize political parties was considered by the Communists as a
counter attack on their socialist revolution. Even the church was considered as an anti-
revolutionary and reactionary social group, because of the parties. For this reason, the way in
which the Christian parties competed for power caused persecution in North Korea. This
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4. The Conflicts between the Christians and the Communists
4.1 A Short Honeymoon
At the beginning of the partition, it seems that the relationship between the Christians and the
Communists was not bad. For evidence, when Kim Il-sung and his guerilla army came back
with the Soviets to Pyongyang, the Protestant leaders invited Kim, Choi Young-gun and the
commander of the Soviet Army and held a welcoming worship at the house of Elder Hyun-suk
Kim, who was the Chair of Cooperation of the Christian Liberal Party. Although Hyun-suk
136*Kim later supported an assassination attempt on Kim Il-sung and Yang-uk Kang, relations
seem to have been cordial at this stage. Furthermore, on the occasion of the "Pyongyang
Civilian Welcoming Ceremony for General Kim Il-sung" on 14th October 1945, Elder Cho
Man-sik introduced him, and other Christian leaders praised Kim's leadership of the anti-
Japanese guerilla struggle.137 In response to this, Kim and the Soviet authorities confirmed that
people would be enjoying full freedom of religion. Especially, Christians would be fully
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allowed to worship in church.
However, after the collision in November at Shineuijoo, the relationship between the
Communists and the Christians started to break down. Even during the short honeymoon, the
northern Christians were closer to the USAMGIK in the South than to Kim and the Soviet
authorities.139 Rev. Eun-kyun Hwang, a leader of FPJP, witnessed that the FPJP had regular
secret communications with the USAMGIK.140 In addition to the Shineuijoo affairs, and the
136 Institute for North Korean Studies ed., Op. Cit., 284.
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Pyongyang, Minju Chosunsa, 1948, 2. As a minor argument, Young-jin Oh asserts that most
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establishing of Christian parties, this pro-American approach could also stimulate Kim's
hostility.
When the Moscow Conference of foreign ministers of the US, the USSR and Great Britain
agreed multilateral trusteeship in Korea for up to five years on 16th December 1945,141 the
relation between the Christians and the Communists came unstuck. The Communists agreed to
the trusteeship because they understood that anti-trusteeship would cause the division of the
nation. However, the Christians organized a massive anti-trusteeship campaign in cooperation
with South Koreans, because they understood the trusteeship as a new colonial rule.142
4.2 Conflicts
4.2.1 Memorial Ceremony of March First Independence Movement
From the beginning of 1946, the tension between the Christians and the Communists
increased on the issue of the trusteeship. The Christian leaders who understood the trusteeship
as a revival of colonial rule planned to hold the Memorial Worship of the March First
Independence Movement (MFIM) as an anti-trusteeship and anti-Communist campaign. They
intended to connect the Christian mass commemoration of the MFIM with their political
slogan of anti-trusteeship.143
On the other hand, the Provisional People's Committee in North Korea also intended to hold a
big memorial ceremony in the newly liberated nation. When the Committee realized that the
FPJP planed a separate ceremony, they proposed to hold it jointly. However, the FJPJ rejected
the proposal because they did not want to work with the Communists.144 Due to this rejection,
the Provisional People's Committee suddenly arrested the fifty-five leaders of the FJPJ on 26
February in 1946. Most historians insist that the Committee arrested the leaders to prevent the
Christians from holding their separate ceremony.1411
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However, we need to note that the Presbyterian Youth Conference held from 23rd-25th
February 1946, Pyongyang, had also demonstrated a strong anti-Communist reaction.146
Therefore, a fundamental reason behind the arrest was not only to disturb the Christian
ceremony, but also to prevent another anti-Communist campaign through the MFIM
memorial worship.
In practice, this arrest poured oil into the burning anti-Communist fire among the Christians.
About 10,000 Christians gathered at the Jangdaehyun Presbyterian Church on 1st March 1946.
Thousands of young Christian men protected the congregation because the police of the
Provisional People's Committee asked that the worship cease. In his sermon, Rev. Eun-kyun
Hwang, who had connections with the USAMGIK, asserted that North Korea was becoming a
land of the Bolshevist who is atheist and materialist, and he encouraged Christian youth to
struggle against them as follows:
Now, a rebellion is inevitable in North Korea. We are facing a war between the North
and the South. There will be a war between theist and atheist, democracy and
proletariat dictatorship. Shall we, Christian youth, give the initiative of national
reconstruction to the Communists and to their party? Absolutely not! We must fight for
a just war to keep our freedom of faith like the Crusades in the medieval age. 14
Here we can see that in his sermon, Communism was considered as an unacceptable satanic
idea. The ideologically captured minister proclaimed a war, not a peace, without any
reasonable consideration of the new situation in the pulpit. Here, we can find that the
opposition paradigm between church and state in the issue of the Shinto shrine worship was
uncritically adopted and inserted into the Communist context in North Korea after the
liberation. S. Masahiko points out that the worship event was a kind of anti-Communist
... . 148
political demonstration, rather than proper worship as such.
After his inflammatory sermon, the congregation decided to have three days of prayer and
fasting. However, when the members of Red Guard took out Rev. Hwang to arrest him after
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the worship, an angry crowd of 5,000 Christians started a demonstration which headed
towards the Head Office of the Soviet Army, shouting "anti-trusteeship, anti-Communist and
freedom of faith".149 There were also several collisions between the Christian youth and the
Red Guard during this march.
At first glance, this demonstration occurred by accident because of the Red Guard. However,
in fact, FPJP leaders carefully prepared it to achieve political hegemony in North Korea. As
evidence, firstly, it should be noted that similar demonstrations, followed by similar collisions,
happened in several cities on that same day. Secondly, Yang-sun Kim, who was one of the
leaders of the FPJP, stated that the Christians participating in the worship brought crosses and
the former national flag (now the flag of South Korea since 1946) for the demonstration.1"0
On account of this pre-organized demonstration, the Communists got confirmation of their
negative understanding of Christianity in North Korea. For the Communists, Protestant
Christianity in North Korea seemed to be a religion of the bourgeoisie who preferred the
South Korean regime, not the northern minjung.
4.2.2 Christian Complicity in the Attempted Assassination of Kim Il-sung
Apart from the analysis of most historians, who maintain the Communists' responsibility for
causing the collision on 1st March 1946, the Christians clearly had some responsibility as well.
The bombing terror against Kim Il-sung during the Ceremony held by the People's
Committee is another incident that needs to be considered. So far historians have failed to dig
out the details of the assassination attempt, and have not sufficiently examined possible
Christian involvement in it.
According to V. Suhanin, the Russian ambassador in 1946, in his interview with The
Hankyeore,151 there was an attempt to assassinate Kim Il-sung at the Ceremony. A group of
1 S9
young people threw a hand grenade at Kim. However, J. Novichenko, the Russian military
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officer, protected him, losing his right arm in the process. This assassination attempt occurred
at 8:30 a.m. at the Pyongyang Station Square. The terrorists were Sung-yul Lee, Hyung-jip
Kim, Ki-sung Choi and Hee-du Lee, who were members of the Korean Independence Party in
the South.153
Kwang-soo Kim reported that even though the terrorists were members of the Korean
Independence Party, Elder Hyun-suk Kim154 and other Christian Youth leaders, Du-byung
Kim, Won-bok Kim, Eui-hong Kang and Jun-sam Chun, helped to plan and supported the
attempted assassination. Elder Kim even hid the terrorists in his house after it had failed.133
Some of leaders of the FPJP and the Christian Liberal Party were thus deeply involved in the
attempt to assassinate Kim Il-sung. The Communists also had a strong doubt that some anti-
Communist Christian leaders had been engaged in the assassination attempt.136 However, they
157had no evidence, because they failed to arrest the terrorists.
It is highly significant that the terror happened at 8:30 a.m. at the People's Committee
Ceremony, and the Christian Memorial Worship started at 10:00 a.m. The Red Guard who
came from the Pyongyang Station, the terrorized place, must have been extremely upset
• • • 158*because they had a suspicion that the Christians were behind what had happened. In this
context, Rev. Hong's sermon and the following demonstration was very provocative for the
Communists, pushing them to take strong action.
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However, it was not a single attempt. After twelve days, the members of the Seobuk
Chungnyun Dan or North West Youth League in the South,159 attempted to assassinate Rev.
Yang-uk Kang (1904-1983), a leader of the Christian socialists, on 13th March. Most members
of the League were Christian youth who had evacuated from the North, after the Shineuijoo
collision.160 The terrorists were "financially supported and given a shelter by Elder Min-kyu
Hong,"161 who was an Elder of Jangdaehyun Presbyterian Church162 in Pyongyang. Moreover,
they cooperated with the former members of the Christian Social Democratic Party in
planning and executing the assassination attempt.
The terrorists threw a hand bomb into Rev. Kang's bedroom at midnight. On the day, he had
two visitors, Rev. Duk-ho Kim and Rev. Byung-jik Kang, who were Christian socialists. They
had come to discuss the Christian perspective on the issue of land reform.164 The beloved first
son of Kang, Young-hae who was 22 years old, and the two ministers were killed instead of
him that night, because Kang had given his bedroom to his friends.165 Kang's first daughter
also died that night. Kwang-soo Kim claims that the visitor was Rev. Jong-sung Kim.
However, Elder Se-yong Kang, the daughter of Byung-jik Kang witnesses, "there were two
visitors on the night, my father and Rev. Duk-ho Kim".166
Rev. Yang-uk Kang, the chairperson of the NKCA, was an important leader of the Christian
socialists with Rev. Chang-joon Kim, who was in the South at that time. He had been the
teacher of Kim Il-sung at the Changduk Christian Primary School, which Kim's grandfather-
in-law had established. Later, Kim remembered that Kang had influenced him encouraging
his nationalistic patriotism for the colonized fatherland and reminding him to love the minjung
159
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who were suffering under Japanese rule. When the North Korean government was
established in 1947, Kang became the secretary general of the SPA.
For the Christians colored by anti-Communism, Kang was not seen as a pastor. They thought
Christianity and socialism could not co-exist. They might also have been afraid that Kang's
influence could convince the Christian minjung of socialism, because he was a "highly
1 f\R
respected leader and famous preacher" in the northern Presbyterian Church. For these
reasons, Kang was the next target for the assassination, after Kim Il-sung. These assassination
attempts brought about the rapid spread of anti-Christian antipathy among the Communists in
North Korea.
4.2.3 The Issue of the Election on the Sunday Sabbath
Even though the collision in March 1946 was serious, it was a local conflict in Pyongyang and
Shineuijoo. However, in the autumn of 1946, when the whole country was excited by an
election for the establishment of the new state, the conflict between the Christians and the
Communists developed on a national scale in North Korea.
On 5th September 1946, the Provisional People's Committee in North Korea announced a law
for establishing the National People's Committee as a people's regime through election. The
Committee announced the Election Day for Sunday, 3rd November 1946. In addition, the
Committee mobilized church buildings as voting points and places for mass propaganda for
the election.169
However, in response, the FPJP announced the following statement and delivered it to the
Committee on 20th October 1946.
The 2,000 churches and 300,000 Christians, for the preservation of the faith and the
progress of the Church, having approved the following five principles for the
government of the Church and as rules for Christian living, wish to inform the
People's Committee of these principles, hoping for their kind co-operation:
167 Kim Il-sung, Seki wa dubuleo, (With a Century: Kim Il-sung's Autobiography), Pyongyang, KWP
Press, 1992, 88-89.
168
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169 The Center for the Study of History ed., Chosun Tongsa, (A History of Chosen), Pyongyang, The
Institute for Social Science; reprinted by Seoul, Owol, 1989, 328.
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1.Keeping the Sabbath day holy is of the life of the Church, so there should be no
attendance at any activities except worship on the Lord's Day.
2.Politics and religion should be distinctly separated.
3.The respect for the Deity in the church building is the proper duty of the church, so
that the use of church building for other purpose than worship is forbidden.
4. In the event that an acting church minister enters the field of politics, he must resign
his office in the church.
5.The church stands for freedom of religion and of assembly. 170
Even though this statement was "for the government of the church and as rules for Christian
living", it was a statement on the issue of church and state which rejected cooperation for the
establishment of the Communist government in North Korea through the election. At bottom,
the statement emphasizes a fundamental approach to church and state issues based on a clear
paradigm of separation. However, in the detail, the articles contain some contradictions,
which was counter to the reality that northern Protestantism was already politicized. For
example, the church buildings had been centers for mass education and civil meetings in
Northern Korea. In the MFIM, most anti-Japanese political gatherings had been held in the
churches. Moreover, a considerable number of Protestant Christian leaders were involved as
political leaders of the Committee for the Preparation of National Foundation, and of the
political parties that followed from it. However, they had not been required to resign any
ecclesiastical offices on account of their political participation. The officers of the FPJP at the
time of announcing the Statement were themselves, even at that point in time, organizing the
Christian Liberal Party.
In the statement, the key issue for the Christians was said to be that of the Sabbath. They
interpreted the Sabbath narrowly, as in the Old Testament. The Christians thought that the
Communists scheduled the election on a Sunday to disturb Christian activities.171 Therefore,
the Pyungseo Presbytery announced a stronger statement the next day, as follows:
1. We will boycott the general election on the Lord's Day, 3rd November 1946.
2. The Provisional People's Committee must clarify a hidden intention of the election on
Sunday. Change the date right now! 172
Keeping the Sabbath is highly important in Christian life. However, in general, it has been
natural to hold some national business on Sunday in East Asia, where there is no concept of
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the Sabbath in the people's traditional religions.
Yang-sun Kim, Op. Cit., 68.
171 A. Clark, Op. Cit, 242.
172IKCH ed., Op. Cit, 398-399.
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The Communists took the Christian opposition to the election seriously. Kim Il-sung, the
secretary general of the Provisional People's Committee, invited ten Protestant leaders, who
were close friends of his father, Kim Hyung-jik, at the Sungsil Christian Secondary School, to
his house. Here is a record of their conversation on the election:
Kim: Why do you oppose the general election? I think that the election of people's
representatives is good for democracy of this country.
Ministers: We agree that the election is good but we cannot participate in it on
Sunday Sabbath.
Kim: In the Bible, Jesus said that we can do ordinary activities on the Sabbath, if they
have a good purpose. As you know, the Pharisee who criticized what Jesus did on
the Sabbath was finally shamed. If the general election is good for the people, there
is no reason to reject it because of its date. Do you also elect elders and deacons on
Sunday? Don't you?
Ministers: Yes, we do.
Kim: I believe that there is no religion which is against something good for the people
because believers also love their fatherland and people. Please, participate in the
election, which is such a good activity. This is the first time in Korean history to elect
representatives of the people for the government by the people.174
Hence, we can say that at first Kim Il-sung and the Committee tried to persuade the Protestant
leaders, who were from the educated elites in North Korea. However, the leaders did not alter
their decision. Rather, they strengthened it, continuing to deliver the anti-election decision to
the local congregations. This approach caused an aggressive reaction from the Communists.
Kim spoke on 1st November 1946 as follows:
Rejecting general election is trying to give another colonial yoke to the people... They
are those who do not agree with the sovereignty of the people... There are some
Christian ministers who are against the election. However, if they are patriotic
ministers, they should not reject it. They use their religious cult or doctrine as an
excuse. In fact, it is not for their religious intention, but they must have some other
purpose. I affirm that there is full religious freedom in North Korea. I have a suspicion
that the Protestant ministers who are against the election could be a spy of the
175
enemy.
From this, it seemed that Kim and his followers might have no more expectations of the
Christians, and they could be ready to do something drastic. In this context of tension, the
177
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Preparatory Committee of the Christian Association, which had been started by some
Christian socialists in June 1946, made a statement based on an entirely different approach.
1. We fully support the Kim ll-sung government.
2. We do not recognize the South Korean regime.
3. The Church vows to be leader for the minjung.
4. Therefore, the Church participates in the election on its own initiative. ,7"
However, this approach represented a small minority in northern Protestantism in 1946.177 On
3rd November 1946, the day of the election, the moderator of Pyungseo Presbytery, Yang-sun
Kim noted that a large majority of congregations of the FPJP boycotted the election.178 They
did not go to their homes after Sunday worship, but had prayer meetings until midnight for
protection from the "Red Dragon". The Provisional People's Committee therefore extended
the election until the next Monday morning, to give an opportunity for the Christians to
vote.179
However, already it was not a matter of date for the Christians. "The Christians were ready to
be martyred for eternal kingdom in Heaven,"180 as their ancestors had done against the
Japanese idolatry. Here, we can find that the opposition paradigm between church and state in
the issue of Shinto Shrine worship influenced the new situation. From the beginning,
Protestant Christianity in Korea had a mono paradigm of church-state relations based on
conflict, since it had opposed both the monarchy and the Japanese state. Therefore, the
Protestant Christians were not familiar with the idea they could cooperate with state power in
North Korea, even although Kim Il-sung's group had fought in the frontline of the
independence struggle.
On the other hand, acting differently from what they had done on the issue of shrine worship,
in this case, the "Lapsed leaders" within the FPJP led the boycott of the election. They did so
for two reasons. Some were afraid of the Communists' political slogans about "the clearance
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of Japanese legacy" and "judgment of the pro-Japanese," while others felt guilt for their
cooperation with the Japanese. Therefore, they wanted to recover their orthodoxy by rejecting
the Communist government.
In conclusion, the Protestant leaders misinterpreted the meaning of the separation of church
and state as an anti-Communist struggle. They failed to distinguish the church from politics
because their strong anti-Communist position also had a political intention. Theologically,
northern Protestantism rejected the election from a puritan perspective on the issue of the
Sabbath and church-state relations. However, political, economical and socio-historical
motives were mixed in, and lay behind their rejection.
4.3 Land Reform: A Key Factor
The conflict between the Christians and the Communists in North Korea was caused mainly
by an ideological confrontation. However, behind this conflict, the Christians were also
concerned about disadvantage they would experience as a result of the social transformation
program of the Communists. Land reform was a key issue here. This was one of the factors in
the confrontation.
4.3.1 The Democratic Reformation
As soon as Kim Il-sung's Communist guerilla came back to North Korea, they introduced a
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reforming program in order to develop a socialist revolution in North Korea. The program
was not put forward as if it could be completed in one go. Rather, it would develop bit by bit,
in a sequence.
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On 8th February 1946, on the occasion of the Joint Gathering of the Political Parties and
Social Organizations in North Korea, Kim Il-sung suggested the "Anti-Imperial, Anti-Feudal
183Revolution" as an urgent task for the Communist revolution to accomplish in North
1 84
Korea. The North Korean Communists understood that clearing the remains of Japanese
colonialism, and the pro-Japanese landlords, was a highly important'task on the way toward
building up a Communist society in North Korea.
For this purpose, he organized the Provisional People's Committee in North Korea. The
committee enacted several laws before the general election such as "The Law on Land
Reform" on 5th March, "The Labor Law" on 20th June, "The Law on Equality ofWomen and
Men" on 30th July and "The Law for General Election" on 5th September in 1946.185 Kim Il-
sung summarized the purpose of the laws as: 1) to reform land, and nationalize key industries,
taking them out of the hands of pro-Japanese people and landlords, 2) to secure the rights of
labor and women, 3) to establish a people's regime through democratic election and 4) to
develop a people's economy.186
In spite of his ambitious plan, the democratic reformation program faced serious challenges
from the Christians. In politics, the Christians rejected the general election. In economy, the
Christians resisted the program of land reform, which was against the personal interests of
many of them, as well as the plan for the nationalization of key industries. This was related to
the church's desire to keep its mission properties, including its hospitals and schools.
4.3,2 Nationalization of Key Industries and the Protestant Churches
According to the Law of the Nationalization of Key Industries, schools and hospitals were
also objects of nationalization, under the category of social facilities.187 The Nationalization
would confiscate individual properties from North Korean people due to the Communist
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economic idea. However, we need to note that "ninety percent of all industry belonged to
• • *188
Japanese individuals or corporations." Indeed, the Nationalization of Key Industries was
urgently necessary in North Korea after the liberation, so as to retain these industries to
Korean control.
As we already noted, when Korea was liberated 80% of all hospitals and schools in North
1 OQ
Korea were managed by the northern Protestant churches. Therefore, the Communist policy
ofNationalization of Key Industries was a serious challenge for the churches. It was not only
an issue of property but posed problems for carrying out their Christian mission. The northern
churches understood that the nationalization of schools and hospitals meant losing their
strongest mission tools and strategy. However, from the Communist point of view, education
and health service were key social infra structures for establishing a socialist society in North
Korea.
To avoid this, the Christians tried to prevent the establishment of a Communist government in
North Korea. The Christians thought establishing an alternative government would be the best
way to keep the churches' properties for mission, through organizing Christian political
parties. When this aggressive method failed, they chose the method of boycotting the general
election, which was the next most powerful resistance.
However, the issue of Nationalization of Key Industries was not as serious for the Christians
as that of land reform. In practice, the Christian schools and hospitals were only gradually
nationalized from 1947 onwards.190
4.3.3 Land Reform and Christian Elites
Different to the issue of the nationalization of key industries, the land reform in North Korea
was developed rapidly. In his speech of 8lh February 1946, which inaugurated the Provisional
People's Committee, Kim Il-sung spoke of the need for a thoroughgoing renovation of the
"feudal" land situation in the North.191 He pointed out that only 5% of the entire land was in
188 A. Strong, "North Korea", The New Statesman andNation, vol. 35. No. 880, 17 January 1948, 47.
189 In-chul Kang, "A Recognition of Modern Religious History in North Korea", in Heung-soo Kim
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1901KCH ed., Op, Cit., 408.
191 Kim Il-sung, Kim Il-sung Jangun Jungyo Nonmoonjip, (Selective Writings of General Kim Il-sung),
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the hands of the farmers in North Korea. On the contrary, 95% was controlled by Japanese
1Q?
and pro-Japanese landlords.
In March, the northerners attacked the problem at its roots, at the bottom of Korean society, in
the villages. In so doing, they broke the power both of a landed class of centuries' duration
and of the pro-Japanese. They accomplished this by organizing those with the least to lose,
making poor peasant and agricultural laborers the shock troops in some 11,500 rural
• • 193committees organized, under people's committee aegis, to push reform through.
As later happened with the Chinese land reforms, "anti-traitor" meetings were held, and
reform enforcement regulations stated that all peasants must participate in compiling a list of
individuals who would have their land confiscated, "in order to expose pro-Japanese".
Absentee landlords had their land confiscated for redistribution, unless they had also engaged
in anti-Japanese resistance. A total of 4,751 landlord households had their land taken,
although most of them were allowed to either keep 5 Chongbo194 or 49,587 square meters.'95
Land was also confiscated from previous Japanese holdings and various public institutions
and churches, and was then distributed as follows:
Pyongyang, KWP Press, 1948, 16.
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Table 8) Redistribution of Land in North Korea
Category No. of Households Amount of Land Received
Landless peasants 407,307 583,304 Chongbo
Smallholding peasants 255,993 336,039 Chongbo
Agricultural laborers 5,540 14,855 Chongbo
Landlords moved to other counties 3,911 9,622 Chongbo
According to official American sources, this North Korean land reform was achieved in a less
violent manner than that in China and North Vietnam. "From all accounts, the former village
leaders were eliminated as a political force without resort to bloodshed, but extreme care was
taken to preclude their return to power."197 American intelligence reports at the time also
noted the lack of violence.198 It was amazing that the North Korean Communists completed
the land reform within one month of announcing the law, and within two months of
establishing the Provisional People's Committee.
In his report on 10th April 1946, Kim Il-sung summarized the historical meaning of land
reform in North Korea as follows. Firstly, North Korea achieved a fundamental basis for
achieving the task of people's democracy through land reform. Secondly, the North Korean
Communists obtained people's support through land reform. Lastly, the land reform in North
Korea, which was the first in Asia, was significant not only for the people in the Korean
peninsula but also for democracy in Asia.199
In fact, it was unique that the land reform in North Korea was bloodless and had wide support
from the people.200 Even, after the land reform, there were ubiquitous posters saying, "thank
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you, General Kim Il-sung" for the land. However, Kim Il-sung also criticized several
problems in practicing the land reform as follows: Firstly, he pointed out opportunism
196 The account here is taken from Minjujueui Minjok Chosun ed., Chosun Haebang illyunsa, (History
of the First Year of Korean Liberation), Seoul, Munuinseogwan, 1946, 431-432; 439-440.
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because some Communist party members sold their land just before the land reform. Secondly,
there were cases of land under 5 Chongbo being confiscated. Lastly, due to lack of education,
some farmers menaced landlords and plundered their properties. Kim defined this tendency,
as an inclination to the left, because he believed the former landlords should still be allowed
202 • •
to posses 5 Chongbo for their daily economy. However, it must be a horrible memory to
landlords who had their land confiscated. Already, a large number of Korean landlords,
mostly pro-Japanese, had fled to the South when the Law was announced.
The church land was no exception to the reform. Kim Il-sung thought if there was an
exception, land reform could fail. Therefore, he included every sort of land for reforming and
for redistribution, including even land holding by the Communists. The one exception he
made was for landlords who had supported the independence movement. Here is the rule for
operation on the land of religious institutions:
Bylaw, Chapter II. 7: According to the article 3. d of the Land Reform Law, the land of
churches, temples and other religious organizations which is over the 5 Chongbo
should be confiscated. This article is restricted only for the land, which is cultivated by
the peasants or the employed for a purpose of exploitation. This article does not
apply to the land of churches, temples and other religious organizations which they
are cultivating themselves.
Example) If a church cultivates 3 Chongbo by themselves and let 6 Chongbo rent to
tenant farmers, only the 6 Chongbo land should be confiscated.21)4
Due to this rule the Provisional People's Committee confiscated the land of churches, temples
and other religious organizations. It was only 1.4% (15,195 Chongbo) of the total confiscated
land (1,066,246 Chongbo), and most of the land confiscated from religious organizations had
been Buddhist.202 Therefore, at first glance, it seems as if the confiscation of land was not a
serious issue for the Christians.
However, if we go on to consider Christians as individuals, a different result comes out. As
we have seen, the Protestant Christians in North Korea upgraded their social class during
Japanese rule, through education. They often ceased to be minjung, and become an elite.
Usually, social elites in Korea have had land as a method of keeping their wealth, because
202 Kim 11-sung, "The Results of Land Reform", Op. Cit., 25-26.
203 B. Commings, Op. Cit., 416.
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Korea was an agricultural society. This was still the case in the 1940s. There were three major
groups of landlords in Korea at the time of the land reform issue, namely traditional landlords,
pro-Japanese landlords and Christian elites. However, the majority of the traditional landlords
were in the South, and the pro-Japanese landlords had already fled there too when the Law
was announced. That means the Christian elites were the most victimized landlord group
when land reform was actually put into practice.
The Christian elite did not inherit their land from their fathers, and they had not been awarded
it by the colonial powers due to anti-national cooperation. For the Christian elites, the land
was a symbol of their pioneer struggle and spirit, which had led them from being minjung in
the early history of Christianity in Korea to becoming elites in "the Jerusalem in the East",
through the blessing of God and by their sweat and efforts. Kim Il-sung noted, "There were
no ministers and elders who had no land, therefore, they complain about the practice of land
reform."207
It was almost impossible for the Christian elites to give up their land, which they finally had
come to own after generations of effort through their puritan style of life. They were ready to
do anything else, if they could keep their land. They cursed the Communists and lazy peasants
because, unlike them, they had succeeded to escape poverty by their own efforts.
If we approach the issue of conflict between the Christians and the Communists from this
context, we can understand why Protestant Christians in North Korea chose such a strong
method of reaction, including the formation of Christian parties, the MFIM demonstration,
terrorism and boycotting the general election. The Christians tried to protect their land
through a political power struggle. Indeed, behind the conflict, the issue of land reform was a
key factor.
4.4 United Front: The Religious Policy of Kim Il-sung
To analyze further the causes of the conflict between the Christians and the Communists,
which decisively influenced the future of Protestant Christianity in North Korea, we also need
to examine the religious policy of the North Korean Communist regime.
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207 Kim Il-sung, Selective Writings ofGeneral Kim Il-sung, 134.
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4.4.1 The Christian Background of Kim Il-sung
Kim Il-sung (1912-1994) was "the Great Leader" in North Korea for almost fifty years after
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was established in the northern region of the
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Korean peninsula. Even though his political title was prime minister, and later president, his
power was much more than the western notion of such terms. Most people outside North
Korea describe him as a dictator and some even describes him as a leader of a quasi-
religion.209 However, two things are obvious: that he was one of great leaders in the anti-
Japanese struggle and the North Korean people have respected him as a national father. His
historical significance in North Korea is far-reaching, and beyond doubt.
Kim was born Kim Sung-ju on 15th April 1912, in Pyongyang, to a very poor peasant family.
He was the eldest of three sons, and followed his family into Manchuria because his father
was one of leaders of the independence movement there. He attended primary school there but
later his father sent him to Changduk School in Pyongyang to be educated in the Korean
context. When his father became ill, he then returned to Manchuria and attended grammar
school and middle school there. However, he was expelled from the middle school for his
leadership in the Communist youth league and imprisoned for six months. When he was
released from jail, his parents were already dead, killed in the struggle for national
independence. He then followed his parents' spirit by organizing the anti-Japanese
Communist guerilla movement.210
Kim's relation with his Christian family is very significant. For example, when he missed his
Christian mother and remembered the memory of her religious life in 1989, his son, Kim
Jong-il, the current state head of North Korea, and Communist leaders, immediately allowed
the reopening of the Chilgol Church in her hometown.211 Therefore, the Christian background
208
Concerning Kim's life, see, his autobiography, Seki wa Deobuleo, (With a Century: Autobiography),
8 vols. KWP Press. In addition to this, also see followings in English, Dae-sook Suh, Kim II Sung:
The North Korean Leader, New York, Colombia University Press, 1988; Bong Baik, Kim II Sung:
Biography, vol. 1-3, New York, Guardian Books, 1970; C. Lee, "Kim II Sung ofNorth Korea",
Asian Survey, vol. 7, 1967, 374-382.
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Sacrifice Book Co., 1999.
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Dae-sook Suh, Op. Cit., 3-5; Kim Il-sung, Op. Cit., vol. 1, 345-361.
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of Kim Il-sung is worth studying since it had an influence on the religious policy of the North
Korean government.
Kim Il-sung was born in a Christian family in Pyongyang.212 Nevertheless, the first contact of
one of his ancestors with Christianity had been unfortunate. When the warship General
Sherman, with the first Protestant missionary to Korea, J. Thomas on board, attacked
Pyongyang, his great grandfather Kim Ung-woo was a leader of the civilian army that resisted
9 1 T •
and eventually won the battle. His father, Kim Hyung-jik (1894-1926) became a Christian
when he was a schoolboy.214 Kim Hyung-jik was educated at the Sungsil Christian Secondary
School, which was the best school in the whole of Korea. According to Lak-joon Paik, the
Sungsil School was founded to educate future Christian leaders. To study there, students were
• • • 215
required to have recommendations from both a foreign missionary and a Korean pastor.
This suggests that Kim Hyung-jik must have been a sincere Christian.
In his autobiography, Kim Il-sung remembered two things importantly in relation to his
father's Christian life. The first memory was that his father taught him, "If you want to
916
believe in God, believe in the God of Korea, not the foreign God." The second thing was
that when his father was arrested for organizing Chosun Kukminhoe, or the Society for the
Korean Nation (a secret organization promoting the independence movement) some Christian
leaders held an early morning prayer for his release at the Myungshin Christian School, where
917 . • . . . . •
his father taught. However, his father died soon after his imprisonment, when Kim was still
218
a primary school student.
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Kim's mother, Kang Ban-suk (1892-1928) was born in a famous Presbyterian family in
219
Pyongyang. Her father, Elder Kang Don-uk was an important Christian leader, who
established the Changduk Presbyterian Church and Changduk Christian School220 with the
991
American missionary, Samuel Moffet. Her name "Ban-suk" means "Peter, the Rock," taken
from Matthew 16, 18. According to her friend Sung-rak Kim, "she was a highly religious
laywoman leader."222 Two years after her husband's death, she too passed away.223 Kim II-
sung had lost his Christian and nationalist parents in his early years.
Lastly, Kim Il-sung himself also had his own history of Christian life. He received a Christian
education at the Changduk Christian School, which his grandfather-in-law had established.
994 •
Rev. Yang-uk Kang was one of his teachers there. Remembering his childhood, Kim said,
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"I was surrounded by Christians." After he moved to Manchuria, he regularly attended
worship services and served as a Sunday school teacher at the Kilim Presbyterian Church,
until he became a Communist.226
Kim entered the Hwasung Euisuk, which was a Korean nationalist military boarding school
following the recommendation of friends of his father's. However, he was disappointed with
this place, because the nationalists were seriously divided against each other, and it seemed to
him that they would never succeed in the independence struggle. When he started to frequent
a Communist student circle in Kirin, he become convinced that Communism was the best way
to liberate the colonized fatherland and the suffering people. Therefore, he moved to Yuwen
Middle School in Kirin, taking a distance from the nationalists. Kim met a Communist teacher,
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Sangwol, and he studied the classics of Marx-Leninism, including Das Kapital, under his
227influences there.
Nevertheless, even after he became a Communist, Kim had support from Korean Christian
nationalists in Manchuria for his anti-Japanese guerilla struggle. He used to hide himself in
churches to avoid the Japanese, and would borrow church buildings as suitable places
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educating the masses, and raising their consciousness.
In brief, we can say that he was born and grew up in a family that was both Christian and
nationalist.
4.4.2 Kim Il-sung's Understanding on Religion before the Korean War
Kim Il-sung's understanding of religion is noteworthy. When he argued with his guerilla
comrades on the issue of accepting religious people into his army, he criticized the
interpretation other Korean Communists were giving to Marx's statement about religion being
the opium of the people, in the following way:
We must not interpret the Marx's definition of that 'religion is the opium of the people'
radically or one-sidedly. The definition cautions an illusion of religion but does not
means to oppress religious people. There are many patriotic religious leaders for
example, the Christian and Tonghak nationalists. We should work together with these
999
patriotic religious people in the way of national liberation.
It is obvious that Kim's open understanding on religion before the Korean War was
influenced by his own Christian background. He separated himself from the more extreme
Communists whom he termed "leftist," on the issue of religion. He favored working with the
Christians due to their support for his guerilla struggle in Manchuria.
Kim was influenced by his father's Christian nationalism. He also followed his father's
instruction to "Believe in the God of Korea." When the issue of the Sunday election was
227
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being debated, Kim criticized Christianity in Korea from a self-reliance perspective as
follows:
Christians should cease a wrong attitude praising the foreign missionaries. It is not
necessary to praise America as a model Christian nation and to appreciate sending
missionaries. Christianity in Korea should be a patriotic religion of Korea for the
benefit of Korean people.230
This suggests that Kim favored Christianity provided Korean Christians would be patriotic
and nationalistic. He believed that the liberation of a suffering nation must be top of the
agenda, even in religion.
However, he recognized that before the Korean War "the leftist sectarians oppressed the
Christians in local areas without proper consultation with the Central Party." He claimed that
this had not been his intention.
If there were some Christians who were in trouble, they might be the Christian leaders
who were involved in anti-revolutionary political behavior, but they were not suffering
because of their religion. I fully support religious freedom... I believe that Communist
revolution should be based on sincere love for people, not hating others. In that
sense, I think religion is helpful for the revolution because religion teaches people to
have love and charity for others.231
Most historians in South Korea are skeptical about quotes like these. They think of them
• • 9T9 • • •
merely as rhetorical propaganda to the outside world. " Whether Kim's claim represents his
real intention or not, however, two things are clear: firstly, Kim had his own progressive
interpretation of Marx's definition of religion, and secondly, he highly emphasized
• • • • 9^T •
cooperation with religion in the struggle for liberation and revolution. These two points
were not the usual perspective among Communist leaders in the context of 1940s Korea. Kim
even stated that "Christianity and Tonghak are most important religions" for the work of the
United Front.2j4 These two were specially important because they had a sort of internal,
religious orientation towards the liberation of the oppressed.
230 The Pyongyang Shinmoon, 27 June 1987.
231 Kim Il-sung, Seki wa Deobuleo, vol. 5, 367.
2'2 For representative works from this approach, see, Kyung-bae Min, Kyohoe waMinjok, (Church and
Nation), Seoul, CLS, 1981; Tae-woo Goh, Bitkhan eui Jonkyo Jungchaek, (The Religious Polocy in
North Korea), Seoul, Minjok Munhwasa, 1988.
233 J. Bonino interprets Marx as saying that the proletariat must not waste its forces in a useless and
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recognize the positive role of religion in revolution. J. M. Bonino, Christians andMarxists: The
Mutual Challenge to Revolution, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1976, 51.
234
Kim, Il-sung, Ibid., vol. 5, 383.
137
It is this context, and within the strategy of forming and maintaining a United Front, that Kim
introduced his religious policy.
4.4.3 United Front Tactics and Religious Policy
The united front tactics were suggested by the Third Communist International (Comintern) in
1921 for the application of the revolution in the Third World countries. The Communist
party and the Comintern branches in each Third World country were asked to join in an
alliance with the bourgeois revolutionary forces as a transitional stage toward the proletarian
revolution. A united front has been present in Marxism whenever Communists have sought to
enlist the support of non-Communists for the revolution. Such tactics were often employed in
East Asia countries. They were crucial in Mao's Chinese revolution because there was a lack
of industrial workers, the army of revolution, in China.236 Before 1949, the united front served
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as a strategy for defeating the Japanese in China.
9-30
There were two streams of united front work in Korea during Japanese rule. One, as we
indicated in Part One, was the Shinganhoe, a united organization, on movement for or the
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Korean Fatherland Restoration Association, which was organized by Kim Il-sung in the
1930s. The first of these resulted in failure because of inner conflict and Japanese suppression.
The second did better. Dong-hyun Paik has evaluated that Kim's united front was successful
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in Manchuria, especially in linking Communists with Tonghak leaders and Christian
nationalists.240
On account of this success in Manchuria, Kim believed that a united front would be the most
appropriate tactic for the Korean revolution.241 Before 1945, the idea of a united front served
to unify all kinds of anti-Japanese forces under the banner of patriotism. From 1945-1950,
promoting national construction and realizing people's democracy were the main issues
treated under the notion of a "united front."242 From 1950-1972, when the KWP sought to
mobilize support and enthusiasm for socialist reconstruction, it again did so on the basis of the
united front ideology. Since 1972, this same ideology has become a symbol for of the
reunification of the fatherland, a "united front" being needed to make the Korean peninsula
one entity again.
The period from 1945-1950 was crucial, Kim gave a new definition to the United Front in
October 1945. "All Chosun (Korean) people should be united for an anti-imperial and anti-
feudal democratic revolution," he said. For this revolution, "not only proletariats but also
conscientious intelligentsias, religious leaders and nationalistic capitalists were invited to join
the United Front".243 Kim organized the Minjujueui Minjok Tongil Junsun (KiziiiiKKMi
ifefjc) or Democratic National United Front (DNUF) on 22nd July 1946. He invited
intellectuals, fair and just landlords, and businessmen and patriotic religious leaders to join
into the DNUF for the task of national construction and people's democracy.244
However, in 1946, it becomes clear that the Christians and the Communists were not ready to
work together. Indeed, both of them seriously confronted each other. When they had had a
common enemy, the Japanese, it was easier to work together for a common goal, the
liberation of the fatherland. Now, however, they put forward different ideologies, expectations
and directions for reconstructing a new state in the Korean peninsula. Dong-kun Hong
240
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remembers that "in July 1946, there were anti-Communism revival prayer meetings in
virtually every church, every night, in Pyongyang." "It was impossible to accept Kim's
proposal for the FPJP because the Christians were angry after the land reform."245
In these circumstances, a disappointed Kim Il-sung started to consider the necessity of
creating "pro-Communist Christianity," or pressing for "the renewal of Christianity in a
Marxist land." He needed to reconsider his optimistic approach expecting the Christian
cooperation through the work of a united front.
On the other hand, there were Christian socialists who had a different response in the new
situation.246 They favored Kim's reforming program, and the clearance of the colonial legacy.
They also believed that northern Protestantism should be renewed as a religion of the minjung.
When these two needs came together, a new Christian organization emerged in North Korea,
the North Korean Christian Association (NKCA).
5. The North Korean Christian Association: A Renewal from Above
5.1 The Changes of Organizational Name
Before we study the response of the NKCA, it is necessary to clarify the changes of name the
Association went through. Historians generally use only the name Chosun Kidokyo Ryunmaeg
or Korean Christian Federation, in describing the so-called "pro-
Communist church" in North Korea. However, even though this organization can be traced
throughout the relevant period, it has not always carried the same title.247
In his book, Yang-sun Kim states that "the Kidokyodo Ryunmaeng emerged in November
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1946." It was A. Clark who translated the Kidokyodo Ryunmaeng as the Christian
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League.249 After this, the Kidokyodo Ryunmaeng or Christian league in people's mind as the
name of an organization, which existed from 1946-1953, compromising Christians who were
favorable to the government. Most historians assume that, after ceasing to exist in 1953, the
Kidokyodo Ryunmaeng was revived as the Chosun Kidokyodo Ryunmaeng or Korean
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Christian Federation, in 1974. However, this organization had in fact existed and acted
since 1946, albeit under a variety of names. These names were as follows:
• Bukchosun Kidokyo Ryunhaphoe or North Korean Christian Association, 1946-1958
• Chosun Kidokyodo Ryunmaeng or Korean Christian Federation, 1958-1999
• Chosun Chrisdokyo Ryunmaeng or Korean Christian Federation, 1999-Present
According to an official communication of the KCF, the inaugural name of the organization
was not the Kidokyodo Ryunmaeng or Christian League, but the Bukchosun Kidokyo
Ryunhaphoe (It IS H/* #), or North Korean Christian Association.2?l When
operating under this name, both the denominational bodies and individual Christians had
membership of the organization. However, after the Korean War, the membership of
denominations did not have any meaning because all denominational assemblies had been
abandoned, most of the leaders and members being fled to the South. Therefore, the
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organization had to adjust its structure, and changed its name at its general meeting in 1958.
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is highly significant for our study. Those who ignore the history of this organization between
1953 and 1974 are mistaken.2"'4
5.2 The Activity of NKCA before the Korean War
5.2.1 The Establishment of the NKCA
There was a group of Protestant pastors who supported the Democratic Reformation Program
955
of the Communist regime. The pastors often exchanged ideas on the reformation
program. After the confrontation on the occasion of the MFIM ceremony, the group paid
attention to Kim's proposal about the work of a united front. However, they were a small
minority group in the FPJP. When the FPJP rejected the united front and announced their
boycott of the election, this group considered organizing a separated Protestant Christian
institution. As we already noted, they also made a statement in support of the general election.
When the Christian leaders rejected his proposal of forming a united front, Kim developed
further ideas for setting up a new Christian organization in North Korea. Hence, after the
election, he invited the leading pastors, and suggested they establish a patriotic Christian
educational institution.
With Kim's encouragement, the pastors therefore organized the NKCA on 28th November
1946. The NKCA was founded and promoted as an ecumenical organization among the
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Protestant churches in North Korea. However, Presbyterians, who were the majority among
Protestants in North Korea, were in fact the main leadership of the NKCA. The inauguration
of the NKCA seemed to be successful. The NKCA pastors invited the famous revival
movement leader Very Rev. Ik-doo Kim to be the chairperson and Very Rev. Eung-soon Kim
to be vice-chairperson, and they accepted. The central committee was filled with famous
254 The historians, who made this mistake, made uncritical use of South Korean governmental sources,
not an adequate substitute for primary sources.
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pastors in North Korea.
At the inauguration assembly, the NKCA approved the following general principles:
1. On the basis of Christian charity, we will advocate patriotism among people, and
cooperate with the work of national construction for the complete independence of
Korea.
2. We will struggle against evil and sin in order to construct a democratic Korea, and
make efforts to develop "morality and justice."260
3. We will strive to secure the freedom of the Christian mission, and freedom of speech,
the press, assembly and association.
4. We will strive for the development of Christianity in North Korea.261
The NKCA stood clearly on the pro-Communist side. It intended to cooperate with the
Communists in establishing the democratic reform program. On the other hand, the NKCA
also tried to protect the churches and the Christians, seeking to develop a renewal of
Christianity in North Korea. It presumed that even in a country dominated by Marxist-
inspired government, such a renewal would be possible.
When A. L. Strong, a famous reporter on the Chinese Communist revolution, visited North
Korea in 1947, she interviewed Rev. Yang-uk Kang, general secretary of the NKCA. Kang is
reported to have justified both Christian opposition to the Japanese and Christian support for
Kim over the election issue as follows:
Under Japanese colonial rule, religion and politics had to be separated. The church
opposed the Japanese State. Some religious leaders believed that this paradigm
should also be adopted over the issue of election. However, I believe that if the
election had some good purpose aiming to approve urgent laws and to establish an
independent nation, all citizens and organizations, including religious ones, had to
participate in the election and need to cooperate with the government.262
This interview clearly shows that the NKCA distinguished between the Japanese state in
Korea and the Korean Communist state. A different paradigm of church-state relations had
25y IKCH ed., Ibid., 397.
260 The original text is "Do-euF, in Chinese "jHli". The author cites the translation of "illJ§" in
Editorial Division ed., A Modern Chinese-English Dictionary, 20th edition, Beijing, Foreign
Language Teaching and Research Press, 1996, 175. N.B., in Korean usage, the "iHH" also possible
to have a religious meaning in relation to "7ao (il) or Way."
261 The text taken from, Chosun Joongang Nyungam, (Yearbook ofNorth Korea), Pyongyang, KWP
Press, 1949, 92. Archival No. 488, The Ministry of Reunification.
262 A. Strong, "North Korea, Summer, 1947", in N. Kim et. al., Haebang Jeonhusa eui Insik, (A
Recognition of History of the Liberation), vol. 5, Seoul, Hankilsa, 1989, 513. The author did not
find the original English text, but has translated back from the account of it in Korean.
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emerged in North Korea, quite different from the traditional paradigm based on opposition. A
new cooperation paradigm between church and state was emerging, and being promoted by
the NKCA.
5.2.2 NKCA vs FPJP
After the general election, the respective political positions of the NKCA and FPJP were in
clear opposition to each other. When the North Korean People's Committee was inaugurated
in February 1947 through the election, the number ofNKCA leaders appointed to important
posts of the Committee was noteworthy. For instance, Rev. Yang-uk Kang became secretary
general of the SPA. The NKCA had become a politically powerful religious organization in
North Korea.
By contrast, the FPJP was organizing the Christian Liberal Party. As they had done in 1946,
the FPJP again held a MFIM memorial worship and anti-Communist demonstration on 1st
March 1947. However, this time the participants were reduced to 1,000. After the failure of
the Christian Liberal Party, the eighteen top party leaders, who were at the same time leaders
of the FPJP, were arrested by the People's Committee.264 When they were released, they
escaped to the South, and the FPJP faced a leadership crisis. This brought about a further
weakening of the FPJP. The FPJP then boycotted the election of delegates for the SPA, on
25th August 1948. The People's Committee responded to this boycott by placing even stronger
• 9^5
restrictions on the activities of the FPJP."
There was not only a different approach to political issues but also ecclesiastical tension
between the NKCA and the FPJP. This tension was evident at Pyungseo Presbytery meeting
in October 1948, held at the Yochon Presbyterian Church. At the meeting, the Presbytery
cancelled the membership of Rev. Yang-uk Kang and Rev. Sang-soon Park, on the basis of
the FPJP's decision in relation to the general election in 1946. This had stated that "in the
event that an acting church minister enters the field of politics, he must resign his office in the
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church." Moreover, the Presbytery did not allow the entrance of pro-NKCA students to the
Dukshin Bible College, which it managed.266
This decision was crucial in stimulating the NKCA to grasp the ecclesiastical hegemony
within the Protestant church in North Korea. After the Presbytery meeting, the NKCA
responded by allowing the membership of lay people, and started to organize local branches at
province and county level. By the end of 1948, the membership of the NKCA had increased
to 85,1 18.267 Chang-joo Kye reported that "most Protestant pastors entered the NKCA by
April, 1949."268
It is clear that during 1949 the Christians were seriously considering how they could survive
under the Communist regime. Many may have moved from the FPJP to the NKCA for their
own security. There were several cases of former FPJP pastors being compelled to join the
9AQ • . • • •
NKCA. There is evidence of Communist authorities indirectly supporting the NKCA's
gaining hegemony over ecclesiastical power by discriminating against, or even persecuting
the non-NKCA pastors. For example, non-NKCA pastors were often classified in the
"reactionary" category, 270 and some anti-Communist and anti-NKCA Protestant leaders
971
disappeared.
When the NKCA took over ecclesiastical power from the FPJP, it introduced a radical
restructuring of northern Protestantism. In December 1949, the NKCA officially dissolved the
FPJP, and organized the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in North Korea. The
NKCA claimed that it was necessary to organize a separated Assembly because the southern
Institute for North Korean Studies, Op. Cit., vol. 2, 409-411.
267 The Yearbook ofNorth Korea, Pyongyang, KCNA, 1949, 92. Ministry of Unification Archival No.
488, microfilm.
268
Chang-joo Kye, "The Nature of the North Korean Christian League", in Heung-soo Kim ed., Op.
Cit., 338-339.
269
Chang-joo Kye, Ibid., 339-340.
270 A secret report by North Korean intelligence stated that non-NKCA pastors were carefully watched
by the local authorities, and some of them classified as reactionary people. "Draft of Domestic
Affairs Report: Activities of Reactionary Powers", Ministry of Unification archival document no.
484.
271 For example, Rev. Duck-young Bae, the principle of the Sunghwa Theological Seminary and Rev.
Soon-chun Cho, the principle of the Dukshin Bible School disappeared after refusing to allow their
school to be unified with a NKCA seminary. See, Man-chun Hong, "Christianity in Early Kim II-
sung regime and Rev. Yang-uk Kang", North Korea, February, 1990; reprinted in H. Kim ed.,
History of the North Korean Church after the Liberation, 361-371.
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Presbyterians had already done so. At the same time, the NKCA absorbed the Pyongyang
Theological Seminary directly under its authority. It was also absorbed the Sunghwa
Methodist Theological Seminary and changed its name to the Christian Theological Seminary
in March 1950.273 The NKCA seems to have been in virtually full control over the Protestant
churches in North Korea prior to the Korean War (1950-1953).
5.2.3 NKCA, CDA and United Front
Within the united front in North Korea, there was also a South Korean Christian organization.
Although most of the Christians in South Korea had supported the USAMGIK, some
associated themselves with the NKCA. In order to see how this happened we must give an
overview of events in the South. Most of the Protestant Christians in South Korea supported
the USAMGIK because they greatly appreciated the USA, the country which had spread the
Gospel to Korea. Furthermore, most of the Christian elite were USAMGIK members, and had
974
been educated in the USA on the recommendation of the missionaries. In contrast to the
Christians in the North, Southern Christians cooperated well with the new capitalist authority.
Nevertheless, there was also opposition. Land reform was also a burning issue in South Korea.
The USAMGIK did not re-distribute land which had been confiscated by the Japanese
Colonial Government. Moreover, the USAMGIK protected the land of pro-Japanese Korean
landlords who had obtained huge estates by cooperating with the colonial power. Anger
exploded when the USAMGIK refused to permit the establishment of labor unions. This led
to the "October People's Struggle" in Taegu in 1946. Hundreds of thousands of people
participated, and the US Army fired on the parade and many people died.275
In this context, in the South, a process of renewal similar to that initiated by the NKCA was
introduced by Rev. Chang-joon Kim. Unlike the other Christian leaders, Kim stood near to
those 'left-wing' people whose political motto was anti-USAMGIK. He justified his choice as
follows:
2/2IKCH ed., Op. C/T, 415.
273 S. Masahiko, Op. Cit., 243.
274 For instance, 6 out of 11 Korean ministers in the USAMGIK were Christian reverends and elders.
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See, Kyu-Hong Yun, "A Study of Political Theology and the Line of the Rev. Moon-Sik Choi", in
Heung-Soo Kim ed., Op. Cit., 1992, 242-246.
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The Christian takes the righteousness of God as the criterion of all judgment. What
we experienced in the "October People's Struggle" is that political peace without
economic justice, such as pax Romana, is different to pax Christi which God gives to
us.276
Kim organized a Christian leftist group, Kidokyo Minju Dongmaeng (H;(ft) 59.) or
Christian Democracy Alliance (CDA), on 24lh February 1947. However, on that day, at the
venue of the meeting of promoters, the 405 participants were terrorized by Seobuk Chimgnyun
Dan, a Christian youth organization that was essentially political and specifically anti-
Communist. Most of its member had fled to the South from the North where they became
strong supporters of the USAMGIK.277
Kim reinforced his criticism of the USAMGIK on the occasion of the inaugural ceremony of
the CDA, stating that "the USAMGIK which together with Syngman Rhee, is protecting pro-
Japanese power and trying to establish a divided government, is an anti-democratic tyranny,
and can be identified with the anti-Christ." He urged the CDA to "start a strong struggle
against this tyranny because the original ethos of Christianity is not in protecting the few
278vested rights of a class, and justifying their oppression, but injustice and peace".
The CDA, however, was unable to develop its renewal program because the organization was
made illegal by the USAMGIK. In April 1948, Chang-Joon Kim was invited to the
"Conference of Representatives of All Party and Social Organizations in Korea" at
Pyongyang, to discuss reunification. However, he did not "return" to the South after the
279
meeting.
In North Korea, Kim took a lead in organizing the Democratic Front for the Reunification of
the Fatherland (DFRF), which was the organization that developed out of the former
• • • 280Democratic National United Front. He was elected as its secretary general in 1948. The
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279 Committee for Recording National History, Bukhan Kwankye Saryojip, (A Collection ofNorth
Korean Historiographies), vol. 6, Seoul, Committee for Recording National History, 1987, 111. To
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developed as a meeting point between the KCF and the KWP. Kim's appointment was recorded in
KWP, "The Registration Report of Social and Political Organizations", September 1950.
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NKCA in the North and the CDA in the South represented Protestant Christianity in the
DFRF, the united front.281 However, in reality, it was not possible for the CDA to join the
united front fully because all the other members were in the South, and they were cut off from
their leaders in the North.
5.3 A Renewal from Above
The NKCA had a new perspective on the Communist reform program. The leaders of the
NKCA believed that this reform was moving in the correct direction for the minjung, and for
national independence. Therefore, they accommodated themselves to the Marxist context, and
supported Kim Il-sung. They also worried about the conflict that had arisen between the
Christians and the Communists, and intended to protect the churches in North Korea by
showing Christian patriotism. The NKCA developed a new paradigm of church-state relations
based on cooperation. The NKCA sought a renewal of northern Protestantism within its
Marxist context, not in opposition to it.
On the one hand, it can be said that the renewal program of the NKCA was at first highly
successful, because vast numbers joined the Association and it took the hegemony of
ecclesiastical power by 1949. On the other hand, however, we can say that the renewal of the
NKCA soon failed, because during the Korean War the majority of North Korean Christians
chose to move to South Korea.
There were several problems in the NKCA's renewal program, just as there had been in the
FPJP's resistance program. Firstly, the renewal of the NKCA was a renewal "from above",
not "from below." The NKCA leaders used a top-down method for their renewal, using their
ecclesiastical power. Although the top-down method is easier and quicker than an approach
that starts from the bottom, it makes it difficult for ordinary Christians to participate in a full,
self-affirming way in the renewal program. It seems that the ordinary pastors and Christians
who at first supported the NKCA's renewal simply interpreted it as a strategy for Christian
survival. They therefore did not persevere with it, and eventually decided that flight to the
South would be a more effective means to that end.
281
In the Monument of the United Front, there were 56 constituency organizations. The NKCA and
the CDA represented Protestant churches in Korea. The Epitaph of the United Front Monument,
Ssuksum Island, Taedong River, Pyongyang, 2 May 1948.
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Secondly, in spite of its ecumenical intention, the NKCA brought another division of the
churches. On the issue of the reconstruction of the churches, the conservative Protestant
Christians separated themselves, while the progressive Protestant Christians organized
another Protestant Christian Assembly in the North.
Thirdly, there are similarities between the ways in which both the FPJP and the NKCA were
politicized, although they each used a different paradigm of the church-state relationship. The
NKCA identified with the Communist regime without any proper, constructive criticism of
that regime. Therefore, there was a danger of becoming an "imperial religion," blessing
political power. The NKCA leaders seem not to have realized that Communism was also a
secular power, which could also become corrupt and transform itself into an absolute power.
Just as southern Christians gave uncritical support to the USAMGIK and its capitalist
ideology, so the NKCA was equally uncritical in its approach to the Marxist state in the North.
Lastly, the renewal program of the NKCA proceeded without any clear theological basis. The
NKCA leaders depended on ecclesiastical power to develop their renewal. However, it is only
when a renewal program is backed up by a theology, that it can bring fundamental changes.
Perhaps the leaders of the NKCA knew that the theological task would take a long time and,
whereas they had to act quickly under the pressure of events. Whatever the reason for this
failure, the consequence was that when the Anti-Religious Campaign started after the Korean
War, the NKCA leaders had no theological weapons with which to defend the Christians
against the Communist ideological attack.
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Chapter IV
The Korean War and the Churches, 1950-1953
In this chapter, we will examine the way in which the Christian ideological struggle with
Communism developed during the Korean War. It will be argued that in spite of the renewal
of Protestant Christianity initiated by the NKCA after the liberation, the northern churches
mainly kept their anti-Communist stance. They remained politically pro-South Korea, pro-
capitalism, and pro-America. It will be shown that not only the Korean churches but also the
WCC, due to its ideological preference, supported South Korea, the USA, and the UN during
the war. The WCC at this time argued and preached anti-Communism. This was one of the
main causes of the persecution of Christians in North Korea, because the Communists
regarded Christianity as an anti-patriotic reactionary religion supporting their enemy. It will
be also argued that the North Korean Christian support for the Allied Army, and the mass
exodus ofNorthern Christians to the South that resulted therefrom, brought about the isolation
of the churches in North Korea.
1. The Korean War
1.1 The Outbreak: Who Started the Korean War?
In 1948, two separate governments were established in the southern and northern parts of the
Korean peninsula. From this point onwards, both of them campaigned for the reunification of
the two Koreas. Both of them claimed political legitimacy for their government, and their
ideology, to rule over the whole peninsula. In this process, they were also tempted to unify the
nation by military force rather than by peaceful means. Finally, the worst national tragedy in
five thousand years of Korean history, the Korean War, broke out in 1950.
The official South Korean position on the origin of the Korean War has been that "in the early
morning of 25th June 1950, the North Koreans suddenly opened a general invasion all along
the 38th Parallel against a sleepy, unprepared South."282 In the western world, it has also been
282 Ki-baik Lee, Hankuksa Shimon, (A New History of Korea), 480.
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accepted that the Soviets and North Koreans stealthily prepared an attack that was completely
unprovoked.
However, North Korea has asserted that South Korea started the war with the support of the
US, while North Korea was making efforts to reunify the country by peaceful means:
Comrades! The puppet army of traitor Rhee Syngman has opened an unjust armed
invasion against North Korea all along the 38th Parallel in this early morning...The
Republic's government (North Korea) warned the enemy to cease the reckless armed
attack so as to prevent a large-scale war, and also declared that if they do not stop
this hazardous armed attack, they must have full responsibility of causing this war.
However, the arrogant enemy is developing a full-scale war. The enemies have
784
already invaded about 1 or 2 kilometers north of the Parallel.
The USSR and China supported this account. However, South Korea and the US have
• 78S
continued to believe that Kim Il-sung simply told a lie to justify his attack.
In the field of the Korean War studies, only recently, has documentary evidence been
produced to demonstrate that the responsibility for making a "general invasion" across the
parallel lies with the North. Myung-rim Park examined Russian secret documents on the
Korean War, to which access has been allowed after the end of the Cold War, and came to
'JO/'
this conclusion.
However, B. Cumings claims that although North Korea opened a "general war", South Korea
had first made a "local attack" in the Ongjin peninsula on 23rd June 1950, before the outbreak
787 788
of the general war, and had occupied Haeju city in the North. According to him, this
local attack suddenly spread eastward and developed into a general war on 25th June.289
281 Reference Division, Central Office of Information, Korea, London, November 1958, Quote No.
R.3965, Classification 1.2d, 9. This report was based on the report of the UN Commission on Korea.
However, B. Cumings criticizes the Commission's work, "UNCOK's report was drawn together on
the morning of June 26, then finalized in Japan on June 29, based exclusively on American and
South Korean sources and on the military observer's report, on which some preliminary work had
been done on June 24 before hostilities commenced". B. Comings, Korea's Place in the Sun, 265.
284 Kim Il-sung, Kim II Sung Chujakjip, (Works of Kim II Sung), vol. 6, Pyongyang, KWP Press, 1979,
1.
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taken from, www.geocities.com/Pentagon/1953/ muccio. htm.
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Ongjin is located at the west-end of the 38th Parallel.
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As a matter of fact, however, this was not the first "local attack" on the North by the South.
The first fighting lasted four days in May 1949, and took an official toll of 400 North Korean
and 22 South Korean soldiers, as well as upwards of 100 civilian deaths in Kaesung,
according to South Korean figures.290 Kim Il-sung reported that the "South Korean army
291
made 432 armed attack across border" in 1949. There is evidence that this border fighting
was mostly caused by the South Korean attacks. The US ambassador in Korea, Muccio,
reported that the border battles in 1949 began at Kaesung on 4th May, in an engagement that
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the South started, trying to invade further northward.
The war that came in June 1950 followed nine months of battles along the 38th Parallel in
1949. The border conflicts in 1949 caused the preparation of a civil war between the two
Koreas. In the South, President Syman Rhee developed the policy of Bukjin Tongil (it'Mffli
—) or Reunification by Invasion of the North, based on the limited victories gained in border
fighting in 1949. In the letter of 30lh September 1949 from Rhee to his adviser R. Oliver, Rhee
said:
I feel strongly that now is the most psychological moment when we should take an
aggressive measure and join with our loyal Communist army (sic) in the North to clear
up the rest of them in Pyongyang. We will drive some of Kim ll-sung's men to the
Gupta, "How did Korean War Begin?", The China Quarterly, No. 52, 1972, 699-716; D. W. Conde,
An UntoldHistory ofModern Korea, vol. 2, 1967, and tr. J. Choi, Hankuk Chunjang: Ttohanaeui
Sigak, Seoul, Sakyejul, 1988; N.B., According to Myung-rim Park, "Because the CIA prohibited the
publication of Conde's book in the US, it was published in Japan in 1967 and translated in Korea in
1988". Myung-rim Park, Ibid, 461. See also, J. Holliday and B. Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War,
New York, Pantheon Books, 1988, 71-74.
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Seventeenth Regiment had occupied Haeju in North Korea. B. Cumings, The Origins of the Korean
War, vol. 2, 568-588. The UK military attache in Tokyo cabled on 27lh June a similar report, F0317,
piece no. 84057, "Gascoigne to FO", June 27, 1950.
290 North Koreans replied with counterattacks against South Korean occupation of several territories in
North Korea. The worst fighting of 1949 occurred on 4th August when 6,000 North Korean border
guard soldiers attacked South Korean army units occupying Unpa Mountain north of the border.
New York Times, 5Ih August 1949. The North claimed that because the South Korean Paekkol unit
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The Nodong Shinmun, 6th February 1950.
291 DPRK National Security Department, "Jungchi Bodo mil Damwha Jaryo", (Materials of Political
Press Release and Statements), unpublished Paper, July 1950, 21.
292 US National Archives, 895.00 file, box 7127, "Muccio to State", 13th May 1949.
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Chulwon)". US National Archives, 895.00 file, box 946, Muccio, "Memos ofConversation", 13th
and 16th August 1949.
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mountain region and there we will gradually starve them out. Then our line of defense
must be strengthened along the Tuman and Yalu River (i.e., the Sino-Korean border).
294
This letter is crucial evidence that the South Korean army was not "entirely," organized solely
"for defense" purposes, as was claimed in the report of UN field observer, J. F. Dulles.29:1 On
the contrary, Rhee wanted and tried to invade North Korea in the name of reunification. At
the end of the August fighting, Muccio described the situation as follows:
There is increasing confidence in the Army. An aggressive, offensive spirit is
emerging. Nerves that were frayed and jittery the past few months may now give way
to this new spirit. A good portion of the Army is eager to get going. More and more
people feel that the only way unification can be brought about is by moving North by
force.296
South Korean attacks across the border in 1949, and the intention of war, made Kim Il-sung
nervous because North Korean army forces were far smaller than those of South Korea.297
The situation changed fundamentally in early 1950. Due to the success of the Chinese
Revolution, Korean soldiers who had fought in the Chinese People's Liberation Army
returned to North Korea in large number. Their return dramatically increased North Korean
army strength to 95,000 by June 1950.298
Now, Kim Il-sung also started to consider liberating the South Korean people "suffering"
under the "Pro-Japanese and Pro-American traitor Syngman Rhee" by military means. He
pointed out that "because of American colonial policy, the former pro-Japanese landlords
continued to monopolize the land, and the majority of people had been exploited by them
294 Oliver became the US ambassador in Korea during the Korean War. "From Syngman Rhee to
Robert Oliver", 30th September 1949, in R. Oliver, Syman Rhee andAmerican Involvement in Korea,
1942-1960, Seoul, Panmun Books, 1979, 251. Warren Austin, the US representative to UN, at the
UN Security Council in 1950, denied that this letter existed and claimed that Soviets fabricated it.
However, Oliver validated the existence of the letter many years later. See, Ibid., 252.
295 Dulles maintained that the South Korean Army was organized entirely for defense purposes. See,
Reference Division, Central Office of Information, Op. Cit., 9. J. F. Dulles will repeatedly appear in
this chapter, especially in relation to the WCC Toronto Statement on the Korean War.
296 US National Archives, 895.00 file, box 946, "Muccio to Butterworth", 27th August 1949.
297 Rhee rapidly expanded his army in 1949: army strength was at 81,000 in July and 100,000 by the
end ofAugust. R. K. Sawyer, Military Advisers in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War, Washington
D.C., Office of the ChiefMilitary History, 1962, 58. However, in the North, there were only two
infantry divisions and one tank regiment until August 1949. Myung-rim Park, Op. Cit., 341.
298 For details, see, Myung-rim Park, Op. Cit., 341-351. North Korean army strength became "at least
100,000 more" than that of the South. The China-linked Korean soldiers were well trained and had
abundant battle experience. B. Cummins, Koreas Place in the Sun, 247.
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without land reform".299 Based on this understanding, Kim planned the Chokuk Habang
Junjaeng ('Tib PIM tk ffe ) or National Liberation War, which meant a military attack on the
South.300 Stalin advised Kim to wait until a South Korean attack occurred and then
counterattack. This would provide a justification for the war.301 Mao promised Kim: "If the
US army becomes involved in the war and invades North Korea across the parallel, China will
send military forces to support you." He did not want to face the US army on the Chinese
border, so Kim had the support and assurances he needed.
On the other side, Rhee also got a clear message from Washington that he would get
TOT
American support when South Korea was attacked. Myung-rim Park maintains that South
Korea and the US also prepared a counterattack scenario, similarly waiting for the North
Koreans to launch the first attack. The scenario set out three stages in the case of a North
Korean invasion: firstly, retreat; secondly, counterattack; finally, occupy the whole of North
of Korea.304 The same logic was being followed in Seoul and Pyongyang, and also in
Washington and Moscow, regarding the outbreak of the war.
By mid-1950, things were tense, with each side waiting for the other to start it. The two
Koreas were ready to fight in the name of reunification. The US, the USSR and China all
wanted a "limited war", outside their own territory. Each hoped the war would be to their own
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Furthermore, Park Hun-young, the leader of the Communist party in South Korea encouraged Kim
by stating: "If the revolutionary army march to the South, more than 200,000 Communist guerillas
will rise against Rhee and the US". Myung-rim Park, Op. Cit., 151.
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From the above research on the origins of the Korean War, it seems that at the local level
South Korea impatiently made the first attacks, and then waited for North Korea to open
the general invasion.
1.2 The Process
Both Koreas justified the Korean War as a national reunification war. The war concluded with
an armistice on 27th July 1953, having lasted virtually for three years.307 For the first three
months of the War, the North Korean Army had extraordinary success, pushing South Korean
and American forces southward. The North Korean Army captured Seoul in three days, and
within a month only Kyungnam province was left in the hands of South Korean forces. In
spite of the intervention of American and UN allied forces, the retreat of South Korean and
American forces continued until mid-September 1950. However, on 15th September 1950, the
allied forces of South Korea, the US and the UN, commanded by General D. MacArthur,
counterattacked the rear of the North Korean armies by landing at Inchon, a point about 100
miles below the 38th Parallel and on a line with Seoul. After the success of the Inchon
operation, the allied army crossed into the North on 30th September and marched to the Yalu
River. In November 1950, only a small part of Hambuk province was left in North Korean
hands.
The UN's intervention in the Korean War was the first military action in her history. From
the beginning of the War, the US had participated, as promised to Rhee. However, President
Truman sent American air and naval power to Korea "without congressional approval". The
lack of such approval meant that Truman could not call for general mobilization. Therefore,
he brought the issue to the UN on 27th June, to cover the shortage of ground soldiers. Truman
106 Rhee failed at the second general election in May 1950. His party got only 56 seats but the
opposition had 154. According to well-known historian Ki-back Lee, most South Korean civilians
understood this result as a vote of non-confidence in President Rhee. Therefore, he needed to take
some strong action to change this atmosphere. Ki-baek Lee, Op. Cit., 479. Possibly, Rhee ordered
the local attack to entice Kim Il-sung's general invasion.
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called his intervention in Korea a "police action"309 so that he would not have to get a
declaration ofwar.
The Security Council of the UN met on 27th June 1950. The US delegate submitted a draft
resolution, which recommended that "the members of the United Nations furnish such
assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to
restore international peace and security in the area".310 On the other hand, the Yugoslavia
delegate presented a draft resolution, which suggested introducing mediation between the two
Koreas and inviting a North Korean representative to the Council. This was to ensure that the
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North Korean view on the outbreak of the war would also be heard. The Yugoslav draft
• T1 9
resolution received no support from the Western representatives. It was fortuitous for the
USA that the USSR was deliberately absenting itself from the Security Council at this time in
protest against the non-representation of Communist China in the UN. Had the USSR been
present, it would certainly have vetoed the US resolution.
On 29th June, North Korea rejected the decisions of the Security Council as 'unlawful',
principally on the grounds of the absence of the USSR, one of the permanent members of the
Security Council.313 In this attitude, North Korea was supported by the USSR and by all other
"Soviet-orbit" states, which declared the Council's decision unlawful and accused South
Korea of aggression/14 In spite of this declaration, the UN Secretary-General transmitted the
Council's resolution the same day to all member states and asked assistance for South Korea.
Due to the resolution, in addition to the US army, 15 other nations sent their armies, including
n i r
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12,000 British soldiers. Thus, a civil war in Korea developed into an international war.
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When the allied army eventually crossed into the North, it can be said that it was the
beginning of a new war, because this action definitely went beyond that defensive "Police
Action" which the UN had agreed. "J. F. Dulles was a key advocate of rollback".316 Dulles
emphasized that it was "the first opportunity to displace part of the Soviet orbit".317 However,
This "rollback" brought another international intervention in the war, with the Chinese
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becoming directly involved. In mid-December 1950, the allied army had been driven back
to the 38th Parallel. The battle line was eventually stabilized along the parallel in spring 1951.
On 10th July 1951, truce talks started. The negotiation dragged until after the US presidential
election in the autumn of 1952. D. D. Eisenhower, who strongly criticized the unpopular war,
won the election and rapidly developed an armistice,319 which was concluded on the 27th July
1953. The battle line was accepted as a de facto new boundary between North and South
Korea.321
316 B. Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, 276. Dulles asked J. Allison to report in a top-secret memo
to the National Security Council. Allison justified the rollback by saying that the parallel was agreed
upon "only for the surrender of Japanese troops and that the US had made no commitments with
regard to the continuing validity of the line for any other purpose" National Archives, 795.00 file
box 4265, Allison, "The Origin and Significance of the 38th Parallel in Korea", 13th July, 1950.
However, there was a logical contradiction because if the parallel was not valid in 1950 and the US
Army could freely cross it, how could the US condemn North Korea to the UN as an invader, when
it crossed the parallel?
317 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United State, 1950, vol. 7: Korea, Washington,
D.C.,1976, 386-387.
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Concerning Chinese intervention, see, A. S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision To
Enter the Korean War, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1968; R. E. Appleman, Disaster in
Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur, College Station, Texas A&M University Press, 1989.
319
Concerning Eisenhower's Korean policy, see, H. W. Brands, "The Dwight D. Eisenhower
Administration, Syngman Rhee, and the 'Other' Geneva Conference of 1954", Pacific Historical
Review, vol. 56, 1987, 59-85.
320 This armistice was signed between North Korea and US, not South Korea because Rhee had
handed over the right of command of South Korean army to MacArthur during the war. The
armistice has been the key issue of the peace talks between North and South Korea until now
because North Korea insists that the peace agreement must be made with the US, not with the South.
But, US does not accept this claim and does not return the right to South Korea yet. Rhee wrote to
MacAthur, "I am happy to assign to you command authority over all land, sea and air forces of the
Republic of Korea during the period of the continuation of present State of hostilities". "From Rhee
to MacArthur", 15th July 1950.
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Concerning the truce talk, see, S. D. Bailey, The Korean Armistice, New York, St. Martin's, 1992.
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1.3 The Results: Not a Dream, But a Nightmare
The dream of reunification resulted in a nightmare of killing. The Korean conflict brought
about a tragic internecine war on the peninsula, which also intensified the international
conflict. More tonnage in bombs was dropped on Korea than on the whole of Europe in the
Second World War, reducing the entire peninsula to ashes. The Korean War resulted in
220,000 South Korean, over 600,000 North Korean, 1,000,000 Chinese, 140,000 American,
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and over 16,000 other UN military casualties.
It should be also remembered that the Korean War killed millions of civilians. There were
1,000,000 South Korean and 3,000,000 North Korean estimated civilian casualties.323 About
100,000 civilians were listed as "killed or missing" in the South324 and 1,200,000 in the
North.32:1 That means that, including soldiers, over one sixth of the whole Korean population,
which was about thirty million in 1950, were killed during the war. In addition to this, ten
million people became separated from their own closest family members, and have remained
unable to meet each other from the end of this war until now.326 During the war, 43% of
327Korea's industrial facilities were destroyed and 33% of its homes devastated.
From the above statistics, two things stand out: first, that the number of civilian victims was
enormous, and second. North Korean damage was much greater than that of the South. There
were three reasons for this. Firstly, in the North, one of the major reasons for the vast number
of civilian victims was the massive indiscriminate bombing carried out by the US air force.
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From the beginning of the war, the US was superior in air power. The B-29 planes dropped
329the recently introduced napalm bomb like "monsoon rain" in North Korea. For example, on
3:2 The New Encyclopedia Britannica, Macropedia, vol. 10: Knowledge in Depth, London,
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1978, 513.
323 Ibid. For more detail statistics, see, D. Rees, Korea: The Limited War, New York, St. Martin's, 1964,
460-461.
,24 D. Rees calculates 117,000. Ibid., 460.
325 The Hankyoreh, 25th June 2001, reported this figure quoting from Russian secret military
documents of the Korean War.
,26 Man-kil Kang, Kocheo Ssun Hankuk Hyimdaesa, (The Revised Modern History of Korea), Seoul,
Chanjak kwa Bipyungsa, 1994, 226.
327 The New Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. 10, 513.
,28 The main US air force was jet planes. However, North Korea had a small number of propeller
airplanes. R. F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce,
1961.
329
See, J. Holliday and B. Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War, 187-189.
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29lh August 1952, 1,403 sorties were flown; an official communique said that 10,000 liters of
napalm were dropped 'with excellent results'; 62,000 rounds of ammunition were employed
in 'strafing at low level'; 697 tons of bombs were dropped in seventy-eight North Korean
... . .
cities and towns. North Korea reported 6,000 civilian deaths in Pyongyang from one raid
alone/31 G. Barrett of the New York Times described the civilian victims as follows:
The inhabitants throughout the village and in the field were caught and killed and kept
the exact postures they held when the napalm struck-a man about to get on his
bicycle, fifty boys and girls playing in an orphanage, a housewife strangely unmarked,
holding in her hand a page torn a Sears-Roebuck catalogue crayoned at Mail Order
No. 3,811,294 for $2.98 "bewitching bed jacket-coral".332
According to J. Halliday, "this indiscriminate bombing strained relations between the USA
and its allies, especially Britain". The British Foreign Secretary, A. Eden, was openly critical
of the bombing of civilians/33 This bombing was even a motive for the defection of the
British spy in North Korea, before and during the Korean War, G. Blake, who became a
double agent, acting for the USSR. Blake himself attested to this years later in an interview:
Interviewer: Is there one incident that triggered your decision to effectively change
sides?
George Blake: It was what I saw happening in North Korea. The relentless bombing
of small Korean villages by enormous...American flying fortresses. People, women
and children, and old people, because the young men were in the army. I saw from
my eyes, and we might have been victims ourselves. It made me feel ashamed. Made
me feel ashamed of belonging to these overpowering, technical superior countries
fighting against what seemed to me quite defenseless people.334
However, the US army did not listen to Eden's advice and the policy of "torching" villages
continued. In addition to human casualties, 600,000 houses, 5,000 schools, 1,000 hospitals
• • 335
and surgeries and 8,700 factories were destroyed by bombing from 1950-1951 in the North.
There were also considerable numbers of civilian massacres during the War, carried out by
the US ground army. The famous painter, Pablo Picasso, drew a picture entitled Massacre en
30 J. Holliday and B. Cumings, Ibid., 189.
331 A total of 420,000 bombs were dropped on Pyonyang during the war, which had a population of
400,000 before the war. J. Holliday and B. Cumings, Ibid., 188; For another example, "on
November 8, 1950, seventy B-29's dropped 550 tons of incendiary bombs on Sineuijoo, 'removing
it from the map'; a week later Hoeryung was hit with napalm 'to burn out the place'". B. Cumings,
The Origins ofthe Korean War, vol.2, 753.
v'2
Quoted from, B. Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sim, 295.
333 J. Holliday and B. Cumings, Op. Cit., 188.
334 "Red Files: Secret Victories of the KGB-George Blake Interview", PBS, downloaded from
www.pbs.org/redfiles/kgb/deep/interv/k_int_george_blake.htm
335
Kyungje Kunsul, (The Economic Reconstruction), September 1956, 5-6.
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Coree in 1951. He portrayed the US army killing Korean civilians, mostly pregnant women
and children. Recently, two Associated Press (AP) correspondents proved that Picasso was
correct. The AP writers report that about 400 civilians, who were largely elderly people,
children, infants and women, were killed by the US army at Nogunri on 28th July 195 0.336
This was not the only massacre of civilians by US troops. For example, 35,383 civilians were
killed by US army in Sinchon, North Korea. B. Cumings lists a serious of mass killing by
US troops and recognizes that the majority of civilian casualties during the war came about as
TOO
a result of American operational mistakes. An American soldier said:
"But, hell, they've all got on those white pajama things (Korean traditional dress) and
they're straggling down the road"..."Women? I wouldn't know. The women wear pants,
too, don't they?" "They're troops. Shoot'em".339
American thought anyone in "white pajamas" might potentially be an enemy. "From this
point on, American forces began burning villages suspected of harboring guerillas".340
According to a sensitive British war correspondent, American troops usually began their
hunting operations with burning and firing villages in enemy area. "There were few who
dared to write the truth of things as they saw them".341
There were also civilians who actively supported one side or the other, and for that reason
were killed either by the North or the South Korean armies. The number of those deliberately
executed in this way was much smaller than those killed by the indiscriminate military
operations of the US forces. At first. North Korea strongly prohibited killing civilians because
receiving local support from ordinary people, particularly from farmers and peasants, was one
of most important tactics of their revolutionary war. However, a number of brutal atrocities
were perpetrated against civilians as they retreated, when their occupation of the South ended.
336
See, S. Choe, C. J. Hanley and M. Mendoza, "Bridge at No Gun Ri", 30th September 1999, AP
Press. These three reporters won the Pulitzer Prize in 1999. The full text can be downloaded from
the AP Press website, www.wire.ap.org/Appackges/nogunri/story.html. They found 120 names of
victims. Among the 120, 70 were women and most of the men were over fifty. There were also 25
children and infants under five. See, "Bridge ofNogunri - Victims",
www.wire.ap.org/Appakages/nogunri/victims.html. This massacre was ordered by an American
commander. Ser No-80-Fm:8A: Controlled Movement ofAll Refugees.261000K Jul 50;
www.wire.ap.org/Appackges/nogunri/orders_8tharmy.html. However, Major General H. R. Gay
told a lie that North Korean troops killed the civilians at Nogunri at that time. S. Choe et al., Op.
Cit., 8.
337 Manchester Guardian, 4th December 1950.
338 B. Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, 269.
,39 E. Larrabee, "Korea: The Military Lesson", Harper's, November 1950, 51-57.
,4t) B. Cumings, Op. Cit., 269.
341 R. Thompson, Cry Korea, London, MacDonald, 1951, 39; 42.
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The North Korean army killed thousands of political prisoners, families of the South Korean
police and of the Pro-Rhee people, including some Christians. They did so despite the high
North Korean officials continuously warning against executing people.342 General Mu Jung,
the commander of the Second Crops, was purged by Kim Il-sung because "he executed people
without proper legal process like the brutal act of a feudal monarch".343
The South Korean police were also involved in a mass killing of political prisoners and
families of Communist guerillas. For example, from 2nd-6th July 1950, South Korean police
executed 7,000 people at Yangwol with the supervision of American military advisors.344
These people were either imprisoned guerillas or their relations. Other civilian killings by the
armies of the South occurred in North Korea during the South Korean occupation of the
North.342 The Korean peninsula was indeed a "killing field" during the war, especially in the
North.
2. The Korean War and the Churches
Byung-uk Chang criticizes Korean theologians: "I am shocked that there is not a single
'confession of faith' or theological reflections on the Korean War. I expected there would be
some critical statement of the Christian position on the war".346 This could be something of an
overstatement. However, it is true that we can hardly find any theological works on the issue.
Although some outstanding research has been published since Chang's criticism,347 it is still
difficult to find studies of Protestant Christianity in North Korea during the Korean War.
342 "Do not execute the reactionaries for (their) wanton vengeance. Let legal authorities carry out the
purge plan". "Handwritten Minutes of a Korean Worker's Party Meeting", 7th December, 1950,
MacArthur Archives, RG6, box 80, ATIS issue no. 29, 17th March 1951.
343
Mu Jung was purged on 21st December 1950 at the third Central Committee Meeting of the KWP.
Kim Il-sung, Kim Il-sung sunjip, (Selective Works of Kim Il-sung), vol. 3, Pyongyang, KWP Press,
1953,140.
344
See, B. Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 2, 669.
345 "I know of course that there is a real different between unprovoked aggression and the kind of
atrocities ofwhich the South Korean army is guilty". "From Visser't Hooft to Nolde", 6th November
1950.
,46
Byung-uk Jang, 6.25 Gongsan Namchim kwa Kyohoe, (The Korean War and Church), 1.
347
See, Chi-joon Noh, "Influences of the Korean War on Korean Religion", Korea Society of
Sociology ed., Hankuk Junjaeng kwa Sahoe Byundong, (The Korean War and Social Changes),
Seoul, Pulbit, 1992, 223-259; In-chul Kang, " The Role of Religion in the Development of Anti-
Communism during the Korean War", Ibid., 182-222; Jung-min Suh, "The Korean War and
Christianity", in Soo-il Choi ed., Hinyun Shinhak kwa Tongil Hinyub Undong, (Jubilee Theology
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Therefore, in this sub-chapter, we will examine Christian approaches to the war, and its
impact to northern Protestantism.
2.1 The War and the Northern Churches
2.1.1 Cooperation: The Response of NKCA
During the Korean War, Protestant Christians in North Korea became sharply divided due to
the ideological confrontation. As the war developed, they were forced to choose one of the
two systems, or ideologies, for survival. Under the Communists, northern churches were at
first forced to demonstrate their patriotism. Later, when the Allied army entered the North,
they needed to prove that their cooperation with the Communists was not their real intention.
In this situation, two extreme positions on the war developed as the Protestant Christians in
the North divided into pro-NKCA and anti-NKCA groups, the latter being former FPJP
members.
From the beginning, the NKCA was highly supportive of the "national liberation war against
American colonists". The NKCA organized a series of Christian rallies expressing Christian
support for the war, with prayers for the victory of the North Korean army. For instance, on
30th June 1950, the "Wonsan Christian Indignation Meeting" expressing anger against the
USA was held at the Wonsan First Presbyterian Church. It adopted a statement that called for
"Christian support for victory in the just war". The Christian Pastors Indignation Meeting
in Pyongyang was held "ecumenically" on 15th August. The meeting, in which most of the
leaders of all the Protestant denominations participated, announced an appeal saying:
Dearly beloved brethren, all Christians and pastors in North Korea!
We sincerely appeal to brothers to defend divine doctrine and justice, and to protect
peace, freedom, reunification and the independence of the fatherland as follows:
- Let all churches hold worship to God for the complete victory of our wise and brave
people's army in the just and holy war for driving out the American imperialists.
- Let us pray for the prosperity of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which
secures religious freedom for Christians and a fully, happy and peaceful life for us.
and Jubilee Runification Movement), Chonan, Institute for Korean Theology, 1995, 396-419;
Joong-hyun Choi, "The Korean War and Messianic Groups: Two Cases in Contrast", PhD Thesis,
Syracuse University, 1993; Heung soo Kim, A Study ofthe Korean War and This Worldly Blessings
in the Christian Churches, Seoul, IKCH, 1999.
148 The Nodong Shinmoon, 15lh August 1950.
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- Let us pray for the just judgment of God upon Rhee Syngman and his followers,
who are the murderers and invaders in this civil war.
- Let us pray for the just judgment of God upon the American imperialists, who
indiscriminately bomb our cities, villages and even our holy sanctuaries.
This war is a just and holy war to secure the reunification, independence, freedom
and peace of the fatherland against the invaders. 149
Here, the war is justified as a just and holy war. Although the NKCA believed that the South
opened the general invasion, it was a high-sounding political appeal, which adopted the
Communist slogans uncritically, ignoring the fact that the North also had responsibility for the
outbreak of hostilities. Their declaration of holy war was certainly an over-justification of the
war. The statement was an uncritical endorsement of the Communist political line rather than
a serious theological reflection.
The NKCA went on further to support the Communists, suggesting a "Prayer Day for
Eradicating the Invader American Imperialists and Traitor Syngman Rhee's Conspirators" on
13th August. The official organ of the KWP reported: "All over the country, a worship for
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victory was held in churches expressing a truly patriotic heart". " Furthermore, some of the
NKCA leaders gave donations for providing weapons for the army, and encouraged laypeople
to participate in the donations.351 For instance, Rt. Rev. Ik-doo Kim, Moderator of the
Presbyterian Church and Chairperson of the NKCA, donated 100,000 Won for this purpose.
This cooperation was a sign of the fact that the NKCA leaders' understanding of the war was
similar to that of the Communists. The NKCA had been born out of a criticism of pro-
Japanese and petit-bourgeois Protestantism in North Korea. It had supported the establishment
of the Communist state and its policies, such as land reform. Therefore, the NKCA's
cooperation with the Communists was not something new. However, this is not enough to
explain why the NKCA, a Christian association, eagerly supported the war. Here is a
quotation, which shows their understanding of the war:
The invasion of our fatherland and the satanic barbarous acts of American
imperialists have provoked the anger of all people in North Korea. It has completely
349
"Appeal to All Patriotic Christians and the Religious", 5th August 1950, The Christian Pastors
Indignation Meeting in Pyongyang. This appeal was signed by thirty-six denominational leaders
including Rev. Yang-uk Kang (Chairperson of the Central Committee, NKCA), Rt. Rev. Ik-doo Kim
(Moderator, Presbyterian Church), Rev. Jin-koo Lee (Vice-Chairperson, Methodist Church).
350 The Nodong Shinmoon, 15th August 1950.
351
See, "Appeal to All Patriotic Christians and the Religious", 5lh August 1950.
352 The Nodong Shinmoon, 7th August 1950.
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removed any remnant of Christian respect for the Americans, who introduced the
Gospel to Korea. Koreans had never hurt the Americans before. However, now
American imperialists have sent their troops to the fatherland, and the troops are
destroying our peaceful cities and villages. They have even massively killed unarmed
women, infants and elderly people. The air force of, a so-called Christian country,
America, bombs cities on Sunday, the Sabbath. They killed Christians who were at
worship by bombing churches. We cannot forgive them. We, Christians, must rise for
the reunification and independence of the fatherland based on our patriotism, in
response to the appeal of our great leader, Kim ll-sung.333
The NKCA leaders clearly did not think of the war as a civil war. They regarded it as a just
war to preserve the independence of Korea against American colonialism. Based on this
understanding, it was possible for them to support the war as an expression of Christian
patriotism.
However, their stance emphasized a one-side interpretation of the Korean War. Even though
the war had some characteristics of a "proxy war" by superpowers, it was certainly provoked
by Koreans themselves as a civil war. When we think about this characteristic, it was
necessary for the NKCA to emphasize peace and reconciliation as a Christian church before
justifying the war. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find any such efforts on the part ofNKCA.
The NKCA had originally intended the renewal of Protestant Christianity in North Korea in
the Communist context. However, renewal should not have meant uncritical assimilation of
Communist policy. Although Rhee certainly did cooperate with pro-Japanese and US troops
to kill many civilians, the NKCA should have considered its justification of the war more
carefully because secular powers often use religious authority for their political purposes. As
a result, the NKCA failed to receive widespread support within Protestant Christianity in
North Korea. Consequently, the majority of northern Christians welcomed and supported the
Allied army when they rolled back the northern advance.
The NKCA's support for the war was an emotional approach, based on ideological sympathy
and diplomatic self-interest, rather than theological reasoning. The NKCA's cooperation with
the Communists during the war was therefore carried on without support from below,
continuing the inadequate leadership style that had already prevailed in the attempted renewal
3x1 "The Speech of Rev. Sung-hoon Kwon", in Ibid.
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during the pre-war period. Even some of the NKCA leaders who had themselves signed the
appeal, chose to move to the South, or remain there, when the situation changed.354
2.1.2 "Exodus": The Response of Majority
From the beginning of the war, according to Eun-kyun Hwang, the majority of Christians in
North Korea, who had maintained their anti-Communist position, waited for the coming of
"the angel of salvation, the US army". " The Allied army finally did roll back occupy most of
the North Korean region in October 1950. When the Allied army entered Pyongyang,
Christians in North Korea seemed "to re-experience the rejoicing of the liberation from the
Japanese".356 On 29th October, the Welcoming Service For the Allied Army was held at the
Seomoonbak Church, gathering 3,000 Christians. This was the same church in which,
earlier on, a victory service for the North Korean army had been held. The difference this time
was that it was now the US army that was being welcomed as a "salvation army".
Hweui Sunwoo, a former South Korean intelligence officer in Pyongyang, described the
atmosphere as follows:
The Christians in Pyongyang, who recovered freedom of faith, thanked God for giving
them the second liberation by sending the Allied army. They organized a Great
Revival Prayer Meeting to glorify the name of God on this occasion. 59
It was indeed a moment of great joy for those Christians who had suffered under the
Communists. However, there was not the same feeling among the majority of non-Christian
civilians, most of whom were peasants. Young-sup Kang, chairperson of the KCF, says:
The vast majority of North Koreans hated the US army because many of them had
lost their family members by the indiscriminate bombing of the US air force. However,
Christians praised the US troops like a crusade of divinely liberating soldiers. It was
shameful for me to say, "I am a Christian".360
See, Kwang-soo Kim, Op. Cit., 247.
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Furthermore, one thousand workers from the Christian Placation Unit came with the Allied
Army up to North Korea for propaganda activity aimed at pro-Communist working class
people. This unit was organized by the Korean Christian National Relief Association,
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cooperating with the Department of Defense. This group of workers was led by anti-
Communist pastors who had fled to the South in order to avoid persecution before the war,
having failed to gain power through setting up Christian political parties. These pastors
included Eun-kyun Hwang, Kyung-jik Han, Hang-rok Cho and Won-ryong Kang and
'if.')
others. Most of the group were also members of Seobuk Chunnyun Dan, or North West
Youth League, an extreme right wing Christian anti-Communist organization. Soon
afterwards, the Christian Placation Unit developed into Chiandae or the Civilian Security
Guard in North Korea. Most of these voluntary guards were sons of former Christian
landlords in North Korea, and were very hostile towards the Communists, and especially
towards those peasants who had occupied their land. There is no doubt that "many Christian
in
young people in the guard were involved in investigating and executing the Communists."
This pro-South and pro-American attitudes of many northern Christians also brought
persecution as the North Korean army retreated.364 During the retreat, the Communist troops
executed a number of Protestant leaders. Young-bihn Lee says, "At that time the Communists
considered Christians as pro-American, and even as US intelligence agents".36" According to
"iff.
Kwang-soo Kim, 156 Protestant leaders were "martyred", most of them in October 1950.
Although the executions were not the intention of Kim Il-sung, they had a crucial effect in
increasing Christian hostility towards the Communists.
361 A. D. Clark, A History of the Church in Korea, 247-249.
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Consequently, when Chinese troops intervened and the Allied army retreated again, a large
number of northern Christians, particularly the leaders, were in difficulty. They would not
stay any longer in the North because they feared the reaction of the Communists. Heung-soo
Kim illustrates:
When the prayer meeting for the Allied army was continuing, Chinese troops started
to roll back the Allies. It was inevitable for the pastors in North Korea to flee towards
the south because the Allied army was defeated by the Chinese troops. It proved that
the placation work was impatient, and failed due to the changes of war situation. Most
Christians could not stay any longer in North Korea because they welcomed and
supported the enemy of North Korea, the Allied army. 167
In the end, a majority of the northern Christians fled to the South with the support of the US
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troops. It is difficult to estimate how many Protestant Christians fled to the South. Before
the Korean War, there were about 2,000 churches, 200,000 Christians, 410 pastors, 498
evangelists and 2,142 elders in Protestant Christianity in North Korea. According to the
statistics of Ki-Jun Koh, after the war only about 20 ordained pastors and 50,000 Christians
were left.370
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The Christians who fled call this event an "exodus", under the guidance of God. Whether it
was indeed an "exodus" or merely an evacuation, Dong-kun Hong criticizes what happened,
claiming that "the evacuation of the pastors is an ethical issue, because they left behind a
quarter of their congregations in the North".372 Byung-uk Chang also criticizes the silence of
theologians on this point. He wonders how the shepherds could evacuate to the South while
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leaving their sheep in the North. On the other hand, the NKCA leaders also failed to
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cultivate Christianity in the Communist context, because only about 20 core leaders ofNKCA
chose to stay the North.
2.1.3 The Remnants
Most northern Christians evacuated to the south in January 1951, when the Allied army
retreated. The battle line stabilized in Spring, and the truce talks began in July 1951. With the
beginning of the talks, the war came to a state of lull. From this point onwards, it was almost
impossible for the Christians to evacuate to the South.
In contrast to the flight of the majority of the pastors from North Korea, it is useful to cite two
outstanding stories of those who kept their ministry in the North. A female evangelist in
Pyongyang, Soon-hyo Kim, said, "All the people are going down to the South, but I will go
up to my home church to die for my sheep". She was invited to the Second Shineuijoo
Presbyterian Church, whose senior male pastor had fled even before the war. She was killed
in the Spring of 1951, because she refused to cooperate with the Communists.374 Kwang-soo
Kim remembers several extraordinary stories of pastors who did not evacuate to the South, in
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order to continue their ministry in the North, and were finally executed by the Communists.
Hence, in addition to the diplomatic and emotional approach of the NKCA, and in contrast to
that approach, there was also an evangelistic approach among of the Christian remnants in
North Korea. These pastors had the same understanding of Communism as Christians who
evacuated, but they chose to be in the North due to their strong evangelistic zeal. However,
most these remnants were executed because they refused to support the Communists during
the war.376
Our second example is Pung-woon Lee, a Methodist pastor in a rural village, who realized
that the church should serve the poor, and thus become an authentic church in the Communist
context. Based on this understanding, he devoted himself to building up a local collective
for their congregations, See, K. Barth and J. Hamel, How to Serve God in a Marxist Land, New
York, Association Press, 1959; G. Baum, The Church for Others: Protestant Theology in
Communist East Germany, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans, 1996, 25-44.
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farming community for the poor peasants. When he died in 1960, the Communists in his
region built a monument in remembrance of his contribution for the peasants.377
Unfortunately, except for the monument, there is no record of his work. However, in him we
can find a new paradigm for a Christian approach to the Communist context. His was a
minjung-centered approach, in contrast to the evangelistic approach of conservative pastors
and the diplomatic approach of the NKCA. However, it is difficult to find other cases of the
minjung-centered approach in this period. This indicates that this approach was not popular
within the NKCA.
For the majority of the Christian remnants in the Communist "Babylon", North Korea, a long
and suffering pilgrimage awaited for them. During the Korean War, 408 clergy members,
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including evangelists, were executed by the Communists, and 1,373 churches burned down.
The 50,000 remaining Christians had to face the Communist reaction and social hostility,
without pastors, and without spiritual shelters, or sanctuaries. Moreover, many of them were
women. According to Dong-kun Hong, in many cases, only fathers and sons evacuated to the
South "to preserve their family name", while women (wives and mothers) and daughters were
left behind.379
During the Korean War, northern churches were divided those that were between pro-
Communist and those that were pro-capitalist. Depending on their ideological preferences,
they cooperated either with the North or with the South, and finally chose one of the two
Koreas. In the North, the NKCA represented the cooperation paradigm between church and
• i 380 • • • •
state, while the FPJP group represented the opposition paradigm. Unfortunately, it is
difficult to find any ecclesiastical efforts towards peace and reconciliation for the whole of
Korea during the war, instead, the Christians were fully involved in the divisions that were
tearing the country apart, some of them taking one side and others the other.
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2.2 The War and the Southern Churches
2.2.1 Christian Support for the War
From the establishment of Syngman Rhee's regime in the South, Protestant Christians were
highly supportive of him. Rhee had been an exile in the USA during the Japanese colonial
period. Therefore, he had little political background in Korea compared to other political
leaders who had led the independence struggle in Korea and in China. To overcome this
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disadvantage, he allied with pro-Japanese, American and Christian political powers. He
combined these three different groups under the slogan of anti-Communism.
Syngman Rhee (1876-1965) was born in an impoverished yangban family. During his studies
in a mission school, he became a Christian. Later, he was educated in America with the
support of Methodist missionaries. Rhee obtained a BA (international law) at George
Washington University and a MA (politics) at Harvard. In 1910, he was then awarded a PhD
in politics at Princeton University. He was the first Korean PhD student in America. After his
PhD, he also studied theology (MDiv) at Princeton Theological Seminary. Rhee said that he
would return to Korea to spread the Gospel after his study and indeed, when he did come
TOO
home it was as a teacher at Seoul YMCA, and as a Methodist missionary.
In 1919, he was elected as the first president of Korean Provisional Government (KPG) in
Shanghai. However, Rhee was expelled from the KPG in 1925 for embezzlement agreeing to
the superpowers having trusteeship over Korea. Thereafter, he lost his leadership of the
independence movement and returned to America. When Korea was liberated, he came with
the US army, and was later elected as the first president of South Korea with the support of
381 When the majority of Korean people asked the removal of the Japanese legacy, he claimed that it
was not necessary because it was time to fight with Communism. In accordance with his claim, the
Pro-Japanese justified themselves as national security guards against the Communists and
threatened whom maintained purging them by branding then as a mere tool of Communists. Kun-ho
Song et al., Haebang Jeonhusa eui Insik, (A Recognition of History Before and After Liberation),
vol. 1,25.
382 The USA considered him as pro-American future Korean president at the end of Japanese
colonialism. See, R. Oliver, Syngman Rhee andAmerican Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960, Seoul,
Pamun Books, 1979. "On his return he managed to gain considerable political power, aided by
certain sectors of American occupation forces". S. MaCune, Korea: Land ofBroken Calm,
Princeton, D. van Nostrand Company, 1966, 101.
383
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the USAMGIK. He was finally expelled in 1960 due to the April Revolution, when he
evacuated to Hawaii.384
Rhee was one ofmost favored political leaders among the Christians in Korea because he was
an elder of the Methodist church, and he regarded Christianity as "a state religion of
TOf
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Korea". " In fact, he often expressed his intention of proclaiming Christianity as a state
religion based on his evangelistic and fundamentalistic faith. He believed that through
Christianization, Korea could become as modernized, wealthy and enlightened as America.
Such intentions found favor with the Christian leaders. Rhodes and Campbell describe the
relationship between Rhee and the Protestant leaders as "cordial and cooperative
relationship".387 However, Rhee did not put his idea of making Christianity a state religion
because, as a practical politician, he necessary also had to consider the other religions present
in the multi-religious Korean society. His religious ideas are nevertheless worth examining.
In Rhee's notion of Christianity as a state religion, his religious, political and personal
motives were mixed. Firstly, he saw himself as a messianic figure; God had chosen him as
president to evangelize Korean people.388 Secondly, he wanted to strengthen his links with
American missionaries and the US government by promoting this idea of Christianity as a
state religion. Lastly, he tried to make alliance with the Christians to grasp political power
because of the educational background and nationalist tradition of the Christians, which
ordinary people respected.
Christians had also been deeply involved in the original establishment of a separate South
Korean state. In 1946, of fifty Koreans who were in official positions in the South Korean
government, 35 were professing Christians. In 1946, of the ninety members of the Korean
384
Concerning his political life, see, R. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth, Greenwood
Publication Group, 1973.
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387 Rhodes and Campbell, Op. Cit., vol. 2, 381.
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somewhat of a patriarch with a messianic complex", "Confidential", WCC Executive Committee,
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Interim Legislative Assembly, the number of professing Christians was 21, including seven
ordained ministers. In the first South Korean National Assembly, of 190 members, the
number of Christians is reported to have been about fifty, of whom thirteen were ordained
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ministers. The vice president was Rev. Tai-young Ham, a Presbyterian minister.
The Christians welcomed not only Rhee's notion of a state religion but also his anti-
Communist stance because "to their fundamentalistic faith, Communism was based upon an
unchangeable atheistic stance". 390 The Christians went on further to support Rhee's
reunification policy, Bukjin Tongil or Reunification by Invasion of the North. According to
Wi-jo Kang, for the Christians, "it was unthinkable to sit and negotiate with the Communist
'devils' of the North" for the reunification.391
The Protestant leaders who had fled before the war, after the policy of entering into political
competition with the Communists in the North had failed, played a decisive role in spreading
such ideas. Eun-kyun Hwang, the former leader of a Christian party in the North, stirred up
the Christians in the South: "Atheist Bolsheviks are eradicating Christians in the North". "We
must fight for freedom of faith and all Christians must rise to defeat the Communists!" As
we have already shown, however, it is difficult to find anything resembling religious
persecution in 1947, when Hwang fled from the North. The Christians who had fled at that
time were nevertheless committed to a religious justification of Rhee's reunification policy,
which they promoted by exaggerating the religious situation in North Korea.
This assimilation paradigm between church and state in the South continued during the
Korean War. The Christian support for the war was strong and broad. On 30th July 1950, the
Protestant churches organized the Korean Christian National Relief Association. This began
work in Taegu and Pusan and then extended its work to some 30 other centers, cooperating
with the government's departments of Defense and Social Welfare.393 In addition to relief
work, propaganda, mobilization and placation were also the main activities of this
organization. Heung-soo Kim states that "the most important task of the Association was
189 Rhodes and Campbell, Ibid., 379-380.
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mobilizing Christian young men and sending them to the battle line".394 It seems true that the
Association was not merely for relief work. For example, in August 1950, the Association
mobilized about 3,000 Christian young men and in October, sent about 1,000 Christian
Placation Unit workers to the North.397
Just as the NKCA justified the war as a holy war against American imperialists, so too the
southern churches presented it as a crusade war against the "Red Devils", the Communists.
On 28th September 1950, when Seoul was recaptured, the churches organized a worship for
victory, inviting Rhee and MacArthur. In this worship, the church leaders defined the war as a
"crusade war" and called for a roll back further into the North. The leaders thought that it
would be impossible to cultivate Christianity in a Marxist land. Therefore, the roll back was
given a religious justification. It was presented as necessary in order to transform the northern
society and ensure religious freedom.
However, this expectation was not achieved, because the Allied army had to retreat again
within a few months. A re-evacuation to the South was carried on due to the retreat. Some
twenty thousand Christians and a thousand pastors were evacuated by the US army with the
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support of American missionaries to Cheju island. This evacuation meant that lay people in
the South were left without pastors, and they therefore had the same kind of experience as lay
people in the North. Won-ryong Kang stated that one day most pastors disappeared without
notice from their congregations. Again, he raised the ethical issue of ministry during the war:
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how could pastors evacuate while their congregations remained behind?
2.2,2 Demonstrations against the Truce Talks
By the spring of 1951, the Allies realized that victory was impossible in the immediate future.
The truce talks began in July 1951. However, Rhee was not happy about opening these peace
talks because he believed that defeating Communism was the only way of unifying Korea.
Instead of the truce talk, Rhee introduced his own schemes: "1) March to the Yalu, 2) all
394
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foreign troops leave, 3) separate ROK military action, 4) 90 day limit on political conference
with commitment by the US to start fighting".399 O.F. Nolde, the director of the WCC's
Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA), bitterly criticized Rhee's
schemes after meeting with him, saying that it seemed as if he wanted "to commit national
suicide".400
However, Southern Christians continuously supported Rhee on the issue of the cease-fire.
Even before the truce talks started, the Christians had sent a message to the Secretary General
ofUN, to the President ofUS and to the General Commander of the Allied army insisting that
"there must not be a cease-fire until the final victory".401 This Christian anti-truce stance was
strengthened when the talks began. On 4th December 1952, the Special Committee of Korean
Ministers from all the mainline churches in Korea, including the Roman Catholic Church,
held an anti-truce demonstration and sent a letter to US the President-elect D. Eisenhower,
who maintained the truce, saying:
We earnestly desire that you will do all possible to bring the war in Korea to a
successful and speedy close, effecting at the same time the unification of our entire
country. 402
Of course, this bringing the war to a "close" was supposed to be accomplished by defeating
the Communists, not by a cease-fire. Already millions of civilians and soldiers had been killed
because of this war, but the ministers still asked Eisenhower to re-expand the war. Eisenhower,
however, refused, and ensured that the cease-fire and the truce talks went ahead.
When the truce talks were rapidly developing in June 1953, a series of Christian anti-truce
demonstrations were organized in most major cities in South Korea.403 On 15th June, the
southern churches made a statement to the world churches in English, saying:
Yet, unreasonable as it may seem to the unenlightened, the whole population of
Korea and her government are opposed to the now proposed cease-fire...Any
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attempt at compromise with them can be linked to an attempt at forcing Christ to
compromise with the devil during His forty days in the wilderness... 1. (It is) Not by
appeasing but by subduing the Communists can Korea have unification...3. The UN
can restore justice and righteousness in the world only by nullifying Communism. 404
The Korean version405 of the statement was even more hostile to the cease-fire. It stated, "The
Christians must not reconcile with the Communists" because "they are devils who cannot
repent forever".406 The Christians also express their disappointment with Eisenhower because
of his efforts for the truce.407 It seems that an anti-Communism ideology overwhelmed the
issue of the cease-fire in 1953 within the southern churches.
One major cause of this phenomenon was the uncritical relationship between church and state
in South Korea. For instance, there was a rumor that the NCCK received financial support
from the government in organizing the above demonstrations. The General Secretary of
NCCK recognized that he received such support from a Christian member of the National
Assembly.408 As a matter of fact, these demonstrations were organized under the instigation of
Rhee, who needed a strengthened anti-Communist drive for maintaining his political power
after the war. This would help him to avoid any possible criticism from his political
opponents, who accused him of responsibility for the outbreak of the war and for its
consequences. Nolde points out that Rhee designated the Day of National Prayer on 4th July
1953. This was a high point of the Christian anti-truce demonstrations.409
The Christian anti-truce stance in the South strengthened the Communists' hostility to
Christianity in the North. The southern Christians thought that in the red North, "neither
churches nor missions can continue,"410 and put all the blame wholly on the Communists.
Their own anti-truce activities, however, were themselves one of the causes of the hostility
the Communists would show towards the northern Christians.
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2.2.3 Just War and Anti-Communist Ideology
It is possible for Christian churches to support a just war.411 The doctrine ofjustum bellum or
just war constitutes the dominant teaching of the mainline churches concerning war.412 Even
though the notion of "just war" originated before,413 in Christian theology, both Augustine of
Hippo and Thomas Aquinas established it as a part of Christian doctrine. Based upon
Augustine's view of war,414 Aquinas argued that a war is justified when three basic, necessary
conditions were met: 1) the war was prosecuted by a lawful authority; 2) the war was
undertaken with just cause and means; 3) the war was undertaken with right intention.41:1 In
the middle ages, the idea of holy war (crusade) developed under the authority of the church,
not the state as such. The aim of a "just war" was for the secular power to preserve justice, but
the goal of a crusade was to uphold, preserve and expand the dominion of the Christian
church.416
During the reformation period, the doctrine of just war developed in two ways. Jean Calvin
took the first cautious step towards allowing for a just revolution.417 John Knox went further,
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allowing people's rebellion against tyrannies. Based on the reformation tradition, the just
war doctrine, which had been "written from perspective of the dominant classes", was "re-
411
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written from the poor and oppressed" as a theology of just revolution in modern
Christianity.419 On the other hand, Hugo Grotius, a 16th Century Dutch Protestant, developed
a secularized just war theory by emphasizing the role of international law in providing just
criteria.420 After Grotius, just war theory was widely recognized in the international arena at
the end of the World War II.421
However, just war theory has been abused over the years to legitimate unjust wars by secular
499
powers. Moreover, modern warfare is total war, which brings mass destruction and
indiscriminate civilian casualties. In the times ofAugustine and Aquinas, war was in a smaller
scale and the causes were clear, but modern wars are more complex, and it is much more
difficult to judge where and whether they are just. Therefore, WCC in Amsterdam in 1948
identified three possible positions that Christians might take towards a modern war, without
reaching a lager consensus: 1) limited participation in a particular circumstance, 2) fulfilling a
Christian duty to defend the law by force, and 3) refusing all kinds of military service
(pacifism).423
In this context, when the modern churches support modern wars, this should only be done
after careful consideration of the nature of secular political power. In particular, when the
churches become involved not only in spiritual and charitable support but also give direct
support, such as providing arms and encouraging mobilization, they must do so from the
perspective of the poor and oppressed. Every war can bring about an abnormal situation,
reason being overcome by hostility. Therefore, caring and healing the hurts of the war and
assisting human beings to recover the "image of God" must be a distinctive mission of
churches in modern wars.
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However, when Korea fought under the name of reunification, most of the Korean churches
failed to demonstrate such a distinctive Christian identity because of their anti-Communism.
Christian antipathy to the Communists was developed as an ideology during the war. Here is a
quotation from a statement of the Korean CCIA, which shows the way in which the southern
Christian understanding of the war was dominated by an anti-Communist perspective:
Communism means sin. Therefore, no appeasement can be allowed, we must stand
firm to expel it. If we treat the Communist as we do our enemies, and love them, it is
nothing but the same as if we loved the devil and try ourselves in vain, to make it (sic,
him) repent...Commission (sic, Communism) is worse than war itself and sure to
bring more disaster...we ask you again to join with us to form the (sic, a) crusade to
undertake our full responsibilities till Communism is wiped out of the world.424
Here, the leaders of the South Korean churches regarded the Communists as satanic and
therefore outside the realm of divine salvation. "A sinner may rather easily repent but not the
Communists.'''425 For them, the Communists were unforgivable devils, who were outside the
Grace of Christ. The statement went on further, "Appeasement with Communism is
irreligious, unjust, and against all moral principles."426 Therefore, they understood the Korean
War as a crusade to wipe out the devils, the Communists. Based upon this understanding, the
southern churches rejected the cease-fire and called for re-opening the war. This statement
shows how strongly the churches had become captive to an anti-Communist ideology, even
after the armistice that brought the Korean War to an end.
It is questionable whether any other responses or arguments concerning the just war were put
forward within the southern churches during the Korean War. Of course, there might have
been, but it is difficult to find any written discussions of this. At this point, it should be
remembered that even before the war, the most important Christian independence movement
leaders, who were Rhee's political rivals, including Kim Ku, the former president of Korean
Provisional Government, and Ryo Un-hyung, the Chairperson of the National People's
Committee, had been assassinated at Rhee's instigation.427 These leaders did not favor Rhee's
proposal of establishing a separate state, nor did they approve the idea of Bukjin Tongil. They
also met Kim Il-sung to discuss the possibilities of peaceful reunification, against Rhee's
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Reunification by Invasion of the North. Moreover, Kim and Ryu were more popular and
respected leaders among the Korean people than Rhee. Finally, it has to be noted that Rhee
removed his Christian political rivals not only by MaCarthyst attacks but also by assassinating
them. In this atmosphere, although somebody had a criticism on the war, it was almost
impossible to speak out because of the tyrannical oppression of Rhee. Consequently, we can
hardly find any other written responses by Christians on the war in this period.428
Both the Korean churches in the North (the NKCA) and in the South justified the Korean War
as a just war. However, as we studied, the NKCA supported the war and proclaimed the just
war without proper theological argument. On the other hand, the southern Christians justified
the war on the basis of their anti-Communism, rather than on any more developed or deeper
theological reasoning.
2.3 The War and the World Council of Churches
2.3.1 WCC Toronto Statement
As a civil war in a Far Eastern country expanded into an international collision between the
East and the West, not only the Korean churches but also churches around the world split into
two positions on the Korean War, according to their ideological preferences. The WCC issued
what was called its Toronto Statement on the Korean War on 13th July 1950, and this brought
an ideological conflict between eastern and western churches. The statement influenced the
Communist understanding on Christianity in North Korea as well. Therefore, it is necessary to
examine it in detail.
From the beginning of the war, the recently established WCC had paid deep attention to the
war. On the morning of 26th June 1950, C. Ranson, General Secretary of the International
Missionary Council (IMC) received the following cable from H. Namkung, General Secretary
of the NCCK:
428
Especially, it was difficult to argue against the notion ofBukjin Tongil because the National
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Large invading forces are pressing all around us. Begging immediate help from USA.
Use your best influence.429
Replies were sent on the same day by Ranson (IMC) and Nolde (CCIA) to Namkung and G.
Paik as follows:
Moved by Korean tragedy, CCIA maintaining contact with United Nations and
conferring with church leaders about representation to United States government.430
After consultation with officials of the WCC and the IMC, the director of the CCIA addressed
a letter to the Secretary General of the UN on 26th June431:
The Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, in seeking world peace with
justice, emphasizes the duty of Christians to support negotiation rather than primary
reliance upon arms as an instrument of policy.4"'~
The CCIA began by calling for a peaceful measures to be used to solve the Korean conflict.
Its initial letter to the UN was similar to the Yugoslav resolution at the Security Council.
However, this stance of the CCIA's was dramatically reversed within a week. At the
executive committee meeting of the CCIA, which was held from 3rd-5th July, in Toronto, prior
to the third Central Committee Meeting of the WCC,433 the drafts of a letter "to all Christians
in Korea", a statement on the Korean situation and a prayer were submitted.434 At the debate
on these drafts, Reinhold Niebuhr strongly insisted on the necessity of a "police measure" in
Korea, and M. Niemoller supported it.435 R. M. Fagley, who also favored Truman's "police
action," had drafted the statement.436
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delivered to US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson by Dr. Brumbaugh representing the Methodist
Division of Foreign Mission. "From Brumbaugh to Acheson", cable on 27lh June 1950.
430 "From Nolde to G. Paik", cable on 26th June 1950.
431 The CCIA was a commission co-founded by the IMC and the WCC. For that reason, the
consultation was necessary. Concerning the CCIA, see, N. Lossky et. al. ed., Dictionary ofthe
EcumenicalMovement, Geneva, WCC, 1991, 203; 487; 525; 530; 532; 681.
432 "From Nolde to the Honorable Trygve Lie", 26th June 1950.
433
Concerning the CCIA and the Central Committee meeting in relation to the Korean War, see also
the following newspapers, The Living Church, No.3, 16th July 1950, 5-6; No. 5, 30th July 1950, 5-6:
The Moravian, 30th September 1950, 3-8; British Weekly, 27th July 1950; The Guardian, 4th August
1950; The Christian World, 27th July 1950; The English Churchman, 28lh July 1950; The Christian
Century, 26th July 1950; This Week in the Lutheran, 19th July, 1950, 12.
434
O. F. Nolde, "The Korean Situation from the Standpoint of Certain Actions by the CCIA and
related Christian Bodies", 24th June 1953, 2-3.
435 "Minutes and Reports of the Third Meeting ofCentral Committee of the World Council of
Churches", Toronto, 9-15 July 1950, 26-27.
436 R. M. Fragley was the co-secretary for the Department of International Justice and Goodwill,
Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. He was a close advisor to Dulles and Nolde
on Korean matters. See, "From Nolde to Fagley", 14th May 1947. Just before the statement, he
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The Central Committee of the WCC then met from 9th-l 3th July 1950, also at Toronto, and
appointed Niebuhr and Niemoller to revise the draft statement.437 It then adopted unanimously
the final version of the statement, which was published as "The Korean Situation and World
Order,"438 the letter, "To All Christians in Korea" and the "Prayer" on 13th July.439 The
statement on "The Korean Situation and World Order" was immediately controversial, even
within the WCC. There were serious arguments over the second sentence of the third
paragraph, which read:
The conflict in Korea reveals the precarious nature of peace and security in the world
today. The World Council of Churches expresses its deep concern and calls upon its
members as a world-wide Christian fellowship to pray for Korea, where guilty and
innocent suffer or perish together, and to bear witness to Christ as Lord of all life and
as Prince of peace.
An act of aggression has been committed. The United Nations Commission in Korea,
the most objective witness available, asserts that "all evidence points to a calculated,
coordinated attack prepared and launched with secrecy" by North Korean troops.
Armed attack as an instrument of national policy is wrong. We therefore commend the
United Nations, an instrument of world order, for its prompt decision to meet this
aggression and for authorizing a police measure which every member nation should
support. 440
The main argument was whether the church could support the use of world military forces for
a civil war. Niemoller said, "We in Germany do not think of what is happening in Korea as
war, but police action against armed violence in defiance of authority".441 Niebuhr went on
further with emphasizing its significance: "This is the first time in the modern world that a
police action has been taken by the community of nations. We support it in this statement, as
wrote, "United Nations Memorandum: The Korean Situation", Series 3, No. 9, Federal Council of
the Churches ofChrist in America. In this report, he strongly supported the US and UN positions on
the Koran War. He also sent a secret memo to Nolde as follows: "A unified Korea under the Soviet
domination would be a grave menace to Japan. A Korea under Western control would be regarded
as an intolerable threat to Vladivostok. It might be that some division of Korea would be necessary
for an eventual settlement". R. M. Fagley, "Confidential Notes on Interview", 21st July 1950, 1.
437 "From Fagley to Benedict", 3rd April 1970. The Christian Century, 26th July 1950, reported that
Charles P. Taft drafted the statement. However, the author considers that Fagley's letter is correct
because The Christian Century described Taft as the chairman. At that time, however, Kenneth G.
Grubb was the chairman ofCCIA. See the names ofCCIA honorary officers, "From Nolde to J. F.
Dulles" on 28th June 1950,
438
See, Appendix D.
439 The Third Central Committee Meeting of the WCC was held from 9-15 July 1950 in Toronto,
Canada. Concerning the meeting, see, "Minutes and Reports of the Third Meeting ofCentral
Committee of the World Council ofChurches", Toronto, 9-15 July 1950.
440 WCC Central Committee, "The Koran Situation and World Order", 13th July 1950, Toronto, Canada.
441 The Christian Century, 26th July 1950.
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we should."442
However, F. Haslam gave a counter-argument: "A world organization speaking for Christ
should not make such a statement as this. I doubt whether this action in Korea can rightly be
called a police action".443 T. C. Chao from China, one of presidents of WCC, also protested
against the Statement, "Which sounds so much like the voice of Wall Street."444 He had a
doubt about the political transparency of the police action.
As we will see later, this was merely the beginning of the argument within WCC whether the
statement was proper or not. Finally, the Statement was adopted by a vote of 45 to 2. Only
two pacifists opposed the resolution, including a representative of the Quakers. However, the
vote was taken in the absence of the delegations from the Eastern European churches, who
were not able to take part in the Central Committee meeting, due to their being unable to
obtain entry visas to Canada.445
It is mysterious how the WCC, which had originally urged negotiation rather than military
action, suddenly altered its stance to that of supporting the UN's "police action". Within a
mere nine days, they were approving the use of military force in Korea. How was it possible
for the WCC to justify military action, and called for "all UN member nations to support it",
so very quickly after the outbreak of the Korean War?446
There were two reasons behind this alteration. Firstly, the CCIA was influenced by the UN.
After sending the letter to the UN on 26th June, the CCIA received the report of the United
Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK), which condemned only North Korea as the invader
in the war.447 No blame was laid at the door of South Korea. The WCC did not realize at all
that South Korea had also intended an invasion towards the North, and had launched local
attacks. The WCC did not perceive that the credibility of the UNCOK report was problematic
444
Quoted from W. A. Visser't Hooft, W. A. Visser't Hooft: Memories, London, SCM Press, 1973, 224.
445 The Living Church, 30th July 1950.
446 The UN sent a letter of appreciation to WCC: "Your approval and support of the United Nations is
very much appreciated indeed". "From Francoise Dony to O. F. Nolde", 7th August 1950.
447
Report of the United Nations Commission on Korea, A/1350, Part One: Aggression. The CCIA
mainly depended for their information on the war on UN sources. See, CCIA, "Development in
Korea: As Reported in United Nations Documents", January 1951.
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because parts of it had been written before the war.448 The approval of "police action" was
altogether too hasty a response to the war on the part of a council representing churches
throughout the world. It was based on one-sided information on the Korean situation, and
those involved in drafting or approving the WCC resolution had insufficient knowledge of
what was really happening.
Secondly, after the Security Council adopted the US resolution on 27lh June, the American
voice dominated both the CCIA executive committee and the WCC Central Committee
Meeting.449 Fagley drafted and Niebuhr revised the statement.450 Both of them were strong
supporters of Truman's slogan of "police action" against the Communists.451 Behind this
domination of the American voice, which led the WCC to support the "police action,"
promoted first by Truman then by the UN, there was J. F. Dulles,452 who had a been
awareness of the importance of "churches' functions" in the ideological struggle with the
Communists.
2.3.2 J. F. Dulles: An Invisible Hand
J. F. Dulles was a politician, diplomat, lawyer and an important leader in the early history of
the CCIA, and had addressed the inaugural assembly ofWCC in 1948, at Amsterdam.453 The
elder son of a Presbyterian minister, he was born in 1888. He was educated in Princeton
(Philosophy), the Sorbonne (International Law) and George Washington Law School, and
started his career as a lawyer. After participating in the Paris Peace Congress, he became a
diplomat. He was US ambassador and delegate to the UN before becoming a Senator and
Truman's advisor in 1950. He was appointed as US Secretary of State during the Korean War.
448 B. Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, 265.
449 US had the largest number of commissioners including Dulles, one of strongest leaders and Nolde,
the Director of CCIA. See, The Living Church, 16th July 1950.
4"n
In fact, Niebuhr was not a Central Committee member. He was invited as alternative member.
"From Fagley to Benedict", 3rd April 1970.
451 "I do not think that a Christian who is not a pacifist can possibly advise a particularly Christian
solution for Korean conflict. It is a part of our total struggle with world Communism...", R. Niebuhr,
"No Christian Peace in Korea?", The Christian Century, 4th February 1953, 127.
452
M. A. Guhin, John Foster Dulles: A Statesman andHis Times, New York, Colombia University
Press, 1972, 119.
453
In Amsterdam, Dulles emphasized that WCC should be in the frontline of anti-Communism, See, J.
F. Dulles, "The Christian Citizen in a Changing World", WCC ed., The Church and the
International Disorder, London, SCM Press, 1948, 73-114.
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In M. A. Guhin's opinion Dulles provided the moral and philosophical basis on which US
diplomacy has rested since the beginning of the 1950s.4r>4
He was a religious man, with a strong sense of missionary zeal, which he had received from
his home environment.4" In the ecumenical movement, he started his journey by participating
in the Oxford Conference on Church, Community and State in 1937. There, he experienced an
"intellectual conversion". "In the conference, he had wondered if Christianity would survive
such formidable rivals as Communism and fascism".456 He had a sort of "utilitarian view of
religion," especially in terms of social utility.437 His conversion meant an awakening to the
• • • • 4S8
possible Christian contribution to the development of international order. " Dulles maintained
that "to create the moral foundation for world order is the task of the churches".459
Later, in the cold war context, Dulles started to combine his conservative faith, moralistic
internationalism and anti-Communism.460 He emphasized "churches' functions" in order to
"coincide" with "the particular interest of the United States and the West" against
Communism.461 He understood that the US, a leading Christian country, had the moral power
to fight against the atheistic Soviet Union, as a crusade.462 For him, Christianity and
Communism were "irreconcilable"463
434 M. A. Guhin, Ibid., 11-57.
455 "Almost every work on the subject of Dulles draw some attention to the idea that an understanding
of the man and his policy preferences involves considerations of his religious home environment,
strong religious convictions, a sense of Christian mission, and a subsequent universalization of
missionary zeal.", M. A. Guhin, Ibid., 1.
456 M. A. Guhin, Op. Cit., 119. See also, D. McCreary, "John Bennett on Oxford '37", Christian
Century, 28th October 1987, 942-944.
437
Concerning his thought at Oxford, see, J. F. Dulles, "The Problem of Peace in a Dynamic World",
Marquess of Lothian et al., The Universal Church and the World ofNations, London, George Allen
& Unwin, 1938, 145-168.
458 "The religious movement throughout the country and elsewhere could create the underlying
conditions indispensable to the attainment of better international order by educating the public...", J.
F. Dulles, "The American Churches and International Situation", Biennial Report of the Federal
Council of the Churches of Christ in America, New York, 1940, 22.
459 J. F. Dulles, "Dulles Statement for Manual of Layman's Missionary Movement", Unpublished
Paper, 4th April 1945, The J. F. Dulles Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton
University.
460
Concerning the development of Dulles' thought in international politics, see, M. G. Toulouse, The
Transformation ofJohn Foster Dulles, From Prophet ofRealism to Priest ofNationalism, Mercer
University Press, 1985.
461 M. A. Guhin, Op. Cit., 119.
462 "We wanted our example to stimulate liberating forces throughout the world and create a climate in
which despotism would shrink. In fact, we did just that... Americans are people of faith. They have
always had a sense of mission and willingness to sacrifice to achieve great goals." J. F. Dulles,
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Dulles was not only exercised powerful leadership in the field of international diplomacy but
also in the ecumenical movement.464 For example, when the CCIA was established in 1946,
he influenced the election of the Chairman and the appointment of Director.466 It seems that
most CCIA members were eager to be close with him,466 even Visser't Hooft,467 because of
his influence in international politics. Visser't Hooft invited him as one of main speakers at
the Amsterdam Assembly. When he used his speech to emphasize the idea Christian anti-
Communism, he faced a serious count-argument by another speaker, J. Hromadka, who
Af.Q
criticized Western capitalistic civilization from a biblical perspective. After a long debate,
the WCC criticized both Communism and capitalism, and suggested in their place the notion
of the "responsible society".469
"Address by United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, before the Associated Press in
New York, April 22, 1957", in The Department ofState Bulletin, 6th May 1957, 715-719; see also,
"America's Role in the Peace", Christianity and Crisis, vol. 4, 1945, 2-6. N.B., He had strong
tendency towards "McCarthyism". In the senate election, he used traditional MaCarthyst attacks on
his rival, the nominee of the Democrats. See, M. A. Guhin, Ibid., 124-128.
463
J. F. Dulles, "The Christian Citizen in a Changing World", 91.
464
George Bell, the first Chairperson of the Central Committee, WCC recognized his leadership in
founding CCIA. The Bishop ofChichester, "Opening Address at the Meeting of the Central
Committee of the WCC at Lucknow", The Ecumenical Review, vol. 5, 1953, 229-232: Concerning
his leadership in international affairs of ecumenical movement, see also, R. M. Fagley, "The
Churches and the Peace Patrol", Christianity and Crisis, vol. 10, 27th November 1950, 158-159; J. C.
Bennett, "Mr. Dulles Proposal", Christianity and Crisis, vol. 12, 9th June 1952, 73-74.
465 "1 am glad that Baron van Asbeck will act as Chairman, and I greatly hope that Grubb will be a
Director". "From J. F. Dulles to Visser't Hooft", 23rd September 1946.
466
Especially American members like Nolde, Decker, Fagley...etc. Here is an example how WCC
treated Dulles: "Dr. Visser't Hooft and 1.. .we are eager to have your help. Even if you only give us
a few paragraphs of informal comment they will be helpful". "From S. M. Cavert to J. F. Dulles"
3rd December 1945. Of course he was not such a person, who could give some practical assistance
to the Provisional Committee ofWCC. Even Dulles could not participate most ecumenical meetings
because of his busy schedule: e.g. "regret impossible visit Switzerland planning return Washington
as soon as..." "From J. F. Dulles to Visser't Hooft" cable on 27th September 1945. However, WCC
often sent similar letters to him to make a good relationship.
467 Visser't Hooft, the first general secretary sent several letters to meet him. "From Vissser't Hooft to
J. F. Dulles", 15th May 1945; Cable on 21st September 1945; 17th September 1946 etc.
468 «-pjie Speaker preceding him was John Foster Dulles, later US Secretary of State. Their respective
addresses represented two opposing views on the international situation as a whole. That sparkling
exchange and the discussion it provoked have been recalled ever since as one of the highlight of the
first WCC Assembly". M. Opocensky ed., JosefL. Hromadka: The Field is the World, Prague,
Christian Peace Conference, 1990, 253; See also, J. Hromadka, "The Church and Today's
International Situation", in Ibid., 253-260.
469
Concerning the Responsible Society, see, WCC ed., The Responsible Society, Christian Action in
Society: An Ecumenical Inquiry, Geneva, WCC, 1949.
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Dulles was expected to be absent from the Toronto meeting of the WCC in 1950 because he
had just returned from Korea.4'0 However, although he was an extremely busy person, being
one of three key decision makers of US foreign policy,471 he still managed to get there 472 At
the meeting, the influence of his presence was enormous because he had visited Korea from
18th June until the outbreak of the war both as the head ofUN Field Observers and as the US
special envoy to Korea. Moreover, he was the main figure involved in drafting UNCOK's
report on the Korean War on 26th June in Japan. Dulles was the only person who could give a
detailed description of the war at the Toronto meeting. He also encouraged the American
CCIA members, Nolde, Fagley and Niebuhr, to support the UN's police action in the
statement they drafted and may have ensured that they were the ones who effectively wrote all
the drafts. Chinese church leaders criticized the role Dulles played in regard to the WCC's
Toronto Statement in the following terms:
The person who was actually directing the World Council of Churches to pass this
resolution (The Toronto Statement) was no other than Dulles.473
Even in the West, there was also a criticism of Dulles' role in the CCIA, especially in regard
to the issue of the Toronto statement. Bishop E. H. Burgmann, a CCIA commissioner, voiced
the criticism that Dulles was dangerous to the CCIA, because he used the CCIA for the
purpose of US international politics and for his own business. Burgmann warned the WCC
that if it did not cease its relationship with him, it would find itself in difficulty.474
We can conclude that behind the American delegates who led the WCC into changing its
stance on the Korean War, there stands the influential figure of J. F. Dulles. It is clear that
Dulles desperately wanted the WCC to support the "police action" in Korea. Indeed, he
thought such support so important that he took the time and trouble to go personally to
Toronto to ensure that he got it, in spite of all the other pressing business he had to attend to
on account of the emergency situation. This demonstrates how much his "utilitarian view" on
Christianity mattered to him, and how essential it was to his overall political strategy. It
470 "From O. F. Nolde to J. F. Dulles", 28th June 1950.
471
According to P. Lowe, they were President Truman, State Secretary Acheson and Special Advisor
to the President, Dulles. See, P. Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War, 183-187.
472 "The members from US are following: John Foster Dulles, Dr. O. Frederik Nolde...", The Living
Church, 16th July 1950, 5.
473 "A Joint Statement from the Representatives of Protestant Churches and Organizations of China",
21st April 1951.
474
E. H. Burgmann, "World Council Group Wants China in UN", Christianity and Crisis, vol. 11,
1951,32.
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should also be remembered that he gained his diplomatic reputation by leading the
establishment of UN as the US delegate. Lastly, he had recently demonstrated himself as an
expert on Korea and Japan.477
It was also Dulles' intention to use the WCC's support as a moral weapon in the propaganda
war. After the Security Council had decided, on 27th June, the police action, the UN faced two
serious challenges. One was a legal criticism because the Council reached this decision
without Soviet approval. The other was that it was predicted that China would intervene in the
war in reaction against the UN's intervention. In this circumstance, Truman and Dulles
needed a strong moral justification for the police action.476 Finally, Dulles, with his functional
view of Christianity's role in international order, intended to utilize the WCC for this
477
justification, by getting it to issue a supportive statement for the police action. Indeed,
Dulles regarded the WCC as one of the best international organizations for the moral
justification of Truman's police action.
As we will see in Part Three, the WCC recognized later that its statement had been biased
towards the Western and South Korean position, and acknowledged that the CCIA had
worked closely with the UN for authorizing the police action.478 All this was admitted years
later, in the Central Committee Meeting of the WCC in 1989.
475
See, P. Lowe, Op. Cit., 183-186.
476 "It could be possible that Truman consulted with Dulles using WCC for the justification.",
Interview with the former Bishop of Oxford, Patrick Rodger, former Associate General Secretary of
WCC, 5th February 2001, Edinburgh; "Dulles was possible to act in Toronto by Truman's order".
Interview with Dr. Seong-won Park, Executive Secretary of Cooperation and Witness, WARC, 17lh
January 2001, Geneva; Interview with D. Epps, Director ofCCIA, WCC, 15th January 2001,
Geneva. N.B., as we will study later, the newly established WCC was in difficult for a long time
because of this statement. Of course, WCC kept some distance with Dulles thereafter.
477
N.B., There was another case that Truman tried to utilize WCC for his anti-Communist
international politics. Myron Taylor, another Truman man suggested to WCC in 1950: "The
President would invite the heads of the Christian churches to come to Washington and to work
together on a joint statement concerning peace and concerning resistance to Communism". Truman
also wanted to have US government ambassador to WCC in Geneva. W. A. Visser't Hoofit, W. A.
Visser't Hooft: Memories, 225-227.
478
See, "Peace and the Reunification of Korea, Part One: Background", WCC Central Committee,
Moscow, USSR, 16th-27th July 1989 Document No. 2.4.
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In fact, Dulles was directly involved in the Korean War, and most academic writings on the
subject emphasize his role in its outbreak.479 Some authors focus on his "mysterious" visit to
Korea just before the war. P. Lowe pays an attention to his appearance at the 38th Parallel:
Dulles was shown wearing his characteristic Homburg hat, peering intently across the
38th Parallel at the Communist hordes to the north. This was regarded in Pyongyang
as demonstrating Dulles's aggressive intentions.480
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B. Cumings, by contrast, focuses on the meeting between Dulles and Rhee on 19 June. After
investigating US secret documents, he maintains that Dulles agreed to Rhee's intention to
481
march towards the North. Cumings also indicates that Dulles was "a key advocate" of roll
489
back. J. Holliday claims, "During Dulles's visit to Seoul Rhee not only pushed for a direct
489
American defense but also advocated an attack on the North". A North Korean source also
insists that "Dulles delivered Truman's order to Rhee to attack the North".484
However, it is difficult to conclude what exactly Dulles did with Rhee during his visit to
Korea, because the most important documents concerning the truth of the war still remain top
secret in South Korea and the USA. It is also not the main purpose of this sub-chapter to
examine how much Dulles was involved in the outbreak of the war. The important point to
note is that the alteration of the WCC's position on the Korean War from one of "negotiation"
to that of supporting the "police action" was initiated and led by Dulles. It was surely
"dangerous," if not "mysterious," that a politician so deeply and one-sidedly involved in the
dispute was able to have so much influence over such a sensitive ecclesiastical agenda, within
a world ecumenical body like the WCC.
479
E.g., Tae-ho Yoo, The Korean War and The UnitedNations: A Legal and Diplomatic Historical
Study, 122-124; J. Halliday and B. Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War, 64-67; Cumings', The
Origins ofthe Korean War: The Roaring of the Cataract, 586-588; 601; 608-609; W. Stueck, The
Korean War: An International History, 54-57; M. Park, The Korean War: The Outbreak and Its
Origins, vol. 2, 454-455; P. Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War, 183-186; H. Kim, A Study of the
Korean War and This-Worldly Blessings in the Christian Churches, 69-71.
480 P. Lowe, Op. Cit., 184.
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B. Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, 257-258.
4X2 B. Cumings, Ibid., 276.
483 J. Halliday and B. Cumings, Op. Cit., 65.
484 H. Moon, Mije eui Chosun Chimryak Jungchak eui Jungchae wa Naeran Dobal eui Jinsang eul
Pokroham, (The Nature of American Imperialist Invasion Policy to Korea and Truth on the
Outbreak ofCivil War: A Disclosure), Pyongyang, Joongang Tongsinsa, 1950, 75-76. N.B., Hak-
bong Moon, the Special Advisor of Intelligence Department of USAMGIK. and Political Advisor of
Rhee, wrote this book in June, just after Dulles's visit.
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2.3.3 Controversial Responses
The Toronto statement also brought serious ecclesiastical tension within the WCC. In fact,
such tension predicted immediately the statement came out because of its completely one-side
view of the issue. At Toronto, there had been no opportunity for the churches from the
Communist countries to deliver their opinion of the war.
The American churches were among the strongest supporters of the WCC statement. The
Federal Council of Churches (FCC) had announced appreciation of the "swift action of UN"
on 6th July 1950,48:1 and announced a statement of its own which strongly supported the police
action.486 On 19th September, the Executive Committee reiterated its support for the UN
action:
In Korea, the United Nations was confronted with the severest challenge to its
authority and usefulness. A people...bloodshed by an act of aggression. We are
heartened by the swift action of the United Nations in resisting this aggression. We
are gratified that the forces combating invasion in South Korea serve under the flag
and command of United Nations...At this moment in history the United Nations offers
promise that mankind, if it has the will to do so, can repel aggressions and advance
the cause of peace and justice through the collective endeavor of the world
487
community.
This is a somewhat nai've understanding of the nature of Korean War, because the origin of
the war was not clear and the bloodshed was mostly caused by US operational mistakes. It is
possible that Dulles had a hand in this statement too, because he was the Chairperson of the
FCC's Department of International Justice and Goodwill. It was this Department that
delivered the statement to the UN on 21st September.488
The American churches supported the war, but significant individual Christians opposed it,
and criticized the UN's position. For instance, the members of the Fellowship of
Reconciliation489 claimed that the UN must cease the police action in Korea, which brought
enormous non-combatant and civilian causalities, and must mediate between the two Koreas
485
See, New York Times, 7th July 1950.
486
See, "A Message for Order Day", Federal Council Bulletin, October 1950, 18.
487
"Statement", Federal Council of Churches, 19th September 1950.
488 "From R. Fagley to W. R. Austin", 21st September 1950. Fagley was executive secretary of the
Department.
489 The Fellowship of Reconciliation was founded as an interdenominational and international
religious pacifist organization on the eve of the World War I, and established in the US in 1915. It
continues today as an interfaith activist force for peace. For details, see, www.forusa.org.
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to establish a cease-fire.490 Furthermore, the Fellowship claimed that what was happening was
not "police action", but war between the superpowers.491 According to The Witness and The
Churchman, on 21st August 1950, 469 individual pastors from 27 denominations in the USA
signed a statement, which asked for "a solution of the Korean conflict through negotiation and
mediation," against the support given by the WCC and the FCC to the police action.492 There
were also some personal criticisms of the WCC statement. For example, K. Leslie stated that
the WCC had lost its "prophetic voice" by supporting US imperialism, at the instigation of
Dulles.493 Interestingly, some Korean pastors in the US also appealed to American Christians,
pointing out that the "US intervention is unjust because the war is a civil war".494
In other Western churches, the United Church of Canada and the WCC Group in Australia
also emphasized the necessity for the WCC to be involved in efforts for reconciliation, instead
of supporting military measures in Korea.495 However, most mainline Western churches
supported the Statement by voting its approval at Toronto.
As soon as the WCC announced the Statement, the churches in the Communist countries
bitterly criticized the WCC's support for the police action in Korea. Bishop A. Bereczky, the
President of the Reformed Church of Hungary and the Ecumenical Committee of the
Hungarian Churches, who had not been permitted to enter to Canada, as Hromadka was not,
sent an open letter to the General Secretary of WCC. Here is a quotation from his criticism of
the Statement:
The second point states that an armed aggression has taken place, and accepts the
witness of the Commission on Korea in the UN as the one deserving most confidence
as an unbiased and objective statement. You warned the World Council of Churches
against entering the political arena, and now the Central Committee accepts the
witness of a political actor as an objective and unbiased statement of fact, while
implicitly rejecting the position of the other contending party. Why? The third point
commends the UN "for its prompt decision to meet this aggression and for authorizing
a police measure..." Then you add the pious wish that "at the same time,
governments must press individually and through the UN for a just settlement by
negotiation and reconciliation." How?...If your appeal is addressed to all governments,
which governments will actually press individually and through the UN for a just
490 "Action on Korea Draws Few Protests", Fellowship, September 1950, 19.
491 A. Hassler, "Cops in Korea", Fellowship, September 1950, 4-8.
492 The Witness, 27th July 1950; The Churchman, September 1950, 23.
493 K. Leslie, "Common Sense Concerning Korea", The Protestant, July-August-September 1950, 3-26.
494
"Appeal to American Christians", Korea Independence, 19lh July 1950.
495
See, "Calls for Reconciliation in Korea", Ecumenical Press Service, 20th October 1950; E. H.
Burgmann, "World Council Group Wants China in UN", Christianity and Crisis, vol. 11, 1951, 32.
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settlement? Don't you think that a vague wish like that will but further aggravate the
discredit of Christianity? 496
Berecsky's criticism was focused on the credibility and objectivity of the UNCOK report on
the Korean War, on which the WCC relied. He also pointed to illogicality of the Statement in
supporting the police action and, at the same time, expecting peaceful solution. Bishop J.
Peter of the Hungarian Reformed Church also criticized the WCC resolution, claiming that it
supported the real aggressors in Korea.497 In addition to these criticisms, the Hungarian
Protestant Churches issued a joint statement on the National Protestant Day to the effect that
"the unrighteous and cruel wars in Vietnam and Korea clearly unmask those, who, even at this
horrible price, are bent on defending their privileges".498 The Hungarian Churches also asked
why the WCC had not said anything about the atrocities committed by South Korea.499
It was also a jolt for the WCC to hear the response of the Slovakian church from Rev. Matasik,
General Secretary of the Reformed Church of Slovakia:
The World Council of Churches was created...with the purpose of enabling all
Christian churches which became its members to help one another as much as
possible in a brotherly way, spiritually as well as materially, and strengthen the
consciousness of solidarity and brotherhood among all the Christians of the world. .. In
case we should find out that the World Council of Churches should be an open or a
masked tool of the old dying society, we shall be the first ones to leave the World
Council of Churches. Because we want this Assembly of Churches to be an
Assembly of mutual respect, love and mutual help, any kind of making ill use of this
institution, which in its essence is so beneficial, should be frustrated. 501
Here Matasik questioned not only the Statement but also the decision making process of the
WCC. He warned that his church was considering withdrawing its membership of the WCC
because it had excluded the voice of the churches in Eastern Europe from participating in such
an important decision.
496
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Council ofChurches", The Hungarian Church Press, 1/15 November 1950.
499 "The Message of the Hungarian Protestant Press Conference to the Church Press in Other Land",
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In Asia, the Chinese Church also bitterly criticized the statement. As we have noted, T. C.
Chao501 had a doubt about on the role of Dulles in the matter. From 16th-21st April 1951, 151
representatives of Protestant churches and organizations assembled in Peking, having been
called there by the Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Political
Administration of the Central People's Government. In this gathering, the representatives
made a statement in relation to the Toronto Statement as follows:
The majority of Christians in the world are conscientious, but imperialism consistently
utilizes Christianity as its instrument of aggression. In July 1950, the Central
Committee of World Council of Churches at its meeting in Canada passed a
resolution on the war in Korea and falsely accused the People's Democratic Republic
of Korea as having started the war and petitioned the United Nations to authorize its
member nations to support its "police action" in Korea...The accent of this resolution
was that of the United States State Department. The person who was actually
directing the World Council of Churches to pass this resolution was no other than
Dulles, the tool of American Wall Street and an instigator of the war in Korea. We
raise our serious protest to this resolution of the World Council of Churches.503
A week later, on 28th April, T. C. Chao resigned his presidency of the WCC to express his
protest against the Toronto Statement and against the WCC's position on the Korean War.504
In July last year the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches issued a
statement condemning North Korea as aggressor...! am one of the Presidents of the
World Council on the one side and a loyal citizen of the Republic of the Chinese
people on the other. Only recently I came to realize how impossible my position was.
As a patriotic Chinese I must protest against the Toronto message, which sounds so
much like the voice of Wall Street...! can no longer be one of the Presidents of the
"0I
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World Council. Therefore, I resign from the office and request that my name be
deleted from all committees of the Council.505
The sincerity of Chao's resignation was questioned. In a confidential memo, the WCC
expressed the view that Chao had come under pressure from the Communists to resign his
post.506 However, whether the Communists forced his resignation, or whether he genuinely
wished to do so, it was still true that he really did oppose the WCC's position on the Korean
War. Even before the resignation, he had openly criticized the statement. The Executive
Committee of the WCC finally accepted his resignation at its meeting in Rolle on 10th August
cf)7 # ... ....
1951. In relation to this decision, K. H. Ting criticized the WCC for having little concern to
listen to the voices from churches in the Communist countries. Their view of the statement
had been ignored. Ting also pointed out that the WCC had easily accepted Cho's resignation
508 •without further discussion, and had "not tried to protect him, not even a little". In Ting's
view, if the WCC had accepted only a little part of Chao's criticism, it would not have been
necessary for him to resign his post, and he could at the same time have been protected from
any Communist attack.
The Chinese Church not only criticized the WCC but also organized "The Resist America and
Help Korea Movement",509 which was led by Y. T. Wu.510 To understand these strong actions
of the Chinese church, it is necessary to remember that China had been directly involved in
the Korean War since October 1950.
505 "From T. C. Chao to the Presidents of the World Council ofChurches", 28lh April 1951.
Concerning his resignation, see also, "T. C. Chao Resigns Presidency of World Council of
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509 For the details of movement, see, Y. T. Wu, "A Summary of the Eight Months' Work of the
Movement for the Protection of Self-Government, Self-Support, and Self-Propagation in Chinese
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From the above research, we can conclude that not only the Korean churches but also world
churches divided into two positions on the Korean War. The division followed very closely
along the line which separated the East and the West/11 This division of churches throughout
the world was caused by the Toronto Statement of the WCC, which supported the police
action of the UN and the US in Korea.
3. "The Third Way"
3.1 Hromadka vs Niebuhr
The WCC, which was faced with serious criticism from the East on not only the statement but
also the decision-making process, tried to justify its position. The Ecumenical Review
published the Toronto Statement and justified it under the title of "What the Korean
Resolution does, and does not, mean." Here is an extract:
Faced as we were with the fact that the only international legal authority which we
have, had declared that an act of aggression had been committed, and deeply
conscious of the fact that, however imperfect the United Nations is, breakdown would
lead to complete international anarchy, we could not evade our responsibility for
saying what we did say. Yes, it was necessary to take this action, so as to show that
the Churches, though they are not of the world, are concerned with order in this
world: that though they are not partisan, they cannot remain neutral when a basic
principle of human relationships at stake.512
O. F. Nolde, the CCIA Director, also justified the statement on the grounds that it was based
upon the report of the neutral international commission on the origin of the war, and
• S1 T
emphasized that the statement was adopted by the Central Committee." However, these
justifications were not sufficient to persuade the churches in the East, who questioned the
credibility of the report on account of the fact that it had been adopted in their absence.
Therefore, WCC openly argued the issue in another volume of The Ecumenical Review, vol.3,
511
N.B., In this thesis, "East and West" means the Communist and the capitalist blocs during the cold-
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512 "What the Korean Resolution Does, and Does Not, Mean", The Ecumenical Review, vol. 3, No.l,
1950, 78.
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No.2, 1951, which was entirely devoted to the Toronto Statement. K. Grubb, the chairperson
of the CCIA, maintained that the WCC must listen to the criticisms from the East because
"the first job of the Council is to maintain its own fellowship".514 He insisted that the WCC
should not directly quote the UNCOK's report because it had not been written from a
Christian perspective.513
M. M. Thomas questioned about what was meant by world order, which the WCC had
emphasized in its statement, i.e. world order for what and for whom. He pointed out that the
notion of "the international order and rule does not elicit the same reverence in Asia as (it)
does in western Christians".516 For him, it was not just the question of who started the Korean
War that was the important issue, but also where social justice lay.
J. Garret also argued that in Asia, the WCC should not be linked with the names of Bao Dai
and Syngman Rhee, who led anti-Communist tyrannies. Instead, it should listen voices from
China, because Communism in Asia had been accepted as a mean of social "righteousness"
and national liberation.517
However, it was J. Hormadka, who thoroughly criticized the statement as a theologian.
Hormadka sent a letter to visser't Hooft on 30th November,518 pointing out that the WCC
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supported the action of a secular power too simply, without deep reflection on the
contemporary situation:
Today, when the peace of the world is at stake, and every self-righteous word can
strengthen the aggressive and destructive forces in one's own nation, and prompt a
catastrophe, the World Council of Churches should speak in a way that does not pour
oil into the fire, and does not encourage one side to a self-righteous "Crusade".519
Secondly, he worried that the WCC had become "an instrument of one international power-
group" by supporting the police action in Korea:
It is difficult to understand how a finding of the Korea commission which represents
just one power-group within UNO could have been taken as a ground and justification
of such a far-reaching statement. We are really disturbed by the fact that, in one of
the most decisive and tragic moments of world history, the World Council of Churches
identified itself, self-assuredly, with one side. Instead of challenging the responsibility
of all statesmen it condemned, in an out-spoken and specific way, one of the two
What Hromadka said here can be interpreted as continuing the line he had taken answering
the speech by Dulles at Amsterdam in 1948. "The ecumenical movement cannot be identified
59 1
with one political position if it wants to remain credible". He saw the problem of Korea as
closely connected with the tension between East and West.
Thirdly, Hromadka also drew attention to economic factors, which played a great part in the
Korean War:
It was also essential to lay a finger upon the fact that economic expansion tends
always, sooner or later, tangibly or intangibly, to military aggression. The church
groups are apt to overlook it since the economic expansion does not look, at first
522
sight, as dangerous as a direct political and military domination.
Hromadka also thought the Toronto Statement had been a frightful handicap to Christian
churches. The direct result of it was the resignation of Chao, and withdrawal of Chinese
member churches from active membership in the WCC. Contact with the Christians in North
519 "From Hromadka to Visser't Hooft", 30th November 1950, 1-2. Hromadka also wrote a letter to the
Chairman of Security Council. "I cannot understand the fact that the Security Council submitted to
the American request for 'police action' against Northern Korea with all the raids and destroying of
the lives of civilian population". "Dr. Hromadka on American Aggression in Korea", Christianity
and Crisis, vol. 10, 1950, 160.
520 "From Hromadka to Visser't Hooft", 30th November 1950, 2, WCC Archival No. 301. 437. 1/5.
521 For the detail of the argument between Dulles and Hromadka, See, J. F. Dulles, "The Christian
Citizen in a Changing World", WCC ed., The Church and the International Disorder, London, SCM




Korea was also lost.
Hromadka promoted a theology of dialogue with atheism, and this was one of the motives of
his response. He sought to make a bridge between Christianity and atheism through dialogue
because he believed the Gospel seeks to embrace the whole of humankind. This meant that
"no one should be excluded from dialogue." He tried to interpret atheism to Christians as
the judgment of history on their lack of moral and social sensitivity to the suffering of human
beings.524 Hormadka was unable to accept the Toronto Statement because it ignored the
necessity of a dialogue with the Communists in North Korea.
Visser't Hooft responded to Hromadka's criticisms in his letter on 21st December 1950, as
follows:
The main objection, which you raise against the resolution is that it identifies the
World Council with one group of powers. I can say immediately that this was not the
intention of the resolution. For what the Central Committee had in mind was to say
aggression is wrong whoever commits it and from wherever it comes. If 1 may put in a
personal word, I took a public stand against military action (police action). 525
Visser't Hooft personally had little confidence about the police action. Later, he recognized
that "in that resolution we had failed to show, in line with whole tradition of the ecumenical
• 526
movement, the struggle against the easy conscience of the West".
However, in the context of the early 1950s, Hromadka was blamed as a "Red Stooge" or
"Agent of Moscow".527 H. S. Leiper blamed the criticisms of the Toronto statement from the
c?o
churches in the East, including Hromadka's, as being forced by the Communists.
It was Reinhold Niebuhr who bitterly criticized Hromadka and strongly defended the
statement.329 It was natural for Niebuhr to do so because he had involved in formulating the
523 J. Smolik, Op. Cit., 9.
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statement in the front place. Here is Niebuhr's assessment of Hromadka and the ecumenical
leaders from the East:
There are not many Christians who are prompted by purely Marxist ideology, though
there are men like Y. T. Wu in China, who have been pretty pure Marxist long before
the Communists came to power. But there are many Christians, particularly in Asia,
who know little of one of the most tragic facts of contemporary history, which is that
an alternative to some form of historic injustice may turn out to be more grievous than
the system which it challenges. Failure to recognize this fact has undoubtedly greatly
influenced the thought of men like Dr. Hromadka in Czechoslovakia. 530
Hromadka had argued in detail about the statement, but Niebuhr only criticized him in a
general way, and portrayed him as a simple-minded or nai've theologian. In contrast to
Hromadka, Niebuhr evaluated the statement as a remarkable one:
The two most important emphases in the document are: (1) the commendation of the
action of the United Nations, as an instrument of world order in resisting the
aggression in Korea; and (2) the insistence that this conflict need not be the
beginning of another world war if both the military pressures of totalitarianism are
resisted and the injustice and disorders, which Communism exploits, are
corrected...The question is not how to appease Communism but, in the words of the
World Council, to achieve enough justice to render the world morally impregnable to
totalitarian infiltration.531
Here, Niebuhr understands Communism as totalitarianism. Therefore, for him, it is impossible
to sit together with the Communists for a dialogue. He also justifies a US military intervention
in the life of a nation experiencing Communist infiltration.
In fact, Niebuhr had once been a pacifist and a Christian socialist.532 However, he changed his
533view after 1940 and argued for what he called "Christian realism". J. P. Wogaman
describes this Christian realism: "To Niebuhr, moral judgment is sorting out the most realistic
means to attain the most defensible proximate - without pre-commitment to some means as
inherently more moral than others."534 Niebuhr tried to suggest a realistic re-evaluation of
Two Dimensions of the Struggle", Ibid, 65-66; "The Peril ofWar and the Prospects of Peace", Ibid.,
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human moral capacity. In doing this, he believed that human beings could devise realizable
ethical standards for themselves.
In his realistic and pragmatic view of ethics, the pacifists as well as Hormadka were seen as
naive in relation to the Korean War. Against those who were trying to find a "Christian
solution" to the Korean War, which meant reconciliation and mediation, Niebuhr insisted that
the solution would have to be political to be realistic. Here is part of his interview with The
Christian Century.
What can Christians contribute to peace in Korea?
I do not think that a Christian who is not a pacifist can possibly advance a particularly
Christian solution for the Korean conflict. It is a part of our total struggle with world
Communism, and I do not think there are particularly Christian insights for the
strategic problems involved. There are large issues for which Christian faith is
relevant. But it could be pretentious to offer a "Christian" solution for the special
oc
problem of Korea.
In this interview, Niebuhr stated his conviction that although Christian resources could be
utilized for peace in Korea, Christians should be honest and realistic about Christianity itself.
Trying to offer a "Christian solution" for the special problem of Korea would be a pretentious.
The solution for Korea should be a political and economic solution rather than a Christian
S3A •• • • 1 1 • •
one. From this ethical and theological standpoints, he supported the police action as a
practical and realistic means for achieving the desired result. Unlike Hromadka, he was an
advocate ofmilitary measures.
Niebuhr also believed that "in Asia there is little historic, social or economic basis for the
democratic society we are defending". "Colonial peoples, whether still under tutelage or
recently emancipated, have not achieved social or political stability". Therefore, "a great
deal of moral and political imagination and courage will be required if we are to prevent Asia
coo
from sinking into Communism". For him, it was America which had the moral power to
establish an international order. He used this idea to justify the US intervention in the Korean
War.539 However, the problem of his ethic of intervention was that it left unanswered
questions about who would judge a particular situation, and what kind of morality might be
ix.
535
Editorial, "No Christian Peace in Korea?", The Christian Century, 4th February 1953, 126.
536
See, R. Niebuhr, Christianity and Powerpolitics, 9.
537 R. Niebuhr, "Editorial Notes", Christianity and Crisis, vol. 10, 1950, 130.
538 Ibid.
539 See, R. Niebuhr, "Ten Fateful Years", Christianity and Crisis, vol. 11, 1951, 1-4.
199
necessary in Asia? Niebuhr seems to have thought that the USA should be the judge and
caretaker of Korea. Both Niebuhr and Dulles shared exactly the same logic. Both had
participated in the Oxford Conference in 1937, and they became good friends, sharing the
same utilitarian view of the role of the churches in the international order. Through his
connection to Dulles, Niebuhr became the Special Advisor to the US State Department, and
had a "considerable influence" on US diplomatic policy."40
However, Hromadka responded that the USA and its allies merely formed "one group of great
power", and its policies should not be seen as an international moral crusade. The police
action was "aggressive imperialism of a police state" which was "seeking world
domination"541 Therefore, for him, the Toronto Statement supporting the police action was
irrelevant and inadmissible as a statement of the world churches.
3.2 Barth and "The Third Way"
When the churches and theologians were in ideological confrontation between East and West
because of the Toronto Statement, K. Barth argued for what he called "the third way," urging
them to escape from a black and white logic.542 Nevertheless, he did not ignore the necessities
of the kind of dialogue that people like Hromadka advocated. Rather, he called the churches
to show their Christian identity by promoting reconciliation in the Cold War context."43
K. Barth's quest for the Third Way started when he had joined the Swiss Social Democratic
Party (SSPD) in 1915. He gave an address at that time which highlighted the link between
Christianity and socialism:
Jesus is a movement for social justice, and the movement for social justice is Jesus in
the present...Real socialism is real Christianity in our time...A real Christian must
"40
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become a socialist if he is in earnest about the reformation of Christianity. A real
socialist must be a Christian if he is earnest about the reformation of socialism.544
Often researchers describe Barth, at this time, as a Christian Socialist. However, according to
F. Marquardt, one of the purposes of his joining the SSPD was to point out the problems of
such a identification.545 When we read this quotation, it is important to bear in mind the last
sentence. Indeed, the young Barth sought to be both a good Christian and a good socialist.546
Although Barth had no "inclination toward Eastern Communism",547 he considered anti-
Communism to be even worse than Communism.' He distinguished between Communists
and Communism:
Anti means against. God is not against, but for man. The Communists are man too.
God is also for the Communists. So Christian cannot be against the Communists but
only for them. To be for the Communists does not mean to be for Communism. I am
not for Communism. But one can only say what has to be said against Communism if
one is for the Communists.549
Barth thus had a humanistic approach toward the Communists. Hence, although Barth was not
a Communist, he was not an anti-Communist either. He warns that if a religion
overemphasizes an "anti" stance against one ideology, it could fall into becoming another
ideology, or a form of extremism. It seems that it is too narrow to capture Barth in any one of
the two sides. Rather, Barth sought to understand the Communists. He thought that
Communism was the result of "inhuman" Western capitalism. The reason behind the spread
of Communism was a concern for the salvation, or at least the well-being of exploited labors.
The West, however, considered the Communists to be the "absolute enemy." In this extreme
anti-Communism, Barth saw another "Hitler in us".550
Finally, when the confrontation between East and West was at its height, over the Korean War,
Barth begged Western philosophy, political ethics and theology to come out of its ideological
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"madness". Furthermore, he suggested a new direction for the relationship between the East
and the West:
I think that the West, which should know better, must seek and find a better approach
to the necessary confrontation with the power and ideology of the Communist East.
Possibilities of a worthy, circumspect, and firmly guided policy of co-existence and
neutrality were more than once offered to the West in past years. More honor would
have accrued to the name of "free world" had it take up these possibilities; also, more
useful and more promising results would have been achieved than those which stand
before us today. 51
In the whirlpool of the Cold War, Barth maintained a prophetic voice of "co-existence". He
also developed this idea in relation to the role of the churches in the Cold War context. He
asked the churches not to identify uncritically with one of the two sides because "the present
conflict of East and West" is "the world-political struggle for power". He warned that by
being too close to any one of them, the churches would end up justifying a secular power
which wanted to dominate the whole world. He also asked the churches to transcend the
"natural history of the world" i.e. the history of power struggle and ideological conflict, and to
live in "the Kingdom of God and the Glory of Jesus Christ." He also suggested to the
Christians: "What we can do in the midst of the conflict can only consist in the wholehearted,
sincere and helpful sympathy which we are in duty bound to extend to all its victims as far as
lies within our power." 554 Barth's claim was neither a passive response nor "Christian
disillusionment" in regard to the Cold War conflict. Rather, he claimed for the churches a
more active and fundamental involvement in the conflict. This what he meant by the Christian
churches adopting "the third way" between East and West.555
Barth did not give detailed accounts about the third way, but he did concentrate on developing
the Doctrine of Reconciliation, especially after 1951. E. Busch shows the link between the
Third Way and the Doctrine of Reconciliation.526 In the Church Dogmatics IV, Barth studied
everything "from Christology to ecclesiology together with relevant ethics" in the Cold War
context.557 He, especially, emphasizes "reconciliation" as the task of "the people of God in
551
Ibid, 64-45.
552 K. Barth, Against the Stream, 128.
553 "Not to take part in the conflict. As Christians it is not our concern at all.", Ibid., 131.
34
Ibid, 130-131. See also, K. Barth, Church and State, tr. by G. R. Howe, London, SCM Press, 1939.
C.f. Niebuhr's thought on church and state, which claimed moral superiority of the USA.
555
Ibid, 132.
556 E. Busch, Op. Cit., 381-383.
5"7 E. Busch, Ibid., 377.
202
ffO
world-occurrence" and "the ministry of the Christian community." Reconciliation ought to
be the third way of the churches in the Cold War context, according to Barth.
However, Niebuhr criticized Barth claiming he "refuses to make discriminating judgments
about good and evil if the devil shows only one horn or half of a cloven foot".559 E. Brunner,
who often counter-argued against Barth on many aspects of theology, also asked again and
again why he was so uncritical of Communism, by saying:
I imagined you would undergo the same change of outlook as Reinhold Niebuhr, who
only two years ago was expressing doubts about my fundamental rejection of
Communist totalitarianism at an important ecumenical conference, but who has since
joined the absolute opponents of Communism, particularly since seeing the monster
at close quarters in Berlin. What I cannot understand (about) you - is why a similar
change has not occurred in your attitude... 560
These criticisms of Niebuhr and Brunner were based on something of a misunderstanding of
Barth's third way. During the Korean War, many theologians in Korea and the Western world
were fed on the most vigorous kind of anti-Communism, and tended to feel that the gospel
could not be proclaimed in a Marxist world. But Barth knew that the whole world comprises
the land in which the gospel can and should be cultivated.
From the above study, we can conclude that Barth argued "the third way" as an authentic
identity for Christian churches in the Cold War context. This "third way" was not ignoring
historical context or suffering people. Rather it promoted active witnessing through the
ministry of reconciliation. Indeed, it was a prophetic voice, which called for the churches to
more beyond the ideological struggles, and not be held captive by them. His notion of the
third way is highly significant for the Korean churches, which experienced an extreme
ideological division and confrontation during the Korean War.
558
See, K. Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV. 3. ii, Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1961, §72.
559 The Christian Century, 27th October 1948, 1139. N.B., Barth answered, "God has not called us to
be his lawyers". The Christian Century, 16lh February 1949; cited from J. C. Cort, Christian
Socialism: An Informal History, New York, Orbis Books, 1988, 209-210. N.B., Rather, Niebuhr
changed his claim Concerning the moral superiority of America after the bloodshed caused by
America in the Vietnam War.
560 E. Brunner, "An Open Letter to Karl Barth", in K. Barth, Against the Stream, 106.
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3.3 The Implications
It is now necessary to summarize the implications and conclusions of this chapter. From our
study on the position of the WCC on the Korean War, we can conclude that not only the
Korean churches but also the world churches were divided into two ideological options. In
general, pro-capitalistic, pro-American and pro-South Korean voice of the Western churches
dominated in issuing the WCC Toronto Statement, which supported the "police action." In
this statement, the voice from the churches in North Korea and the Communist countries was
ignored. By doing this, the statement caused a serious ecclesiastical tension to arise, which
continued in the theological debate that followed between churches in East and West.
Hromadka opposed the statement and emphasized the necessity of dialogue with atheists. On
the other hand, Niebuhr supported the police action in order to preserve the international order
and punish the invader, North Korea, based on his ethic of Christian realism. However, Barth
called for the churches to come out of Cold War ideologies and to keep their specific
Christian identity, emphasizing the promotion of reconciliation as a third way in the Cold War
context.
We also noted that the majority of Christians in the North supported the South and the USA
during the war. Because of this, the Communists increased their hostility towards the northern
Christians. The support given to the South was one of the main causes of the persecution of
Christians in North Korea during the war. It seems at first sight that the renewal of Protestant
Christianity by the NKCA had been successful in the North before the war. However, it was
proved that this renewal in fact resulted in failure because the majority of the Christians from
the North eventually chose to relocate to the South. Finally, the Christians remained in the
North became isolated in the Communist society after the war. We will study this isolation in
move detail in next chapter. For the Communists in the North, the anti-Communism of the
Korean churches and the Toronto Statement were excellent reference points to use as tools for
criticizing Christianity as an anti-revolutionary and imperialistic religion.
In this context, the theological arguments and disputes which arose from the Toronto
Statement had several implications for the Korean churches. Firstly, there is the significance
of theological argument itself. We concluded that the renewal before the war and the support
offered to the state by the NKCA during the war were not backed up by any proper
theological reflection. Because of this, the NKCA failed to conduce grassroots Christians of
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their renewal ethos. However, the theological controversies and arguments that followed the
Toronto Statement enriched the ecumenical social thought of the WCC. Therefore,
theologizing and the development of a grassroots approach to the renewal were future tasks
which still awaited the NKCA. Only when they fulfilled these tasks would they be able to
launch a renewal that would be authentic.
We also indicated the need for the southern churches to listen to Barth's criticism of anti-
Communism in the post-war context. So far, we have seen that anti-Communism was
dominant ideology among the Korean Christians. However, as Barth warned, anti-
Communism is not Christian faith. Rather, reconciliation is a core of Christian faith, a fact
that was especially relevant to the Korean context.
Lastly, the WCC debate, and the mistakes that were made, already indicated some of the ways
in which both the Korean and the world churches would have to approach the issue of the
reunification of Korea. When there were two Koreas both fighting to reunify the peninsula by
force, and churches around the world supported one side or the other, the results were
disastrous. It became evident that neither reconciliation nor an authentic reunification could
be achieved in this way.
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Chapter V
The Winter ofChristianity in North Korea, 1954-1972
In this chapter, we will examine how northern Protestantism's ideological struggle with
Communism before and during the Korean War affected the northern churches in the post-war
context in North Korea. We will pay particular attention to the manners in which the
responses of the Korean and world churches during the Korean War influenced the fate of the
remnant Christians in the North. We will also investigate how the remnant Christians
responded in the new socio-political context ofNorth Korea, and the kind of relationship they
developed with the state in this period.
It will be argued that the ideological struggle with Communism prior to the Korean War, the
Christians' support for South Korea and the USA during the war, and the continuous
collisions between the state and the remnant Christian community in the North in this period
after the war, all helped to cause the isolation of the Christian churches in post-war North
Korea. Consequently, when the "Anti-Religious Campaign" began in 1958, the northern
Christians were not able to demonstrate that they would make a Christian contribution
forwards reconstructing North Korea. In the end, after the campaign, the churches in the
North largely disappeared, and the remnants experienced what might be termed a long and
cold winter ofChristianity in North Korea.
1. The Post-War Context
1.1 Socio-Economic Situation
The truce was concluded on 27lh July 1953. Although the armistice was a temporary
settlement to cease the hostilities, it was greeted with relief and approval by the people of
North Korea. The strains of the war, such as incessant bombing, prolonged fear, food
shortages and the loss of relatives, had resulted in widespread yomjonjueui or "war-
weariness".561 On the other hand, there was strong hostility towards the USA because of its
561 G. D. Paige and D. J. Lee, "The Post-War Politics of Communist Korea", R. A. Scalapino ed.,
North Korea Today, London, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963, 18.
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indiscriminate bombing, and towards the South, because ordinary people believed that it was
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the South that had opened the war.
The previous chapter has shown the degree to which human casualties and material damage
were concentrated in North Korea during the war. When the war finished, the gross domestic
product of North Korea had decreased to half of what it had been before the war. Agricultural
production was reduced to about 25% of its previous level. Most industrial facilities,
including the railroads, roads and bridges had been destroyed throughout North Korea. It is
recorded by a contemporary eyewitness that "families were separated and orphans wandered
the countryside".564 Therefore, rehabilitation and reconstruction were the most urgent tasks
for North Koreans.
To meet this task, the 6th Central Committee Meeting of the KWP met in April 1953 and
introduced the Three-Year Economic Plan (1954-1956) for post-war economic reconstruction.
In this plan. Kim Il-sung introduced an economic policy which was to give priority to the
development of heavy industry, while simultaneously developing agriculture and light
industry.565 However, this was later interpreted to mean that the production of consumer
goods would be sacrificed in order to concentrate on the development of heavy industry.566
The former South Korean Communist group, which had relocated to the North opposed this
policy because it did not recognize the popular desire for improved living conditions.567 Kim
argued that through the nationalization of all industries, including light industries and most
means of production, the government could control and maintain a balanced production
between heavy and light industries. He also introduced cooperative farms to increase
Cf-o
agricultural production.' In spite of criticisms, this plan was evaluated as a successful one by
the party, and it was carried through in two years and eight months.569
562 "The Communist version of how the war began was still widely believed...", Ibid., 19.
563 The statistics are cited from Han-kil Kim, Hyundae Chosun Yuksa, (A Modern History of Chosun),
Pyongyang, Institute for the Study of History, 1983, 339-340.
564 S. McCune, Korea: Land ofBroken Calm, 108-109.
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Jung-suk Lee, Hyundai Bukhan eui Yihae, (A Understanding Modern North Korea), 73.
566 Dae-sook Suh, Kim II Sung, 140.
567 G. D. Paige and D. J. Lee, Op. Cit., 22.
568
Jung-suk Lee, Op. Cit., 76.
569
Y. T. Kuark, "North Korea's Industrial Development During the Post-War Period", R. A. Scalapino
ed., North Korea Today, 52.
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Based on this success, the KWP launched the Five-Year Plan (1957-1961), which devoted
attention to machine tools, farm implements, mining machinery and chemical industries.570 In
this period, most farmland was transformed into cooperatives because the party made a
positive assessment of the test trials of the cooperative system which had been undertaken
during the Three-Year Plan. Along with the development of the cooperatives, small
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businesses were also nationalized by 1958. The party reported that the total value of
industrial output had risen more than threefold, and the total value of commodities in
circulation was about 2.5 times over what it had been in 1957. It has been claimed that the
Five-Year plan was completed within two and half years. The remaining time was then called
a "transitional period" dedicated to preparing the second Five-Year Plan.572 Jung-suk Lee
claims that North Korean society accomplished a socialist transformation of production
methods in this period.'
Although Kim aimed to achieve the "simultaneous" development of light and heavy industry,
the former was less developed in these plans. His political rivals criticized him for this.
Therefore, in a new Seven-Year Plan (1962-1969), not only industries but also rehabilitating
the cities was emphasized. New streets and municipal buildings were laid out, and public and
educational facilities promoted. "New and cozy houses for 600,000 families" were provided,
and the urban population increased.574
It is generally recognized that these economic plans enabled North Korea to overcome the
damage of the war faster than South Korea. It is of interest to study the relationship between
the economic growth and military expenses in North Korea in this period. According to Y. T.
Kuark, the expenditure on the national defense of North Korea was not more than 6.5% until
I960.575 The percentage given to military expenses was not more than 10% of the state budget
S7f\ • • ....
in the Seven-Year Plan period.' In general, the state investment in relation to military in this
570 S. McCune, Op. Cit., 133.
571
Jung-suk Lee, Op. Cit., 76-77.
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See, A. Hideo, "On the Economy", Kita-Chosen no Kiroku, (Record ofNorth Korea), Tokyo,
Shindokushosha, 1960, 75-118.
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Jung-suk Lee, Op. Cit., 77.
574 S. McCune, Op. Cit., 134.
575
See, the Table 5. State Expenditure ofNorth Korea in Y. T. Kuark, "North Korea's Industrial
Development During the Post-War Period", North Korea Today, 55.
576 C.f.. The military expenses ofNorth Korea in 1998 was Concerning 30% of GNP. For details, see,
"North Korea", US andAsian Statistical Handbook, 1999-2000, Washington, Heritage Foundation,
2000.
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period was balanced. This balance enabled the government to invest considerable amount of
its budget in industrial development, before the beginning of the North-South military
competition from 1970 onwards changed the situation/77
1.2 Political Power Struggle
In the 1950s, the most serious power struggle in the history of North Korea took place. Many
persons who had formed the centers of anti-Communist resistance had taken advantage of
war-time chaos to evacuate to the South. Therefore, the political power struggle during the
1950s took place within the Communist Party itself.
After liberation, the KWP was included various streams of the Korean Communist movement.
Because of this historical background, although Kim was the prime minister, the KWP was
being led by a collective leadership representing several groups of Korean Communists.578
The armistice brought an end to the war-time pressures which had helped to ensure cohesion
within this factional coalition.579 The KWP had five main factional elements.
The "Kapsan faction" comprised the immediate associates ofKim Il-sung who had been with
Kim during his anti-Japanese guerilla struggle. Kapsan was the name of a town that Kim had
occupied during the guerilla campaign. The "Soviet-Koreans faction" had returned with the
Soviet Army in 1945. Most of them belonged to the second generation of Korean Russians.
They had not been active in the independence movement, and some of their leaders could not
even speak Korean. The "Te^rm-Koreans" was another faction rooted in a foreign Communist
background. The members of this faction were Communists who had participated in the
Chinese Communist revolution as members of the Chinese Communist party. There were also
two domestic Communist factions from within the Korean peninsula; the "domestic North
Korean Communists," who had been active in the Japanese period, and the "domestic South
Korean Communists," who had formed the South Korean Worker's Party (SKWP) before the
577 On 15th August 1970, President Park declared Daebuk Kukryuk Kyungfaeng or National Power
Competition against North Korea. This declaration brought the dramatic increase of military
expenses in North Korea. See, Joo-suk Seo, "A Study of Military in North Korea", in Society of
North Korean Studies ed., Bundan Banseki Bukhan Yunkusa, (A History ofNorth Korean Studies
during the HalfCentury of Division), Seoul, Hanul, 1999, 125.
578
Concerning the stream and the leadership, see, Dae-sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement
1919-1948; R. A. Scalapino and C. S. Lee, Communism in Korea: The Movement, vol. 1.
379 G. D. Paige and D. J. Lee, Op. Cit., 19.
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establishment of the KWP.380 The head of SKWP was Park Hun-young. The SKWP unified
with the North Korean Workers Party and formed the KWP in 1948.
When the North Korean army retreated in October 1950, inner conflicts within the KWP
began. For example, Mu Jung, the leader of the Yenan-Koreans and Ho Kai, the leader of
Soviet-Koreans, were purged. This was a rather individual purge because of the failure of
operations during the war. However, this purge provoked the antipathy of these two factions
CO 1
toward the Kapsan.
Moreover, the challenge from the domestic groups was also serious. There was an organized
• ... S&9
effort to overthrow Kim and replace him with their leader, Park Hun-young." Park and his
followers attempted a military coup in early 1953 during the war but failed, and all the
conspirators were arrested. An official educational publication intended for the party members,
Chosun Nodongdang Yoksa Kyojae, (History Text of the Korean Workers' Party), shows that
• ... S&T •
Kim believed that the US had instigated this coup. The leaders of the domestic group were
accused on three counts: espionage activities for the US, indiscriminate destruction and
slaughter of democratic forces and Communist revolutionaries in the South, and the attempted
overthrow of the government by military forces. According to Dae-sook Suh, Park was
executed in 1958.384
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See, G. D. Paige and D. J. Lee, Ibid., 19-20.
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See, Dae-sook Suh, Op. Cit., 122-126.
582 Park was born in 1900 in Yesan. He represented the domestic Communists. He was the best-known
Communist during the Japanese occupation and commanded the support of Communists in both
North and South after the liberation. He was a founding member of the Korean Communist Party in
April 1925, and he studied in Moscow. When he was the chairperson of the South Korean Workers'
Party in 1946, he fled to the North because the USAMGIK suppressed the party. Later, Park became
vice-chairperson of the KWP, vice-premier, and concurrently foreign minister ofNorth Korea. For
his biography, see, Dae-sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948, 71-72. Dong-kun
Hong states that he was the helper of H. Underwood in early 1920s. Underwood introduced the
Evangelist Ryu Un-hyung, who was a famous Korean nationalist leader for Park. Park studied at the
Nanjing Union Theological Seminary, where Ryu studied, for a short period. This was to prepare
him for his studies in America, with the recommendation of Underwood. When this plan was not
successful, Park changed his mind and studied in Moscow. Kim accused Park of being an agent of
the US with citing his closed relationship with Underwood and some Americans, to remove him.
Interview with Rev. Dr. Dong-kun Hong, 13th April 2001, Los Angeles.
583 Chosun Nodongdang Yoksa Kyojae, (History Text of the Korean Workers' Party), Pyongyang,
KWP Press, 1964, 297. N.B., Some remnants of this faction resisted Kim rejecting his heavy
industry centered reconstruction plan.
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The Yenan and the Soviet Koreans continued to struggle for political hegemony after the war.
This began with criticism of Kim's policy, both factions strongly arguing against Kim's
rehabilitation policy. This criticism later developed into an anti-Kim Il-sung campaign based
on his alleged "monopolization of power" and "personality cult".'
There is no doubt that there was truth in this accusation. Kim was commonly referred to as
Suryung or supreme leader, an appellation reserved only for the greatest. Kim himself used to
call Stalin "our dear and respected Suryung". Mao was also called as the Suryung of the
Chinese peopled87 It was obvious that Kim expected to be called one of the Suryungs of the
Communist movement. He began to apply the title of to himself from 1967 onwards, during
coo
the "Sino-Korean dispute," when he declared the self-reliance ofNorth Korea.
The North Koreans more than matched the long list of prefixes and titles that characterized
the Chinese adulation of Mao. Kim was called "the great Suryung, the peerless patriot, the
national hero, the ever-victorious iron-willed brilliant commander, an ingenious thinker, the
COQ
sun of the nation, the red sun of the oppressed people of the world" and so on." Dae-sook
Suh interprets this tendency of personality cult: "it is perhaps understandable that a small
country in search of self-identity should launch a campaign to project an image of the unity
and stability of its people and political system abroad, and promote their leader in the
process".590
However, the Yennan and Soviet-Korean factions noted the Khrushchev's criticism of the
personality cult of Stalin. They had already found some personality cult within the KWP
585 G. D. Paige and D. J. Lee, Op. Cit., 22.
586
See, Kim's speech on 15th December 1952, at the fifth joint plenum of the Central Committee in
Kim Il-sung, Nodongdang eui Chojikchaek Sasangjeok Kanghwanun Uri Seungri eui Kicho, (The
Organizational and Ideological Consolidation of the Party is the Basis ofOur Victoiy), Pyongyang,
KWP Press, 1953,2-57.
587 Chosun Chungang Nyungam 1954-55, (Yearbook ofNorth Korea, 1954-55), Pyongyang, KWP
Press, 1955, 14-15.
588 The Chinese Red Guards during the cultural revolution made personal attacks on Kim in wall
posters and resurrected a perennial problem on the China-Korea boundary by reclaiming disputed
territory. The Red Guard also produced a rumor that Kim was arrested by the generals of the Korean
People's Army in 1967. Kim criticized this attack as imperialism. He said every party has its own
point of view, and it should be respected. The Big Powers tend to be suspicious of others and
pressure others to take side. Kim also said, "Koreans would never dance to the tune of others", and





during the 1950s. The anti-Kim factions were encouraged by Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization
campaign," of the 20th party congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The two
groups criticized Kim's exercise of power. They asked for a return to the pre-war collective
leadership system at the Third Party Congress of the KWP, 23rd-29th April 1956.591 Kim
refused, and accused these factions of the "fault of dogmatism", which uncritically adopted
Soviet experiences and ignored the Korean context. The highlight of this conflict was the
attempted military coup of 1st June-19th July 1956, during Kim's visit to the USSR and the
Eastern European countries. The coup failed when Kim canceled his schedule and returned
to suppress it. He immediately purged the leaders of the two factions, but later restored their
positions under political pressure from China and the USSR.594 This was a great dishonor for
Kim, because China and the USSR asked him to recognize that he had led the KWP in an
incorrect fashion. Those remaining from these factions were a danger to Kim's political
sustainability. Therefore, Kim set in motion the "Anti-Factionary Campaign"393 from 1957-
1960 to remove the factions, on the grounds of ideological deviation. Jung-suk Lee describes
this period as "the time of political storms" in North Korea, during which Kim mercilessly
purged his political rivals.596
Kim's immediate problems in the 1960s, however, were not at home, but in his international
relations within the Communist world. He was caught in the heat of the Sino-Soviet dispute.
Kim was extremely careful to remain neutral and tried to establish North Korea's self-identity.
In this manner, he developed the Juche (Self-Reliance) Idea during the 1960s.697
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L. I. Brezhnev visited this meeting and emphasized the importance of collective leadership in the
party. See, Ibid., 146.
592
Jung-suk Lee, Op. Cit., 77.
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594 The USSR sent the vice-premier, A. I. Mikoyan, and China sent the Secretary of Defense, Peng
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Mongryung Sunwoo, Inmin Jungkwon eui Surip kwa Keni Kongohwa rul wihan Chsun
Rodongdang eui Tujaeng, (The Struggle of the Korean Workers' Party to Establish and to
Strengthen the People's Regime), Pyongyang, KWP Press, 1958, 102.
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597 It is necessary to understand Kim's "self-reliance" in foreign policy in the context of the 1950s
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1.3 Emergence of the Juche Idea
The issue of national identity plays a highly important role in the history of the Korean people,
especially in their struggle against colonial oppressions. People in North Korea had to face
extremely complex tasks in all spheres of life after the end of the Korean War. Given the
tremendous obstacles faced by the people, including severe starvation, mass homelessness,
and abject misery and despair, they could cope with these issues only if they were extremely
organized and mobilized. This mobilization, though, could occur only if "national confidence
fQO
and identity were stimulated". There was an objective need to conceive a new ideology that
would restore the badly shaken self-confidence of the people, and deepen their sense of
national identity.6" This was one of main causes for the emergence of the Juche Idea.
On 28th December 1955, Kim Il-sung proclaimed the Juche Idea to the public.600 This idea
was established with the goal of making the country independent, self-confident, and self-
sufficient. Kim defined the new ideology as follows: "The Juche Idea is Juche (self-reliance)
in idea, Chaju (self-independence) in politics, Charip (self-sustenance) in economy, and
Chawi (self-defense) in military".601 Juche was the principle that was to inspire every effort to
strengthen the country.
According to Kim Jong-il, the Juche idea originated in Kim Il-sung's early years of
revolutionary activities:
The leader discovered the truth of Juche idea in the course of the struggle against
bigoted nationalists and bogus Marxists, flunkeyists and dogmatists, while hewing out
a new path for the revolution. Finally, he explained the principles of the Juche idea at
the meeting of Leading Personnel of the Young Communist League and the Anti-
Imperialist Youth League held at Kalun in June 1930, and put forward a Juche-
oriented line for the Korean revolution. This was a historical event which heralded the
creation of the Juche idea and the birth of the Jucbe-oriented revolutionary line.602
In the context of the 1930s, Korean Marxists did not recognize independence as a task the
598 1. Gothel, "Juche and the Issue ofNational Identity in the DPRK of the 1960s", H. S. Park, North
Korea: Ideology, Politics, Economy, New Jersey, Simon & Schuster, 1996, 20.
599 Dae-sook Suh describes the mobilization as "the super human drives", which emphasized
"maximum production with evincing thrift". Op. Cit., 164.
600 Kim Il-sung, Selective Writings, vol. 4, 325-354.
601 The Rodong Shinmoon, 19th December 1962.
602 Kim Jong-il, On the Juche Idea, Pyongyang, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1982, 7-8.
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Korean revolution. They followed dogmatic Marxism and sought an international proletarian
revolution against nationalism. Even Korean nationalists, especially those who followed
Syngman Rhee's line, also focused on an international diplomatic approach to Korean
independence. In this context, Kim instead emphasized the gaining of independence by the
Korean people themselves as the primary task of the Korean revolution.603 Under Japanese
rule, Kim's Juche idea was a mixture of Korean nationalism and Marxism.
However, it was especially from the mid-1950s that the Juche idea reappeared, and was
theoretically developed as the leading ideology in North Korean society. Juche played an
important role not only in mobilization, but also in domestic and foreign policy formation. In
domestic politics, Kim criticized Yenan and Soviet-Korean factions, on the basis that they
uncritically adopted foreign Communism for the Korean revolution. Kim said that Koreans
should not dogmatically imitate the experiences of other Communist countries, but should
instead critically analyze them, and then creatively adopt only those aspects of those
experiences that would benefit their own cause. The adoption of foreign ideas should be made
at their own pace, and at their own convenience, in view of the situation prevailing in their
own country. "One should be the master of one's own revolution".604 In international relations,
Kim therefore severed what was now called "the two decade long hierarchical relationship of
'master and puppet'" with the USSR and China, and sought out "friends in the Third World"
instead.60^ During the 1960s, the Juche Idea also became a sort of applied philosophy through
which the North Korean revolution was put into practice. The theoretical and philosophical
aspects ofJuche were nevertheless expanded and developed later, during the 1970s.
Kim's emphasis on "self' sounds similar to the "three self' idea in the Nevius Plan or Three
Self Patriotic Movement in China. However, it is difficult to find any evidence of the
influence of Kim's Christian background in the development of the Juche idea.
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See, Kim Il-sung, "Chsun Huykmyung eui Jinro-Kalun eseo Jinhaeng doin Gongchungmit
BanjechungnyundongmaengJidoganbu Hoeuieseo han Bogo ", (The Way of Korean Revolution:
The Report at the meeting of Leading Personnel of Young Communist League and Anti-Imperialist
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604 Kim Il-sung, Uridang eui Juchesasang kwa Konghwakuk Jungbu eui Taeneoe Jungchak eui mutkaji
Munje e daehayeo, (Concerning Several Problems of our Party's Juche Idea and Domestic and
Foreign Policy ofOur Republic), Pyongyang, KWP Press, 1969, 1-13.
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1.4 Hardened Division
Although the war had finished, there was a steady escalation of military competition, mutual
distrust, reciprocal vilification and hostility between the two Koreas. The military rivalry
between North and South accelerated up to the level of 840,000 troops in the North and
600,000 in the South. The prolongation of division also led to abuses of human rights and
justified long-term military dictatorship in both systems in the name of social security.
Until 1972, no peace talks for reconciliation between the two Koreas existed. During these
years, Rhee and his successor Park Jung-hee continued the Bukjin Tonngil or Reunification by
Invasion of the North policy in the South, and Kim strengthened his Nam Chosun Haebang or
Liberation of the South by the Military policy. Both Koreas often sent guerillas to harass the
rear of their enemy.606 In this context, any peaceful approach towards reconciliation was
regarded as anti-state behavior.
The complete suspension by both sides of postal services, travel, visitation and all other
communication between the two Koreas was established in this period, and made them the
most distant adjacent countries on earth. The educational systems compelled Koreans to hate
each other as irreconcilable enemies, rather than emphasizing their common nationhood.607
While at first most Korean people considered the division of their country as temporary, it
was gradually accepted that this situation was becoming a fixed reality. Not only
geographically and politically but also psychologically, people started to recognize the
division of Korea as an established fact.
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During the 1960s, 2,150 South Korean guerillas were killed or lost in North Korea. For details, see,
The Hankyoreh, 8th, 9th, 10th, October; 2nd, 5th, 6th 22nd November 2000. Also, a number of northern
guerillas attacked the South in this period. As a representative case, 31 northern guerillas attacked
the House of the President on 2f January 1968 in Seoul.
t>()7 When the author was in primary school, all his classmates, including himself, portrayed the North
Korean people as red wolves or monsters in a painting class. In 2000, when the summit talk
between the North and South was held in Pyongyang, there was a sort of "psychological shock" in
the South because South Koreans found Kim Jong-il, the President in North Korea, also had a
"human face" with humorous jokes and good manners. See, The Junngang Ilbo, 16lh June 2000.
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2. The Remnant Christians in the Post-War Context
2.1 The Situation of Northern Churches After the Korean War
During the Korean War, the majority of Christians in North Korea had maintained an anti-
Communist position, and finally evacuated to the South. About 20 ordained ministers and
50,000 Protestant Christians were left behind. Most church buildings were destroyed by the
bombing of US air forces. However, the most serious challenge which the remnant Christians
faced was the social antipathy toward Christians that was cultivated by the Communist
leadership. Rev. Young-sup Kang describes the situation as follows:
During the war, the majority of the Christians in North Korea supported the American
and South Korean armies, which were the enemies of North Korea, and finally
evacuated to the South. Therefore, after the war, North Korean people criticized
Christianity as an anti-revolutionary American religion. The remnant Christians were
ashamed and afraid to say, "I am a Christian". Reconstructing the churches? You
know, in this situation, it was difficult to talk about the reconstruction of churches. 608
This comment reflects the fact that the social antipathy against Christians among most North
Korean people was stronger than the remnants expected. Even the NKCA, which had
supported the Communists before and during the war, was threatened by this antipathy. Rev.
Choon-ku Lee gives a general account of the situation of the remnant Christians:
People were starving. Streets were full of war orphans. Rebuilding public facilities and
houses was urgent. The NKCA also tried to support the rehabilitating works, but we
had no human and material resources. To rebuild churches, we needed to ask the
party for its support so that we could obtain building materials, because of our
socialist economic system of North Korea. However, who could ask for that in this
situation? All resources should firstly go to the people to provide food, warmth, and
houses... In this context, we were not able to rebuild the churches. We just gathered
in the houses of members for Sunday service. The former lay leaders of house bible
study groups led the worship services. 609
We can summarize three findings in this account. Firstly, there was a lack of leadership
among the remnants. Because of the evacuation of most of the important leaders of the
Northern churches, the 20 remnant ministers were too small in number to respond properly in
the new context, and could not personally lead the 50,000 remnant laypeople. Secondly, the
608 Interview with Rev. Young-sup Kang, Chairperson of the KCF, 13th December 2000, Fukuoka,
Japan.
6119 Interview with Rev. Choon-ku Lee, Secretary for Mission, KCF and Lecturer of Pyongyang
Theological Seminary, 3rd April 2001, Pyongyang, North Korea.
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NKCA therefore found it difficult to make a Christian contribution towards the rehabilitation
work. It even seems that the ministers did not know where they should go. For example, from
the end of the war until 1958, the NKCA could not hold an official meeting to discuss
ecclesiastical matters.610 Lastly, it is clear that the traditional bible study meetings in house
cell groups611 started to function as worship centers in this period. These later developed into
"house churches" in the "revival period" that followed.
2.2 Boycotting Election Again
North Korea had a general election to elect representatives of the Second SPA on 27th August
1957. However, about 2,000 people collectively boycotted the election at Yongchun County,
• f\ 19
Pyungbuk Province, which had been one of the most important centers of Protestant
Christianity in North Korea since missionary times. Immediately, the central party sent
security police to investigate the causes. The police noted that farmers in collective farms in
• • f\ 1T
the county had been massively absent from their work on Sunday.
After thorough investigation, the police found that Rev. Man-wha Lee had organized about
500 hundred small, secret cell groups of underground Christian life in the area of
Yongchun.614 Rev. Lee had gone underground to organize these secret Christian groups at the
end of the Korean War. He had a strong anti-Communist view, influenced by some
conservative and evangelistic leaders of northern Protestantism before the war.615 The police
accused Lee and ten other leaders of this underground Christian group of organizing a boycott
610
Concerning the Assembly Meeting of the KCF in 1958, see following sections.
611
Ever since the Great Revival Movement in 1907, bible study meetings in house cell groups have
been developed in Korean churches. Even today most South Korean Christians meet every Friday
for bible study. Some theologians in Fuller Seminary emphasize that this meeting has greatly
contributed to church growth in Korean. See, P. L. Kannaday ed., Church Growth and the Home
Cell System, Seoul, Church Growth International, 1995.
612 Center for the Study of Far Eastern Affairs ed., Bukhan Jeonseo, (Collective Writings on North
Korea), Seoul, Kyungnam University Press, 1974, 235-236.
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Concerning the collective farming system in North Korea after the war, see, C. S. Lee, "Land
Reform, Collectivisation and the Peasants in North Korea", R. A. Scalapino ed., North Korea Today,
65-81; Y. T. Kuark, "North Korea's Agricultural Development during the Post-War Period", Ibid.,
82-93.
614 S. Masahiko, Nambukhan Kidokyo Saron, (An Argument on the History of South and North Korean




of the general election against the KWP. They were found guilty, and "openly executed"
later.616
Kim Il-sung, who was facing serious political challenges from other factions in the
Communist party, strongly criticized this boycott as anti-revolutionary behavior. In a speech
in April 1958, he urged severe punishment for Lee, in contrast to the tolerant judgment of the
Supreme Court.617 S. Masahiko claims that Kim personally ordered the execution of Lee.618
Whether this is true or not, it is important to note that this boycott by underground Christians
alerted Kim to the possibility that the activity of North Korean Christians could also pose a
challenge to his political power.
To understand the above nervous reaction of Kim, it is necessary to recall that the FPJP had
already boycotted two previous general elections before the war, relating respectively to the
National People's Committee and the First SPA, in order to resist the Communist regime.
Indeed, the boycott of general elections had been a traditional method of Christian resistance
to the Communists in North Korea. Furthermore, only recently, Kim had experienced an
attempted military coup by the Yennan and Soviet Korean factionaries, who were still in the
party with the protection respectively of China and the USSR. In this circumstance, Kim tried
to teach everyone a lesson through the execution of Lee and other underground Christian
leaders, who had no protection from outside, as a warning to his opponents.619
Kyung-bae Min, one of the most distinguished church historians in South Korea, claims that
Lee followed the opposition paradigm between church and state of the FPJP, with his
conservative understanding of the issues involved.620 Lee rejected the election in order not to
give legitimacy to the Communist regime in the post-war context. Min sees this as "an
extraordinary example of heroic religious resistance against Communist dictatorship in North
f01 .....
Korea". Whether it was "heroic resistance" or not, it is obvious that this boycott crucially
616
See, Center for North Korean Studies ed., Bukhan Minju Tongil Undonsa, (A History ofDemocracy
and Reunification Movement in North Korea), vol. 2, Seoul, Bukhanyunkuso, 1990, 685-687.
617 Kim Il-sung, "Uri Dangeui Sabup Jungchaek eul Kwanchulhagi wihayeo", (To Carry on the Policy
of Justice ofOur Party), manuscript, April 1958.
618 S. Masahiko, Op. Cit., 296.
619
N.B., Park Hun-young, the leader of South Korean Communists was executed at this time as well.
620
Kyung-bae Min, Kyohoe wa Minjok, (Church and Nation), 443.
621 Ibid., 443.
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affected the fate ofChristianity in North Korea in the post-war context: it was one of the main
factors that led to the "Anti-Religious Campaign".
Unfortunately, the underground Christians carried on their boycott during the "political
storm" period. In doing so, they gave the Communists a justification to eradicate Christianity
in North Korea, because they considered the boycott to be an example of "religious factionary
behavior." Therefore, the Communists introduced the "Anti-Religious Campaign" from 1958,
in line with the Anti-Factionary Campaign.
2.3 From the NKCA to the KCF
In 1958, in this extremely difficult situation, the Central Committee of the NKCA held its first
meeting since the Korean War. The leaders of the NKCA perceived that Kim Il-sung
understood the boycott as a serious instance of anti-state behavior. Therefore, as they had
done at the first Christian boycott in the pre-war context, the NKCA reconfirmed their support
of Kim's leadership.622 According to Rev. Choon-ku Lee, who is only source for what
happened at the meeting, about 50 committee members participated and approved the
following three decisions:
Firstly, the title of North Korean Christian Association (NKCA) was altered to the
Korean Christian Federation (KCF).
Secondly, the KCF membership was changed from denominations to Protestant
Christian individuals.
Thirdly, the KCF and the members agreed to fully support rehabilitation work and the
socialist revolution in North Korea.623
Here the NKCA leaders tried to create a new image of northern Protestant Christianity by
changing the association's organizational name. The reaction to the boycott from Kim Il-sung,
i.e. execution of eleven leaders of an underground Christian group, had been a source of
astonishment to them. Therefore, the new KCF intended to "directly guide" individual
Christians "to protect them" by giving them a proper account of Communist policy.624 Behind
this intention, the NKCA leaders were trying to protect themselves as well, by cooperating
with the Communist policies.
622 Interview with Rev. Young-sup Kang, 13,h December 2000, Fukuoka, Japan
623 Interview with Rev. Choon-ku Lee, 3rd April 2001, Pyongyang, North Korea
624 Ibid.
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The KCF was now the sole official Christian organization in North Korea: Since 1958, there
have been no other official or known Protestant ecclesiastical organizations in North Korea.
This process was very similar to the emergence of the China Christian Council (CCC) through
the Three Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM). However, there is no evidence of any direct
influence from the Chinese Christian experience in the establishment of the KCF.62"
Lastly, the KCF strongly affirmed Christian support for the socialist reconstruction of North
Korea. In doing so, the KCF tried to reassure Kim Il-sung by affirming that the central
organization ofNorth Korean Christianity constantly supported his leadership.
In spite of these efforts, the KCF's standpoint was not enough to persuade the Communists
and overcome the tide of Anti-Religious Campaign, which brought a winter of Christianity in
North Korea. Even before the new-born KCF was able to develop further policies, the
campaign struck not only underground Christians, but also the KCF itself.
3. The Anti-Religious Campaign and the Isolation of the Churches
3.1 The Anti-Religious Campaign
The Anti-Religious Campaign which began in 1958 in North Korea was the Communist way
of counteracting the boycott. Although the boycott was carried on in only one county, it was
enough stimulation for Kim Il-sung and his followers to oppress the Christians throughout
North Korea. The aim of Kim and his followers was to uphold their political hegemony by
introducing a much more hostile religious policy than before.
There was an ideological necessity in this campaign as well. To mobilize North Korean
society for the reconstruction, and to stabilize Kim's power by doing this, an ideological unity
was necessary for Kim's group in the post-war context. For this purpose, the Juche Idea was
emphasized. However, in addition to factionary ideologies, Christianity was considered as
625
N.B., In 1985, KCF and CCC met in Shanghai and Najing. This meeting was highly influenced the
development of KCF in the context of revival. Concerning meeting, see, Ching Feng, May 1985.
626
See, Ha-chul Jung, Urinun Wae Jongkyo rul Bandae hanunga?, (Why Do We Oppose Religion?),
Pyongyang, KWP Press, 1959, 7-10.
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another ideological rival of the Juche. Therefore, it was necessary for Kim and his followers
to develop the Anti-Religious Campaign in parallel with the Anti-Factionary Campaign.
The Anti-Religious Campaign developed in two ways, namely social discrimination and anti-
religious ideological propaganda. The KCF leaders claim, even today, that "there has always
been religious freedom in North Korea since liberation". However, there is evidence that
the Communists persecuted Christians not only during the war but also in the post-war period.
In addition to Lee's group, underground Christian groups in Bakchun County, Pyungbuk
Province, in Wonsan and Haeju, in Onchun County in Pyungnam Province were accused by
the police, and some leaders were executed and the members sent to work in the mines.
There was also systematic social discrimination toward Christians. On 30th May 1958, the
Central Committee of the KWP approved the document "On the Massive Struggle with Anti-
Revolutionaries." This document advocated the survey and classification of the "social
composition" of North Korean society in order to "enhance the level of mass culture" and "to
• (\~) Q ....
purge reactionaries". Based on this resolution, a nation-wide Communist mass education
and social classifying campaign was carried on from 1958 to the end of the 1960s. The
KWP classified North Korean civilians in three categories: revolutionaries, masses, and anti-
revolutionaries. Until the central committee meeting of KWP in February 1964, the KWP
removed anti-revolutionary factors of the society. In this period, leaders of the underground
Christians such as the above cases were classified as an "undesirable religious reactionary
631
element," and in many cases sent to concentration camps.
Having achieved the removal of the reactionaries, the KWP continued from 1964 to 1969 to
categorize North Korean people according to their class background, attitude during the
Korean War, former profession and "socialist morality". Finally, the Communists classified
North Korean people as three classes: the core, the basic and the hostile, and fifty-one sub-
627 Interview with Rev. Choon-ku Lee, 3rd April 2001, Pyongyang, North Korea.
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See, S. Masahiko, Op. Cit., 294-300.
629 KWP Central Committee, "BanhyukmyungBunjawaeui Tujaengeul Jimkunjungjukeuro
Jungaehande daehayecT, (On the Massive Struggle with Anti-Revolutionaries), Pyongyang, KWP
Press, 1958.
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See, Jae-uk Park, "The Social Class in North Korea", in his book Bukhan eui Sahoe, (North Korean
Society), Seoul, Eulryu Munhwasa, 1990.
631 Hun Ryu, A Study ofNorth Korea, Seoul, Naewoi Munje Yunkuso, 1966, 285.
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categories. The results of this work determined many aspects of personal and social life in
North Korea. For example, it provided reference points for deciding who was to be educated,
who was to be employed in what positions, who could be party members, military officials,
etc.
According to this categorization, Christians were normally classified as Section 38, the
category of those requiring "general and special observation". Even those Christians who
were eager to contribute to the party were put in this category, the members of which were
nor allowed to be appointed at higher position in the government. For the normal Christians,
"special observation" was recommended, and if they created social problems, severe
• • ..... ....
punishment was suggested. In this context of social discrimination towards Christians, it
was very difficult for the Christians to openly profess and enjoy their religious life.
The Anti-Religious Campaign was developed as a means not only of social discrimination but
also of ideological attack. In 1959, the KWP and its subordinate organizations published six
booklets for anti-religious propaganda and education.634 These criticized religious faith as a
form of fatalism, which justifies the social status quo. Religion is the opium of the people,
weakening revolutionary desire with its non-scientific fantasy aimed towards the next world.
On this point, the North Korea Communists had an understanding of religion similar to that of
other Marxists. Their criticisms ofChristianity re-iterate the standard views of the Communist
polemics of the period, and lack any originality.
Nevertheless, the authors of these works devoted most space to criticizing Christianity on the
basis of their own experience. For example, Fla-chul Jung claims that "Christian mission in
632
See, The Academy ofKorean Studies ed., Bukhan eui Silsang, (The Reality ofNorth Korea), Seoul,
The Academy of Korean Studies Press, 1986, 112-117; In-chul Kang, "A Recognition of Modern
Religious History in North Korea", 183-184.
633 Center for North Korean Studies, "The Policy on Social Class in North Korea", in Bukhan Sahoe
eui Jaeinsik, (A Recognition ofNorth Korean Society), vol. 1, Seoul, Hanul, 1987, 323.
634 Ha-chul Jung, Urinun Wae Jongkyo rut Bandae hanunga?, (Why Do We Oppose Religion?),
Pyongyang, KWP Press, 1959; Hee-il Kim, Inmin eui Apyun, (The Opium of People), Pyongyang,
Minchung Chulpansa, 1959; Jae-sun Ro, Jongkyo nun Inmin eui Apyun ida, (The Religion is the
Opium of People), Pyongyang, Minchung Chulpansa, 1959; Jae-sun Ro, Mije nun Namchosun eseo
Jongkyo rul Chimryak eui Dokuro Iyonghago Itta, (US Imperialists Use Religion as a Tool of
Invasion in South Korea), Pyongyang, KWP Press, 1959; Won-kyu Paik, Jongkyo Doduk eui
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Chosun Yeosung Sa, 1959.
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Korea started with Western imperialism" in Urinun Wae Jongkyo rul Bandae hanunga?,
(Why Do We Oppose Religion?), which was one of the Party's official textbooks of anti-
religious propaganda. Jung highlights the experience of a massacre by the US army, which
"the Christians called as divine army", during the Korean War.635 He reminds readers that the
Korean churches supported the invader, USA, and world churches justified US military
intervention as a just action. He concludes that Christianity has been a tool of American
. ... ......
imperialism in Korea. In this logic, being Christian in North Korea meant being an agent of
the US imperialist. It is evident that Christian support for South Korea and the US during the
war crucially influenced religious policy in North Korea in the post-war context. Lastly, Jung
suggests a religious policy as follows:
We need to distinguish among religious people between those who support the policy
of our party for the victory of our revolution, and those who are undesirable religious
reactionaries attempting anti-revolutionary plots, hindering our march and destroying
our socialist construction. For the latter, we must inflict severe punishment...However,
for the former, it is false to identify them with the latter. We must persuade them to
give up their religious belief through continuous enlightening education, which gives
the right epistemology on things. In doing this, we can remove the root of religious
remnants in our society.637
It is evident from this passage that the KWP did not intend to persecute the Christians because
of Christian faith itself. The Party wanted to remove the root of Christianity because it had
supported the South during the war and boycotted the elections. In brief, the criticism was
based more on patriotism than on ideological views. This provided a possibility for Christian
survival in North Korea, if only the Christians could prove their patriotism. The situation was
similar to that of China in 1950, when the Communists had demanded that Chinese Christians
demonstrate their patriotism.
3.2 The Results: AWinter ofChristianity in North Korea
There are few primary sources that relate the story of the remnant Christians in the period of
the Anti-Religious Campaign. North Korean officials deny that there was any religious
persecution. During the interviews the author conducted in North Korea, neither KCF leaders
nor house church members were prepared to comment on this period, or they simply repeated





official statements. However, it is obvious that there was social discrimination against the
Christians in this period, and that religious activity was restricted, as the campaign suggested.
It is not our main purpose to dig out all detailed stories of persecution in this section. Rather,
the section will illustrate the general situation of the remnants during the campaign.
Dong-kun Hong, a lecturer at the Kim II Sung University, notes that "the Christians in North
Korea...passed through the fire-kiln of suffering" during the campaign period. 638 The
increased social antipathy towards Christians on the part of ordinary people, the social
discrimination organized by the government, the regular watch the security police put on them
and the persecution of underground church leaders together comprised a winter of Christianity
in North Korea. These difficulties were experienced not only by the ordinary Christians but
also by the KCF members. R. A. Scalapino and C. Lee state that in this period even pro-
zrog
Communist Christians were doubted, and were under regular observation. Even the KCF
was daunted by the campaign. For instance, before 1958, the NKCA had regularly appeared in
the reports on the United Front produced by the KWP. However, from 1958-1971, there was
not a single mention of the activity of the KCF.640 It seems that only the central office of the
KCF existed, in Pyongyang, during this period.641
It seems too that in this period, there were two kinds of phenomena among the remnant
Christians. A lot of Christians must have given up their faith, because the total number of
Protestant Christians reduced from 50,000 in 1953 to 5,000 in 1972.642 Obviously, one of
main causes of this was social discrimination. Under such terrible circumstances, it would be
very difficult for ordinary Christians to continue with their religious life.
In another case, some Christians voluntarily withdrew from Christian faith because they were
ashamed to be Christian. Here is a story of a lady who gave up her faith:
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Her husband was a Christian leader who opposed the Communist policy. He
evacuated to the South alone during the war because he was afraid of the US nuclear
bombing. She had several children and was poor. He prayed for material blessing to
educate her children. However, their children had a benefit to study in higher
education due to the socialist educational system in North Korea. Later, she told her
children, "your father believed God and evacuated to the South, leaving us
behind...He opposed the Republic and praised America. However, you have had the
benefit of free education in this socialist country. Therefore, I insist you must be good
Communist civilians supporting the Republic".6 3
Some Christians they abandoned their faith due to the anti-religious propaganda of the
Communists. However, the campaign was not able to entirely eradicate all the roots of
Christianity. Remarkably, there were house cell groups that continued to function as
communities of the remnant Christians. For example, Elder Se-yong Kang of the Nakrang
House Church in Pyongyang states that she was able to attend a regular prayer meeting in a
house group even in this period.644 This would be a special case because she was a daughter
ofRev. Byung-suk Kang, the assassinated leader of the NKCA in 1946. According to Se-yong
Kang, the Communists tolerated this Christian house community, whose members had
contributed in the construction of Communist North Korea. However, in many cases, such
communities were not able to openly enjoy Christian life. Therefore, most remnant Christians
kept their faith individually,645 or went underground. For example, an underground Christian
community in Onchun County in Pyungnam Province was detected, and its members sent
away as mine workers in 1968.646
Despite Kim Il-sung's denial of religious persecution, this period of North Korean history
seems similar to the "cultural revolution" years in China. Except for a few Christians, it was
extremely difficult to exercise religious freedom from 1958-1971. As a result of the Anti-
Religious Campaign aimed against the Christians, the KCF was isolated and the Christian
churches disappeared in North Korea, except for a small number of house groups. It was
indeed the winter ofChristianity in North Korea.
The Anti-Religious Campaign lasted thirteen years from 1958 to 1971. It was extremely
difficult witness openly to the Christian faith. The Jangdaehyun Presbyterian Church, which
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Dong-kun Hong, Op. Cit., 156-157.
644 Interview with Elder Se-yong Kang, Pyongyang, 6th April 2001.
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was a symbolic place for northern Protestantism, became the People's Learning Center. The
Pyongyang Theological Seminary ceased to train theological students. However, even in those
days, the Christians did not altogether cease to meet. Hundreds of house groups met in homes,
worshipped and studied the Bible together, without ministers.647 Kyung-seo Park claims that
the South Korean Christians too, must learn this strong faith, following the example of the
f.AQ
northerners.
The Jnche Idea provides a theory on the material world and social revolution in North Korea.
However, there are other aspects of human life, including spiritual desire and questions on the
next world. When Dr. Seung-duk Park, the director of the Institute for the Jnche Idea, was
questioned on how the Juche Idea interprets the next world, he answered, "you Christians
teach us spiritual matters."649 He also recognized the ceaseless efforts of northern Christians
to keep the Christian faith during in this period.650
There are a number of factors which enabled the revival of Protestant Christianity in North
Korea after 1972. Above all, it was possible to revive because the remnant Christians had
maintained their faith and met in house groups. Indeed, this was "the holy stump" of
Christianity in North Korea.
647 This experience was similar to Chinese Christian experience during the Cultural Revolution period.
See, K. H. Ting, "The Church Endures", in R. L. Whitehead ed., No Longer Strangers: Selected
Writings ofK. H. Ting, New York, Orbis, 1989, 132-135.
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Conclusion to Part Two
When Korea was liberated, Christianity and Communism, which were both widely respected
among the northern minjung, encountered each other as ideological rivals in constructing a
new nation-state. Part Two of this thesis has examined the history of Protestant Christianity in
North Korea with special reference to the Christian ideological struggle with Communism. It
was of interest to investigate how each encountered, struggled and related with the other, and
to note the kind of church-state relationship the had developed as a result.
After the liberation, Kim Il-sung invited the Christians to join the united front for national
construction. However, the northern churches repeated the paradigm of opposition between
church and state because they believed that Christianity could not coexist and cooperate with
atheistic Communism. Furthermore, the Christians competed for political power by
organizing Christian parties. In this political competition, the collision between the Christians
and the Communists escalated with the boycott of the general election on Sunday Sabbath,
and the attempted assassination of Kim. One of the main reasons behind this collision was the
land reform, because many of the Christians had upgraded their social status from minjung to
become members of the elite through modern education, and they had recently emerged as
landlords in the North. Another important reason for this collision was that the northern
churches had had only a single paradigm of church-state relations in their experience so far,
the oppositional paradigm. The Christians adopted this paradigm again in the new context of
liberation and Communist national construction that had come into existence.
On the other hand, a cooperational paradigm also emerged, promoted by the leaders of the
NKCA. The NKCA recognized that the Communist reform was necessary in North Korea,
and supported it. With the support of the Communists, the NKCA had taken the ecclesiastical
initiative by 1949, and introduced a radical renewal program for northern Protestantism in the
Communist context. However, this renewal was carried on by a top-down method, which
depended on ecclesiastical power that rendered it ineffective. The renewal also lacked a
proper theological justification, and there was insufficient Christian reflection on it. Because
of these limitations, finally, the renewal of the NKCA was not able to take deep root among
ordinary Christians, and it resulted in failure.
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When the Korean War broke out in 1950, the NKCA leaders continued their cooperational
paradigm. They justified the war as a just war. However, the majority of Christians did not see
it this way, and opposed their Communist state. They welcomed the allied army as a "divine
army" attempting to liberate the northern Christians, and supported it. Not only the Korean
churches but also the Western churches, including the WCC, supported the US position on the
Korean War, as was evident in the issuing of the Toronto Statement. Finally when the allied
army retreated, the majority of Christians evacuated to the South because they were afraid of
the reaction from the Communists.
After the war, only one fourth of Protestant Christians and a few NKCA ministers were left
behind the Iron Curtain. However, they did not dare to openly reconstruct Christian churches
because there was increased social antipathy toward the Christians, most of whom had
supported the enemy. In this post-war context, some of the remnants again boycotted the
general election, indicating that they still did not accept the legitimacy of Kim's regime. This
boycott brought about a reaction from the Communists. A severe "Anti-Religious Campaign"
was introduced. This was accompanied with the legalizing of social discrimination against
Christians, the execution of some underground Christian leaders and much anti-Christian
propaganda. Finally, not only underground but also even pro-Communist Christians,
belonging to the KCF (formerly the NKCA), were in difficulty to openly enjoy religious life
after 1958. The cold winter ofChristianity in North Korea lasted until 1972.
The issue of church-state relations was one of the crucial issues determining the fate of
Christianity in North Korea during this period. Prior to the liberation, Protestant Christianity
in North Korea had succeeded by introducing the oppositional paradigm between church and
state. However, after the establishment of the Communist regime, the repeat of this paradigm
caused a failure of Protestant Christianity in North Korea. Although a new paradigm of
cooperation emerged under the leadership of the NKCA, it was not widely adopted among the
grassroots Christians in North Korea until 1972.
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Part Three
Church, Minjung and State: The Revival and Renewal of Protestant
Christianity in North Korea, 1972-1994
Introduction
One of the aims of Part Three is to analyze the revival of the churches in North Korea.
Whether conservative or progressive, historians in South Korea find one of the crucial causes
of the revival in the close relationship between the KCF (church) and the KWP (state). For
example, Kyung-bae Min insists that the KWP revived the KCF for its own political
propaganda purposes.1 Similarly, In-chul Kang claims that the northern churches revived
'y #
because of the cooperation paradigm of church and state. Flowever, this fails to explain why
the former NKCA, which had a similar paradigm, was not successful. We will argue that in
order to interpret the inner dynamics and motivations of the revival correctly, the element of
minjung must also be added to the picture. The manner in which the efforts of Protestant
Christianity in North Korea for the minjung influenced the process of the revival will be
clarified. Both the minjung element and the aspect of church-state relations need to be taken
fully into account in any attempt to understand the revival. It will thus be argued in Part Three
that the revived Protestant Christianity in North Korea has developed a "minjung-centered
cooperation paradigm between church and state," which is quite different from the former
cooperation paradigm of the NKCA.
The triangular reality of church, minjung and state will also help to define the two key
concepts that characterize Chapters VI and VII: revival and renewal respectively. The concept
of "revival" in Chapter VI is an external reference, denoting the institutional growth of the
KCF. on the basis of the 1972 Platform, as a federation of house churches, growing in number
with an increasingly professional leadership of theologically-trained pastors. In evangelical
circles, "revival" often means movements of spiritual awakening that are followed by church
growth. As used in this thesis, "revival" refers to the KCF's constructive engagement with the
KWP that resulted in the rapid growth of house churches. By 1994 there were 511 of these
house churches, and they provided the backbone of the revival ofChristianity and of Christian
engagement in public life in North Korea. The concept of "renewal" in Chapter VII, on the
'
Kyung-bae Min, Church andNation, 443.
2 In-chul Kang, "A Recognition of Religious History in North Korea", 198.
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other hand, is an internal reference, denoting the theological and diaconal identity of North
Korean Christianity, with special reference to developments from the late 1980s up to 1994.
As a result of the Christian opposition to the Communist state, there was no officially
recognized church in North Korea from 1958-1972. This was mainly due to the Communist
Anti-Religious Campaign. However, North Korean Protestant Christianity revived after 1972,
in a publicly recognized fashion. It is of interest to examine how this was possible after the
one and half decades of "non-existence".
The aim of Part Three of this thesis, therefore, is to give a comprehensive account of the
history of the revival and renewal of Protestant Christianity in North Korea, paying special
attention to the minjung-centered approach to church-state relations from 1972-1994. It will
be argued that Protestant Christianity in North Korea revived through an authentic renewal of
its mission in the Communist context. This stands in contrast to the earlier attempt at renewal
led by the NKCA that ended in failure. The churches that have revived since 1972 have
carried out a "Social Diakonia Mission," emphasizing mission for the minjung. In line with
this, it will also be argued that the renewal of the KCF was not a compromise but an effective
accommodation with the KWP. The NKCA attempt at renewal failed to take root among
grassroots Christians because it lacked theological foundations and a commitment to mission.
However, the revived KCF carried out an authentic Christian-Juchean Dialogue in order to
articulate its theological identity. It will be argued that the KCF has succeeded in justifying its
presence and mission in North Korean society theologically, through this dialogue. Lastly, as
we stated above, it will be argued that the revival had a minjung-centered approach on the
issue of church and state, and that this was the key to its success.
This Part makes constructive use of primary research materials, drawn from archives and
interviews. Although the author of this thesis has succeeded in collecting wide range of
original sources, he was not able to access the minutes of the General Assembly meetings of
the KCF, which would shed light on important decisions taken by the KCF in relation to the
renewal and revival of northern Protestantism. Unfortunately, the KCF does not allow
anybody from outside to access the minutes yet.4 However, the author was able to hear of
3 "Rev. Yang-Uk Kang's Interview", in Bukhan (North Korea), July 1974, 126.
4
N.B., Since the revival, the general assembly of KCF was held in every four years, from 1973 to
present.
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important decisions of the assemblies through interviews with KCF leaders, who have
participated in the organization's general assemblies, such as Rev. Choon-ku Lee.
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Chapter VI
The Revival ofNorthern Churches, 1972-1988
In this chapter, we will examine how Protestant Christianity in North Korea revived after the
Anti-Religious Campaign. A comprehensive account of the history of the revival will be
given. It will be argued that the revival of the northern churches was not merely a claim of
Communist propaganda, but an authentic ecclesiastical revival that was accompanied by
changes in the Communist understanding of Christianity.
1. The Context of Revival
1.1 The New Constitution and Election
The period from 1972-1988 can be characterized as a politically stabilized, or static era in
North Korea. Kim Il-sung exercised absolute power, and disallowed any political opposition.
During the 1950s, Kim had faced serious internal political challenges from his Communist
rivals. He overcame these challenges through the strong Anti-Factionary Campaign. In the
1960s, there was an external crisis, the Sino-Soviet Dispute, which threatened his leadership.
China and the USSR both wanted North Korea to take sides with them, and each of them
limited Kim's power through frequent intervention in the domestic affairs of North Korea.
Against this, Kim declared the independence of North Korea by maintaining Juche, or self-
reliance.
In this context, the year of 1972 was a very important turning point in not only the
ecclesiastical but also the political history of North Korea. In that year, Kim Il-sung
succeeded in rewriting the constitution and was elected president of the republic at the fifth
SPA.^ The general election of 12th December 1972 was the most remarkable election for
Kim.6 In contrast to previous general elections, there was neither a Christian boycott, nor
factionary resistance nor foreign influence.7
5
N.B., Kim was the premier of the cabinet before 1972. Concerning the political development in
North Korea in this period, see, V. Mikheev, "Politics and Ideology in the Post-Cold War Era", in
Han S. Park ed., North Korea: Ideology; Politics, Economy, 87-104.
''
According to article 87 of the Constitution, the SPA is the highest sovereign organization in North
Korea. People elect the representatives of SPA through direct, equal and secret vote. The term of
representatives is five years except in extraordinary circumstance. The SPA also elects the president
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As soon as the fifth SPA formed, it made two important decisions in its first meeting, 25th-28th
December 1972. The KWP introduced a bill before the assembly suggesting amendments to
the constitution. It was generally recognized that the constitution needed to be revised because
it had been established before the Korean War, in the context of national construction.8 The
1948 Constitution was aimed at legally establishing achievements made by the "anti-feudal
democratic revolution," and "providing a favorable condition for socialist revolution." Known
as the socialist Constitution, the 1972 constitution was aimed at consolidation of North Korea
as a socialist republic.9 The new constitution passed the SPA unanimously on 27th December.
A number of changes distinguished the new constitution from the old, such as lowering the
voting age from eighteen to seventeen 10 and the moving the capital from Seoul to
Pyongyang.11 However, the most radical changes were the substitution of Juche, Kim's own
political thought, for Communism as the official ideology of the state, the establishment of
Kim's own revolutionary tradition as the tradition of Korea,12 the institution of the new office
of President of the Republic13 and the creation of a new, all-powerful administrative organ
called the Central People's Committee.14 The new President of the Republic was head of state,
concurrently serving as commander of the armed forces and chairman of the National Defense
Committee. He had power to issue edicts, grand pardons, and conclude and abrogate treaties.
ofNorth Korea due to the 1972 Constitution. Concerning the SPA, see, Ministry of Unification ed.,
2000nyun Bukhan Gaeyo, (Introduction to North Korea, 2000), Seoul, Ministry of Unification, 2000,
103-114.
7 The elections which followed were the Sixth SPA in 1977, the Seventh in 1982, the Eighth in 1986,
the ninth in 1990, and the tenth in 1998. See, Kap-sik Kim, "Bukhan Choikoinminwiwonhoe eui
Kinunge daehan Yunku: Injeondae Kinung eui Junsimuro", (A Study of the Supreme People's
Assembly in North Korea with Special Reference to the Role of Transmission Belt), M.L.
Dissertation, Seoul National University, 1994.
8
Concerning the context of the first constitution, see, Kyung-seop Yoon, "1948nyun Bukhan Hunbup
eui Chejung Baekyung kwa geu Sungrip", (The Context and Establishment of the 1948 Constitution
ofNorth Korea), M.L. Dissertation, Sung Kyun Kwan University, 1996; Concerning the
development of the constitutions, see, Korea Legislation Research Institute ed., Bukhan eui Hunbup
Gaejung kwa Ipbub Donhyang, (The Amendments of the Constitution and the Tendency of
Legislation in North Korea), Seoul, Korea Legislation Research Institute, 1994.
9
See, On the Socialist Constitution ofthe Democratic People's Republic ofKorea, Pyongyang,
foreign Language Publishing House, 1975.






See, Ibid., Chapter Six, "The President of Democratic People's Republic of Korea".
14
See, Ibid., Chapter Seven, "The Central People's Committee".
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Dae-suk Suh interprets the new constitution as "the proclamation of (North Korea's)
transformation into an independent state." The country would no longer be ruled by "a
satellite Communist party created and heavily manipulated by domineering Communist
superpowers (as it had been) in the past."15 In order to preserve and develop the independence
ofNorth Korea, Kim needed to become a head of state in fact as well as in law. However, it
has to be noted that in the process of transformation, there was a degeneration of the Juche
Idea. What is manifest in the constitution of 1972 should be considered trivia compared with
what is being practiced in the North. Kim's lust for power was satiated only by unbounded
loyalty and absolute submission throughout his domain. His cult of personality has been said
to eclipse those of such Communist leaders as Stalin and Mao in scope, magnitude, and
fervor.16 Indeed, his cult demanded not only subjugation to him but also reverence for his
parents and loyalty to his son. He practiced not Communism, in the so-called socialist state,
but rather a peculiar brand of oriental despotism.
In this process, the Juche Idea played a role of ideological justification. Article 4 of the new
constitution declared that North Korea was guided in its activity by the Juche Idea. The article
describes the Juche Idea as "a creative application of Marxism and Lennism to the condition
peculiar to the country".17 Jang-yup Hwang, the former director of the Institute for Juche
Idea,18 says that the Juche Idea began to degenerate into mere "Kimilsungism" from this
moment.19 By adopting the Juche Idea as national ideology in the 1972 constitution, Kim II-
sung became the national hero not only in practical politics but also from an ideological and
philosophical perspective. Hwang, who was directly involved, says that from 1972, Kim
asked Juche scholars to focus more on the role of the suryung (supreme leader) in the Korean
• • •c • 20
revolution, to justify his supreme power.
15 Dae-sook Suh, Kim II Sung, 270.
16
Byung-chul Koh, "Political Leadership in North Korea: Toward a Conceptual Understanding of Kim
II Sung's Leadership Behavior", Korean Studies, vol. 2, 1978, 139-157.
17 The Socialist Constitution, Article 4.
18 It has been known that Hwang (1923-) de facto philosophically theorized the Juche Idea. He studied
philosophy for his doctoral degree at the University ofMoscow during the Korean War. He was the
President of Kim II Sung University from 1965-1972, and served as the Chairman of SPA from
1972-1983. He was also the founding director of the Institute for the Juche Idea. He was the
minister of Foreign Affairs of the North Korean government from 1984-1997. He evacuated to
South Korea after criticizing the political succession of Kim Jong-il in 1997. For his biography, see,
Jang-yup Hwang, Nanun Yuksa eui Jinri rul Boatta: Hwang Jang-yup Hoegorok, (I Have Seen the






Under the new constitution, Kim was elected as the President of North Korea. Although he
was elected for a four-year term, it allowed re-election without restriction.21 The elevation of
Kim from premier of cabinet to President of the Republic was not merely a change of title.
Now, Kim was able to grasp total political power as the "great leader" in North Korea, in the
year of his sixtieth birthday. The political stability which then followed in North Korea, under
its undisputed supreme leader, was an important aspect of the context in which Protestant
Christianity revived. In this atmosphere, the Communists no longer regarded the Christians as
a possible political threat.
1.2 The North-South Dialogue
In the 1970s, there began to be definite signs of a realignment in the old East-West
confrontation. There was a Sino-American rapprochement and the Soviet-Japanese and Sino-
Japanese peace treaties were concluded. It was in 1972 that all these dramatic changes became
• • • 22historical realities. The Cold War climate that had created the division of the Korean
peninsula was changing. Both North and South Korea were forced to readjust their position to
cope with the new developments. Kim Il-sung took two steps in the hope that he could keep
up with the rapidly developing international changes. One was to open a dialogue with the
South Koreans to explore the possibilities of reuniting the country; the other was to broaden
and solidify his ties with the Third World.23
As early as the second plenum of the fifth Central Committee of the KWP in April 1971, Kim
began to discuss the problem of reunification seriously. The North Koreans agreed to meet
South Korean representatives of the Red Cross in August 1971. More important than the Red
Cross talks was Kim's apparent willingness to discuss the issue of reunification through
political consultation. After some secret talks between intelligence officials from both sides,
Kim Young-joo from the North and Lee Hu-rak from the South, a dramatic joint communique
21
See, The Socialist Constitution, Article 90.
22
N.B., The Shanghai communique issued by US and China was dated 27th February 1972. The Soviet
Foreign Minister, A. Gromyko, visited Japan for the treaty in 1972. The Japanese Prime Minister
Tanaka visited Beijing for the Sino-Japanese peace treaty in September 1972.
23
In dealing with the Third World, Kim was successful in having the North join the conference of
nonaligned nations while South Korea's bid for membership was rejected. He was also successful in
having many Third World countries endorse a pro-North Korean resolution in the UN during this
period. Dae-sook Suh, Kim II Sung, 249-251.
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was issued on 4th July 1972, comprising seven articles. The first delineates three principles
upon which the dialogue was to be conducted. These principles are worth quoting here
because Northern and Southern Christians, too, have used them as a basis for carrying on
"their" reunification talks.
First, unification shall be achieved through independent efforts without being subject
to external imposition or interference.
Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through use
of force against one another.
Third, a great national unity, as a homogeneous people, shall be sought first,
transcending differences in ideas, ideologies and systems.24
Two Koreas which had experienced a fratricidal war through inviting foreign forces into the
peninsula two decades ago, now committed themselves to following an independent and
peaceful approach for reunification through mutual recognition. After three separate
preliminary meetings in subsequent months, both sides agreed to establish the North-South
Coordinating Committee on 4th November 1972. A series of reunification talks undertaken
9S
through this committee lasted until 1975.
However, the following year, President Park Jung-hee of South Korea rejected the
reunification talks and tried to perpetuate the division of the country, as a means of
9 ft
prolonging his military dictatorship. The government of the third republic of the South that
had ruled for a decade after a military coup prepared for another decade in power by
introducing a revitalized constitution (Yusin Hunbup) and martial law in October 1972, Park
himself being confirmed as the permanent president. One of the justifications of Park's
original coup had been to achieve reunification, but once his position was secure, he rejected
further talks.
For the northern churches, the North-South dialogue, while it lasted, created a new
opportunity for revival. On account of it, North Korean society was exposed to the South and
24 For the full text of the communique in Korean, see, Nambitk Taehwa Paekseo, (White Paper on the
North-South Dialogue), Seoul, Nambuk Chojul Wiwonhoe, 1975, 36-37. The same text can be
found in North Korean publications in Chosun Chungang Nyungam 1973, (The Yearbook ofNorth
Korea, 1973), Pyongyang, KWP Press, 1973, 336-337. The English text can be downloaded from
ysiwyg://.192/http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/1953/nscomm. htm.
25 For the chronology of the dialogue between North and South, see, Republic of Korea, National
Unification Board, South-North Dialogue in Korea, No. 54, Seoul, 1992.
26 Dae-sook Suh, Kim II Sung, 269-270.
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outside. Often, during the dialogue, North Korea was questioned as to whether there was
religious freedom. This question was posed in such a way that it focused on the presence of
Christians and existence of churches in North Korea. 27 It must have caused some
embarrassment to North Korean Communist officials, who claimed the superiority of their
political system over that of the South. Through the dialogue the North Korean Communists
also began to learn about the Christian struggle for democracy and support for the minjung in
the South. Until then, for the Communists in the North, the image they had of Christianity
was only as an "American imperialistic religion". However, the minjung movement and
minjung theology of the southern churches gave them a different picture altogether. It was an
extraordinary experience for them, which forced them to reconsider their understanding of
28 • •
Christianity. Consequently, for the first time, Kim Il-sung made an open address in 1973, in
29which he recognized that "Christianity has some resources for the liberation ofminjung."
1.3 Military Competition and Economic Situation
From the end of the 1960s, North Korea dramatically increased military expenditure. The
military outlay in the national budget jumped from about 2.6 percent in 1961 to 5.8 percent in
1964, reaching 10 percent by 1966. The following year it tripled to 30.4 percent and remained
• • TO
in the 30 percent range during the 1970s. It was certainly over-investment and broke the
balance of the national budget. This policy was motivated by the country's declaration of self-
reliance. Within the framework of the Juche, the further idea of self-defense in military power,
known as the Jawi, was emphasized in this period, in order to free the military forces ofNorth
"2 1
Korea from their dependence on China and the USSR.
At first, this unbalanced over-investment in the military budget was regarded as a temporary
one. However, on 15th August 1970, President Park of South Korea declared Daebuk Kukryuk
27 For example, see, the interview of Rev. Yang-uk Kang in this chapter, section 2.1.
28 From 1974-1983, the KCF announced Concerning ten supportive statements for the minjung
theologians, and official party magazines regularly reported their struggle. This will be argued in
detail in later sections of this chapter.
29
KWP, Chosun Joongang Nyungam, (The Yearbook ofNorth Korea), Pyongyang, KWP Press, 1974,
261.
,0 Dae-sook Suh, Kim II Sung, 219-220; J. Lee, A Recognition ofModern North Korea, 81. Cf., Y. T.
Kuark gives a slightly different statistics. It was less than 6.5% of national expenditure from 1953-
1959, and kept Concerning 10% from 1960-1966. See, Y. T. Kuark, "North Korea's Industrial
Development During the Post-War Period", 55.
11
Jung-suk Lee, Ibid., 81.
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Kyungjaeng or the National Power Competition, against North Korea. This
• • • • 99 /-»
declaration resulted in heavy military competition between North and South. Therefore,
inevitably, North Korea continually failed to balance its budget. One possibility for North
Korea to return to normal economic management, and a balanced national budget, was
through the peace talks of 1972. However, these failed, and North Korea lost an opportunity
to decrease its military expenditure. Economically, this had a direct and negative effect on
ordinary North Koreans.
South Korea deliberately intended to bring about the collapse of the North Korean economy
through the military competition. There had been US troops with an enormous amount of
military equipment in the South since the Korean War. While this US presence in the South
continued, North Korea rejected military support from China at the end of 1960s. Furthermore,
South Korea experienced rapid economic development after 1970. This meant that military
expenses were far more burdensome to North Korea than they ever were to South Korea,
• 33which had advantage of a US military presence and a large, expanding economy.
Over-expenditure on military expenses caused a depression in North Korea's national
economy.34 Kim indicated as early as 1965 that the pace of economic development had been
retarded because of increased military expenditure, and the goals of the Seven-Year Economic
Plan would not be met on schedule/2 The fifth party congress of the KWP was delayed until
1970 on account of the Seven-Year Economic Plan being extended another three years in
order to meet the goal/'6 The increase in military expenses forced the government to cut down
expenditures in other areas, such as health, education and social welfare.37 Therefore, the
economic life of ordinary people was getting worse in this period.
32
See, Joo-suk Seo, "A Study of Military in North Korea", in Society ofNorth Korean Studies ed.,
Bundan Banseki Bukhan Yunkusa, (A History ofNorth Korean Studies during the Half Century of
Division), Seoul, Hanul, 1999, 125.
33 For detailed statistics about the economic gap between the North and South in this period, see,
Republic of Korea National Reunification Board ed., Statistics ofNorth Korean Economy, Seoul,
Republic of Korea National Reunification Board, 1986; Eui-gak Hwang, The Korean Economies: A
Comparison ofNorth and South, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993.
,4
For detailed statistics, see, Korea Institute for Defense Analysis ed., The Analysis ofMilitary
Expenses ofNorth Korea, KIDA, 1980.
35 Kim Il-sung, "New Year Address on 1st January 1965", Selective Writings, vol. 4, 195-240.
36
Concerning the plan, see, J. S. Chung, "North Korea's Seven Years Plan (1961-1970): Economic
Performance and Reforms", Asian Survey, vol. 12, 1972, 527-545.
37 Kim emphasized, "most of our workers do not work for money, nor do they need any material
incentive. They demand nothing more than the state's guarantee of their livelihood, and they work
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2. The Revival ofChurches
2.1 The New Platform
During the Korean War, most church buildings in North Korea were destroyed or used as
hospitals and for other public facilities. However, this did not mean the disappearance of the
Christian community. The remnant Christians gathered in house groups for worship and
fellowship. Nevertheless, due to the harshness of the Anti-Religious Campaign, most
Christians kept their faith individually, and many house groups remained underground.
In 1972, the central committee of the KCF gathered together to discuss the revival of the
churches in North Korea, and adopted what it called a "new platform" for this purpose.
Firstly, the KCF the declared that Christianity is a patriotic religion ofNorth Korea. The KCF
declared that the Christians fully supported their government, and would cooperate with its
policy:
With patriotism, we will make efforts for the prosperity of the country upholding the
OQ
constitution and policy of the Republic government.
It is understandable that the new platform thus starts by expressing strong support for the state.
The KCF needed to reassure the government because of the history of opposition between the
church and the state in North Korea. The revival of the churches was not aimed against the
government, and would not threaten its authority. This was not merely political lip service
paid to the Communist government. Rather, Protestant Christianity was genuinely trying to
root itself among the North Korean people as a patriotic religion, and shed its image of being
a tool of "American imperialism".
Secondly, the KCF explained further some of the ways in which the revival would benefit
North Korean society:
conscientiously". Paradoxically, this speech shows the difficult economic condition of ordinary
workers in this period. Kim Il-sung, "Speech at the Eighteenth Plenum of the Central Committee on
16th November 1968", Selective Works, vol. 5, 284.
38
See, Appendix F.
39 The Platform of the Korean Christian Federation, 1972, Article 1.
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We will strive to eliminate all sorts of discrimination based on gender, nation, religion,
property and class, and to establish a free, equal society founded on the spirit of
Christian Charity.40
The second article indicated that the revived church would not work only for the Christians.
Rather, it promised that the Christians would contribute to the wider community. In fact, the
platform went on to confirm that the KCF would rejoin the United Front, strongly committing
itself to stand with other social organizations for the independence and reunification of
Korea.41
Then thirdly, the KCF expressed its ecclesiastical concerns:
The KCF will work to defend the freedom of faith and religious life for the
development of Christianity in Chosun (North Korea), including work for evangelism,
and the rights and demands of the Christians.42
Although the internal concerns of the KCF, the actual revival and spread of Christianity
comes thirdly, this was nevertheless a powerful declaration, demanding religious freedom in
North Korea. It also shows great confidence in the solid faith of the remnant Christians. As a
matter of fact, the revised constitution ensured the freedom of religion, in its article 54.
However, at the same time, it also guaranteed what it called "the freedom of anti-religious
propaganda".43 Article three of the platform of the KCF was a strong request to the
government to realize the spirit of the constitution, and not to apply it only one-sidedly. The
KCF tried to confirm that the freedom of faith in the new constitution specially included the
freedom of evangelism. This can even be interpreted as an indirect criticism of the "freedom
of anti-religious propaganda", which was a left-over from the Anti-Religious Campaign,
which had been used to restrict and suppress evangelism. The KCF understood the freedom to
evangelize as an essential aspect of the freedom of religion.
We can summarize by noting that the KCF's revival platform pushed Protestant Christians in
North Korea in three directions. Firstly, the KCF confirmed their support for the government.







43 "Citizens have freedom of religious belief and freedom of anti-religious propaganda.", The Socialist
Constitution, Article 54. N.B., The freedom of anti-religious propaganda was completely deleted in
the constitution of 1992.
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Thirdly, the KCF would defend the freedom of faith and evangelism. Like the "Christian
Manifesto" in China, the 1972 platform was a short, but historic declaration. It provided a
common basis for the development of Protestant Christianity in North Korea among both the
KCF leaders and the house church Christians from 1972 onwards.
2.2 The Revival of the KCF and the House Churches
In addition to the new platform, in the same year (1972) the revived central committee of the
KCF decided to reopen the seminary, register individual Christians and reconstruct the
ecclesiastical order of the KCF. This was to be an institutional revival of the northern
Protestantism. However, behind it, there was also the revival of the house churches, which is
most significant from the perspective ofminjung. Here, let us stop to listen to a story from the
Protestant Christians in Kaesung.
Before the Korean War, there were 850 Protestant Christians in Kaesung city. However, only
about 200 of them were left behind after the war, and they had no pastor. When the war
finished, the remnant Christians in Kaesung divided themselves into three sections, the
western, northern and eastern, and organized each house church with about ten members in
1954. They justified this because "believers are scattered, and some are too old to walk
distances to worship in homes".44 However, here we can find a way of organizing house
churches among the Christians in Kaesung similar to Man-hwa Lee's underground group,
which was persecuted in 1957. In fact, the Christians in Kaesung must have organized the
house churches in order to continue their religious life "silently," without stimulating a
reaction from the Communists.
During the Anti-Religious Campaign, the house churches existed underground.4^ This effort
of grassroots Christians without a single pastor shows an extraordinary commitment not only
to keeping their faith, but also to protecting their faith community, in the house churches,
44
NCCUSA, "Confidential Report of the NCCCUSA Official Delegation Visit to North Korea", 19th
June-2July 1987, 20-21. N.B., There are two versions of the report, the official report and the
confidential report. The NCCCUSA does not open the confidential report to the public, which
includes a full record of the visit, because of political sensitivity.
45
Still, most interviewees in North Korea did not want to make any comment about the campaign.
Dong-kun Hong describes, "The remnant pastors, who had walked out the fire-kiln of suffering,
shut their mouth, and they are saying in silence." Dong-kun Hong, UncompletedDiary of
Homecoming, vol. 2, 90.
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amidst the terrible atmosphere created by the Anti-Religious Campaign. They even worked
hard in the collective farms and factories, and were actively involved in the socialist
reconstruction works in order to make a good reputation for themselves.46 Without this effort,
it would have been impossible for the Protestant churches in North Korea to revive, even in
the changed context that arose from 1972 onwards. When they reopened eventually their
churches in 1972, they did so by themselves, without the assistance of the KCF. When the
Christians in Kaesung first met the pastors from outside, the delegation of the National
Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA (NCCCUSA) states that they simply shed tears
and embraced them. The delegation felt that these tears symbolically expressed the efforts the
Kaesung Christians had made to keep their communities alive.47
The number of Christians in Kaesung who joined the KCF in 1972 is unknown. However, in
1985, the provincial committee of the KCF in Kaesung reported that the house churches in the
city had fully recovered, and all had joined the KCF. This indicates two things. Firstly the
revival of the house churches was not a single event. Rather, it took more than a decade for
them to recover to the point where their was the same number of them as there had been
before the Anti-Religious Campaign. Secondly, not all houses churches immediately became
members of the institutionally revived KCF. It took more than ten years before all the house
churches in Kaesung had fully joined up with the KCF.
In this story, it is clear that the grassroots Christians were the people who originally
developed the house church tradition in North Korea. It was only in the early 1980s that the
Kaesung house churches became closely related to the KCF. The Kaesung Christians, who
had not a single ordained pastor, organized their churches as house churches after the Korean
War. They preserved their faith communities underground, in spite of persecution, from 1958-
1972. Even after 1972, they have revived and strengthened their communities by their own
initiative. This characteristic allows us to define the house churches as the minjung Christian
community in North Korea.
In 1972, when the Anti-Religious Campaign finally disappeared, the KCF did not have exact
statistics of how many Christians remained in North Korea. Therefore, surveying the remnant
46 Interview with Rev. Dr. Insik Kim, 13th December 2000, Fukuoka, Japan.
47
NCCUSA, Op. Cit., 20.
48
NCCCUSA, Op. Cit., 20. There were 120 members of the KCF in 1985.
242
Christians, and registering them with the KCF, was an important task for the KCF to
undertake, as they set about reconstructing ecclesiastical order. Flowever, the Christians in the
underground must have been suspicious of the new approach of the government, and possibly
of the KCF as well. The registration work of the KCF must have been delayed because of
misunderstanding and mistrust of the Christians concerning its purpose.49 Nevertheless, after a
certain period of observation, the majority of Protestant Christians did join the KCF. This
resulted in a dramatic increase of the membership of KCF.
Table 9) Distribution ofMembership of the KCF, 1984-2002 50
Year 1984 1988 1996 2000 2002
Membership 5,000 10,000 12,000 12,343 13,043
The statistics given above for 1984, 1988, and 1996 are approximate number for the
membership of the KCF. These were reported either to foreign delegations or in ecumenical
meetings. Only more recently, (as in the statistics for 2000 and 2002) did the KCF announce
the exact numbers of its membership. Although the figures were approximate, it seems that
the membership was doubled in the four years from 1984-1988, and increased by about 300
members annually from 1988-1996. Choon-ku Lee states that, in this period, "approximately,
half of the increase was new believers, the other half being individual Christians who were
joining the KCF for the first time."51
By 1984, the KCF had finished surveying the situation of house churches across North Korea.
There were about 500 house churches, and each church had about ten members. The average
• • 52 • •
age of the Christians was fifty-five years old, and 70% of them were women. It is certain
that the majority of the churches had joined the KCF by 1984, as was the case in Kaesung. In
49 Interview with Jong-ro Lee, Secretary for International Relations, KCF, 13th December, Fukuoka,
Japan. The KCF recognizes that still there are Christians, who do not registered with the KCF.
50 The statistics of 1984 are from J. Moyer et al., "Visit of a Delegation to the D.P.R.K. from May 24 to
June 10, 1984", Lutheran World Federation, 4; 1988 from T. M. Brown, "Trip Report: East Asia,
October 27-November 28, 1988", Asia/Pacific Desk, Anglican Church of Canada, 20th February
1989, 7; 1996 from K. Park, "North Korea-Background of the Churches" WCC Memorandum, 25th
June 1996, 1; 2000 from Y. Kang, "Keynote Speech", The Seventh Korean Christian Conference for
Peaceful Reunification of Fatherland, 13th December 2000, Fukuoka, Manuscript, 4; 2002 from Y.
Kang, "Keynote Speech", The Eighth Korean Christian Conference for Peaceful Reunification of
Fatherland, 23rd June 2002, Tozanso, Unpublished Paper, 3.
51 Interview with Rev. Choon-ku Lee, the secretary for mission, KCF, 3rd April 2001, Pyongyang.
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NCCCUSA, "Report of the Official Delegation Visit to North and South Korea, June 19-July 3,
1987", 9.
243
other words, by 1984, the house churches and the KCF seem to have reached a situation of
mutual trust. One evidence for this was that both jointly launched a national Christian
campaign in 1985, based on a common demand.
Hence, at the general assembly of the KCF in 1985, the representatives of the houses churches
and the KCF leaders decided together to begin the Ileoburin Shinja Chatki Undong or the
Campaign to Find the Lost Believers. This campaign would last four years, until 1988.53 Its
target was to find individual Christians to invite them to house churches, and encourage them
to register with the KCF.54 For instance, Soo-ik Lee had attended Sunday school with his
parents, but he was "far away" from Christianity in his adulthood. His Christian friends "re-
evangelized" him, and he became a deacon in a house church.35 It seems, however, that the
campaign was not targeted only at individual or former Christians. Hyun-chul Kim was in his
twenties in the period of campaign, but he had never been in a church, although his late father
had been an elder. He became a Christian under the guidance of Rev. Young-sup Kang, who
had been a friend of his father's.56 This shows that the "campaign to find lost believers" was
an evangelistic tactic of the house churches and the KCF. Through this efficient campaign, the
membership of the KCF was doubled in only four years. It is certain that one of the
characteristics of Protestant Christianity in North Korea is its strong interest in evangelism, in
accordance with the evangelistic tradition of Korean Christianity. More recently, in 2002, the
KCF has again launched yet another evangelism campaign, aiming to increase membership to
14,000 by 2004.57
However, even in this evangelistic movement, the contribution of house church was
remarkable. Although it was launched by the initiative of the general assembly of KCF, the
"doer" of the movement was the house church and its ordinary members. For this reason, the
growth of membership of the KCF through the campaign does not mean merely an increase of
in the number of existing Christians who are registering, but rather an increase in new house
church members as well. As Lee points out, half of new KCF membership in this period was
the "new believers". That means the new membership of house churches increased by about
53 Interview with Rev. Choon-ku Lee, the secretary for mission, KCF, 3rd April 2001, Pyongyang.
54 Interview with Prof. Kyung-seo Park, former Asia Secretary ofWCC, 28lh November 2000, Seoul.
55 Interview with Mr. Soo-ik Lee, 12th December 2000, Fukuoka, Japan.
56 Interview with Mr. Hyun-chul Kim, 13th December 2000, Fukuoka, Japan
37
See, Young-sup Kang, "Keynote Speech", The Eighth Korean Christian Conference for Peaceful
Reunification of Fatherland, 23rd June 2002, Tozanso, Unpublished Paper.
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5,000 from 1984-1988, and these new members also registered with the KCF. By 1988, the
ordinary attendance of each house church had increased to about twenty as well. Indeed,
through this campaign, both the house churches and the KCF had been strengthened.
Moreover, both were getting closer to each other through campaigning together.
In addition to the evangelistic achievement, the Campaign thus strengthened the relationship
between the KCF and the house churches. It seems that by 1988, the house churches fully
recognized the KCF leadership as their representative ecclesiastical body, as a result of the
campaign. However, the house churches and the KCF have not always had the same
expectations about future ecclesiological development.
The house church is a unique ecclesiological form of Protestant Christianity in North Korea. It
may be described as a small congregational community under lay leadership. At first, the
remnant Christians started to organize house groups in the disaster of the Korean War. The
Christians met in the houses of lay leaders to carry on their religious life because their pastors
had evacuated to the South. During the Anti-Religious Campaign period, the state officially
abolished the house communities, but many continued to exist underground. In this context,
the church had to be organized as a small and lay-centered secret faith community for survival.
This small and secret lay-centered congregational model of house church, under persecution,
is similar to the ecclesiastical form of the First Church, during the early centuries.
However, in 1988, there was a new phenomenon in the house church tradition in North Korea.
From 1972 onwards, the underground house groups had been coming out into the open, and
registering with the KCF. With the reopening of the seminary, the house groups began to be
developed as house churches, where ordained ministers would proclaim the Word of God and
celebrate the sacraments. The house churches also recovered their baptism, ministry and
Eucharist, based on Presbyterian tradition.58 As consequence of the positive results of the
evangelism campaign, and the ecclesiological embodiment of the house churches, remarkably,
in 1988, the Bongsu Church was built in Pyongyang, and has now 450 members. The Chilgol
Church was built in 1991 in memory of deacon Kang Ban-suk, the mother of Kim Il-sung,
and has now 150 members. The two churches absorbed more than half of the 50 house
churches in Pyongyang. From 1988, a new congregational model began to emerge in North
58
Concerning this development, see, Chapter VI, Section 3.
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Korea, and was evident in the Bongsu Church and the Chilgol Church. As in the South
Korean Church, senior and associate pastors were appointed, elders were elected, choirs were
organized, and the church buildings were beautifully decorated by the Christians of the two
churches who belonged to the urban elite.
The KCF, which took the initiative in constructing these two churches, said them as a symbol
of the revival of Protestant Christianity in North Korea. Indeed, it was an historic event in the
history of the North Korean church. The Christians were proud of what they had finally
achieved.59 However, when the KCF encouraged by these successes, tried to build another
church in Hamhung, the house churches there rejected it.60 Although the establishment of two
organized churches in the capital city was highly impressive for the grassroots Christians in
Hamhung, they preferred the atmosphere and fellowship of their house churches. As a matter
of fact, this rejection was predicted when some former house church Christians criticized the
atmosphere of the Bongsu Church. E. Weingartner notes that during his days in the Bongsu
Church, about twenty former Nakrang House Church members returned to their house
church:61
They soon found that it felt uncomfortable in such a large setting. There were many
people in the congregation whom they did not know. It seemed impersonal. After the
service people simply returned to their homes. They did not have any chance to stay
and mingle. They missed the quiet of their meetings, the comfort of communing with
those whom they trusted. They missed having snacks and drinks and visiting with
each other after worship. Eventually, they left Bongsu and reassembled their small
house church.62
This indicates the reason why the house churches do not hurry to construct church buildings
and big congregations. Indeed, the 511 house churches63 which overcame "the fire-kiln of
suffering" have mostly developed as a distinct ecclesiological structure in North Korea, which
preserves close fellowship between believers.
59 Interview with Se-yong Kang, 6th April 2001, Pyongyang.
60 Interview with Rev. Young-sup Kang, 13th December 2000, Fukuoka.
61 Interview with Eric Weingartner, 12"' April 2001, North Bay, Canada.
62
E. Weingartner, "God Leaves No One Without Hope", Unpublished Paper, 25th March 2001, 4-5.
63 The statistics are taken from Young-sup Kang, "Keynote Speech", The Eighth Korean Christian
Conference for Peaceful Reunification of Fatherland, 23rd June 2002, Tozanso, Unpublished Paper,
3.
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The structure of the KCF is a combination of administrative function and ecclesiastical order.
Kyung-seo Park says, "The Korean Christian Federation is de facto the post-denominational
church in North Korea like the China Christian Council."64 However, although the main
tradition has been Presbyterianism in Protestant Christianity in North Korea, the KCF is not a
general assembly, but a loose federation of house congregations. Ecclesiastical life largely
depends on the experience and tradition of each house church. 65 In other words, the
ecclesiastical polity ofKCF is similar to that of Congregationalism.
However, although there was some tension between the KCF's intention of effecting a kind of
centralization and the congregation centered approach of the house churches, both have fitter
themselves into the ecclesiastical structure of the KCF since the revival. For the KCF leaders,
they needed the support of house churches to be authentically the central ecclesiological body.
On the other hand, the house churches also needed to be protected by a powerful central
Christian organization, but on their own initiative. Because of their need for each other,
neither wanted to continue the status quo and, together, they gradually strengthened the KCF
as a central Protestant organization.
To do this, firstly, the KCF recovered its General Assembly in 1973. From 1946-1954, the
assembly meeting had been held annually. The next general assembly after 1954 was in
1958.66 After that, the KCF was not able to hold another assembly meeting until 1972,
because of the Anti-Religious Campaign. Therefore, it was urgent for the KCF to revive its
ecclesiastical governing structure, since denominational structures had not existed in North
Korea since the Korean War.
After the revived central committee meeting in 1972, the KCF held its Eleventh General
Assembly meeting in 1973, in Pyongyang, to approve the proposals of the central committee
for the revival of Protestant Christianity in North Korea. Choon-ku Lee remembers that there
was a deep emotion and thanksgiving to God for the revival during the assembly.67 The
revived assembly unanimously approved the new platform and the decisions of the central
64 Interview with Prof. Kyung-seo Park, the former Asia Secretary ofWCC, 28th November 2000,
Seoul.
6" Interview with Mr. Eric Weingartner, 12th April 2001, North Bay, Canada.
66 Interview with Rev. Choon-ku Lee, 3rd April 2001, Pyongyang.
67 The general Assembly meeting of KCF has been held in 1946, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 58, 73,
77, 81, 85, 89, 93, 97, and the 18th assembly was in 2001. Ibid.
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68committee. Since 1973, the KCF has held a general assembly every four years, at which it
has carried out its businesses and made important decisions, such as electing the KCF
chairperson, general secretary and central committee members,69 evaluating the activity of the
central committee, revising the platform, and making policy etc.
Beneath the general assembly, the central committee has met twice in every year. The
committee elects the executive committee members and executive secretaries, and governs the
business of the secretariat in accordance with the mandate of assembly. The committee
members are usually twenty-five, chosen to represent each regional body within the KCF.70
The Pyongyang Theological Seminary is also under the governance of the central committee.
The executive committee is composed of the chairperson, general secretary and four executive
secretaries. It coordinates and shares out the work of each unit. Under the committee, the
general secretary plays the role of chairperson of the secretariat.71 There are also four
executive secretariats in the units of mission, organization, finance and international
79
relations.
As local structures, the representatives of each house church form the county committee of the
KCF. Before the famine in 1993, the role of provincial committees was similar to that
Presbytery in Reformed tradition (i.e. governing house churches, conducting ordination of
pastors and elders etc.). However, since the famine and economic crisis in North Korea, the
province and county committees have been developed in such a way that they promote local
development projects and provide food distribution, supported by foreign Christian
organizations. There are fifty county committees and ten province committees within the KCF,
and each province committee has about five staff members.
68 Ibid.
69
N.B, Rev. Young-sup Kang, the current chairperson of KCF was elected at the 15lh General
Assembly in 1989. Interview with Rev. Young-sup Kang, 13th December 2000, Fukuoka.
70
Jung-hyun Paik, Bukhanedo Kyohoega Itnayo?, (Are There Christian Churches in North Korea?),
58-59.
71 The general secretaries, who have served since 1972, and their period are as follows: Sung-ryul Kim
(1972-1981), Duk-ryong Kim, 1979-1981, Ki-jun Koh (1981-1994), Chun-min Lee (1994-2001),
Kyung-woo Oh (2001-present).
72 There were 30 staffmembers in the central office of the KCF in 1997. "From the Central Committee
ofKorean Christian Federation to Asia Desk, World Council of Churches", June 1997.
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Table 10) Ecclesiastical Structure of the KCF 73
Apart from its ecclesiastical structure, the KCF is also a member of the Committee for the
Peaceful Reunification for the Fatherland. This is a united front unit under the KWP, which is
concerned with the political reunification of the peninsula. The Korea Religionists' Council
(KRC) is another organization of where the KCF belong. It consists of the Korean Christian
Federation, the Korean Buddhist Federation, the Korean Chondoist Association (Tonghak),
and the Korean Catholic Christian Association. It promotes religious peace and religious
cooperation for the peaceful reunification of Korea.74
73 The information on this table is based on the report, "From the Central Committee of the Korean
Christian Federation to the Asia Desk, World Council of Churches", June 1997.
74
Concerning other religions and KRC, see, Heung-soo Kim and Dae-young Ryu, "A Study of the
Present Situation of Religions in North Korea and Possibility of Religious Exchange between the
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2.3 Underground Church
The house church has been the basic ecclesiological structure, being in practice the local
congregation, in the revived Protestant Christianity in North Korea. However, there are
controversial arguments among South Korean scholars about whether the house churches are
genuine or not. As we noted, the KCF reported that there are 511 house churches and two
organized churches as its member churches.
In spite of the KCF's report, some conservative South Korean scholars claim that this statistic
was fabricated, and there exist only "secret underground house groups" in North Korea.7"
Tae-woo Koh claims that the genuine church in North Korea disappeared through the Anti-
Religious Campaign, and that the small numbers of house churches used to gather only when
foreign Christian delegations visited North Korea.76 K. M. Wells also asserts that there are not
511 house churches under the KCF, but about 200 underground churches.77 T. J. Belke, shows
the hand-copied Bible, the letters and photos of underground Christians as evidence of the
existence of underground churches.78 However, in contrast to the detailed statistics of KCF,
these scholars do not provide details on the underground churches. They justify this on the
ground that their intention is to protect them.
A second group of scholars who recognize the existence of the 511 house churches, but claim
that there are only two "official churches", Bongsu and Chilgol Church and a few urban house
churches, that are the member churches of the KCF. They claim that the majority of house
churches still remain underground.79 However, this claim is out of date, because the majority
of house churches had joined the KCF during the 1980s.
North and South", History ofChristianity in Korea, vol. 16, 2002, 123-180.
75
See, Kyung-bae Min, Church andMinjok, 449-450; Sung-min Ryu, "A Study of Religion in North
Korea", in Society ofNorth Korean Studies ed., Budan Baseki Bukhan Yunkusa, (A History of
North Korean Studies during the Half Century of Division), Seoul, Hanul, 1999, 428-429; Young-
han Kim, "Peaceful Reunification and Mission of the Korean Churches", in PCK ed, Bukhan
Kidokyo Chongram, (A Collective Study on Christianity in North Korea), Seoul, PCK, 1995, 77-78.
76 Tae-woo Koh, Bukhan eui Jonkyo Jungchaek, (The Religious Policy in North Korea), 16-20; 153-
158.
77
K. M. Wells, "Protestantism in North Korea: An Exploration", Religion in Communist Lands, vol.
11,1983,135-145.
78 T. J. Belke, Juche: A Christian Study ofNorth Korea's State Region, Bartlesville, Living Sacrifice
Book Co., 1999, 141-155.
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See, Hee-gon Eun, "The Mission of the Methodist Church toward North Korea and Its Prospect", in
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Lastly, contrary to the above claims, there are progressive scholars who insist that there are no
underground churches in North Korea. Kyoung-seo Park maintains that in the North Korean
context, secret Christian groups are not able to exist because the central government
completely controls the whole society. Ha Choi, who is a political refugee from North Korea,
is another who states that there is no possibility for underground churches to exist.81 It seems
true that it is very difficult for any secret underground church to survive in such a totalitarian
society. However, there are Christian groups outside the KCF. The KCF itself recognizes that
there are about 5,000 Protestant Christians, who have not yet registered with them.82 This
suggests that although the government tolerates them, there non-registered Christians continue
the tradition of an underground church in North Korea.
Historically, there were three categories of underground churches in North Korea. From the
establishment of the Communist regime, the Hyuksin Pokkn Pa or Reformed Restoration
Group, later Jaegunpa or Restoration Group, was the first to go underground. Secondly,
there were the anti-Communist Christians who were not able to evacuate to the South, and
went underground during the Korean War.84 Man-hwa Lee's group is an example of this.
Lastly, the biggest number of remnant Christians went underground during the Anti-Religious
Campaign.
More recently, a considerable number of secret, underground Christian groups have begun to
organize in North Hamkyung Province. During the famine in North Korea, especially from
1993-1996, more than one million people fled to Manchuria for food. Some South Korean
missionaries in Manchuria, who were disguised as businessmen, started to evangelize this
The Western Annual Conference ed., Pyunghwa Tongil kwa Bukhan Sunkyo, (Peaceful
Reunification and Mission to North Korea), Seoul, Seobuyunhoe, 1998, 208-210; Jung-hyun Paik,
Are There Churches in North Korea, 184-190. .
80 Interview with Prof. Kyung-seo Park, 28th November 2000, Seoul; See also, J. Noh, "An Evaluation
and Prospect on the Mission of Korean Churches toward North Korea"; Jong-hwa Park, "A
Prospect and Task ofNorth Korea Mission after the Summit Talk between North and South" The
Symposium on Mission to North Korea, July 2001.
81 The Kookminilbo, 6th September 2000.
82
See, J. Moyer et al., Op. Cit., 4; T. M. Brown, Op. Cit., 7; NCCCUSA, Op. Cit., 22; Interview with
Rev. Young-sup Kang, 13th December 2000.
83
Concerning the Hyuksin Pokku Pa or Reformed Restoration Group, see, Chapter III, Section 2.3.1.
84
Concerning Man-hwa Lee's group, see, Chapter V, Section 2.2.
83 It is illegal to work as a missionary in China, and the Chinese government does not grant missionary
a visa.
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"uprooted people" from North Korea, and sent them back to the border towns in order to
organize underground Christian groups. Although it is hard to study the details of this
movement because of its secrecy, it seems true that underground Christian groups have been
organized through this route. On 12th April 2001, the KCF sent a letter to the NCCK as
follows:
The Christian organizations in South Korea say that they are strengthening mission
activity for underground Christian groups in the North. They secretly send Bibles, and
support the evacuation of refugees... It must be a mean trick to disturb our
relationship between the KCF and the South Korean churches, to dishonor the
reputation of the KCF, and to hinder our mission in North Korea...We would like to
humbly ask the NCCK to inform other Christian organizations in the South not to do
07
this anymore.
This new underground group is separate from the history of the traditional house churches and
underground groups in North Korea. It tries to transplant South Korean versions of Protestant
Christianity into North Korea, while ignoring the socio-historical context of Christianity there.
As the above letter indicates, this aggressive approach already creates ecclesiastical tension
between the northern and the southern churches, and even makes difficulties for the KCF.
Moreover, it may also create some problems of safety for historical underground groups.
In conclusion, as the conservative scholars claim, it is true that there are underground
Christians in North Korea. However, it is also virtually certain that the majority of house
churches are members of the KCF. The house churches have been the mainstream in
Protestant Christianity in North Korea, and the backbone of its revival.
It is also necessary for the progressive scholars to recognize the presence of underground
Christians. The diversity that exists in North Korean Protestant Christianity ought to be
recognized, so that other, minor Christian traditions present in the country are not ignored.
Authentic unity, even for the KCF itself, must be achieved through unity in diversity.
86
See, T. J. Belke, Op. Cit., 147-161; Kyung-il Choi, Bukhan Bokeumhwaro Kaneun Kil, (The Way to
Evangelize North Korea), Seoul, Jihyewon, 1999, 39-51; The Kookminilbo, 17th December 2001;
The Joongangilbo, 18th June 2001; Le Monde, 20th June 1999.
87 "From Rev. Kyung-woo Oh to Rev. Don-wan Kim", 12th April 2001.
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3. The Reopening of Pyongyang Theological Seminary
The revival of Protestant Christianity in North Korea began with the restarting of theological
education. From the Korean War until 1972, there had been no theological education in North
Korea. Therefore, for the KCF, the training of new pastors was the most urgent priority for the
oo
revival. Rev. Ki-jun Koh (1921-1994), the former general secretary of the KCF, described
the situation as follows:
In 1950 there existed a seminary in Pyongyang, which was also destroyed in the war.
For a long time this seminary did not exist. In the past we had many pastors. Some
died in the war, others went to the South. Those who were left became old and many
have died. When this seminary was reorganized in 1972, there were only 10 ordained
pastors left in North Korea. They were old and anxious about the training of new
OQ
pastors.
Just as the Anti-Religious Campaign was an external challenge for the Christians, so too the
lack of pastors was a serious internal crisis for the KCF. Syngman Rhee, the moderator of the
PCUSA from 2000-2001, tells the story of his sister as follows:
When I firstly visited North Korea in 1978, I met my younger sister, who was a
maternity doctor. I wondered and asked whether she had kept her faith. She said, 'I
personally read the Bible and pray the Lord's Prayer'. I asked, 'What about house
churches?' 'I heard, but there is neither a pastor nor house church near my home.'
She said, 'Many former Christians no more believe God because they have been
taught that religion is an unscientific illusion'.90
This shows how difficult it was for the remnant Christians to contact pastors in the context of
1972. The ten elderly pastors who remained were not able to cover house churches and
individual Christians widely scattered across the whole nation. Although there were lay
leaders like Ki-jun Koh,91 preaching and sacraments were rare and very restricted in house
churches. Communion was usually held only twice a year, at Easter and Christmas, conducted
88
Rev. Koh was born in Jungsan in Pyungnam Province. He studied at Pyongyang Theological
Seminary from 1975-1977 and was ordained in 1978. He served as the general secretary of the KCF
from 1981-1994. He was a well-known North Korean church leader in international ecumenical
circles. He contributed to the reconciliation talks between the North and South Korean churches, the
Christian-Juche Dialogue and the WCC Glion meetings. For his curriculum vitae, see, Jung-hyun
Paik, Op. Cit., 279-280.
89 E. Weingartner, "Confidential Report: CC1A/WCC Delegation to the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea, 9-16 November 1987", 21.
90 Interview with Rev. Prof. Syngman Rhee, the moderator of PCUSA, 25lh September 2000, Seoul.
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by circulating pastors. On these occasions several local congregations would come together.
However, even this was limited to the house churches in larger cities. According to Elder Se-
yong Kang, the service of her house church was simply a matter of "reading the Bible and
QO #
singing hymns together". Full worship services and celebrating the sacrament has recently
become possible again due to the appointment of a young pastor, Sung-sook Lee, to her
church.94 In this context, the priority of the reopened seminary was to train pastors.
The Pyongyang Theological Seminary was opened in 1901 by Samuel Moffet.95 From its
establishment, the seminary had been the main theological training center of the PCK. It was
abolished by the Japanese in 1938 because the professors and students opposed Shinto shrine
worship. With liberation, it reopened in 1945. However, with the outbreak of the Korean War,
it was closed again. An institution which saw itself as the direct continuation of Pyongyang
Theological Seminary later reopened in the South, as the Assembly Theological Seminary.
Due to the division of PCK and PCK-Hapdong in 1959, this seminary was renamed as the
Presbyterian Theological Seminary of the PCK. On the other hand, in the North, in 1972, the
KCF once again reopened the original Pyongyang Theological Seminary.
This seminary of the KCF offers a three-years course of Bachelor of Divinity.96 Most students
have degrees in other subjects before entering their theological training. For example,
according to Evangelist Bong-il Paik, all but two of his ten classmates, who graduated in
1995,97 had university degrees before getting into theological education.98 In every three-year,
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NCCUSA, "Confidential Report of the NCCCUSA Official Delegation Visit to North Korea", 19th
June-2nd July 1987, 8.
93 Interview with Elder Se-yong Kang, Okryu House Church, 6th April 2001, Pyongyang.
94 Ibid.
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Chilsipnyunsa, (A History of the Presbyterian Theological College and Seminary, 1901-1971),
Seoul, Presbyterian Theological College and Seminary Press, 1971; In-soo Kim, Jangrohoe Shinhak
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97 Chul-hun Kim (age, 36), Kun-sam Paik (35), Sung-ho Kim (44), Hae-yun Hwang (48), Ki-chan
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from ten to fifteen new students are enrolled, a new group of students entering when the
previous group graduates."
According to Ki-jun Koh, "Students are selected from among those who are engaged in the
work of the Central Committee of the KCF or in local KCF committees"100 He adds that
"Officiators (lay leaders) of house churches may also be recommended to attend the
seminary".101 For example, Rev. Si-chon Hwang was trained in the seminary after serving as
the secretary of the Pyongyang Provincial Committee of the KCF from 1973-1989.102 Rev.
Byung-chul Ryu led several house churches as a lay leader when he was secretary of North
Hwanghae Provincial Committee of the KCF, and he was recommended for training by the
i r\-2
house churches. In Kaesung, there were three house churches and 120 believers in 1987.
They asked the KCF to send an ordained pastor who had grown up in Kaesung, but none
came from there. Therefore, they expected to send one or two students to the seminary course
on their recommendation.104
The reopening of the seminary fundamentally changed the life of the house churches in North
Korea. With the appointment of ordained pastors, the house churches became more stable and
active. When the seminary reopened, only ten pastors were left, but as a result of restarting
theological education, house churches had more opportunity of having ordained pastors to
99
Kyung-seo Park, "North Korea-Background of the Churches" WCC Memorandum, 25th June 1996.
100 E. Weingartner, Op. Cit., 21.
101 Ibid.
102 Curriculum Vitae of Rev. Si-chon Hwang
Born in 1942
Address: Dongsung-Dong, Joong-kuyok, Pyongyang
1961-1964: BA, Pyongyang Urban Management School
1989-1992: BD, Pyongyang Theological Seminary
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Address: Kyunghung 2 Dong, Botongkang-kuyok, Pyongyang
1978-1981: BD, Pyongyang Theological Seminary
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minister to them. By 1989, thirty-seven graduates from the seminary had been ordained, and
served in house churches.105 By 1995, seventy students had graduated from the seminary.106
According to the report from the KCF to the WCC, fifty-two had been ordained and the others
1 07
were having pastoral training in their placement in 1997. In this period, the number of
• 108
Protestant Christians in North Korea doubled.
The graduates are ministering to several house churches in urban areas among a total of 511
house churches. However, rural house churches are still being led by lay leaders. Due to the
development of the "Social Diakonia Mission",109 some of the human resources of the KCF
are invested in diaconal projects in the central and provincial offices. There are thirty staff
members in the central office and fifty in the provincial office, including several ordained
ministers.110 Therefore, training pastors is still a priority for the KCF. According to Bong-il
Paik, the graduates prefer to work in house churches rather than offices because of the
"atmosphere of fellowship in house churches, and their evangelistic zeal".111
The curriculum of the seminary is similar to that of the old seminary before the Korean War:
It indicates Biblical Theology, Church History, Systematic Theology, Practical Theology and
• . . 117 ..... . •
Religious Philosophy. It seems that the training is similar to what used to be given in the
old seminary in missionary times as well, sometimes without much change. For example,
according to Insik Kim, Rev. Deuk-ryong Kim, who taught Homiletics, used his notes, which
• ... 113
he had taken in the class of Homiletics given by Allen Clark by the end of the 1930s. When
E. Weingartner asked about the textbooks, Ki-jun Koh, answered, "We use old books that
have survived from old seminaries". Therefore, the KCF often asked for theological textbooks
to be sent from outside. For instance, WCC Publications donated more than three hundred
Kyung-seo Park, Op. Cit.
106
Jung-hyun Paik, Op. Cit., 77.
107
"From the Central Committee of KCF to the Asia Desk ofWCC", June 1997. N.B., According
Kyung-seo Park, the former Asia secretary ofWCC, WCC contributed for the budget of the
seminary in this period. Interview with Prof. Kyung-seo Park, 28th November 2000, Seoul.
108 In 1984, there were 5,000 Protestant Christians in North Korea. See, J. Moyer et al., "Confidential
Report: Notes on a Visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from May 24 to June 10,
1984", Lutheran World Federation, 4. However, the Christian population increased up to 12,000 by
1996. Kyung-seo Park, "North Korea-Background of Churches", June 1996, 1.
109
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110 "From the Central Committee of KCF to the Asia Desk ofWCC", June 1997.
111 Interview with Evangelist Bong-il Paik, 5th April 2001, Pyongyang.
112 E. Weingartner, Op. Cit, 21.
113 Interview with Rev. Dr. Insik Kim, 13"' December 2000, Fukuoka, Japan.
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theological books, and the Christian Literature Society of Korea sent five hundred books,
including commentaries and dictionaries.114 Theological books for the seminary library are
among the important items which the KCF asks for, whenever visitors pass through from
outside to send.115
The KCF has often expressed strong political opinions against "US imperialism" and the
"military dictatorship of South Korea".116 In this respect, it sounds as if the theology of the
seminary could be radical and political. However, although the KCF has an interest in
political issues, that does not mean that the theology of the seminary is radical. On the
contrary, most specialists on Christianity in North Korea agree that the theological education
of the seminary is quite conservative.117 According to Dong-kun Hong, who was a part-time
lecturer at the seminary, "theological education of the Pyongyang Theological Seminary
preserves the conservative Korean Presbyterian tradition, which was influenced by the
• • • 118American missionaries".
Indeed, the theological development of the seminary had been held back, ever since its
abolition in 1938. After eight years of non-existence (1938-1945), the seminary reopened for
five years (1945-1950), but it closed its doors again for another twenty-two years (1950-1972).
In this circumstance, it was difficult for the seminary to develop its own theology.
Furthermore, the staff members of the reopened seminary were drawn from among ten
surviving pastors, who were educated before 1950. What they taught was based on their own
conservative theology, in which they had been trained by the American missionaries.
114
Kyung-seo Park, "North Korea-Background of the Churches", WCC Memorandum, 25th June 1996.
115 For example, the delegation of the NCCCUSA also presented a number of theological books in
Korean, which were offered on behalf of the NCCK, and others in English by the NCCUSA, Op.
Cit., 6.
116 For example, from 1974-1981, KCF announced seven statements, which blamed the US annual
military training in South Korea, the Team Spirit and the arrest ofChristian leaders by the military
dictator in South Korea. For the list of the statements, see, IKCH ed., A History of the Chuch in
North Korea, 447.
117 The author asked same question on the theological characteristics of the seminary to eight
specialists. Prof. Kyung-seo Park, Rev. Young-il Kang, Rev. Dr. Insik Kim, Prof. Syngman Rhee,
Rev. Dwain Epps, Rev. Dr. Seong-won Park, Mr. Eric Weingartner and Rev. Dr. Dong-kun Hong.
All interviewees point out the conservative nature of its theology.
'18 Interview with Rev. Dr. Dong-kun Hong, 13th April 2001, Los Angeles. Hong visited North Korea
for six months every year from 1989-2001 from USA to lecture at the Kim II Sung University and
Pyongyang Theological Seminary. He passed away on 11th November 2001 in Pyongyang during his
visit for the lectureship.
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The theological education in North Korea is still fairly basic. It is not yet equipped to train
people as independent researchers. Rather, its main target is ministerial formation, the training
of pastors. For the development of North Korean theology, the KCF must consider how to
upgrade the quality of its seminary. Already, there is some development in this direction. For
instance, from 1999, the seminary extended its course from three-years to five-years."9 Rev.
Young-sup Kang said, "the KCF intends to upgrade nominees for ordination to the masters
190 • •
level". To improve the quality of lectures, recently the KCF has started to organize visiting
i j 1
lectureships for Korean theologians working in overseas countries. Since the reopening, the
Pyongyang Theological Seminary has been the backbone of the revival of Protestant
• 199
Christianity, by training and providing pastors.
In addition to the reopening of the seminary, another significant event was the establishment
of the Department of Religious Studies at Kim II Sung University. The university was opened
in 1946 by the Provisional People's Committee ofNorth Korea. Since its establishment, it has
been the most prestigious institution of higher education in the North. It is here that the
1 99
Communist elites of North Korea were educated. There have been Units on Buddhism and
Islam in the Department of Asian History, and of Tonghak in the Department of Korean
History.124 These units were brought together and the Department of Religious Studies
19<r # ... . .
inaugurated in 1987, but there did not Christianity feature until 1989. In that year, a Unit on
119 In 2002, twelve students are training in the seminary. Remarkably, there are three women students.
If they successfully finish the course, they will be ordained in 2005. They will be the first women
pastors in the history of Protestant Christianity in North Korea. Young-sup Kang, "Keynote Speech",
The Eighth Korean Christian Conference for Peaceful Reunification of Fatherland, 23rd June 2002,
Tozanso, Unpublished Paper.
120 Interview with Rev. Young-sup Kang, the Chairperson of the KCF, 13th December 2000, Fukuoka,
Japan.
121 For example, Syngman Rhee, Dong-kun Hong, Insik Kim and Kyung-seo Park lectured at the
seminary during their visits. They visited North Korea more than twenty times.
122 The KCF also is constructing new seminary buildings from 2002 to accept more students, with the
financial support of the PCK. The Kidokongbo, 24th August 2002.
123
Concerning the educational system in North Korea, see, Jiangcheng He, "Educational Reforms", in
Han S. Park, ed, North Korea: Ideology, Politics, Economy, 33-50.
124
Heung-soo Kim and Dae-young Ryu, "A Study of the Present Situation of Religions in North Korea
and Possibility of Religious Exchange between the North and South", History ofChristianity in
Korea, vol. 16, 2002, 138.
125 There are different claims about the year of the inauguration. Chan-young Lee claims 1987 in his
book, Bukhan Kidokyo 100 Myungjangmyun, (The One Hundred Important Events of Christianity in
North Korea), Seoul, Hankichong, 2000, 359. Heung-soo Kim claims 1988, in Heung-soo Kim and
Dae-young, Op. Cit. Jung-hyun Paik claims 1989, in Jung-hyun Paik, Op. Cit., 87. The Hankookilbo,
22nd October 1989 reports, "It will be inaugurated in 1990". However, Tong-chul Choi, who studied
there at that time, said in an interview that the department was inaugurated in 1987 in The
Chosunilbo, 9th October 2000.
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Christianity was inaugurated for the fist time in university education in North Korea. Dong-
kun Hong remembers this as follows:
During my visit to the university in 1989, I had conversations with staff members of
the Department of Religious Studies on the dialogue between Christianity and the
Juche Idea. After the conversation, I was invited for dinner by Prof. Chang-kook Lee,
the head of Department. He said, "Dr. Hong, we have decided to inaugurate the Unit
of Christianity in our Department, but we have no specialist on Christianity". And, he
suggested, "Would you kindly take responsibility for it?" "Already, we have the
permission of President Kim." 26
Hong accepted the post and inaugurated the Unit of Christianity in 1989, starting lectures
from the spring term of 1990.127 There were 20 students in the Department and Dr. Hong
lectured on Introduction to Christianity, Introduction to Biblical Theology, Minjung Theology
• IOC
and Liberation Theology. He also supervised postgraduate students. According to The
Chosunilbo, although this department has only recently been established, there is high
competition to enter because the KWP has recently recruited a number of specialists on
religion.129 Especially, the study of Christianity is "the most favorite subject," perhaps
because of frequent opportunity to travel to foreign countries for international Christian
conferences.130 Jung-hyun Paik claims that the graduates of the Unit of Christianity made a
useful contribution to the positive reinterpretation of Christianity from a Juche perspective
during the 1990s.131
The inauguration of the Unit of Christianity at Kim II Sung University was another impressive
occasion for the Christians ofNorth Korea. Such a thing would have been unimaginable when
northern churches started to revive in 1972. However, now the best students in North Korea
are eager to learn about Christianity. Furthermore, some of these students, who understand
and have sympathy with the Christian faith, later become officials of religious affairs in the
government, and some others become researchers on Christianity at the Institute for the Juche
Idea in the Academy of Social Science in Pyongyang. Unlike China, there was no so-called,
the "cultural Christians" in North Korea. However, since the establishment of the Unit of
126 Interview with Rev. Dr. Dong-kun Hong, 13th April 2001, Los Angeles.
127 For this job, PCUSA appointed Dr. Hong as a missionary to North Korea.
1-8 Interview with Rev. Dr. Dong-kun Hong, 13lh April 2001, Los Angeles.
129 The Chosunilbo, 9th October 2000.
130 Ibid.
131
Jung-hyun Paik, Op. Cit., 92-93. The details of the Christian-Juchean dialogue will be examined in
Chapter VII.
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Christianity at Kim II Sung University, the possibility of appearing "cultural Christians" in
North Korea is increasing, especially among younger intellectuals.
4. Publication of Bible and Hymnbook
When the KCF was studying the situation of house churches, it discovered another urgent
demand of the remnant Christians. The Christians were eager to have a new Bible and
hymnbook. The Bible and hymnbook had not been printed since the liberation in North Korea.
Therefore, the language used was not appropriate in modern Korean. Moreover, even this old
version of Bible was not sufficient for the Christians because only a few copies had survived
during the Anti-Religious Campaign. Suk-jung Song states his experience in 1982 as follows:
During the worship, we carefully watched the Bible and hymnbook of the members.
The covers of most of them were worn out...Some had hand-copied Bibles. However,
there were colorful underlinings. They might read several times whole pages of Bible.
After the worship, I heard that some hid their Bible in a vat (for Kimchi), and used to
1T2
read it only in the night before the reopening of their (house) church.
In response to this, the KCF prepared the publication of a new Korean Bible and hymnbook,
from the mid-1970s on. The New Testament was published in 1983 and the Old Testament in
1984. In 1984, the complete Bible was brought out and the KCF printed 10,000 copies of it.
They also printed 10,000 copies of the new hymnbooks. However, by 1987, none of them
were left. The number of Protestant Christians had already reached 10,000. The KCF
• 1T2
therefore reprinted the Bible and the hymnbook in 1990.
At first, the KCF had intended to bring out an entirely new translation, but the leaders soon
realized that this would be over ambitious. Therefore, the written Korean of the Bible was
modernized, and partly revised through a comparative reading with Hebrew and English
Bibles. However, Ki-jun Koh frankly said that many preferred the United Korean Bible,
which was jointly translated and published by the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches in
South Korea, in 1977.134 In the preface to the hymnbook, the KCF said the "hymns are taken
132
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(Across the Division), Seoul, Jungwonmunhwa, 1988, 222.
133
Jung-hyun Paik, Op. Cit., 121.
134
Jung-hyun Paik, Ibid., 120.
260
from the New Hymnbook, Department of Education, PCK, 1939, with modernized words".135
The hymnbooks in 1990 were printed at the Amity Printing Company in Nanjing, with the
support of the United Bible Society (UBS).136
Tae-woo Koh again claims that only a few copies of Bible and hymnbook were printed by the
1 "37
KWP for a propaganda purpose. He asserts that there is a notice that the KWP is the
1 38
publisher of the Bible. This is incorrect, and Koh seems to be writing history from a Cold-
War perspective. It is clearly stated that the KCF is the publisher, and we have been unable to
find any mention of the KWP in the 1983, 1984 and 1990 versions. Moreover, if only few
copies were printed for propaganda purposes, it would not have been necessary for the KWP
to reprint another 10,000 copies of the hymnbook in China with the financial support of UBS
in 1990.
In addition to the reopening of the seminary, the publication of the new Bible and hymnbook
were events of symbolic importance for the revival. The Christians donated 2% of their
monthly income to the KCF for the publication, and for the Pyongyang Theological Seminary,
• • • 1TQ •
during this period. Now, the Christians, who had hidden the Bible in Kimchi pots, were free
to read the Bible and sing hymns openly. Every Christians was at last able to have a copy of
the Bible and hymnbook for themselves. On every Sunday, they rejoiced and worshiped in
house churches with their new Bible and hymnbook.140
5. International Ecumenical Relationships
As J. Hormadka predicted when the WCC Toronto Statement was issued, the ecumenical
relationship between the North Korean church and the WCC had been closed since the
135
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136
Jung-hyun Paik, Op. Cit., 123-124.
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Korean War.141 The international ecumenical relationships of the KCF were frustrated by the
policies of the Cold War. Especially during the Anti-Religious Campaign period, the North
Korean church was completely isolated from the world Christian community. However, the
revival of Protestant Christianity in North Korea brought the revival of its international
ecumenical fellowship as well.
The first known contact of the KCF with international ecumenical organizations has been
described as follows:
On 2 August 1974, the Korean Christian Federation unexpectedly applied for
membership of the World Council of Churches. The purpose of the application was to
propagandize the North Korean government as a modern state, which has religious
freedom. There was a notorious motive in this application, in order to carry on political
propaganda amongst international Christian organizations. However, the WCC
rejected the application because the WCC became aware of this intention. The WCC
replied that the application was difficult to accept because it was difficult to know the
situation and membership of the churches in North Korea. 142
S. Masahiko also claims that this application was merely a "disguising tactic" of North
Korea.143 However, this claim is based on a secondary South Korean source, an article in
Bukhan, (North Korea).144 It is not based on primary sources either from the WCC or from the
KCF.
In fact, the beginning of the recovery of the relationship between the KCF and the WCC
originated in a supportive telegram sent by E. C. Blake, the general secretary of the WCC, to
the respective presidents of the two Koreas on 4th July 1972. Blake hoped the goal of
reunification would be quickly realized through the North and South Dialogue.142 As a
response, the KCF sent a letter through the North Korean Office of Permanent Observer to the
141 "From Hromadka to Visser't Hooft", 30th November 1950. The ecumenical relationship of the
Chinese church also closed because of this statement. See, P. L. Wickeri, Seeking the Common
Ground: Protestant Christianity, the Three-SelfMovement, and China's UnitedFront, 227-229.
142
Kyung-bae Min, Church andMitijok, 446.
143 S. Masahiko, Nambukhan Kidokyo Saron, (A Historiography of Christianity in North and South
Korea), 205.
144
See, Hae-moon Choi, "The Religious Situation and the Political Strategies against South Korea of
North Korea", Bukhan, (North Korea), vol. 4, 1975, 8-12. Choi quoted from the report ofKCIA, not
WCC.
145 "From E. Carson to President J. Park" and "From E. Carson to President I. Kim", telegram, 4th July
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United Nations at Geneva.146 In this letter, the KCF expressed thanks for supporting the
reunification talks, and called for the WCC to show concern over the military junta in South
Korea.147 With delivery of the letter, the counselor of the Office asked for information about
148
applying for membership of the WCC. There was neither a formal application on the part of
the KCF nor a rejection of such an application by the WCC in 1974. Rather, P. Potter, the new
general secretary ofWCC, sent a letter to KCF as follows:
We are very happy to learn that a representative of your organization participated in
the Asian Christian Peace Conference held in India recently. We would very much
appreciate having the opportunity for more information about the life and witness of
the churches in your country and for direct contacts with you, and with churches and
Christian groups there...We shall also be happy to explore the possibility of a visit by
representatives of some member churches of the WCC to your country to establish
contacts (which) will be mutually enriching and will strengthen the ties that already
united us in Jesus Christ. 149
In spite of this intention, nothing more than initial contact between the two organizations took
place during the 1970s because the KCF still did not have full confidence in the WCC
because of the WCC's earlier support for the US police action during the Korean War. Instead,
the KCF preferred to participate actively in an organization called the Christian Peace
Conference (CPC). Delegates of the KCF took part in the Asian Christian Peace Conference
(ACPC), 9lh-14th January 1975, Kottayam, India. It was the first international conference in
which the KCF participated after the revival.130 From the next year, the KCF also began to
participate in the international CPC. In 1976, it participated in the meeting of the Commission
of Economy and Politics of the CPC, 24th-28lh October, at Brno, in Czechoslovakia.151 After
joining several commissions, the KCF was also invited as an observer to the Sixth All-
Christian Peace Assembly, 2nd-9th July 1985, Prague, and obtained full membership of the
146 Tai-keun Djeung, the counselor, and Il-bu Pak, the second secretary, delivered the letter to WCC.
"Confidential CCIA file, North Korea: Visit of July 5, Friday, 1974", 6.
147 "From the Central Committee of Korean Christian Federation to Rev. Eugine Carson", 2nd February
1974. There was no response from South Korea.
148
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1995,41.
149 "From Philip Potter to the Korean Christian Federation", 28th February 1975.
130 There were four delegates from the KCF, Song-ryul Kim, general secretary of KCF, Song-ik Ho,
Guang-il Kum, Song-za Jong, at the ACPC in India. The APCP adopted the Resolution on Korea,
expressed alarm at the "suppression of the South Korean people as they struggled against to Fascist
regime." Asian Christian Peace Conference, 9th-14th January 1975, Kottayam, India, 82; 72.
151 G. Wirth, A History ofthe Christian Peace Conference, Prague, CPC 1989, 209. Concerning the
meeting, see, CPC Information, No. 207, 1975.
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CPC there. There were several other exchange visits between the KCF and the CPC during
this period.153
Within the CPC, the KCF expressed a strong political voice on the issue of Korean
reunification. For example, the ACPC in Kottayam and the CPC Assembly strongly supported
the North Korean reunification policy, by adopting a Resolution on Korea.154 When we recall
the criticism of Hromadka, the founder of the CPC, had made of the WCC's Toronto
Statement, the CPC's support for North Korea on the reunification issue was understandable.
The KCF also favored the CPC and found itself at home there because the churches from
Communist countries were the mainstream of the CPC. However, it was a dilemma for the
KCF when the CPC became less active in the mid-1980s.
The CPC nevertheless played a role of reconciliation between the KCF and the WCC. The
CPC leaders informed the KCF of the changes that had taken place in the WCC after the rise
of the notion of the social gospel at the 1968 Uppsala Assembly, and encouraged the KCF to
take more interest in the WCC.155 In 1981, the KCF then sent a letter to the WCC, and again
informally asked for information on membership of the WCC,156 Heung-soo Kim claims that
this application was rejected once more by the central committee of the WCC because the
WCC had no confidence in the existence of Christians in North Korea, and also had some
doubts about the political purpose of the application.127 However, Kyung-seo Park, who was
in the WCC when the WCC discussed the possibility of the KCF's membership, states the
following:
As you may know, even to be an associate member of WCC, the membership of
church must be over 45,000 by the law. Therefore, the KCF was not able to be
considered as a member church of the WCC. The WCC did not reject the KCF
because of her political intention, but simply on the number of membership. How
could we know their real intention? Moreover, it was highly important for the WCC to
restore ecumenical relationship with the Christians in North Korea. Therefore, the
152 There were Choi Lee, Young-chul Lee, Byung-chul U and Hye-suk Kim. Sixth All-Christian
Assembly, Praha, CPC, 1985, X.
I 5j
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WCC sent Eric Weingartner and Victor Hsu to Pyongyang in order to study
Christianity in North Korea.
It is possible that the KCF was approaching the WCC with some political purpose. However,
WCC did not reject the KCF, but explored new possibilities of establishing a relationship.
South Korean historians misunderstood what happened because it was the North Korean
diplomatic office in Geneva that delivered the letters from the KCF to the WCC. However, E.
Weingartner,1?9 who encouraged the reestablishment of the relationship between the KCF and
the WCC, says that, originally, the contact between the two organizations was mediated by
the CPC:
Question: How did you first have contact with the KCF?
Answer: We had some contacts with pastors, who had gone through Pyongyang.
And, mostly the ones who came to me were not Korean pastors. They were
westerners. So there were some who were people who worked and were involved in
the CPC, and with other relations to eastern Europe and so on. Some of them were in
church structures and others completely on their own, individuals...you know,
individual...kind of interest from USA, from Australia, some German pastors also. So
we got some information from their reports and listening from them about how things
are functioning about KCF, about house churches and so on. And actually first
contact directly I had with KCF was in Prague for CPC conference (at the commission
of International Secretariat, CPC, 26-30 January 1981), not through the North Korean
UN Office in Geneva. Not initially, we approached the embassy only when we were
beginning officially at the Tozanso in 1984...Even before me Ninan Koshy, the
director of CCIA, met KCF people through CPC...Basically even this first contact
didn't lead to anything during the 1970s because from WCC side, as you know, we
were forbidden to have relations with North Korea by the member churches in South
Korea. They simply said, "No way", because it's too dangerous for them in South
Korea. So, that's why we started to think in terms of when is the good moment of
transition in that kind of thinking. 16(1
This interview proves that North Korean diplomats did not approach the WCC first, but rather
the CCIA informally contacted the KCF through the CPC to reestablish the ecumenical
relationship during the 1970s. However, the South Korean member churches of the WCC did
not want it. Therefore, it was not possible for the WCC to develop further the relationship
158 Interview with Prof. Kyung-seo Park, 28"' November 2000, Seoul.
159 Eric Weingartner was Executive Secretary of the WCC-CCIA from 1978-1986. He first visited
North Korea within the WCC in 1984. He launched the WCC Tozanso process and Glion meetings,
which mediated reconciliation between North and South Korean Christians. Later, he became the
head of the UN Office in Pyongyang.
160 Interview with Mr. E. Weingartner, 12 April 2001, North Bay, Canada; See also, E. Weingartner, "A
Chronicle of the Dialogue between Christians in North and South Korea", Peace Office Newsletter,
vol. 30, No. 3, 2000.
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with the KCF.161 The claims which assert that the KCF approached the WCC politically
through the North Korean UN Office, seem like a copy of the report by the South Korean
1 (s)
intelligence agency. The North Korean UN Office merely delivered the letters from the
KCF to the WCC.
Paradoxically, the South Korean member churches prevented the WCC from approaching the
KCF during the 1970s, but it was also the South Korean church which asked the WCC to
contact the KCF for reconciliation of Korea during the 1980s. In 1979, President Park was
assassinated by Jae-kyu Kim, the head of the Korea Central Intelligence Agency. The South
Korean people expected a civil government to take over, through a democratic election.
However, General Doo-hwan Chun became President through a military coup on 12th
December 1979. There were nationwide demonstrations against Chun's coup. However, Chun
suppressed the people's demonstrations by killing about one thousand people in Kwangju. A
number of democracy movement leaders, including Christian pastors and theologians, were
accused of being spies for North Korea in relation to Kwangju uprising, and some of them
i f-'i
were sentenced to death in the military court. Progressive Christians in South Korea now
realized that the issue of democracy could not be separated from the issue of reunification,
because Chun justified his suppression of democracy on the grounds that it was necessary to
counteract the threat of Red North Korea.164 Finally, the NCCK asked the WCC to help
161 E. Wengartner also states, "Stories about the existence of a worshiping community in the DPRK
were met with extreme skepticism. Expatriate Korean Christians and pastors who visited North
Korea were regarded as dupes of Communism. One such pastor visited my office at the WCC and
offered to write a report of his visit to the North. I gratefully, if naively, accepted. Swift and
emotional reactions caught me by surprise. South Korean ecumenical friends accused me of
conspiracy and collaboration with the enemy. 1 learned quickly that even the smallest step taken by
the WCC with regard to North Korea implicated nervous South Korean member churches and
therefore required intimate dialogue and acquiescence". E. Weingartner, "The Tozanso Process:
Ecumenical Efforts for Korean reconciliation and Reunification", in G. Baum and H. Wells ed., The
Reconciliation ofPeoples: Challenges to the Churches, Geneva, WCC, 1997, 70.
162 The Naewei Tongshin (lU^UMfSQ, the news agency of the Korea Central Intelligence Agency, was
only allowed to produce information on North Korea during the military dictatorship period in
South Korea. Most historians quoted it, but it is not a primary source for writing a history of the
churches in North Korea in this period. For representative examples, see the quotations of Kyung-
bae Min in Church andMinjok, 417-450.
163 For example, President Kim Dae-jung, the Nobel Peace Prize winner, 2000, was sentenced to death,
and Rev. Prof. Ik-hwan Moon was sentenced to twenty years in prison. Prof. Wan-sang Han, Rev.
Prof. Nam-dong Seo, Rev. Prof. Byug-moo Ahn, Prof. Moon-young Lee and Rev. Hae-dong Lee,
the minjung theologians, were sentenced to ten years.
164
See, Working Group on Peace, "Realities in the Divided Korea: Challenges for the Churches",
Peace andJustice in North East Asia: Prospectsfor Peaceful Resolution ofConflict, Geneva, WCC-
CCIA, 1985, 59-65. In fact, this document was the NCCK's. However, it was announced under the
disguised name ofWorking Group on Peace to avoid the oppression of the military dictator.
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mediate a meeting between the North and the South churches, to discuss the issue of
reunification, in 1982.165
The WCC, which had been waiting for "the moment of transition", began to move quickly.
Two executive secretaries of the CCIA, E. Weingartner and V. Hsu, secretly contacted the
KCF, and suggested a direct meeting between the northern and southern Christians for
reconciliation.166 They came back with news of active Christian life in house churches in
North Korea. Furthermore, the KCF accepted the WCC's invitation to meet the church leaders
from South Korea at the CCIA conference on Peace and Justice in North-East Asia, 29th
October-3rd November, Tozanso, Japan, which was especially organized to discuss the issue
of Korean reunification.167 Not only to reduce the political burden, but also to recognize that
the division of Korea has been a key issue for security of North-East Asia, the title and
• • 1
participants were expanded.
Unfortunately, the KCF was not finally able to take part in the Tozanso conference, but they
sent a message of greetings and encouragement.169 The KCF promised their participation in
any future ecumenical initiatives on Korean reunification. In spite of the absence of KCF, the
170Tozanso conference made a historic resolution on Korea, the so-called Tozanso Process,
which it recommended to the global ecumenical family:
E. Weingartner, Op. Cit.
166 E. Weingartner, Ibid.
167
Concerning the Tozanso meeting, see, CCIA ed, Peace and Justice in North East Asia: Prospects
for Peaceful Resolution ofConflict, Geneva, WCC-CCIA, 1985; E. Weingartner, "The Tozanso
Process: An Ecumenical contribution to the Struggle for Peace and Justice in North-East Asia",
Peace And Reunification of Korea, Geneva, WCC-CCIA, 1990, 12-28; E. Salter, "The Tozanso
Process: Reflections on an Ecumenical Adventure", Ibid., 48-50; M. Kang, "Reflections on the
Tozanso Process and Plans for the Jubilee", Unpublished paper, The Third Glion Meeting, 2-5
December 1990, Glion, Switzerland.
168 In fact, the Tozanso Conference was prepared through two informal meetings, the strategy meeting
on Korean Reunification between the CCIA and the NCCK from 21s,-22nd June 1982, Los Angeles,
and the ad hoc meeting in July 1983, Tokyo. It is worthwhile to list the pioneers of this new stage of
history here: Ninan Koshy, Eric Weingartner, Victor Hsu, Sang-jung Park, Moon-kyu Kang, Kwang-
sun Suh, Myung-gul Son, Myung-kwan Chi, Kwan-suk Kim, etc. Concerning the two meetings, see,
"CCIA-Korean Reunification Meeting", 21st-22nd June 1982, manuscript, and "Aide Memoire" Ad
hoc meeting of the NETWORK in July 1983, manuscript.
169 "The Central Committee of the Korean Christian Federation extends warm congratulations to the
International Conference for Peace and justice in North-east Asia and through the Conference to the
representatives. We believe that the Conference will make every effort to realize peace and justice in
this region, particularly peaceful reunification of Korea focusing attention upon the urgent situation
ofNorth-East Asia..." "From the Central Committee of the KCF to International Christian
Conference for Peace and Justice in North East Asia", Telegram, 25th October 1984.
170 This will be argued in detail in next chapter.
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8.2.1. The WCC be asked to explore, in collaboration with CCA, the possibility of
developing relationships with churches, Christians and others in North Korea, through
visits and forms of contact.
8.2.2. The WCC, in collaboration with CCA, should seek to facilitate opportunities
where it would be possible for Christians from both North and South Korea to meet in
dialogue.
8.2.3. The churches be encouraged to share with the WCC and the CCA plans for
contacts with and results of visit to North Korea. 171
Although the KCF was not even in the category of an associate member ofWCC, an official
resolution had now been established allowing and encouraging the WCC to develop its
relationship with the KCF. In 1985, the first official visit from the WCC to North Korea was
carried on from 10th-19th November.172 During the visit, N. Koshy and E. Weingartner
worshiped in house churches, and had a conference with the KCF leaders. In this conference,
the CCIA suggested a direct meeting between the North and South Korean churches under
WCC auspices, on the basis of Tozanso recommendations. The KCF welcomed this proposal.
They also asked for the cooperation of North Korean government in this direct meeting
between North and South Korean churches when they were received by President Kim II-
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sung. Finally, for the first time since the partition of Korea, the official representatives of
the KCF and the NCCK met at Glion, 2nd-5th September 1986, for the reconciliation of the
churches, and for the reunification of nation.174 The KCF also participated in the WCC
Central Committee meeting in Moscow, 1989, and the General Assembly meeting in
Canberra, 1991. K. Reiser, the general secretary of WCC visited North Korea in 1995, and the
KCF has been sending a delegation to the WCC almost every year since 1985.
Furthermore, based on the Tozanso resolution, not only the WCC, but also other confessional,
regional, and national ecumenical organizations such as the LWF, WARC, CCA, NCCK,
NCCJ, NCCCUSA, EKD,177 and denominations in South Korea, USA, Canada, Australia,
171
"Findings and Recommendations", CCIA/WCC Consultation on Peace and Justice in North East
Asia, 29th October-2nd November 1984. Tozanso, Japan.
172 The Invitation was jointly signed by the Central Committee of KCF and Committee for the
Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland. Therefore, the schedule of delegates was divided as two
parts, visiting churches and government offices. See, E. Weingrtner, "The Tozanso Process", 17.
173
Ibid., 16-22.
174 The Glion meeting will be argued in detail next chapter.
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i.e., Lutheran World Federation (LWF), World Alliance of Reformed Churches (WARC), Christian
Conference ofAsia (CCA), National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK), National Council of
Churches in Japan (NCCJ), National Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA (NCCCUSA),
and Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (EKD)
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Germany and Japan, which have historical links with the North Korean church, have
developed close relationships with the KCF.176 Among these contacts, the KCF's visit to the
CCC in May 1985, which followed P. Potter's visit to Nanjing, was particularly note
177 • • • 1 • • •
worthy. During the visit, they studied the Three Self Patriotic Movement, the houses
churches in China, and Biship Ting's idea on the Amity Foundation.178 This was an
opportunity for the KCF to benefit from referring their ecclesiastical development to another
church living in an Asian Communist context.
The revival of Christianity in North Korea brought the development of an international
ecumenical relationship. On the other hand, the international ecumenical fellowship also
contributed to the revival of the KCF. Firstly, this ecumenical relationship brought the KCF
an upgrade in its political status. According to Kyung-seo Park, the KCF, which was a small
religious organization, had not been well known even in Pyongyang society before the
WCC's Tozanso process. However, after Tozanso, the diplomatically isolated North Korean
government began to notice the potential of the KCF as a possible non-governmental
diplomatic channel to the western world.179 In this context, the government gave financial
support to the construction of the Bong-su and Chilgol churches. Moreover, Rev. Ki-jun Koh,
General Secretary of the KCF, was appointed as a member of the committee of foreign affairs,
SPA, in 1990.180
Secondly, the KCF also had financial support for the revival from the WCC. For example, the
Asia Desk of the WCC provided financial support of between 20,000 and 100,000 US
annually for Pyongyang Theological Seminary and for house church pastors from 1988
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onwards. The WCC also did not forget to support the wider community of North Korean
society, which helped the reputation of KCF, even before the famine. The WCC thus
supported several long-term development projects in North Korea. For instance, from 1989-
1993, it developed an agricultural project, involving a community outreach program, in
collaboration with Wonsan Agricultural College.182 When the successful results of this project
176 This will also be stated in detail in next chapter.
177 E. Weingartner, Op. Cit.
178 Interview with Dr. Han Wen Zao, the Chairperson of CCC, 19th March 1999, Nanjing, China.
179 Interview with Kyung-seo Park, 28th November 2000, Seoul.
180
Jung-hyun Paik, Op. Cit., 280.
181 "From the Central Committee of KCF to the Asia Desk ofWCC", June 1997.
182 For details, see, Kyung-seo Park, "WCC Cooperation with North Korea", Memo, 25th January
1996.
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were reported to Kim Il-sung, he invited the WCC delegation to the presidential palace and
i on
#
expressed his appreciation to them. On this occasion, which took place in 1992, he also
invited the KCF leaders to the presidential house, and directly encouraged the activity of the
• • 184
KCF for the first time in its history. Kim's encouragement made a big impression on the
Christians of North Korea. Now, Protestant Christianity became a religion which the "great
leader" officially admired. Indeed, the ecumenical solidarity of the world church with the
KCF contributed greatly to the revival of the northern churches.
However, beyond the political contributions, one ofmost remarkable contributions ofWCC to
the revival of the KCF and the house churches was its pastoral visits. The WCC and other
ecumenical organizations made continuous team visits to the KCF and the house churches,
based on the Tozanso resolution from 1984 onwards. The Christians, who had continued to
keep their faith, in spite of the social discrimination leveled against them and without any
contact with the outside world for three decades, suffered greatly from a feeling of isolation.
For the grassroots Christians, the pastoral visits on the WCC were a bigger encouragement
than the financial support. Most reports of the ecumenical team visit describe the tearful
reception they got when meeting with the grassroots Christians. For the suffering minjung,
togetherness was the best pastoral care. The reestablishment of relations with the WCC
contributed to the revival of the KCF not only at an institutional level, but also, more
importantly, at the level of ordinary people, through direct pastoral contact with the Christians
• 185in the house churches.
183 Interview with Kyung-seo Park.
184 Ibid.
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The impromptu poem of Un-bong Kim, a house church pastor, well expresses the house church
Christians' impression of the ecumenical movement as expressed in the WCC:
Glory to the Boat of Cross
When the Hitler's med-storm covered heaven and earth,
a boat constructed in the midst of a dark cave.
It was the boat of salvation, it set up high the canvas of the Cross.
It was the ark ofNoah.
It was the salvation boat for the whole oikoumeme, the boat ofWCC!
Let us go aboard, whole people, all believers together.
Glorious final harbor is in our eyes.
Loading the fruits of love, peace and reconciliation,
the boat comes with the blessing of all peoples.
Let us embrace with one heart and one soul.
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6. Rev. Yang-uk Kang and the Revival
One ofmost significant changes for the Protestant Christians in North Korea in 1972 was that
Rev. Yang-uk Kang, the chairperson of the KCF, was elected as the Vice-President of North
Korea, at the fifth SPA.186 Yang-uk Kang (1904-1983) had been the teacher of Kim Il-sung at
the Chanduk Christian Primary School, and had influenced the formation of Kim's
nationalism.187 Moreover, Kang was the secondary maternal grandfather of Kim. When Kim
came back from Russia, Kang, who was a famous preacher in the northern churches,
supported Kim's socialist reform, and was elected as secretary general of the first SPA. He
had also been at the forefront of organizing the NKCA for the renewal of Protestant
Christianity in North Korea.188
Although Kang was in a higher political position, it seems that even he was not able to openly
support the revival of the northern churches during the Anti-Religious Campaign period
(1958-1971). It is difficult to define his activity in relation to Protestant Christianity in North
Korea in this period. He seems to have worked mostly, if not wholly in the arena of politics,
because of the anti-Christian atmosphere. However, when he became the second highest
person in North Korea, he started to take a leading part in the revival of Protestant Christianity.
According to Rev. Choon-ku Lee, Rev. Kang called and greatly influenced the central
committee meeting of the KCF in 1972. It was this meeting that made three important
decisions for the revival initiative:
But, the boat is still on the sea.
Let us gear up for an unfinished journey uniting together in Christ.
Blow away fire-cloud ofwar!
Break boundary of divisions!
When we drop our anchor,
all people will bless the boat of the Cross, the boat of oikoumene\
Glory, glory, glory forever to the righteous voyage of the WCC!
Un-bong Kim, "Let Us Become One in Jesus Christ", manuscript of sermon on 23rd November
1988, Ecumenical Center, Geneva.
186 Dae-sook Suh, Kim II Sung, 96.
187
See, Kim Il-sung, Seki wa dubuleo, (With a Century: Kim Il-sung's Autobiography), vol. 5, 377-
379.
188
Concerning Rev. Kang, See, Chapter III, Section 4.
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Firstly, the central committee decided to reopen the Pyongyang Theological Seminary.
Secondly, the committee appealed to the individual Protestant Christians to register
with the KCF in order that the KCF could protect them, and ensure their freedom of
worship.
189
Thirdly, the committee decided to reconstruct the ecclesiastical order of the KCF.
These were remarkable resolutions, which brought about the revival of Protestant Christianity
in North Korea. The KCF, which had just passed through the "fire-kiln of suffering", now
dared to start to expose the presence of Christians in North Korean society. Lee remembers,
"Without Kang's leadership, it would not have been possible for to be declared".190 The KCF
was also able to get through permission for reopening the Pyongyang Theological Seminary
from the government, through the support and influence of Kang.
Rev. Young-il Kang, the general secretary of the Korean Christian Church in Japan, also
agrees that "Yang-uk Kang's contribution for the revival was remarkable".191 According to
him, Yang-uk Kang wanted to hand over his chairmanship of the KCF to Rev. Sung-ryul Kim
during the 1970s because of his health problems, but the Central Committee urged him to
retain his post. The presence of the Vice-President of the country as the chairperson of the
KCF was highly significant for the protection of the Christians. Young-il Kang also claims
that the only people who were politically safe enough to be able to give open support the
Christians, even in the changed context of 1972, were Kim Il-sung's relatives. "The Christian
family ofKim's mother, Kangs from Chilgol town, often lobbied, advocated and spoke up for
the Christians."192
From a minjung perspective, the emphasis in writing history should be on the contribution of
1QT
people themselves, rather than that of individuals. In this outlook, the revival of Protestant
Christianity in North Korea was possible because the Christian minjung continued to worship
together in house churches, in spite of social discrimination and persecution. However, it must
be also recorded that Rev. Yang-uk Kang, who loved the Christian minjung, was the one who
called the scattered Christian leaders, and suggested that they discuss how Protestant
189 Interview with Rev. Choon-ku Lee, 3rd April 2001, Pyongyang.
190 Ibid.
191 Interview with Rev. Young-il Kang, 5th December 2000, Seoul.
|92 Ibid.193
According to Yong-bock Kim, the minjung are the subject of social history, and their story is
viewed as the center of history in minjung theology. "Theology and Social Biography of the
Minjung", CTC Bulletin, vol. 5, No.3, 1984, 67.
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Christianity in North Korea could revive, in the changed context.194 Although Kang was a
politician, he continued his ministry as the chairperson of the KCF until his death. Rev.
Young-sup Kang, Yang-uk Kang's son, who survived an assassination attempt in 1946,
remembers that "in his later years, my father was happy to see the revival of house churches
and the seminary."193 It should be remembered that in the revival of Christianity in North
Korea, there was a politician and pastor, who protected the Christians, using his political
influence.
Despite Yang-uk Kang's contribution to the revival, in the South historians bitterly criticize
both his leadership and the revival itself. For example, Kyung-bae Min claims that the revived
KCF was hurriedly constructed by the KWP for political propaganda purposes, during the
North-South Dialogue. He went on further to claim that the KCF only consisted of the central
structure led by Kang, with neither member churches nor Christians.196
It might indeed be possible that when the KWP allowed the revival of the KCF, they had
some propaganda purposes in mind. However, if there had been no house churches and
Christians, it would not have been necessary for the Communists to allow the revival.
Furthermore, if there were no congregations and no Christians, it is difficult to explain why
the revival began with the reopening of the Pyongyang Theological Seminary.
Tae-woo Koh, Wan-sin Park and Kwang-soo Kim also criticize the role of Kang, making the
same assumptions as Min. They claim that Kang had an order to reopen the central office of
the KCF as a "bogus organization," the real purpose of which would be to win the progressive
South Korean Christians for the work of the United Front.197 However, on the contrary,
according to Jung-hyun Paik, Rev. Kang, accompanied by Rev. Deuk-ryong Kim, the general
secretary of the KCF, went to meet the officials of department of education in order to get
support for the permission of reopening the seminary on his own initiative, and by his own
free will.198
194 Interview with Rev. Dr. Dong-kun Hong, 13th April 2001, Los Angeles.
193 Interview with Rev. Young-sup Kang, 13lh December 2000, Fukuoka, Japan.
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Kyung-bae Min, Op. Cit, 445.
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Tae-woo Koh, Bukhan eui Jonkyo Jungchaek, (The Religious Policy in North Korea), 218-223;
Wan-sin Park, Bukhan Jongkyo wa Sunkyo Tongilron, (Mission, Reunification and Religion in North
Korea), 149-150; Kwang-soo Kim, A Historyfor Christianity in Northern Korea, 279-281.
198
Jung-hyun Paik, Are There Churches in North Korea?, 77.
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Those Southerners who try to discredit Kang and the KCF developed their claims on the basis
of a hypothesis that there was no real church in 1972 in North Korea.199 This hypothesis was
established with evidence descrived from Yang-uk Kang's interview with a South Korean
correspondent during the North-South Dialogue in 1972:
Correspondent: Could you tell me the situation of Christianity in North Korea?
Kang: During the three years of the American imperialist's invasion, all church
buildings were destroyed by the US bombing. When the American missionaries came
up to the North for the pacification work, they said 'opposing USA is opposing God'. It
was a tactic to submit the North Korean people to the USA. These American
missionaries tried to propagate Christianity, but they justified the bombing of the
churches as well. I recognize that the American missionaries did a lot of work for
mission in the North. However, at the same time, they failed their mission as well.
C: As I know it, you are a pastor. Aren't you? Could you tell me something about your
faith at present?
K: My faith is the same as it was.
C: Do you believe in the existence of God?
K: How could I not believe it as a pastor!
C: How do you distribute the Bible?
K: There is no one who is willing to have the Bible because we have no Christians!200
Since 1972, the last sentence of this interview has often been quoted, as providing crucial
evidence of the claims that there was no real church in North Korea. However, The
Pyongyang Shinmoon on 27th June 1987, a North Korean source, reported a different story of
this interview in an article which was a tribute to Yang-uk Kang, as follows:
It was 1972 when the North-South Dialogue was in Pyongyang. A correspondent from
South Korea visited Rev. Kang and asked, "Rev. Kang, do you believe in God?" This
question must be implied as criticizing the religious policy of the Republic, based on
the correspondent's bias, because although he called Kang "the Reverend," but he
also asked whether the Reverend believed in God or not. Rev. Kang humbly
answered, "You call me Reverend, why do you ask such a question?" The face of the
correspondent became red, but tried to trump up charges on the slightest pretext. He
asked another stupid question whether there was a church in the North. Finally, Rev.
Kang became upset and answered, "There had been churches in the North, but the
201
Americans bombed and destroyed them all during the war".
199 As representative case, see, Jai-keum Choi, "Christian and Anti-Christian Movement in North
Korea, 1945-1980", Yonsei Journal ofTheology, vol.5, 2000, 363-397.
200
Quoted from, Heung-soo Kim ed., A History of the Church in North Korea after Liberation, 507-
508.
201 The Pyongyang Shinmoon, 27th June 1987.
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When we read the above two quotations together, we can see that Rev. Kang must have
answered, "There are no Christians" in order to close the interview. The correspondent
already had his own answer, from a prejudice that there was neither church nor Christian in
the North. Then, he expected the same answer from Kang. The questions were, undiplomatic,
and impolite to someone who was a pastor, as well as to the Vice-President of a country.
Finally, Kang became angry because the correspondent did not treat him as a real pastor, and
did not believe in the existence of Christians in the North.
The claim that Rev. Kang revived the KCF merely as "bogus organization," on an order from
the KWP, is a statement made under the influence of Cold War ideology. The truth is that the
North Korean Christian leaders first met together, after the Anti-Religious Campaign period,
in 1972, at the suggestion of Rev. Kang, and they decided upon the reopening the house
churches and Pyongyang Theological Seminary. In this process, Kang played a vital role in
safeguarding the Christians. Kang's political position in North Korea was much higher than
that of someone who could be sent to lead merely "bogus" organizations. When the
delegation of the LWF visited North Korea several months after Kang's death, Oo-jong Kim,
the vice-chairman of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland (CPRF),
remembered:
This person remained Christian and a priest all of his life. When he died the Great
Leader (Kim ll-sung) and the Dear Leader (Kim Jong-il) visited his family and
expressed a great deal of sadness. All of the people in the country were sad. 2(L"
Although Rev. Kang was not a theologian like Y. T. Wu and K. H. Ting in China, he also
committed himself for the revival of Protestant Christianity in North Korea as a politician and
a pastor. Dong-kun Hong remembers that Kang said on his sickbed, just before his death, "We
must reconstruct our churches, but we must believe in the God of Korea, not the God of
America!"203 Rev. Kang wanted the revival of the church in North Korea as a church "of'
Korean minjok (suffering nation) and a church "for" the Korean minjung (suffering people).
Kang passed away in 1983, just before the historic Tozanso conference.
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203 This idea was very like to what Kim Il-sung's father had told him when Kim was still a boy. In fact,
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In this chapter, we have examined the revival that took place in Protestant Christianity in
North Korea since 1972. After the long winter of the Anti-Religious Campaign, the context of
the Protestant church in North Korea gradually changed, allowing this revival. We have seen
that the KCF bureaucracy led the external development of the revival. It did so by establishing
the Platform for cooperation with the state, developing leadership institutions for the churches,
providing a new translation of the Bible and hymnbook, instituting a system of registration,
and engaging in North and South dialogue with the assistance of WCC. The institutional
efforts of the KCF as the vehicle of revival of post-1972 Christianity in North Korea were
successful. However, before 1988, it seems that the revival was focused on quantitative
growth rather than qualitative development.
At the same time, this external structure was based not on a hierarchic, corporate model of
institutional authority, but on the "congregational" principle of house churches. It is the house
churches that evidence the actual growth in the numbers of North Korean Christians, reaching
10,000 by 1988. In the relationship between the church (KCF)-axis and community (house
church)-axis, up to 1988 there is no evidence of any tension between them. Both the KCF and





TheMinjung Centered Renewal of Protestant Christianity in North Korea, 1988-1994
After the revival from 1972-1988, there emerged another paradigm in the development of
Protestant Christianity in North Korea from 1988 onwards. While the "revival" had been a
matter of external development and quantitative growth, the "renewal" would be an internal
reference, denoting the theological and diaconal identity of North Korean Protestantism. It
will be argued that the revival of northern Protestantism was not only an institutional revival
along the church-axis, but also a theological and missiological renewal along the minjung-axis.
It will be also argued that the renewal was not essentially a compromise with the Communist
context. Rather, it was an authemtic effort to gain a theological identity through the dialogue
with the Jucheans, and through becoming a church for the minjung by means of diaconal
mission in the new socio-economic context after 1988. At the same time as the renewal of the
North Korean churches was taking place, a renewal of the way the South Korean and world
churches were approaching the North Korean issue was also occurring. This renewed
approach from the South and elsewhere made an external contribution to the renewal of
Christianity in North Korea, and it too will be studied.
1. The Suffering Minjung: The Context ofNorth Korea from 1988-1994
1.1 The Rise of Kim Jong-il
The politics of North Korea during the 1980s can be characterized by the rise of Kim Jong-il,
the eldest son of Kim Il-sung, as the successor of the "Great Leader".204 Kim Il-sung became
seventy, the retiring age in Korea, when the seventh SPA was convened in April 1982.
Nevertheless, on 5th April, Kim Il-sung was re-elected president of the Republic for a further
90S • • • •
four-year term. There were great celebrations for Kim's election and seventieth birthday on
204 For details of the political changes during this period, see, Byung-chul Koh, "Political Change in
North Korea", in C. Lee and S. Yoo ed., North Korea in Transition, Berkeley, University of
California Press, 1991, 1-16; "Political Succession in North Korea: Problems and Prospects", Paper
presented at Research Institute for Unification Conference, Seoul, October 1991; S. R. Yu, "Political
Succession in North Korea", Korea and WorldAffairs, vol. 6, 1982, 565-594.
205 He was elected for four years, but there was no restriction on the re-election. See, The Socialist
Constitution, Article 90.
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15th April 1982.206 However, throughout the 1980s it become obvious that Kim had gradually
turned over the affairs of the state, and the party, to his son. While his political power was
never challenged, a new generation of North Korean politics had emerged, and Kim's old
partisan comrades from guerilla days were dying off. For example, two of three Vice-
Presidents of North Korea from the old guard, Yang-uk Kang and II Kim, died within two
• • 907
years of their election to the post.
In this context, there were visible signs of Kim's relaxing the reins of power.208 Instead of the
"Great Leader", Kim Jong-il began to make the "on-the-spot guidance tours",209 and official
speeches. Gradually, Kim Jong-il succeeded to the second highest position in the party.
Officially, the younger Kim was fourth in the order of the KWP until the death of his father in
1994. However, this rise of Kim was de facto the emergence of a new leader in North
910
Korea. The 1980s was a transitional period of political succession in North Korea. Kim
Jong-il had a sort of management training as the new leader of the state, with the protection
and guidance of his father, so that he could grasp political power without opposition and
construct his own leadership. Finally, when Kim Il-sung died on 8th July 1994, Kim Jong-il
became the "Great Leader" ofNorth Korea.
The South Korean media has criticized Kim Jong-il for being able to succeed to power
through removing his political rivals in this transitional period. However, in the academic
field of North Korean Studies, it has been recognized that there were no signs of a political
purge during this period. Jung-suk Lee insists that there was almost no resistance to the
206
To celebrate the occasion, the North Korean government extended an invitation to more than 200
representatives from 118 countries. Moreover, the world's tallest stone monument, the Juchetap, a
North Korean Arch of Triumph, the Kaesumnoon, and the Kim II Sung Stadium were unveiled on
the day. See, Dae-sook Suh, Kim II Sung, 287.
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succession of Kim Jong-il because he had already proved his quality as the future leader of
North Korea.211
However, it must be said that this kind of political succession from father to son was similar
to the old custom of Asian Confucian feudalism, which the Asian Communists had considered
one of the main enemies of the Asian Communist revolution. Furthermore, in the process of
political succession, North Korea lost an opportunity for change, and opening up to the
outside world. Kim Il-sung closed North Korea's door even more firmly during this period,
isolating the country still further from external pressures and criticisms.
The death of Rev. Yang-uk Kang, and the rise of Kim Jong-il, was a new context for
Protestant Christianity in North Korea because, in contrast to his father, the younger Kim had
neither direct experience of Christianity, nor any direct relationship with the Christians. Most
of the younger Kim's power elites, the second generation of the anti-Japanese guerilla leaders,
were not familiar with Christianity as well. The Christians now faced a new challenge: they
would have to make Christianity understandable to the new generation of North Korean
Communists, so that they would not discriminate against them again.
1.2 International Isolation
While North Korea was in the process of passing on the political succession, from Kim senior
to Kim junior, the outside world was rapidly changing. In the 1960s, North Korea had
declared its independence from the USSR and China, and in the 1970s it turned to the non-
aligned movement. However, the non-aligned movement was already declining, in the 1980s,
and most Communist countries were developing a pragmatic diplomatic approach, which
emphasized economic benefit apart from Communist internationalism. Moreover, the voice of
people, which sought to move the Communist governments towards the market economy and
democracy, began to explode in the Communist countries. In the end, most Communist
regimes dramatically collapsed from 1989 onwards, and policies of openness and
transformation were brought in.
211
Jung-suk Lee, Op. Cit., 519-529.
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In spite of this tide of change, Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il rowed the boat of North Korea
against the stream in order to secure their political succession.212 They were afraid of the
external influences promoting change coming into North Korea. Therefore, they locked the
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door by maintaining Urisik Sahoejueui, or Socialism in Our Style. In his New Year
message in 1993, Kim Il-sung said, "We will steadfastly maintain our independence and
faithfully uphold our revolutionary principles and international duties, no matter how
complicated the circumstances may be".214 Although the international situation had changed
radically, Kim stuck to the same old policy of independence, and condemned the USSR and
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China as traitors of the Communist revolution. This closed-door policy increased still
further the diplomatic isolation ofNorth Korea.216
In this context of isolation, the new leadership of the KWP began to be interested in the active
international relationships that were open to the KCF. They considered that the KCF, while
remaining a Non-Governmental Organization could play the role of being a diplomatic
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channel to the outside world.
1.3 Economic Crisis and Famine
One of the most dramatic changes in North Korea during this period was the economic crises
from 1990, culminating in the terrible famine from 1993. As we pointed out in the previous
chapter, the economy of North Korea had been stagnating since the 1970s because of over¬
investment in military expenses. However, it did not become a crisis until 1990. According to
212
See, R. A. Scalapino and H. Lee ed., North Korea in a Regional and Global Context, Berkeley,
University ofCalifornia Press, 1986; S. Yu, "Political Succession in North Korea", Korea and
WorldAffairs, vol. 6, 1982, 565-594.
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Concerning the Urisik Sahoejueui, see, Sang-woo Rhee, "North Korea in 1991: Struggle to Save
Chuche's Amid Signs ofChange", Asian Survey, vol. 32, 1992, 56-63; Moon-young Huh,
"1980nyundae Bukhan eui Daejung, Daeso mit Daenam Jungchaek Yunku-Jung, So Kaebanghwa
Jungckaek eul Jungsimeuro", (A study of the Diplomatic Policy ofNorth Korea in Relation to the
Soviet Union, China and South Korea in the 1980s, with Special Reference to the Influence of
Opening and Transforming Policy of the Soviet Union and China", PhD Thesis, Sungkyunkwan
University, 1991.
214 The Nodong Shinmoon, 1st January 1993.
215 Ibid.
216
Concerning the foreign policy ofNorth Korea in this period, see, Y. H. Kihl, "North Korea's
Foreign Relations: Diplomacy ofPromotive Adaptation", Journal ofNortheast Asian Studies, vol.
10,1991,30-45.
217 Interview with Kyung-seo Park, 28"' November 2000, Seoul.
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a US congress report, the economy of North Korea had averaged about 3 percent growth rate
annually from 1984-1990.218
However, with the beginning of the 1990s, the North Korean economy hit a downward turn.
The gross national product (GNP) decreased 3.7 percent in 1990 and 5.2 percent in 1992.219
From 1993, it was not even able to gather detailed statistics on the economy because famine
hit all across North Korea. Since 1990, harvests in North Korea had been reducing steadily
each year. The reasons of this reduction were shortage of fuel and farm inputs, which the
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Soviet Union had previously given freely as part of an assistance package. In 1990, the
USSR asked North Korea to pay in foreign currency for the oil supply. North Korea, however,
did not have enough currency because the USA had embargoed the country, preventing it
• • • 221from engaging in international trade and business, ever since the Korean War. The lack of
fuel also crippled the manufacturing industry of North Korea because the electricity of North
Korea, which largely depended on oil from the USSR for its electricity supply. The country's
• 222total electricity consumption in 1999 was only 55 percent of what it had been in 1991. As a
result of the electricity shortage, most factories stopped operating. There was not even enough
to provide energy for homes from 1993. What was worse, China also ceased to supply free
food assistance, which had amounted to approximately one million tons of crops per year, and
demanding foreign currency payment from 1990 onwards. North Korea always had some
difficulty to produce enough food because about eighty percent of its territory is mountainous.
On the top of this economic crisis, a series of natural disasters also hit North Korea from 1993.
During the summer of 1993, it endured heavy hailstorms, especially in Whanghae province,
218 "North Korea: Economy", in A. M. Savada ed., North Korea: A Country Study, Washington,
Federal Research Division, Library ofCongress, 1993.
219 Ibid. The total GNP ofNorth Korea in 1991 wasUS$ 22.9 billion, orUS$ 1,038 per capita.
220
See, E. Banzhanov and N. Banzahanov, "Soviet Views on North Korea", Asian Survey, vol. 31,
1991, 1123-1138; M. Tamaki, "The North Korean Economy During 1990-1991", in Kita Chosen no
keizei to boekin tenbo, (North Korean Economics and Trade Prospects), Tokyo, Japan External
Trade Organization, 1991, 1-21.
221 Even now neither corporations nor individuals from the western world are able to have any
financial dealings with North Korea through the international banking system. For example, in 1998,
the WCC tried to transfer US$ 20,000 to the KCF for a project fund, but it was blocked by the New
York Bank. Kyung-seo Park, "KP9201-Activities of Korean Christian Federation", 22nd April 1998,
WCC-Asia Desk memorandum.
222 A. M. Savada ed., Op. Cit., North Korea relies on three sources of commercial energy, coal, oil and
hydropower. However, it became two in 1999. Coal accounted for almost 77% of primary energy
consumption and hydropower for more than 13%, because the USSR stopped supplying oil to North
Korea.
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which is the major grain producing area. Then, for nineteen days, between 30lh July and 18th
August, the country was confronted with torrential rains ofmore than 300 mm on average per
223
day, which claimed many victims. Again in 1995, North Korea was hit three times
994
repeatedly by torrential rains. As most dams could not cope with more than 400-800 mm of
rain per day, many of them broke and water crashed into fields, destroying crops due to be
99 c
harvested one and a half months later. According to the statistics of the United Nations'
Food and Agriculture Organization, in 1989, 8,100,000 tons of crops were harvested in North
Korea. However, in 1993, this reduced to 6,640,000 tons, and in 1995 only 4,930,000 tons
99 f\
were harvested. Because of this, most North Korean people in 1993 were able to eat only a
kind of corn soup twice a day. In 1995, most North Korean people were not even able to have
this simple soup, and only 100 grams of food per day were distributed.227
As the famine worsened, hundreds of thousands of North Korean asylum seekers fled to
China to find food. Broadcasts reported that two or three million people died in North Korea
990 OQQ
because of starvation. The famine was most terrible for children and elderly people. The
United Nations' World Food Planning warned that it could be possible that North Korea loses
"one generation" because a lot of children were already dead, and even children who survived
during the famine are now having other difficulties on account of the malnutrition they
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experienced early in their lives. A number ofNorth Korean asylum seekers in China said in
223 "Act Team Visit North Korea: Recommendations More Aid", 2nd-9,h March 1996, 6.
224 The first time was for one week from 8th to 15th July, mostly affecting Paekdoo mountain area in
Yangkang and Jakang provinces. The second downpour was for two weeks from 26th July to 12th
August and affected almost the whole ofNorth Korea. The third disaster lasted ten days between
17lh and 27th August and particularly affected the central part ofNorth Korea. For details, see, Ibid,
7.
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According to the Rehabilitation Commission ofNorth Korea, the devastation amounted to US$ 2
billion. 1,500 houses were destroyed. 75 people, 26,000 cows, 66,000 pigs, 10,000 goats, 32,000
sheep, 160,000 chickens, 180,000 ducks and 42,000 rabbits were killed, Vast tracts of rice fields
inundated and 100 million green houses smashed. Quoted from Ibid, 7-8.
226 "Executive Report on North Korea", UN-FAO, December 1995.
227
"Report ofACT TEAM Visit to North Korea", 27th May - 3rd June 1997.
228 "Famine May Have Killed Two Million in North Korea", CNNNews, 19th August 1998; "North
Korea Loses 3 Million in Famine", BBC WorldNews, 17th February 1999.
229
According to the UN-FPA, the infant mortality rate in North Korea rose to 14.1 in 1995, and 18.6 in
1997 per one thousand. The average life span of the North Koreans decreased from 72.2 to 70.1 in
this period. This was a dramatic decrease in the statistic of the average life span within two years.
The increase of infant mortality and the decrease of the average life span in North Korea in this
period was one of the worst figures all over the world. The Hankyoreh, 5th June 2002.
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In 1997, UN-WFP reported that 80% ofNorth Korean children were in a state of malnutrition. The
Kukmin Daily, 5th July 1997; New York Times, 11th June 1997; see also, The Hankyoreh, 7lh May
2002. UNICEF also reported Concerning 800,000 children in North Korea were at risk of
malnutrition. See, D. Frado, "North Korea Emergency Update Note 14", UNICEF, 8lh August 1997.
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interviews that they saw several families commit collective suicide to escape the suffering of
231
starvation.
The causes of economic crisis and famine in North Korea in the 1990s were complex. It was a
combination of several factors and problems, including over-investment in military expenses
and the closed-door policy, the cessation of free aid from the USSR and China, the US
economic embargo, and above all, the succession of natural disasters that hit the country. All
these helped to bring about human tragedy in North Korea. Paradoxically, this terrible
situation became an opportunity for the northern Christians to give witness to their
commitment to the wider community.
2. The Christian-Juchean Dialogue: Seeking a Theological Identity
2.1 The Juche Idea
The south-centered Confucian power elites had discriminated against the northern part of the
Korean peninsula during the Chosun Dynasty. The Japanese colonial rule that followed was
even worse for the North. Although the northern people established an independent socialist
country after the liberation, North Korea was often considered a satellite country of the USSR
and China. It was in this context that the Juche Idea emerged as the national ideology,
promoting independence, under Kim Il-sung during the 1950s and thereafter.
Juche is the word that sums up the political thought of Kim Il-sung. It consists of two Korean
words: ju means lord, master, owner, ruler, the main one, and so forth; che means the body,
the whole, the essence, the substance, the style. In Korean, the word Juche thus refers to the
basic object, the main constituent, or the basis of action. It is often used with the suffix sung,
e.g. Juchesung, meaning to act in accord with one's own judgment. As a system of values,
Juche is commonly translated as "self-reliance." This notion has become the blueprint of
North Korean society and the central guidance for policies. It has evolved through various
phases ranging from a mere political slogan to a comprehensive Weltanschauung.
231 A South Korean newspaper, The Hankyoreh, which conservative politicians had criticized as a pro-
Communist newspaper during the military regime, interviewed more than four hundred asylum
seekers from North Korea, and reported this shocking news of family suicide. See, The Hankyoreh,
10th March 1998.
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Concerning the socio-historical context of the Juche Idea, see, Chapter V, Section 1.3.
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In his own explanation of the idea, Kim Il-sung said that the basis of Juche is "man is master
of nature and society, and the main factor that decides all matters'.233 The master of socialist
construction is the masses, and the power to effect revolution and construction rests with the
people. The master of one's fate is oneself, and power to control one's fate rests with
oneself.234 Therefore, Juche's self-reliance has been interpreted as meaning a human-centered
world-view. Juche theoreticians maintain, "Society consists of people, social wealth, and
social relations. Here man is always master. Both social wealth and social relations are
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created by man and serve him". As such, man should not be subjected to enslavement of
any kind, whether it is caused by economic poverty, political subjugation, or military
domination on the part of other human beings. Furthermore, human beings, according to
Chajusung or "self-independence", should never be manipulated by institutions, material
conditions, or mythical beliefs such as religious dogmas. The doctrine that, man is the master
of the universe suggests that along with its many institutions, society is created by man and
should serve the well-being of its members.
While being an ideology that proclaimed itself to be essentially socialist and Marxist, Juche in
fact stands in defiance of material determinism of history. The Marxist premise of economic
or material structure as the substructure upon which all superstructures are founded is
unequivocally rejected. Instead, in the Juche ideology, it is the spiritual consciousness that
determines the course of history and it alone underlies all other structures. In fact, Juche's
fundamental deviation from Marxism begins at this point. According to its doctrine, human
behavior is guided not by the conditions of the modes and relations of production, as Marx
233 Kim Il-sung Works, Pyongyang, Foreign languages Publishing House, vol. 27, 491.
234 There are many books on the subject ofJuche by Kim, but these are all collections of his speeches,
reports, and portions of interviews. See, among others, Kim Il-sung, Juche sasang e daehayeo, (On
the Idea of Juche), Pyongyang, KWP Press, 1977; Kim Il-sung, Uri hyukmyung eseoeui Juche e
daehayeo, (On the Juche in Our Revolution), Pyongyang, KWP Press, 1970. For the study of the
Juche idea, see, such representative works as the three-volume study by the Academy of Social
Sciences ed, Hyukmyung kwa kunsule kwanhan Kim II Sung Donjieui Sasang kwa keu widaehan
seanghwallyuk, (The Thought of Comrade Kim Il-sung on Revolution and Construction and Its
Great Strength), Pyongyang, Sahoe Kwahakwon Chulpansa, 1969. Another work by the same
institute is entitled Widaehan Suryung Kim II Sung Dongji eui Juche Sasang, (The Juche Idea of the
Great Leader Kim Il-sung). In English, See, Kim Jong-il, On the Juche Idea, Pyongyang, Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1982.
235 Kim II Sung Encyclopedia, New Delhi, Vishwanath, 1992, 85.
236 Kim Jong-il, On the Juche Idea, 9-10.
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had claimed, but by the direct guidance of the "brain". Likewise, social change occurs in
accordance with the command of the society's Noesu or "brain", as opposed to being dictated
700
by the forces and relations of production. In this way, a direct analogy is made between the
individual human being, with his or her brain and the social organism, which is also said to
have a brain. This analogy enables the development of a theory of the "socio-political life" in
which a triangular relationship is advanced involving the people, the Party, and the Suryung
(the Great Leader). The leader, in this case, performs the function of "the brain" that makes
decisions and commands actions for the various parts of the body, the Party is the nerve
system that mediates and maintains equilibrium between the brain and the body; and, finally,
come the people themselves, who implement the decisions of the brain and channel feedback
to the Leader.
The central concept in the ideology is Uisiksung or "consciousness". According to Juche, it is
this quality of man that makes human beings unique and distinguishable from all other living
species. Juche theoreticians perceive consciousness "in relation to man's independence and
creative abilities to reshape and change the world". They define consciousness as "a mental
activity, a special function of the brain which directs man's independent and creative actives
7-20 #
in a unified way". Man is meant to be conscious of his place in the universe as dictated by
the aforementioned Chajusung (self-independence). This Chajusung guides all forms of
relationship in the world of living beings, and addresses the concerns and problems arising in
the existential historical situations. Man is a "conscious social being". Uisiksung is "an
attribute of social man, which determines all his endeavors to understand and reshape the
world and himself'.240 This consciousness guarantees the Chajusung and creativity of man,
and ensures his "purposeful cognition and practice".241
Central to the Juche is its interpretation of human nature. According to this doctrine, man
consists of body and spirit. It is the spirit that enables man to cultivate and develop
consciousness. And it is also the spirit that ultimately commands the body. However,
consciousness will not develop without concerted efforts by the individual through education





239 Kim II Sung Encyclopedia, 79.
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of the Leader and the Party.242 In this way, Juche adheres to the logic of a dialectical synthesis
among the three entities - the leader, the party and the people - in order to create the "socio¬
political body."
While this Uisiksung refers to metaphysical or spiritual realities that prepare for the
development of human nature, Changbalsung, or creativity, is the internal component of
human nature that is the active, mobile, and operating force in human action. If Uisiksung is
static and philosophical, Changbalsung may be understood as dynamic and scientific. This
quality of man enables him to apply abstract principles to concrete reality by creatively
adapting the principles to the specific condition of the society. Kim Il-sung defines creativity
as "a quality of man who transforms the world in keeping with his independent aspirations
and requirements".243 Accordingly, Juche maintains that it is this quality of man that has
developed and adapted Marxism and Leninism in such a way that it can work in the peculiar,
indigenous situation of North Korea. Creativity thus advances the original Marxist-Leninist
ideological system to greater perfection. Conversely, if political ideologies and institutional
arrangements are copied from foreign experiences, without adjusting them creatively to the
concrete indigenous condition of each society, they will exhibit irregularities and ill-
symptoms. 244 Therefore, a society of people must not blindly adopt foreign values or
institutions. To establish Juche thus means to approach the revolution and construction by
oneself in a self-reliant manner, using one's own head, trusting in one's own strength, relying
on one's own revolutionary spirit of self-reliance, and rejecting dependence on others. It also
means to maintain a creative mind, opposing dogmatism, and applying the universal principle
of Marxist-Leninism, as well as learning from the experiences of other countries, in such a
way that these are made to suit the national characteristics of one's own country.24"
We may call this understanding of the human being the first, or fundamental part of the Juche
Idea. In the second part, the Juche Idea then lays out certain socio-historical principles. Kim's
ideology not only tried to give a world-view, but also a socio-historical view, which centered
on the mass of the people. The most important socio-historical principle in the Juche idea is
24~
Exposition of the Juche Idea, Pyongyang, Foreign Language Publishing House, 1983, 28-29.
244 Kim Il-sung, Answers to the Questions Raised by Foreign Journalists, Pyongyang, Foreign
Language Publishing House, 285.
244
Exposition ofthe Juche Idea, 26-27.
24" Kim Il-sung, "Report to the Fifth Congress of the Korean Worker's Party on the Work of Central
Committee", in Selected Works, vol. 5, Pyongyang, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1970,
500-501.
286
that "the mass of the people is the subject of history".246 The Juche defines the socio-
historical movement as an independent and creative movement of the popular masses. In this
movement, the people's independent ideological consciousness plays a decisive role in the
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revolutionary struggle. The Marxist materialistic conception of history considered all social
movements from the angle of economic relations which it took as the basic factor. It
explained the history of society as a process determined by the replacement of various modes
of production. However, according to Jucheans, by bringing up the question of the subject of
history, and insisting that the masses of the people are the real subject of social history, the
Juche Idea brought new development to the Marxist understanding of the laws that govern
historical change.248
Kim Jong-il insists that the working masses thus came to be recognized as the master of
history, and the motive force of social progress.249 In the Juche idea, the working masses are a
community of people with Chajusung, Uisiksung and Changbalsung. In order to be the
subject of history, the masses of people must have Chajusung. Juche insists, "The history of
human society is a history of the struggle of the popular masses for defending and realizing
Chajusung".25° Because the subject of history is the popular masses, human history can be
scientifically explained only when the perspective of the working masses is placed at its
center.231 However, when the people have no consciousness (Uisiksung) they are the subject
of history (Chajusung), they will never become the center of history. And even once they
have realized this position, they must develop specific means and strategies (Changbalsung)
to realize it.
Juche also claims that if the masses of the people are to hold their position, and fulfil their
role as subject of history, they must be linked with leadership. "Only under correct leadership
would the masses, though creators of history, be able to occupy the position and perform their
role as the subject of socio-historical development".252 Here, the role of personal leadership -
i.e. of great leader himself - was emphasized in the revolutionary struggle, being added to the
traditional notion of the leadership of the Communist party in Marxist-Leninism. This notion
246 Kim Jong-il, Op. Cit., 14.
247
Exposition of the Juche Idea, 40.
246
Ibid., 41.






of personal leadership is a delicate point in the Juche Idea, because when it is too much
emphasized, it is in danger of falling into a cult of the personality of a specific individual.
This emphasis on personal leadership can be seen as an intentional extension of the notion of
the dictatorship of the proletariat in Leninism. It also, of course, enshrined Kim Il-sung.
Han S. Park claims that the Juche theoreticians copied this theory from Christian theology.233
It sounds very similar to Paul's ecclesiology, which used an analogy of the head, the body and
the organism. Although Park failed to give direct evidence for his claim, it might be possible
that Kim, who had been a Sunday school teacher at the Kilim Presbyterian Church, borrowed
Paul's ideas in developing his political idea.
Lastly, the Juche Idea suggests the practical guiding principles to be taken in regard to
revolution and construction: Juche (ZEIS, self-relience) in ideology, Chaju (@i, self-
independence) in politics, Charip ( ^ \L, self-sustenance) in economy, and Chawi ( 1=5 Hj, self-
defense) in military matters.234 Here, the practical suggestion of Juche idea concentrated on
the issue of national independence rather than the other practical demands of the people. To
ensure the Chajusung of the masses, the Chajusung of nation was to come first. Although the
basic thesis of Juche is that the masses of the people are the subject of history, the guiding
principles were full of slogans for the mobilizing people for national independence, without
balancing these with slogans concerning the quality of life of the people. This is the main
problem of the application of Juche idea in practice. The macro approach to nationalism
sacrificed the micro approach on behalf of the people's welfare. Consequently, this macro
approach began to fall into a from of totalitarianism, which justified Kim's absolute power on
the grounds that it was necessary for the struggle for national independence, from the 1970s
onwards.
In spite of this problem, the four slogans of Juche, Chaju, Charip and Chawi which North
Korea used for developing an indigenous Communism was a remarkable attempt at self-
reliance within the Communist bloc. In Marx's Manifesto of the Communist Party, "workers
have no nation of their own."253 However, in the Juche Idea, the concept of nationalism was
253 Han S. Park, "The Nature and Evolution ofJuche Ideology", in North Korea: Ideology, Politics,
Economy, 15.
234
See, Exposition ofthe Juche Idea, 99-124.
255 "Manifesto of the Communist Party", in M. Cowling ed., The Communist Manifesto: New
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given a positive interpretation, and integrated into the process of the socialist revolution then
presumed to be taking place in the third world countries.2:16 The Juche idea critically states
that imperialism is possible even within the Communist bloc, and can be practiced by the
Communist super powers. This positive understanding of nationalism, unique within the
Communist countries of the time, resulted from Kim's experience of the anti-Japanese
guerilla struggle, and his opposition further foreign interventions during the 1960s. In the
Juche idea, national independence is not a sub-task of the Communist revolution, but it has an
equal importance with the Communist revolution, especially in the Third World context. This
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is a crucial difference compared to orthodox Marxism. Although the Weltanschauung of the
Juche Idea is certainly different from orthodox Marxism, this does not mean that it rejected
Marxist-Teninism but only that it accepted Marxist-Leninism critically and integrated it with
the North Korean context. It tried to establish an independent theory of the Korean revolution,
with its own initiative. The nationalistic characteristic of the Juche Idea rooted well in the soil
of North Korea, because of the northerners' historical experience of being subjected to
discrimination.
The Juche Idea also introduced a strongly optimistic view of human moral ability. Although it
was necessary to be hopeful in this regard after the disaster of the war in order to mobilize
manpower for the reconstruction, the overestimation of human ability ended up in the cult of a
super-personality ofSuryung (the great leader).
The emphasis on the role of the leader in the revolutionary struggle brought a degeneration in
the Juche Idea. In fact, the philosophy of Juche was the outcome of a collective work ofJuche
scholars. However, the revised platform of the KWP in 1980 announced that Kim had
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"invented" the idea. " According to the Juche Idea, the working masses are the master of
North Korea, but in practice, Kim became the only master of the country through enshrining
• 95Q
the Suryung. To achieve this, the Juche Idea was "privatized" as Kimilsungism.
Interpretations, New York, New York University Press, 1998, 27.
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Concerning the Juche's understanding on nationalism, see, Dong-soo Kim, "Nation in the Juche
Idea", in Haek-jip Ra et al, Kidokyo eseo bon Juchesasang, (The Juche Idea from a Christian
Perspective), Seoul, Minjungsa, 1993, 304-318.
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It may be understandable that a small country in search of self-identity should launch a
campaign to project abroad an image of the unity and stability of its people and their political
system, promoting their leader in the process. However, the North Korean practice of personal
cult goes to extremes seldom found in other part of the world. Kim's photograph is displayed
at home and in every social space, and is more prominent than either the national flag or the
national emblem. There are schools, songs, poems, essays, stories, and even flowers named
after him. Giant statues and towers praising him were built all across North Korea. Through
these propaganda works, Kim was praised as the only national "messiah", and called the
Ubeoi (father) Suryung. Speaking at the fifth Congress of the KWP, Deputy Prime Minister,
Sung-chul Park said, "for all members of our party and for our entire people, there can be no
greater honor than to live and fight under the wise leadership of our beloved leader Kim II-
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sung, the father of Juche." The climax of the personality cult was his handing over the
political succession to his son, who was praised as the "holy blood" of Korean revolution. In
reality, this is an expression neither of the Juche Idea nor of Communism; instead, it is merely
an extreme form ofmodern totalitarianism.
During the 1960s, the Chajusung became the most important principle of the Juche Idea, in
order to struggle with the factions handled by China and the USSR, and oppose the foreign
intervention in domestic politics. However, the Chajusung continued to dominate even in the
changed context of the 1980s. This over-emphasis on self-independence resulted in
international isolation. According to the Changbalsung, in carrying out the socialist revolution,
the Korean people were to apply the changes and socio-historical developments of the world
taking place in to their own North Korean context. However, in reality, North Korea has
ignored the wind of change of the outside world. Even in economics, the notion of self-
independence has been dogmatically applied by emphasizing an extremist self-support system.
In this modern world, it is almost impossible to sustain a country's economy without
developing international trade.
Despite these problems, it is necessary to draw attention that part of the Juche philosophy that
emphasizes spiritual consciousness as the determining factor in driving the course of history.
260
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The Juche Idea thus importantly holds the spiritual dimension of human beings, in high regard,
contrary to the Marxist theory of material determinism. This particularity has been an
important philosophical reference point for the Christian-Juchean dialogue, because it meant
that spiritual aspect of religion could be interpreted positively by the Jucheans.
2.2 The Christian-Juchean Dialogue
2.2.1 The Proposal of Ki-jun Koh
A Czechoslovakian theologian, J. M. Lochman asked some question from within his owm
context, which could able to be applied to North Korean Christianity: "How should a
Christian live and react to a situation where the official society considers its very existence as
undesirable, and thinks of it as an obsolete remnant from the benighted past and an obstacle to
progress? Should the church then cut off its links with the society and ignore its development,
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concentrating on its own spiritual life - and hope just to survive?" " When the revival of the
Protestant Christianity in North Korea stabilized, as Lochman points out, the Christians in
North Korean began to question how they could forge links between Juchean society and the
meaning of their Christian existence in North Korea. The Christians, for whom mere survival
had hitherto been their main concern, began to search for their identity in North Korean
society.
Rev. Ki-jun Koh was the first to suggest a Christian-Juchean dialogue, in his paper
• 969
"Socialism and Christianity in North Korea". As soon as he was elected as the general
secretary of KCF in 1981, he proposed the dialogue as a new policy of the KCF. Koh began to
observe his journey of faith:
I was born in a Christian family and baptized when I was an infant. Since then, I have
kept my Christian faith up to over Whangap (sixtieth birthday). Long time ago, I had
doubts about the socialists, and believed that Christianity and socialism were
opposite systems of belief. There were socialists in North Korea who believed that
Christianity and socialism were ideological enemies, and they discriminated against
the Christians. On the other hand, there were pastors who identified Christianity with
262 J. M. Lochman, Christ and Prometheus?, Geneva, WCC, 1988, 23.
263
Later, this paper was published in South Korea. See, Dong-kun Hong ed., Vienna eso Frankfurt
kkaji: Buk kwa Haewoi Dongpo, Kidokja kaneui Tongil Daehwa 10 Nyun Hoego, (From Vienna to
Frankfurt: A Memory of Ten Years of Reunification Talks between the North Korean Christians and
the Korean Christian Diaspora), Seoul, Hyungsangsa, 1994, 135-143.
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anti-Communism, and encouraged this in their preaching...However, now we find that
the Christians live without any problem with the socialists in our daily life, under the
guidance of the Juche idea.26
Koh examined why and how the Christians and the socialists were now able to live together
without a conflict between the two belief-systems, a situation that was very different from
previous experience. He believed that the answer of this question would clarify the
theological identity of revived Christianity in North Korea. He also asked: "Is it possible for
the Christians and the Jucheans to cooperate together in the construction of socialist country,
and for the reunification of fatherland?" and on the presumption that the answer to this
• • • •
question would be affirmative, "Where is the rationale for this cooperation?" These were
the theological questions that revived North Korean Christianity needed to answer, yet they
were remarkable. While the churches had reopened since 1972, nobody had tried to interpret
their experiences before Koh.
Koh understood the Juche idea as follows:
When I read the Juche idea from a Christian perspective, briefly, the Juche idea can
be summarized as a human centered philosophical ideology. It is a sort of ideology of
love for human beings, which approaches all social phenomena from the standpoint
of the interest of the masses of the people, and demands service for the well-being of
266
man.
Based on this understanding, he found similarities between Christianity and the Juche idea:
Firstly, there is an ideological similarity between North Korean Communism and
Christianity. Of course, it is difficult to deny that there are fundamental differences in
philosophy, world-view, and methodology of salvation between the Juche idea and
Christianity. However, we cannot deny that the human centered approach of the
Juche idea has a similarity to Christianity, which emphasizes love for human beings.
Although the Communists and the Christians have a different ideology and a different
faith, we can work together for the well-being of our people and nation, and for the
development of our society, on the basis of this similarity. "67
Here, Koh was trying to connect the core of two systems of thought to justify cooperation










In my understanding, the Juche idea, which is a human centered philosophy, is an
ideology to realize the Chajusung (self-reliance) of the exploited and oppressed
working masses of people. This thought is similar to the Christian teaching, which
preaches the liberation of the poor, the oppressed and the marginalized. 268
Here, Koh was attempting to reintroduce Christianity as a religion for the liberation of the
suffering people. This was a distinct change of image of Christianity in North Korea. It was
also a significant challenge to the North Korean Communists, who had understood
Christianity to be a "pro-American imperialistic religion". Koh was surely intentionally
proclaiming that North Korean Christianity was no longer a pro-American religion, but a
religion "of' and "for" the North Korean people, and he would prove it through launching a
process of dialogue between the Christians and the Jucheans.
Koh also drew attention to common ground on national independence:
Thirdly, both the Communists and the Christians in North Korea have been
considering the issue of national independence as a top priority of their mission. In
this tradition, we can work together for the issue of the reunification of the fatherland.
269
Koh recognized the positive Communist contribution to the national liberation movement. At
the same time, he reminded the Communists of the history of northern Christians'
commitment to the independence movement. He concluded that both the Juche idea and
North Korean Christianity share, as a common characteristic, concern for national liberation.
By doing this, he was reminding the Communists that the Christians too could make a
positive contribution to national issues, such as reunification.
Koh's proposal of a dialogue opened up a new horizon for both the Jucheans and the
Christians in North Korea. For the Juche Communists, the Christians began to appear in a
different light. Their new image made them possible partner who could cooperate with the
Communists in addressing public issues. For the Christians, too, a new task were emerging,
proposed by their General Secretary. After spending years simply trying to survive, they could
• 970 • •




270 This terminology of "wrestling" is quoted from K. H. Ting, No Longer Strangers: Selected Writings
ofK. H. Ting, 76-78.
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2.2.2 The Dialogue
Responding to the Koh's proposal, the Institute for the Juche Idea in Pyongyang and some
Korean theologians living abroad decided to open a dialogue with the KCF. These theologians
later organized themselves into a body known as the Association of Reunification
Theologians Abroad. A consultation process of the Christian-Juchean dialogue was launched
in 1981, entitled Juchesasang kwa Chokuk Toingile kwanhan Bukkwa Hoewoidongpo
Kidoksinjagan Daehwa, or "Dialogue on the Juche Idea and the Reunification of the
Fatherland among the Christians in the North and Overseas and North Korean Scholars." The
dialogue consultations were held annually from 1981-1991 and a number of scholars
• 971 • ... 979
participated. There were representatives of the KCF from the Christian side, and on the
other side Juche scholars representing the Institute for the Juche Idea in the Academy of
Social Science.27' Remarkably, a considerable number ofKorean theologians abroad also took
part in the consultations.274 The presence and contribution of these theologians was a great
support for the KCF, which had limited intellectual resources both in quantity and quality,
compared to the Juche scholars275 To accommodate the participation of the Korean
theologians living abroad, most consultations were held in foreign countries. This was a way
of getting round the National Security Law of South Korea, which disallowed any civilian
from visiting North Korea.
271 The first Consultation on the Christian-Juchean Dialogue was held from 3rd-6th November 1981 in
Vienna. The second was from 3rd-5th December 1982 in Helsinki. The third was from 5th- 19th July
1983 in Pyongyang. The fourth was from 15th-17th June 1984 in Beijing. The fifth was from 15th-
17th December 1984 in Vienna. The sixth was from 14th-16th December 1985 in Vienna. The seventh
was from 18th-19th 1986 in Vienna. The eighth was from 15th-18th 1988 in Helsinki. The ninth was
from 23rd-25lh 1990 in Helsinki. The tenth was from 30th January-3rd February 1991 in Frankfurt.
For details, see, Dong-kun Hong, Op. Cit., 25-120.
27" Rev. Ki-jun Koh, the general secretary of the KCF, Rev. Duk-ryong Kim, Rev. Hyun-dal Lim, Edler
Kuk-rul Yum, Rev. Sung-bong Lee, Rev. choon-ku Lee, Rev. Se-il Kim, Rev. chul Lee, et al.
participated in the consultations from the KCF side.
273 Prof. Sung-duk Park, the director of the Institute, Dr. Hyung-sup Yang, Dr. Kum-chul Chun, Prof.
Young-kul Jin, Dr. Sung-moon Kim, Dr. Young-rul Kim, Prof. Jong-hun Lee, Prof. Min-kyu Kim,
Prof. Kun-bae Lee, Prof. Jung-sup Song, Prof. Young-il Chun, Prof. Chang-ryong Choi, Prof.
Kwang-sik Kim, et al. were the participants from the Juchean side.
2/4
Rev. Dr. Dong-kun Hong, Prof. Hak-won Sunwoo, Prof. Wi-jo Kang, Dr. Hwa-sun Lee, Rev.
Young-bihn Lee, Prof. Eun-sik Yang, Prof. Suk-jung Song, Prof. Kwnag-suk Kang, Rev. Dr. Sung-
rak Kim, Prof. Dong-soo Kim, Prof. Ki-hwang Kim, Prof. Suk-ja Choi, et al. were the Korean
theologians from overseas who participated.
2 , 5 It is necessary to remember that theological education in North Korea is at the level of pastoral
training, rather than educating independent researchers. See, Chapter VI, Section 3.
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The first consultation was held in November 1981, in Vienna. At the consultation, three
papers were presented from the Christian side. Ki-jun Koh opened the consultation by
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introducing his proposal, once again emphasizing the necessity of dialogue. Wi-jo Kang,
from the USA, read a paper on "The Responsibility of the Korean Christians in the History of
• • 978
National Division". Kang claimed that the Korean Christians must escape from the legacy
of the Cold-War mentality, which had justified the Korean division. He insisted that the
responsibility of Christians in a conflict situation is not that of justifying collision or enmity,
but rather that of fostering reconciliation. "Christianity is neither pro-Communism nor anti-
97Q
Communism, but the spirit of love and reconciliation." Lastly, Young-bihn Lee suggested
four future tasks for Christianity in North Korea: developing a theology of reconciliation,
solidarity with the poor, liberation from American Christianity, and gaining a progressive
understanding ofNorth Korean socialism.280 There was no presentation from the Juchean side
at the first consultation. The Juchean delegates just listened to what the Christians said.
The second consultation was held in Helsinki in 1982. Two papers were presented, one from
each side. Don-kun Hong from the Christian viewpoint, and Hyung-sup Yang, the Director of
the Academy of Social Science in Pyongyang, from that of the Juchean idea. By reducing the
presentations, more time was given to the social programs. The Christians invited the
276
"At first, the first consultation was planned to be held in Geneva. However, the Swiss church
cancelled our reservation for the conference center on our arrival day due to the pressure of the
South Korean government. We were not allowed to use any Christian facilities in Switzerland
including even the Ecumenical Center. The Austrian church, which heard this news, allowed us to
use the Schweitzer House in Vienna for the consultation. The church there also faced the same
pressure, but ignored it. Therefore, we flew to Vienna, and finally we were able to have the first
meeting there. However, the KCIA threatened the participants. About fifty South Koreans in Vienna
demonstrated in front of the Schweitzer House shouting, "Get away! Agents of Kim II Sung",
"Don't blaspheme against Christianity". We were able to finish the consultation with the protection
of the Austrian police because some demonstrators attempted to enter the house. Because it was
difficult to arrange proper conference centers, the consultations were mostly held in Vienna and
Helsinki." Interview with Rev. Dr. Dong-kun Hong, 13th April 2001, Los Angeles.
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Wi-jo Kang is Wilhelm Loehe Professor of World Religions and Mission, Wartburg Theological
Seminary, USA. He is the author ofReligion and Politics in Korea Under the Japanese Rule,
Christian Presence in Japan, and Christ and Caesar in Modern Korea: A History ofChristianity
and Politics, and co-editor ofFuture ofthe Christian WorldMission.
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See, Wi-jo Kang, "The Responsibility of Korean Christians in the History ofNational Division", in




See, Young-bihn Lee, "The Tasks of the Christians for the Reunification", in Dong-kun Hong, Op.
Cit., 144-156.
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Jucheans for worship, and organized an excursion and a cultural night. By doing this, the
981
atmosphere of the consultation was much more sociable than the first consultation.
Hong, in his paper entitled, "Tasks of the Christians in Promoting the Reconciliation and
989
Reunification of Nation", argued that Korean Christianity had been captive in a pro-
American and anti-Communist ideology since the partition of Korean peninsula. In his view,
this anti-Communist Christian ideology had been produced without a proper understanding on
Communism. Therefore, it was important for the Christians to realize what the Communists
had actually said:
Dialogue is not a monologue. Dialogue means stating clearly the way we understand
ourselves and our world-view to the partner. The Korean Communists have claimed
that Christianity is merely the opium of the people, and the Korean Christians have
believed Communism to be an atheistic evil. Both claims have the same problem of
dogmatism, so that each has misunderstood the other. It is important to understand
exactly what the partner is saying, and what we are saying. In other words, it is not
sufficient to recognize each other as belonging to the same minjok (nation); rather the
Communists should learn the ethos of the Bible and Christian theology, and the
Christians should also study the Juche idea. This should be done before we discuss
our possibilities for cooperation. Through this mutual learning, we will be able to find
981
ways in which we can cooperate.
In this respect, Hong claimed that concern for the poor and social justice, and a vision for
social transformation are common ground between the two world-views, Christianity and the
984 • •
Juche idea. However, he failed to argue from the specific philosophical characteristics of
the Juche idea, which is different to Marxism. He simply used the findings of the Christian-
Marxist dialogue in Eastern Europe.285
98f.
In the second presentation, Yang gave an introduction on the Juche idea. His distinctive
understanding was that national self-determination and independence are more important than
classical liberation. Therefore, he claimed that the Jucheans emphasize the unity of the
Korean people in view of complete national independence and reunification, rather than class
281 Interview with Rev. Dr. Dong-kun Hong, 13th April 2001, Los Angeles.
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See, Dong-kun Hong, "Tasks of the Christians in Promoting the Reconciliation and Reunification











antagonism. From this standpoint he affirmed: "Of course, it is possible to work together
with the Christians for national independence and reunification, which the Jucheas consider
9RR
as the top priority of the Korean revolution." However, he pointed out that in order to work
together in this way, the Christians must not depend on foreign powers, and not justify the
• • 9RQ
system of division. Here, Yang called for Christian patriotism, which demanded Christian
commitment on the issue of reunification. Following his suggestion, the issue of reunification
emerged as a common task of cooperation between the Christians and the Jucheans.290
Consequently, the consultations from 1983-1986 focused on the study of reunification in
order to find a common understanding on the issue. In brief, through consultations in this
period, both reached agreement on the principles and methodology of reunification, and
• • • • 901
issued joint statements on the subject. According to Rev. Choon-ku Lee, one of most
important results in this period was that the Jucheans realized that the Christians were able to
make a significant contribution to reunification, for instance through exchange with South
• • 909
Korean Christians, and through developing a reunification theology.
The fact that the third consultation from 5th-l9th July 1983, was held in Pyongyang was
significant because remarkably, during it, the dialogue team had opportunities to visit the
house churches there. One of aims of this visit was to study how grassroots Christians
understood their dual belief system, incorporating both Christianity and the Juche idea.
According to Dong-kun Hong, the team found these grassroots Christians in Pyongyang
recognized the positive contribution the Juche idea had made in the development of politics,
economy and community culture in North Korea. They hardly experienced any conflict
between the two belief systems in their ordinary life.293 This is a distinctive tendency of the
post-war generation of grassroots Christians, compared to the Christian clash with the
Communists in the pre-war generation. At the same time, the problem of a dualistic approach
among the Christians was also noted, because they had a strong other-worldly faith.294 It









For details, see, Ibid., 43-59.
292 Interview with Rev. Choon-ku Lee, 3rd April 2001, Pyongyang.
293 Interview with Rev. Dr. Dong-kun Hong, 13th April 2001, Los Angeles.
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a "two kingdoms" theology, which separated the church and politics into two completely
distinct spheres.
From 1988-1991 the dialogue continued to focus on "seeking the common ground"295
between Christianity and the Juche idea, in order to establish theoretical references for
Christian cooperation with the Jucheans in this world. At first, it seems that the Juchean
scholars had difficulty finding this "common ground" with the Christians. Byung-soo Ahn
even confirmed their old understanding of Christianity as an anti-nationalistic and anti-
• • 9Q(\
proletariat religion.
However, the Christians strongly argued against this old view by introducing ideas from
minjung theology being developed in South Korea and from Latin American liberation
theology. Dong-soo Kim argued that Korean Christianity has not been always "the opium of
the people". For example, minjung theology in South Korean Christianity is a theology for the
poor and the oppressed, who are similar to the proletariat in Communism. He went on further
to suggest that the minjung churches and theologians have been at the frontline of the struggle
for democracy and reunification in South Korea.297 For Kim, minjung theology was evidence
of Korean Christianity serving for the socially marginalized people, in the same as the North
Korean Communists had done for the proletariat.
Ki-jun Koh also criticized Ahn by describing and analyzing the efforts of North Korean
Christians to promote reunification since the Tozanso conference. He insisted, "Now the
Christians are among the most patriotic citizens in North Korea on the issue of
9QR
reunification." The introduction of minjung theology and liberation theology was a great
challenge for the Jucheans. Therefore, Sung-duk Park, the Director of the Institute for the
Juche Idea, promised that the Juche scholars would study modern theologies, and suggested a
deepening of the dialogue.299
295
Quoted from, P. Wickeri, Seeking the Common Ground: Protestant Christianity, the Three-Self
Movement, and China's UnitedFront, New York, Orbis, 1988
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See, Byung-soo Ahn, "Juchesasang kwa UriMinjok eui Unmyung Gaechuk eui KiF (The Juche
Idea and the Way of Improving Our Nation's Future), manuscript, The Eighth Dialogue on the
Juche Idea and the Reunification of the Fatherland among the Christians in the North and Overseas
and the North Korean Scholars, 15th- 18th July 1988, Helsinki.
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See, Dong-soo Kim, "Juchesasang e daehan Ihae", (Understanding on the Juche Idea), manuscript.
Ibid.
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See, Ki-jun Koh, "Glion Hoieui Bogo", (The Report on the Glion Meeting), manuscript Ibid.
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The ninth consultation, in 1990, must be remembered as a historic moment in the
development of the Chnstmn-Juchean dialogue. Hyun-hwan Kim argued that the liberation
theology had successfully used and developed the Marxist methodology of social analysis as a
theological methodology.300 He claimed that liberation theology was no longer a peripheral
theology, but had come into the mainstream of third world theologies. Furthermore, he
challenged the Jucheans to change their understanding of religion, as follows:
In spite of the development of modern theology, which has been the theological
reference for the Christian struggle for justice, democracy and reunification in Korea,
the claim that Christianity is the opium of the people is still being followed and is
captive to the old dogmatism of the Communist understanding of religion...The
Jucheans must properly evaluate the Christian contribution to social transformation in
Third World countries, and consider how to strengthen solidarity with the Christians in
Korea.301
Kim criticized the official statement of the KWP in the Chulhak Sajeon (The Dictionary of
Philosophy), and Jungchi Yongeo Sajun (The Dictionary of Political Terms), which was still
claiming that "Christianity is a method of feudal exploitation justifying the class system."
Kim insisted that such statements must now be rewritten.302
In response to this criticism, Sung-duk Park introduced a new way for Jucheans to understand
••• TOT
Christianity in his paper, "A New Perspective on the Juche Idea of Christianity". He began
his presentation by saying that "there have been misunderstandings among the North Korea
Communists, who said that Christianity and the Juche idea are not able to co-exist in North
Korea".304 As the Director of the Institute for the Juche Idea, he insisted that the Juchean
perspective on Christianity is different to the Marxist understanding. As evidence, Park
quoted Kim Jong-iTs understanding of religion:
The Great Leader rejected the maneuvers of anti-revolutionaries and imperialists in
the name of religion, but he never rejected religions and believers. There are not
always bad things in religion, but good teachings as well. It is remarkable that religion






See, Sung-duk Park, "Kidokyoe daehanun Juchesasang eui Saeroun Kwanjum", (A New
Perspective on the Juche Idea ofChristianity", in Dong-kun Hong, Op. Cit., 202-209.
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Ibid., 202.
30" Kim Jong-il, Juchesasang eui Kibone Daehayeo, (On the Basis of the Juche Idea), Pyongyang,
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Park claimed that this approach of Kim's, which viewed the role of religion in a positive light,
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must be a reference point in developing the Juchean perspective on Christianity. Park
attempted to distinguish the Juchean understanding of Christianity from the Marxist view of
religion. Firstly, he criticized the Marxist understanding of Christianity, which criticized
Christianity as a "fantastic and non- scientific world-view":
The Juche idea has a scientific view of knowledge, based on analyzing the objective
world. However, it emphasizes even more the demands and needs of people. In this
respect, religion also reflects the ontological needs of the people, and has social
consciousness as well. Religion does not aim to examine the nature and law of the
objective world in scientific language and method. For example, Christianity
originated in the context of slavery and the poor in Palestine, among those who
struggled for equality and independence against the colonialism of the Roman Empire
in the 1st century. Christianity proclaimed a method to realize the hope and dream of
the people, and provided a value system and ethic to the people in a religious way. In
the Old Testament, the origin of Christianity was not the creation story, but the
experience of Exodus of the Hebrew people, who were in slavery in Egypt... Here, we
can find that the nature of Christianity is not scientifically stating a world-view, but
providing a truth of life for the people in a language of religious experience, promoting
freedom and equality against oppression and enslavement. Therefore, it is not of
interest to the Juche idea to argue whether Christianity is scientific or not, but we
need to notice that the origin of Christianity is rooted in people's desire for liberation.
Here, the Jucheans find that the Christian emphasis on human salvation and
307
liberation has much in common with the Juche idea.
Park suggested that the Marxist-Leninist criticism of Christianity was mistaken because it had
criticized the symbolic system of religion on the basis of the criteria employed by science.
Park argued that the Marxists and Leninists did not sufficiently distinguish between
differences in the language systems used to describe human religious experience, on the other
hand, and scientific facts on the other. Therefore, it was irrelevant for them to criticize
Christianity based on the basis of scientific value. Rather, he asked the Jucheans to pay
attention to the liberation tradition ofChristianity in their cooperation with the Christians.
Secondly, Park questioned what kind of Christianity Marxists had criticized. He pointed out
that the Marxist understood Christianity from the perspective of a single paradigm. However,
he claimed that there have been several paradigms of Christianity in church history.308 He







suggested the Jucheans approach each historical paradigm of Christianity separately in order
to evaluate it properly:
Exactly, what the Marxists and Leninists criticized was a form of Christianity that
supported the bourgeois, ignored social responsibility, and justified Capitalism. As we
well know, Marx condemned Christianity as the opium of the minjung, and Lenin
defined Christianity as a cheap brandy alcohol, which deceived the minjung by
speaking of the happiness in the other-world. However, the Christianity, which Marx
and Lenin criticized was only one of historical paradigms of Christianity. Therefore, In
the Juche idea, it is necessary to separately evaluate each paradigm of Christianity,
according to the historical development of Christianity; primitive Christianity, the
Christianity of Christendom which supported the upper class and the development of
capitalism, and modern Christianity.30
He maintained that primitive Christianity was a religion for the minjung. This Christianity
opposed exploitation, oppression to the poor and the slavery. The minjung expressed their
• Tin
vision of a classless society, and the coming of the ideal world, as their messianic faith.
"This primitive Christianity was the original teaching of Christianity, and carried on an
••••Til
authentic Christian mission." Therefore, he claimed, the Christians who believe this
• T19
paradigm must not be excluded by the Communists and Jucheans.
However, he understood that the Christianity of Christendom, after the time of Constantine,
came to serve the exploiting powers. Often, this Christianity was a religion for the rich,
encouraging the minjung to obey the existing order in medieval times, and serving later for
the development of capitalism. Park suggested that Marx and Lenin mistook this paradigm of
Christianity for the whole tradition of Christianity. He argued that it is difficult to cooperate
with Christians who believe this paradigm of Christianity. However, he also rejected the
•••313
generalization that applied this paradigm to the whole of Christianity.
Lastly, Park drew attention to modern Christianity after the Second World War. He found that
it had three characteristics: the development of the ecumenical movement, liberation theology
and indigenous theology. "The ecumenical movement has not only strengthened Christianity
as a world religion, but also rooted Christianity in local soil and committed it to the struggle









ecumenical movement, liberation theology too has contributed to the change from the
"Christianity of Christendom" to the "Christianity of Third World people". "Liberation
theology turned the Christian interests from the other-world to this-world, from personal
salvation to social gospel, and from escaping to participating in reality".314 He also insisted
that the development of indigenous theology has contributed to Christian cultural liberation
from western Christianity, which had hitherto been considered the only form of Christianity.
In addition Park asked the Juche scholars to pay special attention to the Christian struggle for
TIC
the minjung and the development ofminjung theology in South Korea.
With the above analysis of the historical paradigms of Christianity, Park concluded that the
Jucheans must not mechanically accept the Marxist criticism of Christianity, which was only
relevant for the "Christianity of Christendom". He suggested that the Jucheans need to
recognize the positive aspects of Christianity, and of the Christian mission for the minjung
i| r
and the minjok. He closed his presentation by suggesting another dialogue between the
Jucheans in the North and the minjung theologians in the South, for the purpose of developing
o i n
further a reunification theology.
This new perspective suggested by the Director of the Institute for the Juche Idea, represented
a radical change in Juchean understanding of Christianity. However, this change was not
brought about only by the contribution of a Juche scholar; rather, it must be seen as the result
of the process of dialogue, and as a response to the Christian challenges that the Christians
had raised in their joint consultation with the Jucheans. Park's intervention was also a most
important help towards increasing the religious freedom of the North Korean Christians,
because one of the best-known Juche scholars had now openly introduced a new, positive
understanding of Christianity. After Park's presentation, Ki-jun Koh invited him to become a
special lecturer of the Pyongyang Theological Seminary, treating the subject of the Juchean
understanding of Christianity.318 Park willingly accepted, and lectured there until he fell







318 Interview with Rev. Dr. Dong-kun Hong, 13th April 2001, Los Angeles.
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2.2.3 The Results
As a result of the ten years consultation process, the Institute for the Juche Idea reported to
• • • ^ 1Q
the KWP its new understanding of Christianity. Due to this report, in 1992 the statement on
Christianity in the Hyundae Chosun Mai Sajun, or Dictionary of Modem Korean was
rewritten, with the permission of the Department of Culture of the KWP. It is worthwhile to
compare the 1992 statement with the previous one of 1981.
In the 1981 edition, the dictionary explained Christianity in the following negative terms:
This religion appeared in the Middle East in the 1st century, believing in Jesus. It
preaches people to obey to the ruling class, blinding them about the social problems
of inequality and exploitation, through dazzling them with the Heaven.320
Here, Christianity was described as a negative, anti-revolutionary religion. However, in the
1992 edition, entitled Chosun Mai Daesajun or Great Korean Dictionary, the above statement
was rewritten as follows:
This religion worships Jesus Christ and believes his teachings. It is a world religion,
which originated in the Middle East in the 1st century, under the colonization of the
Roman Empire. It preaches if people believe that Jesus, who is the Son of God, died
on the Cross and rose again to save human beings, they will enter the Heavenly
Kingdom. The main doctrine of Christianity is charity and equality. It divided as the
Roman Catholic church and the Eastern Orthodox church in the 11th century, due to
the division of the Roman Empire. In Europe, with the emergence of the bourgeoisie,
Protestantism separated from Roman Catholicism as a result of reformation in the
16th century. In Protestantism, there are many denominations such as Presbyterian,
Methodist etc. 321
This later statement on Christianity was certainly rewritten from a neutral position, and even
described Christianity positively as a religion of charity and equality. New definitions of
Christian terms such as church, resurrection, messiah, pastor, elder, evangelist etc also





Hyundae Chosun Mai Sajun, (Dictionary ofModern Korean), Pyongyang, Bakwasajeon Chulpansa,
1981,328.
321 Chosun Mai Daesajun, (Great Dictionary of Korean), vol.1, Pyongyang, Sahoekwahak Chlpansa,
1992,413.
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Compare, Hyundae Chosun Mai Sajun, "church", 229; "resurrection", 1235; "messiah", 245;
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However, the most dramatic change in the official Juchean understanding of Christianity was
not in the dictionary definitions, but in the amendment of the article on religion in the
constitution. Article 54 of The Socialist Constitution in 1972 had said: "Citizens have freedom
of religious belief and freedom of anti-religious propaganda". However, the reference to the
"freedom of anti-religious propaganda" was completely deleted in the Kim II Sung
Constitution in 1992. Compared the still existing Article 46 of the Chinese Constitution,
which talks about "the citizen's right to enjoy freedom not to believe in religion,"323 the
complete deletion of the "freedom of anti-religious propaganda" in North Korea was a
remarkable change of religious policy. It is certain that the Christian-Juchean dialogue had
influenced the above changes.
In addition to the above visible results, both the Christians and the Jucheans increased mutual
their understanding of each other through the dialogue. The Christians recognized that the
Juche idea is not merely a sort ofmaterialism, but respects spiritual life as well. The Jucheans
have learned that Christianity is not now the opium of the people. Rather, they recognized that
modern Christianity and Christian mission are committed to the oppressed, the poor, and the
marginalized.
Both found that Korean Christianity and the Juche idea share a strong concern for the minjung
and the minjok. They also recognized that both were important ideologies leading the struggle
of the Korean people for national independence in modern history. This tradition became a
historical reference point for developing cooperation between the Christians and the Jucheans.
Thirdly, Juchean intellectuals have emerged who have understanding and sympathy for the
North Korean Christians, especially among the scholars in the Institute for the Juche Idea.
Dong-kun Hong remembered that after the last consultation in Frankfurt, Prof. Sung-duk Park
and Dr. Kum-chul Chun asked him to pray for them. After the prayer, Chun said, "My heart
"pastor", 958; "elder", 1702; "evangelist", 1736, and Chosun Mai Daesajun, vol. 1, "church", 296;
"resurrection", 1482; "messiah", 316; "pastor", 1128; vol. 2, "elder", 88; "evangelist", 134.
323
Concerning criticisms on this article, see, T. Lambert, The Resurrection ofthe Chinese Church,
Illinois, SHAW, 1991, 37; with W. Rees-Mogg, "Religious Policy of China", Interview with Jian
Zemin, The Times, 18lh October 1999. See also, A. Lam, "Recent Changes in China's Religious
Policy", Tripod, vol. 22, 55-61.
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became suddenly hot during your prayer".324 Park confessed that he was becoming a Christian,
and there was a joke calling him "Deacon Park". Indeed, the dialogue changed the old
understanding, and contributed to the formation of a new positive understanding of
Christianity among the Juchean intellectuals in North Korea.
Despite these positive results, there were some limitations as well. Firstly, although the KCF
reported on the dialogue to its constituencies, as the Institute did to the KWP, the influence
and spread of the dialogue was limited because most consultations had been held in overseas
countries. Secondly, the results of dialogue were not developed into a North Korean theology,
as Koh expected in 1981. It has been difficult to develop a North Korean theology because of
the lack of intellectual resources within the KCF. Nevertheless, it can be said that the North
Korean Christians did start to seek a theological identity in the Juchean society, through the
dialogue, even if they did not make as much progress as they might have.
To overcome the above limitations, both the Christians and the Jucheans expected to develop
further dialogue within North Korean territory. However, two unfortunate events prohibited
further development. Firstly, because of the terrible famine across North Korea from 1993,
the whole society fell into an emergency situation. According to Insik Kim, even the staff
members of the KCF had difficulty to get enough food during the famine period. In this
circumstance, reopening the dialogue within North Korea has been delayed.
Secondly, when Prof. Jang-yup Hwang327 left for political asylum in South Korea in February
1997, it was a big blow for the Institute for the Juche Idea. Hwang, the founder of the Institute,
had been known as "the constructor of the Juche idea." Even as far back as 1977, he had
shown interest in developing a dialogue with the Christians.328 When Hwang became the
Foreign Secretary of North Korea in 1984, Sung-duk Park, Hwang's brother in law,
324
Dong-kun Hong, Op. Cit., 104.
325 Interview with Rev. Dr. Dong-kun Hong, 13th April 2001, Los Angeles.
326 Kim said, even Mrs. Chung, the wife ofChairperson of the KCF was not able to have lunch during
the famine period. Interview with Rev. Dr. Insik Kim, 13th December 2000, Fukuoka, Japan.
327
Hwang was born in Kangdong, South Pyungan Province. He became a member of the KWP in
1946. He studied law in Japan, and received a PhD from Moscow University. He was Professor of
Philosophy in Kim II Sung University from 1954-1972. He was also the President of the University
from 1965-1972. In 1972, he was elected Chairperson of the SPA. He founded the Institute for the
Juche Idea in 1979. He was the Foreign Secretary ofNorth Korea from 1984 until he left for
political asylum to South Korea in February 1997. Concerning him and his thought, see his
autobiography, Nanun Yuksa eui Jinri rul Boatta, (I Saw the Truth of History), Seoul, Hanul, 1999.
328 "From D. Borrie to P. Potter", 8lh October 1977.
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succeeded him in his post as Director of the Institute. Moreover, most staff members of the
Institute had been Hwang's students when he was Professor of Philosophy at Kim II Sung
University. However, because of Hwang's flight to the South and attack on Kim Jong-il, Park,
and those staff members at the Institute who had been under Hwang's intellectual influence,
were politically purged in early 1997. This purge did great damage, preventing the Christians
from developing the dialogue because not only was Park a good supporter for the Christians,
but he also had a deep knowledge of Christianity as a philosopher. Furthermore, some of the
purged staff members were the active participants in the dialogue from the Juchean side.
Fortunately, however, there was no threat to the KCF because the purge aimed simply at
removing Hwang's relatives.
2.3 Juche and Minjung: "The Subject of History"
Minjung theology played an important part in changing the Juchean understanding of
Christianity. It was this theology that gave concrete evidence for Christians' claim that
Christianity is a religion for the suffering people and nation in Korea. In response, Sung-duk
Park suggested a dialogue between the minjung theologians in the South and the Juche
scholars in the North in 1990. However, because of Park's political purge, his suggestion has
not been realized yet. In this section, we will make a comparative examination of one of the
most important notions held in common by minjung theology and the Juche idea, namely "the
subject of history". This notion could be a key area of "common ground" in the future
encounter between the two systems of thought.
Although one of these systems is a theology, which developed within the climate of the
suffering minjung during the military dictatorships in South Korea in the 1970s, while the
other is a political ideology, which developed within the circumstance of the reconstruction of
North Korea after the Korean War and emphasized political independence against China and
the Soviet Union during the 1950s, both begin their theological and philosophical argument
with the issue ofhistorical subjectivity. The first principle of the Juche idea is that "man is the
subject of history".329 On the other hand, the first theological theme of minjung theology is
"the minjug as subject of history".
329 Kim Il-sung Works, Pyongyang, Foreign languages Publishing House, vol. 27, 491.
330
Yong-bock Kim, Messiah andMinjung: Christ's Solidarity with the Peoplefor New Life, 5.
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This is not a coincidental conjunction but, in both instances, the result of indigenization of
foreign ideas. The Juche idea should be seen as indigenous Korean Communism, and minjung
theology as indigenous Korean liberation theology. Both are strongly rooted in traditional
Korean philosophies. One of the characteristics of traditional religion and philosophy in
Korea is humanism. In the establishment of the Old Chosun Kingdom, the founder, Tankun,
made the idea of Hongik Ingan (-fit A US), or Broad Benefits for Humanity, as the
ideological basis of his rule. During the dominance of Buddhism in the Silla and Koryu
periods, the idea of Hokuk Bulkyo (ill III or Buddhism for the Protection and Benefit of
the Nation, was one of the strongest elements in Korean Buddhism. Then during the Chosun
dynasty, Confucian humanism dominated Korean thought. At the end of the 19th century,
when the indigenous religion Tonghak (jit-P) emerged, its basic philosophical idea was In
Nae Chun (AJbfi), or Heaven is in Humanity. Shamanism, a very influential spiritual force
among the Korean people, always emphasized the worldly practical and utilitarian benefit it
could provide to the people in their everyday lives.
The two influential modern Korean beliefs, the Juche idea and minjung theology, do not stand
apart from this strong, humanistic tradition of the Korean ethos. Both have links with the
traditional humanism of Korean thought through declaring that "man," or the "minjung" are
the subject of history. This is a highly important reference point for the dialogue between the
Juche idea and minjung theology, because both have a similarity in their methodology of
indigenization as well in their as human-centered approach to history.
We must now examine the question of who is considered to be the subject of history in each
of the two systems, beginning with the Christian one. The idea that "the minjung is (or are)
331the subject of history" has been one of the most unique aspects of minjung theology. The
question then arises concerning who the minjung are, and why the theologians claim that the
minjung is the subject of history. The word "minjung" is a Korean pronunciation of two
Chinese characters: and "jung"(zfc). "Min" literally means "the people"; 'jung"
means "the mass." Combining these two words, we get the idea of "the mass of people". Yet
"minjung" is a more inclusive word than the mass. At the same time, it must be acknowledged
that there is no single agreed meaning of minjung even among the minjung theologians
331
See, CTC-CCA ed., Minjung Theology: People as the Subject ofHistory, New York, Orbis, 1983.
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themselves, because minjung movements broke out spontaneously in diverse fields. Most
minjung theologians have insisted that minjung defies any easy definition. They have argued
against any conception of minjung as a class movement, since the life of the minjung cannot
be traced exclusively to any one economic, political or cultural group. Nevertheless, it is also
true that when one looks at its historical origins, a rough, "rule of thumb" definition of the
term emerges as follows: "the minjung are those who are oppressed politically, exploited
economically, alienated socially, and kept uneducated in cultural and intellectual matters".333
When Kim Il-sung firstly proclaimed the Juche idea to the public in 1955, he began by noting
that "saram" is the subject of history.334 "Saram" is a Korean pronunciation of two characters:
"saw''and "am". "Sam" literally means "life"; "am" means "awareness." Combining these two
words, saram means, "the being that knows the value of life". However, in practice, saram
really means "the natural man" in Korean. Therefore, the first principle of the Juche idea can
be translated as the affirmation that "man is the subject of history". Kim's original human-
centered understanding in defining historical subjectivity this has similarities with to the
traditional Korean thought.
Kim Jong-il later developed the principle that "inmin daejung is the subject of history."
"InminiAS:)" is a compound of "m" (A) and "win" (K). It means literally "the people of the
human." However. Korean Communists used this term "i'/im/'h" as an equivalent of the term
"proletariat." "Daejung (AA)" is a compound (A) and "jung'' (A), which means "the
general public". The concept of "daejung" reminds us of a group of people who can be easily
manipulated by a ruling class. Kim Jong-il translated "inmin daejung" as "the masses of the
people." Here, we can summarize by saying that the literal meanings ofminjung and inmin
daejung are similar. Both basically refer to "the mass of people", who were always considered
important, even in traditional Korean thought.
332 The first official consultation on minjung theology was held by the Commission on Theological
Concerns of the Christian Conference of Asia at the Christian Academy House, Seoul in 1979. In
this consultation, the issue of defining minjung was the subject of hot debate. See, Yong-bock Kim
ed., Minjung Theology, Singapore, CTC-CCA, 1980.
333 C. Moon, A Korean Minjung Theology: An Old Testament Perspective, New York, Orbis, 1985, 1.
334 Kim Il-sung, Selective Writings, vol. 4, Pyongyang, Foreign Language Publishing House, 1960,
325-354.
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At the same time, the minjung as the subject of history in minjung theology, does not refer
only to "the mass of people." The concept ofminjung carries connotations with the history of
minjung uprisings against the rulers. Minjung stands as a symbol of suffering people who
resist oppression and exploitation in Korean history. The sufferings and aspirations of the
minjung are "woven into their story, blending the sad elegy and the song of hope".337 This
story is a "social biography (history)" of the minjung, which is an "intermingling of events,
hopes and memories; intertwining of the promise of the future and the disappointment of the
present; celebration and suffering; joy and sorrow; forgiveness and guilt; renewal and
338defeat". In this social history, the minjung are the subject, and their story is viewed as the
center of history.
Such a view of history stands in contrast to that in which the leader, ruler, hero or ruling
• ... -2-2Q
system is regarded as the historical subject. However, in historical reality, the minjung do
not become the real subject of history, but are defined and determined by the ruling system.
Thus the status of the minjung is that of the "ruled", and their historical experience is one of
suffering. Therefore, it is important that the minjung be the people who are conscious of their
unjust situation, and who are ready to be involved in a minjung movement in order to change
the status quo. According to Kim Yong-bock, through their commitment to the minjung
movement for the transformation of history, the minjung experience a sudden intervention of
the Messianic Kingdom which exists in the future, yet already enters into the present
historical reality, so that the minjung themselves now become the subject of history.340 In
other words, the importance of human leadership in the minjung movement is restricted in
minjung theology. Rather, divine guidance through the intervention of "Messianic politics"
change the minjung, who dare to get involved in the transformation of history, as a new
subject of history.
On the other hand, the conception of inmin daejung as the subject of history is not simply "the
masses of people" as well. Rather, it is an expanded conception of the proletariat. As we
already noted, in the Juche idea, the master of socialist construction is man, the master of
one's fate is oneself. The power to control one's fate rests with no-one other than oneself.
337
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Therefore, man should not be subjected to the enslavement of economic poverty, political
subjugation, or military domination by others. Hence, Chajusung or the "self-independence"
of man should never be manipulated by external powers and conditions. When a man, or the
mass of people is enslaved, Uisiksung or the spiritual consciousness calls the inmin daejung
(the masses of the people) to struggle for the recovery of their mastership over their own life
and society.341 The Juche idea thus defines the socio-historical movement as an independent
and creative movement of the inmin daejung. Through this process of ontological and social
awakening, and their initiating the socio-historical movement, the inmin daejung are changed
into the subject of history. In the Juche idea, the inmin daejung is thus a community of people
who have the Uisiksung required for the transformation of social history. To be the subject of
history, the inmin daejung must be eager to defend their Chajusung.342 Nevertheless, the
inmin daejung are able to fulfill their role as the subject of history "only under correct
leadership".34"' Here, the role of the personal leadership of Suryung, or the Great Leader, the
commander of revolutionary struggle, was emphasized.
From the above comparison, it is clear that both minjung theology and the Juche idea begin
with the question of historical subjectivity. The minjung and inmin daejung are defined as the
subject of history. Literally, both the minjung and inmin daejung mean the same, "the mass of
people". As a theological term and as a philosophical term, each carry a similar meaning,
referring to the people of community who have been politically oppressed, economically
exploited, and socially alienated, who have the consciousness needed to engage in socio-
historical transformation, and who have committed themselves to the minjung movement or to
the socio-historical movement. Both beliefs link up with the traditional Korean concern for
the people who suffer. Both also have also a methodological similarity, stressing
indigenization when developing either Korean theology or Korean Communism. This
"common ground" is a remarkable basis for the Christian-Juchean dialogue and for working
together for the suffering minjung or for the inmin daejung.
However, in spite of the similarities, there is also discontinuity between the two concepts. It is
impossible to identify the the minjung and the inmin daejung with each other in any absolute
way because while the notion of minjung has been formed in the long history and culture of
341





the minjung movement, inmin daejung has a socio-classical meaning in relation to the
proletariat. When the minjung are referred to as the subject of history in Christianity, they are
a relative, not an absolute entity. The history of suffering of the minjung is transformed into
the history of hope through "the sudden intervention of Messianic Kingdom". By this
intervention, the "social biography of the minjung" is renewed, and the minjung are changed
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into a new being.
By contrast, from this minjung Christian perspective, there are dangers in the notion of inmin
daejung. In particular, the internal movement within history and the rule of the inmin daejung
may be regarded as absolute. We already criticized the Juche idea for introducing a view of
human moral ability that was too strongly optimistic. In the Juche idea, the inmin daejung are
able to realize their own self-salvation through the socio-historical movement. While the
conception ofminjung is open to, and inclusive of others, through recognizing the ontological
limitation of the minjung and the need for divine guidance of the minjung movement, the
conception of inmin daejung, which refers to an expanded proletariat, can nevertheless easily
be exclusive of the other social classes. This is a fundamental difference between the two
belief systems.
The conception and role of leadership is also different in each of the two systems. Minjung
theology has developed through the struggle against Korean military dictatorship. Therefore,
minjung theology emphasizes the decentralization of power. It sees secular power, whoever is
in command, as relative power, and believes that the sovereignty of God is the only absolute
power. Even in the traditional minjung uprisings, such as Tonghak, connecting with the divine
power had been a highly important matter in order to gather the support of the minjung.
Therefore, minjung theologians emphasize divine guidance in the minjung movement.
However, in the Juche idea, the leadership of Suryung has the same importance as the inmin
daejung. It is emphasized that "only" through the guidance of the Suryung, who is the brain of
the inmin daejung, can the revolutionary movement succeed. There is surely a danger here of
the inmin daejung being regarded as a simple passive follower of the Suryung in the
movement. Moreover, if there is no real democracy or fairness in selecting the Suryung, it
would be easy for the leader to dominate, rule with absolute power and even force the people
344
Yong-bock Kim, Op. Cit.
3ll
to worship him. This problem of leadership will be the most sensitive subject matter in any
dialogue between Christianity and the Juche idea. So far, it seems that the North Korean
Christians have intentionally avoided arguing this matter out in their dialogue with the
Jucheans. However, if the minjung theologian-/wc/ieuw dialogue is open, the minjung
theologians must strongly challenge the notion of the Suryung. The issue of the Suryung will
be a dilemma for the North Korean Christians in the future. As political changes take place in
North Korea in the future, the public opinion of the northern minjung will need to be read
carefully and examined theologically.
In conclusion, through our comparative study of the notion of historical subjectivity in both
minjung theology and the Juche idea, it seems clear that a dialogue between the two systems
would help the North Korean Christians to develop a North Korean theology, in their Juchean
society. The Christian-Juchean dialogue took place on the grounds of a commonly-affirmed
humanism, rooted in Korean culture. This was aided by the fact that both were seeking to
indigenize their respective ideologies: Juche indegenizes scientific socialism, separating it
from its Russian and Chinese models: minjung theology, developing at the same time in
South Korea, was embraced by the KCF as a Third World theology that made the dialogue
possible.
3. External Renewals
In this section, we will examine the way the South Korean and the world churches renewed
their approach to the North Korean issue. Their renewed approaches also contributed to the
revival and renewal of the Protestant Christianity in North Korea.
3.1 The 88 Declaration: Renewal of the South Korean Church
During the Korean War, the South Korean churches portrayed the Communists and the pro-
Communist Christians in North Korea as an "irreconcilable Satan." The war was therefore
justified as a just war by the southern churches. These churches also rejected the armistice
that brought hostilities to an end, and insisted on fighting until "wiping" all the Korean
Communists "out of the world".345
345 Korea Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, "The Statement to the Second Full
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However, a new approach emerged within the South Korean churches during the 1980s. In the
1970s, certain Christians who were often termed "progressive" Christians had developed the
Sun Minju Hu Tongil or Democracy First and Reunification Second Policy
in their struggle against dictatorship. Part of the purpose of this policy was to avoid an
ideological attack from the government, with the military dictators condemning the Christians
as pro-Communist. However, after the Kwangju massacre in May 1980, the Christians
realized that the issues of democracy and reunification could not be separated in the Korean
context. General Chun Doo-hwan and his followers accused the Kwangju people, who had
demonstrated against him, of being pro-Communist, and killed about one thousand civilians
there. After this terrible massacre, the NCCK began to criticize the military dictatorship in
South Korea for perpetuating the division of the Korean peninsula. The NCCK understood
that the South Korean dictatorship manipulated the mass psychology with anti-Communist
political propaganda. This propaganda attempted to convince people of the danger of the
North Korean Red Army, using this as an excuse to prevent demonstrations for democracy
from taking place in the South.346
The NCCK began its work for Korean reunification through holding a consultation on the
subject with the Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (EKD) in 1981. The division between
East and West Germany had some similarities with the situation on the Korean peninsula. At
the consultation, both churches discussed their common issue, the reunification of their
divided nations, and decided to establish Reunification Committees in their structures.347
However, when the NCCK attempted to launch the activity of their committee through
holding a public consultation on Korean reunification in 1983, the South Korean military
government banned it. The government disallowed any civil or public discussion of the
issue.348 Because of this obstacle, the NCCK asked the WCC to negotiate with the North
Korean Christians in order to set up a direct meeting with them. The request was made at the
Meeting of the CCIA", Chicago University, 1954.
346
NCCK, "Declaration of the Korean Churches on Peaceful Reunification: The Statement of the
Thirty Fourth General Assembly", 28th February 1985.
347 NCCK and EKD, "Joint Statement of the Fourth Consultation Between the Korean and German
Churches", 10th June 1981.
348 At first, the government allowed the consultation to be held with the condition of not holding it in
public, not to inviting foreign participants, and not issuing any statement. However, the KC1A
confined the members of the Committee in their houses, barricaded the meeting venue, and sent a
fabricated letter, which informed the participants that the consultation was canceled. See, NCCK,
"Statement on Disturbing the Consultation on Reunification", 16th June 1983.
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Tozanso Conference in 1984. The purpose was to defy the reunification policy of the military
government, which disallowed any civil contacts with North Koreans/49 At the request of the
NCCK, the WCC thus invited delegations from the northern and southern churches to Glion,
Switzerland in 1985, 1988 and 1990, to promote reconciliation between North and South
Korean Christians.
Through this process, the NCCK reached a new understanding not only of the issue of
reunification, but also of Christianity in North Korea. Finally, in 1988, the NCCK held the
International Christian Consultation on Justice and Peace in Korea, 25th-29th April, at Inchon,
in order to establish a new policy on reunification. In this consultation, the NCCK issued an
historic statement called the "Declaration of the Churches of Korea on National Reunification
and Peace", which is known in Korea as the "88 Declaration".
A new theological understanding of the division of Korean peninsula emerged in this
Declaration, which said:
Jesus Christ came to this land as the "Servant of Peace" (Ephesians 2:13-19), to
proclaim within division, conflict and oppression God's Kingdom of peace,
reconciliation and liberation (Luke 4:18; John 14:27). Jesus Christ suffered, died upon
the Cross, was buried, and rose in the Resurrection to reconcile humanity to God, to
overcome divisions and conflicts, and to liberate all people and make them one (Acts
10:36-40). Jesus Christ blessed the peacemakers and called them the children of
God (Matthew 5:9). We believe that the Holy Spirit will reveal to us the eschatological
future of history, will make us one, and enable us to become partners in God's
mission (John 14:18-21; 16:13-14; 17:11). We believe that all of us who are members
of the churches of Korea have been called to labor as apostles of peace (Colossians
3:15). God has commanded the Korean churches to undertake the mission of
overcoming today's harsh reality of our one people divided north and south in
confrontation, and we are thus obligated to work for the realization of unification and
peace (Matthew 5:23-24).3?2
The South Korean churches, which had justified the Korean War as a just war, now began to
change their theological understanding. Instead of inserting the just war theory into the
349 The Glion Process was a direct meeting and cooperation process between the NCCK and the KCF
mediated by the WCC-CCIA. See Kyung-seo Park, Reconciliation,Reunification, Hong Kong, CCA,
1998, 60-70; "The Glion Statement", NCCK,KCF and WCC, 1988.
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Korean context, they now emphasized instead the doctrine of reconciliation, for the peace of
Korea. The NCCK affirmed that Jesus came into the world for the reconciliation of divided
peoples and nations. It declared that the churches in Korea were called by God to witness to
the mission of peace and reconciliation between the two divided Koreas. Based on this
theological understanding, the NCCK then went on to confess the sin of Korean Christians
who had given in to hatred of each other, in the context of division:
...we confess before God and our people that we have sinned; we have long
harbored a deep hatred and hostility toward the other side within the structure of
division... We have been guilty of the sin of violating God's commandment, "You shall
love your neighbor as yourself" (Matthew 22:37-40). Because of the division of our
homeland, we have hated, deceived and murdered our blood compatriots, and have
compounded this sin through political and ideological justification. Division has led to
war, yet we Christians have committed the sin of endorsing the reinforcement of
troops and further rearmament with the newest and most powerful weapons in the
name of preventing another war (Psalms 33:16-20; 44:6-7)...We confess that during
the course of our national division the churches of Korea have not only remained
silent and repeatedly ignored the ongoing movement for the autonomous reunification
of our people, but have further sinned by trying to justify the division...We confess
that the Christians of the south especially have sinned by making a virtual religious
idol out of anti-Communist ideology and have thus not been content merely to treat
the Communist regime in the north as the enemy, but have gone further and damned
our northern compatriots and others whose ideology differs form our own (John
13:14-15; 4:20-21). 353
Here, the South Korean churches overcame the ideology, which justified the system of
dividing Korea. They repented from regarding the North Korean Communists as
"unforgivable devils". 354 Furthermore, the NCCK declared that the Communists are
"compatriots", who merely have a different ideology, not an enemy. This statement was a
remarkable cornerstone for a new approach to North Korea not only for the South Korean
churches, but also for the whole society.
Next, a new approach to the churches in North Korea was also mapped out. The Declaration
contained a message to the South Korean churches that the KCF was not an "enemy"; rather,
they were "sisters and brothers in faith".3:0 The NCCK prayed for "God's grace and blessing
upon our sisters and brothers who steadfastly endure in their faith even under difficult
"3 ca t
circumstances." Besides recognizing the authenticity of the KCF and the house churches in
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North Korea, the NCCK also stated its intention to establish direct exchanges with the
northern Christians for the purpose of reconciliation:
The mission calling to peace and reunification is the universal task of all Christians on
the Korean peninsula, the churches of South Korea will pray for the faith and life of
the Christian community in the north, and will work for north-south exchanges
between our churches.3?7
However, this statement brought enormous reactions from the conservative churches. The
main arguments against the statement were the reaffirmation of the old understanding that the
KCF is not a genuine Christian organization, but a political propaganda organization of the
North Korean Communists. Some even insisted that the NCCK had become pro-Communist.
They recommended their General Assemblies to withdraw from membership ofNCCK. These
reactions were influenced by the McCarthyism of the South Korean dictators. Here are some
examples:





Even though the NCCK recognizes the KCF, we know that
churches were utterly destroyed by the Communists in North
Korea.
CBAK 22/03/88
We declare that the KCF is a propaganda organization of Kim
ll-sung's believers who persecuted and killed many Christian
believers.
NEA 12/04/88 It is obvious that there is no church in North Korea.
Yongrak
Church
17/04/88 The KCF is not a religious organization.
KCASNR 19/04/88
We are sure that there are underground churches in North
Korea. However, we express our alarm at the opinion, which
recognizes the KCF as a church.
ESP-PCK July/88
We oppose the NCCK statement. At the same time, we
recommend to the General Assembly to cease any
cooperation with NCCK.
PP-PCK 25/07/88
We cannot support the NCCK's direction on the issue of
reunification, and recommend seceding from the NCCK.
PB & HHP-
PCK July/88
The house churches in North Korea were built for the purpose
of Communist propaganda. We recommend that the PCK




KPDA: Korean Protestant Denominations Association, CBAK: Christian Businessmen's Association in Korea,
NEA: National Elders Association, KCASNR: Korean Christian Association for South and North Relationship,
ESP-PCK: East Seoul Presbytery-PCK, PP-PCK: Pyongyang Presbytery-PCK, PB & HHP-PCK: Pyongbuk
and Elamhoe Presbytery-PCK
In spite of theses criticisms, the mainline churches in South Korea supported the NCCK's
approach. The Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea (PROK) was the first to issue a
supportive statement on the Declaration at its General Assembly meeting in 1988.3:>8 The PCK,
the largest denomination in Korea, also accepted the NCCK's direction339 in spite of the
oppositions of some presbyteries, which had evacuated from the North.360 Lastly, the annual
conference of the Korean Methodist Church (KMC) also endorsed the Declaration.361
The 88 Declaration contained not only a new approach to the Christians and the Communists
in North Korea, but also a proposal for launching a Christian reunification movement. The
NCCK proclaimed the year 1995, fifty years after the partition of Korean peninsula, the
"Jubilee Year for Peace and the Reunification". This expressed the belief of Korean
Christian that "the God who rules all history has been present within these fifty years of our
history, and proclaims our firm resolution to bring about the restoration of the covenanted
community of peace in the history of the Korean peninsula today".364 Through proclaiming
the Jubilee, the South Korean churches affirmed their commitment to God's mission
interpreted as calling for the reunification. The KCF warmly welcomed the above new
358 "We fully support the Declaration of the Churches of Korea on National Reunification..." PROK,
"General Assembly's Statement on Peaceful Reunification of Korea", September 1988.
359
See, PCK, "PCK General Assembly's Statement on Peaceful Reunification of Korean Peninsula",
17th September 1991. Because of the reaction of the above presbyteries their support delayed until
1991.
360
Especially, the East Seoul Presbytery, Pyongyang Presbytery, Pyongbuk and Hanhoe Presbytery
strongly rejected the declaration. See, the table of Reaction Statements against the NCCK
declaration.
361
See, KMC, "The Statement of Korean Methodists to Realize Peaceful Reunification", 9th October
1991.
362 For the detailed proposals of the movement, see, NCCK, "Declaration of the Churches of Korea on
National Reunification", 10-13.
363
"ju5i]ee year" is the fiftieth year following the completion of a 49 year cycle of seven
sabbatical years (Leviticus 25:8-10). The jubilee year is a "year of liberation." The proclamation of
the jubilee year is an act of God's people which reveals their unshaking trust in God's sovereignty
over history and their faithfulness in keeping God's sovereignty over history and their faithfulness in
keeping God's covenant. The jubilee year is a time during which the covenant community of unity
and peace is restored through the establishing of shalom based upon God's justice. This is seen in
the liberation of the enslaved through the overcoming of all social and economic conflicts resulting
from internal or external repression and absolutist power: indebtedness is forgiven, sold land is
restored to its original tillers, and seized homes are returned to their original inhabitants (Leviticus
25:11-55)." NCCK, Ibid., 11.
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approach of the South Korean churches. The Declaration was welcomed by the
Communists as well. For example, Radio Pyongyang welcomed and publicized the
"3 zrz
Declaration across North Korea.
Indeed, the Declaration was an historic statement, which brought a renewal to the southern
churches. This renewal included a recognition of the Communists as compatriots, as well as
respecting the tradition of North Korean Christianity. It demonstrated remarkable support for
the revival and renewal of Protestant Christianity in North Korea.
3.2 The Moscow Policy Statement: Renewed Approach of the WCC
The WCC had originally supported the UN's police measure, de facto the US' military
intervention in the Korean War, by making the Toronto Statement in 1950. This support
increased the isolation of Christians in North Korea, because the Communists then
condemned Christianity as an imperialistic religion/67 However, the WCC and the KCF have
come to developing closer relationship since the days of the Tozanso Conference. Therefore,
the WCC found it necessary to reconsider its former approach to North Korea. E. Weingartner
describes the atmosphere of WCC in the early 1980s, when he began to contact the KCF as
follows:
Opening lines of communication with an isolated North Korea meant suspending
judgment and accepting responsibility. And the WCC bore a special responsibility
(because of its) support for the United Nations action during the Korean War...368
The WCC felt some responsibility for the Korean War, and by the 1980s some signs of
changes in its approach were appearing. It wanted to establish a new relationship with the
North Korean Christians. However, despite the significance of the Tozanso resolution,369
WCC was still not clear how to renew its approach to North Korea in 1984. It was only at the
6:1
See, NCCK, KCF and WCC, "Glion Declaration on Peace and Reunification of Korea", Glion,
Switzerland, 25lh November 1988.
366 E. Weingartner, "The Tozanso Process: An Ecumenical Contribution to the Struggle for Peace and
Justice in North-East Asia", in CCIA ed., Peace and the Reunification ofKorea, Geneva, WCC,
1990,26.
367
Concerning the Toronto Statement, see, Chapter V Section 2.3.1.
368 E. Weingartner, "The Tozanso Process: Ecumenical Efforts for Korean Reconciliation and
Reunification", in G. Baum and H. Wells ed., The Reconciliation ofPeoples: Challenge to the
Churches, Geneva, WCC, 1997, 68.
,69
Concerning the Tozanso conference, see, chapter VI Section 5.
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Moscow Central Committee Meeting of 1989, that the WCC declared a new policy statement
T 7A
on North Korea. This statement consisted of two parts, "Background" and "Peace and the
Reunification of Korea". In the introduction, the WCC remembered with regret the Toronto
statement and its original support for the UN's police measure during the Korean War:
Unfortunately, these initiatives came under considerable criticism as being biased
towards Western and South Korean positions. Support for the United Nations meant
in effect supporting the role of USA, whose military forces fought in the Korean War
under the United Nations flag and still make up the bulk of the United Nations
General Command.
An unfortunate consequence of this position was the resignation of Mr. T. C. Chao,
president of the WCC from China, and withdrawal of the member churches in China
from participation in the WCC. It also meant lack of possibility of contacts with the
07 1
Christian community in North Korea.
This self-criticism of the WCC thirty-nine years after the statement it made at its Toronto
Central Committee, went in exactly the same line as the warning J. Hromadka had issued in
195 0.372 The WCC went on further:
The WCC confesses that it has not always dealt equitably with the Korean question.
Mistakes of the past should weigh on the conscience of the ecumenical community
and intensify our determination to struggle for peace and reunification of Korea.j73
Although it took almost half of a century for this regret about its role in the Korean War to be
expressed, this statement of the WCC demonstrates remarkable progress in the ecumenical
movement. The WCC did not forget its responsibility, and confessed the "mistakes of the
past". The WCC listened to the voice of conscience, from within, as the Vancouver Assembly
had demanded:
The churches today are called to confess anew their faith, and to repent for the time
when Christians have remained silent in the face of injustice or threats to peace. The
biblical vision of peace with justice for all, of wholeness, of unity for all God's people,
is not one of several options for followers of Christ. It is an imperative in our time. 174
~l7l) The title of the statement is "Peace and the Reunification of Korea", WCC Central Committee,




See, "From Hromadka to Visser't Hooft", 30th November 1950 in the Appendixes of this thesis.
373
WCC, "Peace and the Reunification of Korea: Policy Statement", Moscow, 16th-27th 1989,
Document No. 2.4, 1.
,74
WCC, "Statement on Peace and Justice", Vancouver Assembly, 1983.
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In 1950, the WCC accepted only the Western and South Korean position on the Korean War.
It condemned North Korea for causing the war, and ending peace on the Korean peninsula,
under the influence of J. F. Dulles and R. Niebuhrf73 However, the WCC now realized that
the positions it had taken were carried through without proper criticism of the injustices of
South Korea and the US government and their past in the outbreak of the Korean War. Finally,
based on the Vancouver spirit, the WCC confessed that the Toronto Statement was a
"mistake".
With this confession, the WCC renewed its policy on Korea, so that it now emphasized peace
and the reunification of Korea. In its statement, the WCC first of all reaffirmed the Tozanso
principles of ecumenical coordination in these pursuits. Hence, it commended the efforts of
many churches and ecumenical organizations, which had already engaged actively and
• • ... 77 f\
responsibly in pursuing contacts with Christians in North Korea. Secondly, the WCC
warmly welcomed and supported the 88 Declaration of the NCCK. In line with the
Declaration, the WCC also renewed its position on the KCF, recognizing it as the
representative Protestant Christian organization in North Korea. The WCC commended the
KCF for "its active participation in the ecumenical efforts for peace and the reunification of
Korea".377 Lastly, the WCC instructed the CCIA to continue to monitor and analyze the
situations in "both" parts of Korea, as well as developments in the region at large and in the
international community of nations as far as the Korean issue was concerned. The CCIA was
also requested to engage itself actively in the UN for the promotion of peace and the
378reunification of Korea, and not to offer any more support for the police measure. This
change of position can be called the renewal ofWCC on North Korea.
The statement also included eight priority considerations to assist member churches and
related agencies to initiate, or redouble efforts so that they could persuade their respective
governments to review their Korea policies. Here are some examples of the priority
considerations:
,75
Concerning the role of Dulles and Niebuhr in issuing the Toronto Statement, see, Chapter V Section
2.3.2 and 3.3.
376




1. The people of Korea should be the ultimate subjects in decisions affecting their
•270
future, without outside interference or tutelage.
The WCC had learned its lesson, after having originally justified the foreign intervention in
Korea at Toronto.
The WCC went on further to say that:
3.The reunification process should respect and recognize the reality of the two
existing autonomous systems in the spirit of peaceful coexistence, with the objective
O OA
of building up one unified country.
The WCC, which had supported the US' condemning North Korea as a "Communist devil,"
now declared that North Korea is South Korean's partner for coexistence. Moreover, the
WCC recommended the UN to renew its position on North Korea:
7. A fresh, truly impartial initiative should be launched by the United Nations in an
381
effort to rectify its historical legacy of bias and complicity in Korea's division.
The WCC also sought to apply the same balanced approach to its own activity in regard to its
Christian constituency in the whole Korean peninsula. Hence, it recommended that its own
future policy should be to:
1. Establish or maintain contact with churches and Christians in both parts of Korea.
Such contacts should promote the building of confidence between North and South
by providing first-hand information, thus contributing to an atmosphere of trust and
38?
reconciliation.
The WCC, which recognized its mistake, now committed itself to be a catalyst ofmutual trust
between the Christians in North and South Korea. In this role of catalyst, the WCC carefully
considered the KCF:
2. In planning contacts and visits to North Korea, it is important to respect the non-
denominational character of Christian life there...Visits should be ecumenical both in






reciprocal invitations to North Korean Christians. Churches in socialist countries carry
a special burden in helping North Korean Christians to overcome their isolation.
Unlike the Toronto Statement, the Moscow Statement gave full consideration to the North
Korean Christians. The WCC now respected the tradition of Protestant Christianity in North
Korea. In Toronto, the voice from the churches in Communist countries was intentionally
ignored. However, in Moscow, the churches in "socialist countries" were respected in dealing
with North Korean issues. In addition to this, it became part of the future plan to publish
information about Korea, engage in biblical and theological peace education on the division
of Korea, and make efforts on behalf of the separated families.384
Moreover, the Moscow Statement was adopted with the full participation of both the KCF and
the NCCK.38? N. Koshy, the director of the CCIA, explained the historical significance of this
participation of the Korean churches: "The fact that in Moscow for the first time church
representatives from North and South Korea attended the same large ecumenical conference
• • 386with the knowledge and approval of their governments was a remarkable achievement". In
the Moscow Central Committee, Ki-jun Ko, the general secretary of the KCF, thanked the
WCC for its efforts on behalf of the Korean issue during the past years, and welcomed the
007
statement. Whereas the Toronto Statement in 1950 had brought serious controversy,
withdrawal of membership, and the resignation of one of presidents of WCC, in Moscow in
1989, the statement was approved unanimously with all delegates voting in favor. Later, Ko
remembered the atmosphere in Moscow as follows:
We cannot forget the impressive scene of the Plenary Meeting of the Central
Committee of the WCC held in Moscow. The declaration on the Korean question was
adapted unanimously and the Conference Hall reverberated with enthusiastic
applause on the historic occasion. Various personages of the WCC including General






N.B., There were two Central Committee members from South Korea, Hyung-tae Kim and Jun-
young Kim, as well as two representatives from North Korea, Ki-jun Ko and Chul Lee with
invitation of WCC general secretary.
386 Recited from M. McClellan, "The World Council of Churches And the Reunification of Korea", in
N. Koshy ed., Peace And the Reunification ofKorea, Geneva, WCC, 1990, 7.
387 On behalf of the South Korean churches, Rev. Dr. Hyung-tae Kim, the moderator of PCK and
Chairperson of the Reunification Committee ofNCCK, also added word of thanks to the WCC
adopting the statement. Ibid., 9-10.
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delegates of various countries gave us warm embraces expressing their joy and
congratulations.388
The policy statement on "Peace and the Reunification of Korea" of the WCC at its Moscow
Central Committee represents a renewal in the WCC's relationship with North Korea. This
statement was the highlight ofWCC's journey with and for the North Korean churches.
3.3 The NCCCUSA Policy Statement and Renewal of the US Churches
• • TRQ
When the Korean War broke, at first, the WCC asked for mediation by the UN. However, it
was the FCC, the former name of what later became the NCCCUSA, which was the first
Christian organization to support the US police action in Korea.390 Based on the FCC's
statement, J. F. Dulles lobbied the CCIA commissioners to support the US' military
• • • TQ1
intervention in Korea at the Second Central Committee Meeting of the WCC in Toronto.
However, in the 1980s, the NCCCUSA performed a prophetic role for the renewal of the
world churches in approaching the North Korean issue. Even before the 88 Declaration and
the WCC Moscow Statement, the NCCCUSA declared its policy statement, "Peace and the
Reunification of Korea", on 6th November 1986, which became an important reference for the
statements that subsequently followed. Therefore, although the NCCCUSA policy statement
was issued prior to 1988, it will be studied in this chapter.
When the reunification movement began among the South Korean Christians, the NCCCUSA
felt responsibility for the division of Korea because of its original support for the police
TQ9
action. Therefore, the NCCCUSA eagerly participated in the Tozanso process. Indeed,
the NCCUSA responded to the Tozanso initiative in two ways. One was by supporting the
reunification movement of the South Korean churches, for example, when it held the North
American Ecumenical Conference on the Unification of Korea in 1985.j94 The other was by
388
Ki-jun Ko, "Bumper Harvest of Ecumenical Movement: In the Sacred Road for Peace and
Reunification ofKorea", Ibid., 46.
389
See, Chapter V, Section 2.3.1.
190
See, Chapter V, Section 2.3.3.
,91
See, Chapter V, Section 2.3.2.
92
See, NCCCUSA, "Peace and the Reunification of Korea: A Policy Statement ofNational Council
of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.", 6th November 1986, 2-4.
393 Ibid., 4.
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creating relationships with the North Korean churches. For this purpose, from 18th April - 3rd
May 1986, delegates of the NCCCUSA visited North Korea for the first time ever.395
After Tozanso, the NCCCUSA recognized the need to renew its approach on Korea. H. L.
Gibble described the process of the statement as follows:
Given the key role that the USA has played in the division of Korea and the tension of
the region, the NCCCUSA began work toward a policy statement on Peace and the
Unification of Korea and took the initiative, with the Canadian Council of Churches, to
call a follow-up regional conference to Tozanso on Korean-related issues and
concerns. This conference took place in December, 1985, at Stony Point, New York.
Following the conference, NCCCUSA named a committee to begin drafting a policy
statement with the mandate that members of the committee, after working on a
preliminary draft, visit Christians and government leaders in both North and South
Korea to consult and to receive reactions and suggestions from these persons
regarding the substance of the policy statement.396
In order to draft the statement with a balanced perspective, the NCCCUSA consulted both
North and South Korean Christians as well.
In its statement, NCCCUSA began with confessing that the division of Korea is the
"consequences of our failures".397 The NCCCUSA said:
The churches too have much to confess. Korea has suffered from uncritical
acceptance by many in our churches and nation of the virulent anti-Communism
which gripped our society hard in the 1950s and has kept it in its grasp to varying
degrees ever since. Many Christians not only acquiesced to the division of Korea
after World War II, but provided theological and ideological justification for it.
Churches in this nation have too often allowed fear of societies different from our own
OQO
to overshadow our vocation to be reconcilers.
Here, the NCCCUSA completely changed its view from the one it had held in the 1950s. The
NCCCUSA surely criticized itself in regard to on its theological justification of the division of
Korea/99 The NCCUSA also regretted its prejudice against the Christians in North Korea:
395
Concerning the visit, see, H. L. Gibble, "A Report on the Visits and Consultations of a NCCCUSA
Delegation in the Democratic People's of Korea and Republic of Korea in the Interest of'Peace and




NCCCUSA, "Peace and the Reunification of Korea: A Policy Statement ofNational Council of the




Concerning the role of R. Niebuhr in relation to the Korean War, see, Chapter V, section 3.1.
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We have been too quick to judge the faith of Christians in North Korea from whom we
have long been separated by political division, and whose witness to the faith we did
not know. Nor have we sought sufficiently to comprehend the witness to the Gospel
of the South Korean churches in their society, or to respond adequately to their call to
us to be more responsible as U.S. Christians in relation to Korea.400
The NCCCUSA concluded, "God has not left this (North Korean) people without
witnesses".401 Furthermore, the NCCCUSA recognized the KCF as the representative national
federation of the Protestant Christians in North Korea.402 Although it had taken thirty-six
years for the NCCCUSA to change its understanding of Christianity in North Korea, this was
an extraordinary statement, which was the first declaration of a renewal of policy on North
Korea among the world churches. The statement also recommended highly significant future
policies for advocacy and action. Here are the examples of how much the political approach
of the NCCCUSA toward Korean peninsula had changed in its 1986 statement, compared to
its earlier one in 1950:
The NCCCUSA shall press for the negotiated withdrawal of all U.S. nuclear weapons
in, and all U.S. and U.S.S.R. nuclear weapons targeted on Korea.403
The NCCCUSA urges the United States to extricate itself from its commanding role in
R.O.K. military affairs and its dominance over the political and economic life in order
to achieve a climate in which productive talks could take place on the basis of mutual
respect for the independence of the other.404
The NCCCUSA urges the United States to withdraw from commanding the U.N.
peace-keeping operation at the Demilitarized Zone in Korea in favor of mutually
acceptable neutral nations, in order to free that world body more adequately to fulfill
its current mandate and explore appropriate alternative roles.405
The NCCCUSA, which had once called for US military intervention to Korea, now stood in
the frontline advocating the withdrawal of the US military in South Korea. Although the
statement expressed the above radical view, the Governing Board of the NCCCUSA,
representing thirty-two member communions, adopted the statement by 154 for, 0 against, and











This statement thus received the support of the mainline US churches which have had
historical missionary links with the Korean churches. Firstly, the Presbyterian Church (USA)
expressed its support for the statement by adopting the Resolution on Reconciliation and
Reunification in Korea at its General Assembly in 1986.407 Next year, the United Church of
Christ (USA) and the United Methodist Church, and the Christian Church (Disciples of
Christ) also issued similar statements in their highest decision making structures.408 This
movement in favors of the new approach, which had been started by the NCCCUSA
statement, spread to the historically related churches in other parts of the world such as the
Canadian, Australian, and Japanese churches.409
The above renewal of the US churches was welcomed not only by the Christians, but also by
the Communists in North Korea. One of the main purposes of the second official visit of the
NCCCUSA delegation to North Korea from 19lh June - 3rd July 1987 was "to inform officially
the churches and governments of Korea about the contents of the policy statement."410 The
North Korean Christians and the Communist officials welcomed the statement. The Vice-
President ofNorth Korea, Sung-chul Park, said:
I read your policy statement and express thanks for it and the concern of the
NCCCUSA for reunification and your support of the Korean people to that end. 411
Kum-chol Chun, the Director of the United Front in North Korea, said, "The NCCCUSA was
the first to adopt such a statement".412 Representing the North Korean church, Ki-jun Ko
expressed appreciation for the NCCCUSA's policy statement during the second visit.413
407
For details, see, PCUSA, "Resolution on Reconciliation and Reunification in Korea", in CCA and
ICNDK ed., Reunification, Peace and Justice in Korea: Christian Response in the 1980s, Hong
Kong, CCA, 1988,40-49.
408
See, UCC, "Peace and the Reunification of Korea", in Ibid., 79-81; UMC, "Peace, Justice, and
Reunification of Korea", in Ibid., 82-84; CCDC, "Resolution Concerning Peace and the
Reunification of Korea", in Ibid., 85-86.
409 See the statements of these churches, Ibid., 50-52, 75-78.
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NCCCUSA, "Report of the Official Delegation Visit to North and South Korea", 19th June-3rd June
1987,3.
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NCCUSA, "Confidential Report of the Official Delegation Visit to North and South Korea-Not to
be Reproduced", 19th June-3rd June 1987, 26.
412 Ibid.
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Ibid., 6. N.B., Even in 1997, when Rev. Young-sup Kang, the chairperson of KCF, visited the
NCCCUSA, he said that the statement has been an historic document on peace and the reunification
of Korea, "Young-sup Kang's Speech", manuscript, 17th March 1997, Church Center for the United
Nations, New York.
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The NCCCUSA Policy Statement brought a renewal of the US churches in approaching North
Korea. Moreover, it challenged the old North Korean Communist understanding on
Christianity, which saw Christianity as "a pro-American imperialistic religion". For the North
Korean Christians, it provided an opportunity to demonstrate a new image of the world
churches to the Communists.
In conclusion, we have noted three "external renewals" which occurred in churches outside
North Korea, and which concerned their relation to North Korean Christianity. These three
were a renewal in the South Korean churches, in the WCC and in the NCCCUSA. These
external renewals supported the renewal of northern Protestantism, which had been started
already through internal stimuli and, in particular, through the Christian-Juchean dialogue.
4. "Social Diakonia Mission": Seeking a Missiological Identity
4.1 "You Give Them Something to Eat"
Ever since 1993, there has been a food crisis across North Korea. However, it was difficult for
North Korea to receive food assistance from the outside world at first because of its
diplomatic isolation, and on account of the US economic embargo. The North Korean
government was also ashamed of their food shortage situation, and did not want it to be
known in the outside world. From 1995 onwards, more severe floods hit, and North Korea fell
into famine. Finally, the government appealed for emergency assistance to the international
community for survival. However, most western governments hesitated to support North
Korea for political reasons, especially the nuclear and missile development projects ofNorth
Korea.
In this context, the northern Christians felt, "We must do something for the starving people
because when people were hungry; Jesus said to his disciples 'You give them something to
eat' (Mk 6,37)."414 The KCF organized urban Christian volunteers to help in the work of
restoring flooded rice fields.41:1 However, it was difficult for the KCF to provide direct support
for the starving people. "We tried to mobilize our resources for our people, but we did not
414 Interview with Rev. Young-sup Kang, 3rd April 2001, Pyongyang.
415 Ibid.
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have enough food even for ourselves."416 Therefore, the KCF appealed for an emergency
humanitarian assistance to the international ecumenical community and the South Korean
churches, "praying for the miracle of five loaves and two fishes." On 26th December 1994, the
Chairperson of the KCF appealed to the WCC for humanitarian assistance.417 Then, when
even more severe floods hit North Korea in 1995, he urgently reported to WCC that two thirds
ofNorth Korea had been severely affected by the worst torrential rain in fifty years, and again
41 8
appealed for emergency relief.
Immediate action was initiated by the Asia Desk together with the Emergency Task Force of
the WCC/LWF, later named Action by Churches Together (ACT). The ACT appeal went out
to its constituencies throughout the world. The first target was to raise one million US Dollars
for an emergency relief program to be put into operation through the KCF.419 Within one
month, about US$ 800,000 had been contributed by the member churches of the WCC 420
From the first appeal, donations from the South Korean churches were remarkable, amounting
to US$ 250,000.421
From the beginning, the KCF's appeal was successful. The ACT delivered SFR 200,000 in
medical supplies at the end of December 1995, and sent 1,000 tons of rice, worth US$
450,000.422 The KCF contacted the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee (FDRC) of the
• 423
government to ensure proper distribution of the rice and medical supplies. The ACT
delegation visited North Korea from 2nd-9th March 1996 to monitor the distribution and, in
4lb Interview with Rev. Choon-ku Lee, 3rd April 2001, Pyongyang.
417 "From Young-sup Kang to Kyung-seo Park", 26lh December 1994. The WCC-Asia Desk sent USD
15,000 in this appeal. "From Kyung-seo Park to Young-sup Kang", 25lh January 1995.
418 "From Young-sup Kang to Konrad Reiser", 10th September 1995.
4,9 "North Korea Floods Appeal-No.9541KP", Emergency Task Force of WCC/LWF, 27th September
1995.
420
"Update No.2-North Korea Floods Appeal-No. 9541KP", ACT, 13th March 1996, 1.
421
Ibid., 3. It was not allowed to support the North Korean people until 1997 in South Korea.
Therefore, the South Korean churches had been supporting North Korea through the international
ecumenical organizations. Since 1997, due to the Sunshine Policy of President Kim Dae-jung, the
direct support of the South Korean Christians has been encouraged. Concerning the Sunshine Policy,
see, Ministry of Unification ed., Hatbyut Jimgchaek eui Euimiwa Chujinbanhyang, (Meaning and
Direction of the Sunshine Policy), Seoul, Ministry of Unification, 1998; Joo-seop Keum "The
Sunshine Policy and the Korean Church", unpublished paper, Conference of the Board ofWorld
Mission, Church of Scotland, 19 June 2002, St Andrews. Especially, it is still not allowed to send
cash from the South to the North. Therefore, often South Korean and the WCC used to send project
funds via the China Christian Council. See, "From Si-chon Hwang to Kyung-seo Park", 5th
December 1996; "From Christine Ledger to Jin Guang Zhu", 4th November 1997.
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"Update No.2-North Korea Floods Appeal-No. 9541KP", ACT, 13th March 1996, 2.
423 "ACT Team Visits North Korea-Recommends More Aid", 2nd-9,h March 1996.
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response to a new request from the KCF, suggested further support be given.424 Young-sup
Kang remembers, "The immediate support and solidarity of WCC was not only much
appreciated by the KCF, but was also a big surprise for our government."425 The northern
Christians began to believe, "Jesus will make another miracle of the five loaves and two
fishes in North Korea"426 In this context, the KCF began to think about how it could develop
social diaconal works, using the resources received from foreign Christians.427
This is the story of the beginning of the "Social Diakonia Mission," as the KCF later named
their activity on behalf of the starving people. The Social Diakonia Mission started after 1995,
which means it is outside the period of this thesis. It is also difficult to offer an evaluative
account this mission because it is still developing. The following attempt is based on the
evidence of the early stage of the dioconal work in which we see the North Korean church
beginning to reach out beyond itself to address the needs of the minjung as a whole. Up to this
time the church had been mainly concerned with its own survival and revival. With the
disaster of 1993 it involved itself deeply in the tragedy that the people were experiencing,
reaching out to the wider community in a spirit of service, responding to Jesus' imperative,
"You give them something to eat."
4.2 The Emergence of the "Social Diakonia Mission"
On 5th March 1996, the KCF received the first aid from ACT, 1,000 tons of rice at Nampo
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harbor. The KCF chose ten counties for the distribution of this rice. The beneficiaries were
578,500 families, who had lost most or all of their food stocks due to the 1995 floods.429 Here
is the statistics of the distribution:
424
Ibid., 1.
425 Interview with Rev. Young-sup Kang, 3rd April 2001, Pyongyang.
426 Interview with Rev. Choon-ku Lee, 3rd April 2001, Pyongyang.
427 Ibid.
428 Before this, the WCC had already supported the agricultural development project of the Wonsan
Agricultural University from 1989-1993, the human resource development program of the
Hamhung Industrial University from 1990-1993, and the Adult Education for Fishermen and
Technicians in the fishing industry of the Wonsan Naval University from 1991-1994. However, this
was the first social diaconal project organized through the KCF. Kyung-seo Park, "WCC
Cooperation with North Korea", unpublished report, 25th January 1996, 1-2.
429 "From Young-sup Kang to Kyung-seo Park", 21st March 1996.
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Table 12) Distribution of the First ACT Shipment4 0
Province County
Date of No. of Allocation Actual No. of
Distribution Beneficiaries Ration (t) A.R.(t) Supply Date
North
Hwanghae
Unpa March 8 52,000 100 99.65 3.4
Rinsan March 9 33,500 60 59.87 3.4
Singhe March 9 83,000 100 99.76 3.4
Heichon March 10 95,500 200 199.56 5.9
Jagang Dongsin March 10 5,200 50 49.95 5.9
Kopung March 11 3,300 30 29.87 5.9
Sinuiju March 9 115,000 250 249.39 3.3
North Pakchon March 9 80,500 100 99.56 3.3
Pyungan Uiju March 11 45,000 50 49.79 3.3
Jongju March 10 65,500 60 59.65 3.3
Total 578,500 1000 997.05 Average 3.8days.
This table contains several significant facts, which connected directly to the future
development of the northern Christian's social diaconal projects. Firstly, attention would be
paid to the counties in which the rice was distributed. Except for the three counties in Jagang
province, which were experiencing the worst food shortage of all, the other seven counties
were the historic centers of Protestant Christianity in North Korea. In particular, the four
counties in the North Pyungan province had been famous for its foreign mission stations, and
there were the areas with the highest percentage of Protestant Christians in North Korea
before the partition of the Korean peninsula.431 The Secretary for Mission of the KCF
explained why counties were chosen as the main recipients of the food distribution in the
following terms:
When we received the first food assistance from ACT, we did not have the national
distribution network because it had been entirely the activity of government before
this occasion. Therefore, we had to use the KCF county committees and house
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churches for the distribution work.
According to Lee, from the beginning, the house churches were actively involved at the
grassroots level in the food allocation for the local communities. It made both the Christians
and the local people feel that the existence of house church was beneficial to their community.
Evangelist Sung-sil Lee, Okryu House Church, remembers the voluntary work public
distribution of the food as follows:
430 "Food Arrival and Distribution Form" in the letter, "From Young-sup Kang to Kyung-seo Park",
21st March 1996.
431
See, Chapter II, Section 1.
432 Interview with Rev. Choon-ku Lee, Secretary for Mission, KCF, 3rd April 2001, Pyongyang.
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I and the members of my church have worked day and night to help the allocation of
the rice, which foreign Christian brothers sent for us. We were so happy because of
this, and received many words of thanks from the people in our community. We are
very proud of our Christian existence in our local community.433
The famine was a tragedy for North Korean people. However, for the Christians, it has been
an opportunity to be close to the local community.
Lastly, in the process of distribution, the KCF and the house churches cooperated closely with
the governmental organization, FDRC. The KCF discussed with the FDRC when choosing the
beneficiaries and deciding the allocation rate, because the KCF did not have detailed statistics
of the damages. The KCF was also involved with the Department of Transport in organizing
transport for the distribution.434 Previously the KCF had only experienced cooperation with
the United Front on the issue of reunification, expressed, for instance, in issuing a supportive
statement for the reunification policy of the government and holding joint consultations.
However, working together with the FDRC for the food aid, and its distribution, was a
completely new experience of practical cooperation with the government. This experience
was also a crucial factor leading to the government's later admission of the KCF to the status
of a Non-Governmental Organization involved in social development.
In the early stages of the KCF's involvement in food shortage problem, another event took
place that was important for the development of the Social Diakonia Mission. From 29th
January to 2nd February 1996, the International Ecumenical Consultation on Solidarity for
Peace in North East Asia was held in Macao, in cooperation with the WCC and the CCA.435
During the consultation, two important recommendations were made in relation to the KCF's
diaconal activities. Churches were urged to continue their assistance through the existing
ecumenical channel of the KCF, and the KCF was asked to continue providing information on
the food situation and their activities.436 The KCF requested the Christian donors to send their
assistance to them so that the North Korean Christians could continue their commitment to
4''3 Interview with Evangelist Sung-sil Lee, 6lh April 2001, Pyongyang.
434 Ihid
435
Concerning the consultation, see, "The Report of International Ecumenical Consultation on
Solidarity for Peace in North East Asia", 29th January-2nd February 1996, Macao.
436 Ibid.3.
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overcoming the famine.4j 7 Of course, the western and South Korean donors welcomed this
idea, and the international ecumenical community promised that they would continue their
humanitarian aid to North Korea through the KCF. This decision meant that the KCF was able
to acquire the material resources they needed to continue their social, diaconal activities
among the starving people.
Some conservative church organizations such as Hankuk Kidikyo Chongryunhaphoe or All
Christian Association in Korea, which do not believe the KCF is a genuine Christian
organization, sent food through the Red Cross on to the advice of the South Korean
government. However, since January 2002, the Association and other conservative churches,
438such as PCK-Hapdong, have changed their assistance channel to the KCF.
The KCF, encouraged by the success of the first appeal and the decisions of the Macao
consultation, made a second appeal to the ACT. From 12th-19th October 1996, the KCF invited
the ACT delegation to discuss to set further involved in the 1997 appeal.4j9
After this visit, the General Secretary of the KCF, Rev. Chon-min Lee, reported on the results
of the aid that had already been given and the WCC made a second appeal.440 The success of
the first appeal encouraged the western churches to keep on supporting North Korea through
the KCF.441 The KCF handled all the processes involved in the foreign Christian donations
437
See, Young-sup Kang, "Task of Mission for Peace in North East Asia", Manuscript of Keynote
Speech, International Ecumenical Consultation on Solidarity for Peace in North East Asia, 29th
January, Macao.
438
Concerning the policy of humanitarian assistance of the conservative churches in South Korea, see,
Bukhan Dongpo Dopki Chunkuk Bogo Daehoi, (The Report of the National Christian Conference to
Support the North Korean People), 5lh September 1997, Korean Ecumenical Building, Seoul.
4,9
See, H. Hensle, "Travel Report ofNorth Korea", 12th-19th October 1996.
440 "From General Secretary of KCF to the World Council of Churches", 5th December 1996. The
North Korean ambassador in Geneva also thanked and reported the food shortage situation to the
general secretary ofWCC, "From Chang-on Han to Konrad Reiser", 11th November 1996.
441 For example, the Protestant Church in Saxony donated DM 30,000, and altogether DM 700,000
from came German churches. "Landeskirhe spendet 30,000 Markfur Hungernde in Nord-Kored\
Der Sonntag, 71'1 July 1996. In the letter "From Si-chon Hwang to Kyung-seo Park", 19th December
1996, the KCF reported the results of this contribution through the WCC. During his participation to
the Kirchentag in 1997, Rev. Young-sup Kang visited the Saxon churches to express appreciation.
See, "From Si-chon Hwang to Kyoung-seo Park", 20th May 1997. The NCCJ also contributed two
million Yen for the emergency reliefwork of the KCF. "From Kenichi Otsu to Kyung-seo Park", 9th
May 1996.
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from shipment to distribution.442 The North Korean government clearly appreciated the KCF
as an important channel for receiving foreign humanitarian aid.
Due to the request of the KCF, the ACT made its second appeal, requesting US$ 2,146,133
for North Korea to the world churches on 17th December 1996.443 In 1998, ACT again made
the third appeal to the amount of USS 4,500,000.444 According to the Asia Secretary of WCC,
ACT supported altogether USS 25,000,000 of material assistance for North Korea, sent
through the KCF, from 1996-2000.445
The South Korean churches also gave a great amount of humanitarian aid to North Korea.
Here are statistics from which one can estimate the amount of such assistance:
Table 13) Statistics of Humanitarian Aid to North Korea 446
Year




(S. Korea) 3,050,000 26,670,000 11,000,000 28,250,000 78,630,000 70,450,000 218,050,000
NGOs
(S. Korea) 1,550,000 20,560,000 20,850,000 18,630,000 35,130,000 64,940,000 161,660,000
Total
(S. Korea) 4,600,000 47,230,000 31,850,000 46,880,000 113,760,000 135,390,000 379,710,000
International
Society 97,650,000 263,500,000 301,990,000 359,880,000 181,770,000 258,490,000 1,463,280,000
In the total amount of South Korean support, the contribution ofNGOs was 43%. According
to the report of the Ministry of Unification, most South Korean NGOs' contributions have
442
For example, see, the letter "From Min-u Hwang to Patricia Patterson", 11th October 1999, which
arranged the US Christian women's support.
443
See, "Appeal-Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Material Aid Assistance for Flood Damage
in 1997", ASKP61, ACT, 17th December 1996; "Update No. 1, North Korea ASKP61", 20th March
1997; "Update No.2, North Korea ASKP61", 10th April 1997; "Update No.3, North Korea
ASKP61", 29th May 1997; "Update No.4, Report on ACT Team visit to North Korea", 27th May-
3rd June 1997.
444
See, "North Korea Crisis-ASKP81", ACT, 28th January 1998; H. Hensle, "North Korea: The
Assistance is Taking Effect", The Report ofACT Team Visit, 18th-25th April 1998.
443
Kyung-seo Park, "The Assistance ofWorld Churches for North Korea", Unpublished Report, 10th
February 2000, 1.
446 The statistics are from, Humanitarian Assistance Bureau, "2001Nyun Indojuk Deabuk Jiwon
Hyunhwang", (The Report of Humanitarian Aid to North Korea in 2001), Ministry of Unification,
17th January 2002.
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been made by the churches and church related organizations.447 For example, in 2001, 90% of
all the NGOs' support was the Christian contribution.448 The South Korean Christian
assistance has mostly been sent through the KCF due to the Macao agreement.
Due to the increase of the assistance through the KCF, in 1998, the KCF considered
strengthening its social diaconal structure. The food situation was also slowly getting better
after the harvest in 1998. Therefore, the KCF began to evaluate their activities for the last two
years, and to discuss new directions. Choon-ku Lee, Secretary for Mission ofKCF, said:
In autumn of 1998, the food situation was slowly getting better. Therefore, we had a
chance to evaluate our activity since the beginning of the food crisis. The Central
Committee of the KCF agreed that a more sustainable and systematic approach to
our diaconal activities needed to be developed. The committee gave a mandate to
the Department of Mission to develop longer term projects in addition to emergency
relief. We agreed to call this new approach the Social Diakonia Mission of KCF. 449
The KCF now began to develop longer-term projects in the name of Social Diakonia Mission.
When the delegation of South Korean churches visited the KCF from 22nd-29lh September
1998, it suggested giving financial support for the construction of church buildings. However,
the KCF asked for support for their longer-term projects because "it is possible to construct
church buildings after saving the starving people."450 The KCF therefore asked the South
Korean churches to support the construction of bread and noodle factories for the hungry
children.4sl However, the South Korean churches were not able to do this because the South
Korean government did not allow it,4r>2 warning that that the bread and noodles from the
factory would be used for military purposes. The primary concern of the South Korean
churches was still church reconstruction. However, by contrast, Insik Kim, the Secretary for
East Asia and Pacific of the PCUSA,453 understood the importance of this idea in the North




449 Interview with Rev. Choon-ku Lee, 3rd April 2001, Pyongyang.
450 "Hankuk Kyohoe Daepyodan Bangbuk Kyulkwa Bogo", (The Report of the Delegation of South
Korean Churches to North Korea), 22nd-29th September 1998, 2.
451 Ibid.
452 "From Young-ju Kim to Young-sup Kang", 26th October 1998.
453
He visited North Korea more than twenty times and his mother and sisters still live in there.
Interview with Rev. Dr. Insik Kim, 13th December 2000, Fukuoka, Japan.
4'4 Ibid. In fact, this project had been discussed by Si-chon Hwang, Secretary for International
Relations of the KCF, Victor Hsu, East Asia Secretary of the NCCCUSA and Insik Kim since from
as far back as 1997. See, "From Si-chun Hwang to Victor Hsu", 2nd December 1997; concerning the
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The KCF felt that it was necessary to explain the background of the Social Diakonia Mission
to the southern churches. The Chairperson of the KCF gave an account of the launching of the
Social Diakonia Mission and explained its necessity at the Sixth Christian Conference on
Peace, Reunification and Mission of the Fatherland in Osaka.455 Kang did not define what
exactly the Social Diakonia Mission means. Rather he emphasized what the northern
Christians discovered through their diaconal activities. He said, "The activity was sharing
love, the love that God has given us through our foreign and southern brothers. Through the
activity, the image and status of Christianity has been upgraded in our society. Therefore, we
would like to begin more sustainable projects to strengthen the KCF as a church for
others."456 During the conference, the PCK agreed to support another long-term project of the
PCK for agricultural development, the green house project to provide vegetables for
kindergartens.457
The KCF also decided to develop the provincial and county committees, which had originally
functioned like presbyteries and later developed into public food distribution centers, as local
social diaconal centers for the wider community. The KCF therefore decided to strengthen the
human resources of the local committees and build local diaconal centers. In 1997, there had
already been an increase of about 230 staff, recruited from the house churches into the KCF
provincial and county committees for the work of food distribution.4^8 Now, the KCF intended
to develop these staff personnel as the enablers of the local social diaconal projects. The first
social diaconal center building is presently being constructed with the financial support of the
PCK.
factory, see, "Proposal on Requesting Cooperation with the Establishment of Instant Noodle
Factory", The Central Committee of the KCF, 7th January 1999.
455
See, Young-sup Kang, "Keynote Speech", manuscript, Sixth Christian Conference on Peace,




For details, see, "Agricultural Life-Saving Project for the North Korean People", PCK's Report to
CWM, January 1999.
458 "From the Central Committee of Korean Christian Federation to the Asia Desk of World Council of
Churches", June 1997.
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4.3 Relevance and Challenges
The Social Diakonia Mission has emerged from the experience of the KCF's involvement in
food assistance as the defining feature of its active engagement in mission. Yet, there has not
been a single research paper on it. There is need for more developed missiological
understanding of what the Social Diakonia Mission of the KCF's, and of what it intends to
achieve.
Diakonia is an essential missiological nature of Christ's church. Serving the poor is a relevant
mission method in a Communist society where evangelism is restricted. While leaders of the
northern Christians defended Christianity by presenting it as a religion for the suffering
people, quoting the minjung theology and liberation theology in the Christian-Juchean
dialogue, it was the grassroot Christians that demonstrated what this theory means in practice
by developing the Social Diakonia Mission. While the dialogue brought a change in the
intellectuals' understanding of Christianity, the Social Diakonia Mission is bringing a similar
change among the minjung. One evidence of this change is the increase in the number of
Christians in North Korea.459 For instance, the membership of Bongsu Church has increased
from about 300 in 1995 to about 450 in 2000. According to Rev. Sung-bok Chang, the pastor
of Bongsu Church, most new believers were people who had received the food distribution
from the church.460
E. Weingartner, who attended that church, is highly critical of this increase because, he claims,
it produces "rice Christians". He has doubts about their motivation for joining the church.461
Diakonia is not merely an evangelistic tactic, but is the nature of church. Therefore, the
missiological understanding of Social Diakonia Mission is necessary to be clarified within the
KCF.
A more serious problem in the development of the Social Diakonia Mission is self-support.
The principle of self-support has been a strong tradition in Korean Christianity. It was
particularly strong in northern Christianity before the liberation.462 Even after 1972, the
northern Christians reopened the house churches and theological seminary by themselves.
459
See, the statistics in Chapter VI, Section 2.2.
460 Interview with Rev. Sung-bok Chang, pastor of Bongsu Church, 6lh April 2001, Pyongyang.
461 Interview with E. Weingartner, 12th April 2001, North Bay, Canada.
462
See, Chapter I, Section 4.2.2 and 4.2.3.
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However, although the situation is understandable, the social diaconal activity of the KCF has
largely depended, since 1996, on the South Korean and foreign financial and material
contributions. This could result in the northern churches becoming completely dependent
financially on the southern churches. Such economic dependency could cause theological and
ecclesiastical dependency as well. Therefore, it is urgent to develop self-support projects
together with the Social Diakonia Mission.
Another problem is the delay of theological development. Although the food supply is now
getting better, it seems that the KCF is losing interest in the Christian-Juchean dialogue.
When the WARC suggested reopening the dialogue, the response of the KCF was dubious
and evasive.463 "Now, most concerns of the KCF are concentrated on projects to upgrade the
social position of Christians and to increase their number, maybe."464 If the Social Diakonia
Mission is developed from a project-oriented perspective without proper theological
examination, its missiological significance threatens to be diminished.
Lastly, the training of the staff in the local committees as enablers of the Social Diakonia
Mission is an important issue for future development. According to Choon-ku Lee, some of
workers have already begun to study at the Pyongyang Theological Seminary. However, the
seminary is only offering ministry training courses at the moment, with nothing specifically
on the topic of Christian mission.465 Therefore, it is necessary for the KCF to train trainers for
the Social Diakonia Mission workers. Such training must include increasing the ability for
theological reflection on social mission.466
Despite these problems, and the future tasks, the significance of the emergence of the Social
Diakonia Mission in North Korean Christianity should not be underestimated. The North
Korean Christians have begun seeking their missiological identity through developing the
Social Diakonia Mission among the suffering minjung.
463 Interview with Rev. Dr. Seong-won Park, Executive Secretary for Witness and Cooperation, WARC,
17th January 2001, Geneva.
464 Ibid.
463
Concerning the curriculum of the seminary, see, Chapter VI, Section 3.
466 The KCF agreed with the WCC to send students to the Bossey Ecumenical Institute for training, but
this has not been realized yet. Interview with Prof. Kyung-seo Park, 28th November, 2000, Seoul.
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In this chapter, we have examined the internal renewal of Protestant Christianity in North
Korea since 1988. The institutionally revived North Korean church first sought its theological
identity through the Christian-,/uc/zecm dialogue in the context of political changes, and then
diaconal identity through the Social Diakonia Mission in the context of famine. While the
revival was an institutional, quantitative, and external development of the northern churches,
the evidence shows that the renewal led to a theological, qualitative, and internal development
of northern Protestantism. The minjung-centered approach of both the dialogue and diakonia
has been successful, in spite of several challenges and deficiencies that still exist. The
dialogue brought a positive change in the Juchean understanding of Christianity, and the
diakonia brought a similar change among the northern minjung. Moreover, through the
development of diaconal mission, northern Christianity developed as a missionary church.
In addition to the renewal of the northern churches, the renewal of the South Korean and
international ecumenical relations with North Korea also contributed to the development of
North Korean Protestant Christianity. The relationship between the church (KCF)-axis and
community (house churches)-axis has cooperated well with the state-axis to overcome the
national crisis since the beginning of the famine. Among various deficiencies that we noted,
however, the most important is probably the need for northern Christianity to develop its
theological positions and increase its capacity for proper theological reflection. Such




A Summary and Assessment of Church-State Relations in North Korea
The premise of this research has been that church-state relations have decisively influenced
Protestant Christianity's success and failure in North Korea. Our thesis has examined the
history of Protestant Christianity in North Korea, with particular reference to the development
of the historical paradigms of church-state relations in North Korea. In so doing, it has
identified that diverse paradigms of church-state relationships have developed, and each
paradigm crucially affected the fate of Protestant Christianity in North Korea. Furthermore,
we have also found that together with the church-axis and the state-axis, the minjung-axis has
been a highly important factor in the dynamics of church-state relations in North Korean
Christianity.
In this final chapter, an attempt will be made to summarize the historical paradigms of
church-state relations in North Korea, and to assess critically the contribution of each
paradigm towards the development of Protestant Christianity in North Korea.
1. Historical Paradigms and Assessments
1.1 The Minjung-Centered Oppositional Paradigm
Protestant Christianity was introduced to the Korean peninsula through the 'northern route.' It
arrived in a northern Korean society that suffered from economic, social and political
discrimination, in relation to Southern Korea, at the end of the Chosun Dynasty. Against the
traditional caste system of the south-centered Confucianism, northern Protestantism engaged
in the enlightenment of social equality among the northern minjung. Northern Protestantism
developed the idea of social reformation, which emphasized a republican polity, emphasizing
the role of the people against that of the monarch. Translation of the Bible into Hangul, the
language of minjung, gave the minjung a new vision of the Kingdom of God, where every
human being is equal.
When Korea was colonized by Japan, the exploitation by the Japanese colonial government
concentrated on Northern Korea because of its mining industry, and in order to prepare the
Japanese invasion of Manchuria. Under these conditions, Protestant Christianity in Northern
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Korea developed as an important focus of the independence movement, in particular through
leading the March First Independence Movement. Korean nationalism thus became an
important characteristic of northern Protestantism. When the Japanese imposed Shinto shrine
worship to suppress the rise of Christian nationalism, the northern Christians strongly resisted,
on the grounds that it was an issue of status confessionis. By leading the independence
movement, northern Protestantism was recognized as a patriotic religion by the northern
minjung.
In summary, therefore, the church-state relationship in Northern Korea before independence
modeled a paradigm of Christian opposition to the state, aimed against both the south-
centered Chsun Dynasty and Japanese colonial rule. In the development of this oppositional
paradigm, the notion of being the church of the minjung was important in Northern Korean
Christian self-identity. Northern Protestantism understood both the Chosun monarchy and the
Japanese colonial state as tyrannies that oppressed the minjung. Therefore, resistance against
the state was justified on the grounds of the liberation of the minjung. Protestant Christianity
in Northern Korea was highly respected by the minjung as a patriotic and, indeed, a minjung
religion.
On the evidence that has been presented and examined in Chapter I and II of this thesis, it can
be concluded that this oppositional paradigm of church-state relations was a major cause of
Protestant Christianity's original success in Northern Korea.
1.2 The Competitive Oppositional Paradigm
During Japanese rule, both Protestant Christianity and the Communist movement, especially
Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese guerillas, were centers of the independence struggle in Northern
Korea. With liberation, a new phase began. Northern Protestantism and Communism now
encountered each other as ideological rivals in the task of nation building. The Christian
attempt to take political hegemony through organizing the first modern political party in
Korean history was offset by Kim Il-sung and his followers, who established a Communist
regime with the support of the Soviet Army. Kim Il-sung invited the Christians to cooperate
in national construction through joining a united front. However, the FPJP rejected this option,
and fell back on the oppositional paradigm of church and state that had prevailed during
Japanese rule. The northern Christians argued that Christianity could not co-exist with
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atheistic Communism. Therefore, the Christians competed for political power through
organizing Christian parties and clashed with the Communists over several political issues,
and most notably that of the boycott of the general election.
In this process of political competition and conflict with the Communists, the northern
Protestant Christians lost the support of the minjung. One of the main reasons behind the
competition and conflict was the issue of land reform. The northern Christians rejected the
Communist land reform in order to maintain their recently upgraded social status, in which
they had risen out of the minjung to become part of the elite. As a consequence, the northern
minjung welcomed the Communist policy of social reform, but did not favor of the northern
Christians' attempt to gain political power. Because of the Communist suppression and the
disapproval of the minjung, the political initiatives of the FPJP finally collapsed. With the
outbreak of the Korean War, the majority of northern Protestant Christians evacuated to the
South to avoid the discrimination and persecution they expected to experience under
Communist rule.
The above oppositional paradigm between the church and the Communist state succeeded the
traditional paradigm of opposition between church and state before liberation. However, the
position of the church altered after liberation, by the fact that it lost the support of the
minjung-axis. From this we can conclude that in the development of an opposition paradigm
against state, the support of the minjung is a crucial factor. Without it, Christianity could not
succeed in North Korea.
1.3 The Diplomatic Cooperative Paradigm
With the establishment of the North Korean state in 1945, a cooperative paradigm developed
between the leaders of the NKCA and the new Communist government emerged. The NKCA
recognized that the Communist social reform was necessary in North Korea. Therefore, they
supported the Kim Il-sung regime, and participated in the United Front of North Korea. The
NKCA and the Communist regime thus developed a cooperative paradigm of church-state
relations.
Although this Christian group was a minority within the northern churches, it held
ecclesiastical power with and through Communist support. The NKCA leaders introduced a
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radical renewal program to root northern Protestantism in the Communist soil. However, this
process of renewal was largely dependent on the support they received from the Communist
state, and was carried out through a top-down method. The theological justification or basis
for this approach was very weak, and in any case deficient. When the Korean War broke out,
the NKCA leaders continued their cooperative paradigm by supporting the Communist cause
against the UN "Police Action," which carried the support of the WCC and western churches.
However, their cooperation resulted in failure because the majority of northern Christians,
including many leaders ofNKCA, fled to the South during the war.
Thus, just as the FPJP's opposition to the Communist government lost the support of the
northern minjung, so too the cooperation paradigm of the NKCA failed to find support among
the grassroots Christians in North Korea. Although the NKCA supported the land reform, and
declared its intention to work for the minjung, most of its activities were actually concentrated
on securing ecclesiastical power through a bureaucratic approach to the Communist state.
While the FPJP aimed at obtaining the secular political power through competing with the
Communists, the NKCA aimed at the same thing through diplomatic cooperation with the
Communist leaders. Both eventually failed.
The original intention of the NKCA was to renew the church-state relationship through
rooting northern Protestantism in the Communist soil. Although the NKCA aimed to be a
church for the minjung in theory, in practice, its activity was focused on diplomatic
cooperation with the Communists. The NKCA failed to achieve an authentic renewal of the
northern churches because it attempted to achieve the renewal simply through bureaucratic
changes.
Although by 1949 the NKCA had become the only representative Protestant organization in
North Korea, it paid the price for its uncritical cooperation with the government. The NKCA
became a sort of religious spokesman for the Kim Il-sung regime. The diplomatic cooperative
paradigm of the NKCA resulted in a dependency of the church-axis on the state-axis at the
expense of the minjung-axis. Its uncritical cooperation with the secular state also brought
about an identity crisis in the NKCA in regard to public issues.
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1.4 The Paradigm of Catacomb
After the Korean War, only one fourth of Protestant Christians and a few NKCA pastors
remained in North Korea. However, they were not able to reconstruct their churches because
of the social antipathy toward the Christians, the great majority of whom had supported the
enemy during the war. In this context, the remnant Christians (who were not part of the
NKCA) again collectively boycotted the general election, as an action aimed against the Kim
Il-sung regime. This boycott brought about a severe "Anti-Religious Campaign" by the
Communists. The Communist state legalized a policy of social discrimination against the
Christians. Anti-Communist underground Christian leaders were executed, and anti-Christian
propaganda and slogans were displayed across North Korea. Because of the NKCA's
concentration on a bureaucratic approach, it was not able to provide a theological justification
for the continued existence ofChristianity in North Korean Communist society.
Consequently, the remnant Christians were in difficulty to openly enjoy religious life after
1958. They gathered in underground house groups for secret and simple worship from 1958-
1972. The state-axis absolutely overwhelmed the church-axis, and did not allow any religious
freedom. This paradigm of church-state relations was similar to the paradigm of the
Catacombs in Rome during the Neronian persecution.
The discrimination and persecution practiced against Christians in North Korea from 1958-
1972 points to the failure of the former church-state relationships, developed by the NKCA
and the FPJP. Both the competitive oppositional paradigm of the FPJP and the diplomatic
cooperative paradigm of the NKCA had ignored the axis of the minjung. Therefore, when the
Communist state introduced its hostile ideological attack on northern Protestantism, the
remnant Christians were neither able to justify their Christian existence in the North Korean
Communist society, nor able to receive any support and sympathy from the minjung. This
taught northern Protestantism an important lesson: a diplomatic rapprochement with the state
was clearly not enough to secure the survival of the church; rather it had to be a church "with"
and "for" the minjung. Furthermore, it would have to articulate a theological understanding of
the significance of Christian churches in a Communist society.
In spite of the terrible climate created by the Anti-Religious Campaign, the remnant
Christians kept their faith by existing underground. This experience trained the remnant
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Christians so that they could keep the seed of faith, withstanding the most severe and trying
conditions.
1.5 The Minjung-Centered Cooperative Paradigm
From 1972 onwards, the political situation in North Korea changed, with the Communists
becoming tolerant towards the remnant Christians because they no longer regarded the
Christians as a political threat. Moreover, for the Communists it was necessary to use the
Christians for propaganda purposes, demonstrating to the outside world that religious freedom
existed in North Korea, during the political competition with South Korea. Therefore, the
state was willing to permit limited religious freedom for the remnant Christians to enjoy free
worship through the rewriting of the article on religion in the constitution. But this did not
allow for public evangelism and religious education.
However, the subjective efforts of the remnant Christians for promoting a revival of
Christianity were more important than constitutional change. They gathered together and re¬
established the KCF as their national ecclesiastical organization in 1972, and reopened house
churches. The revived KCF established the Platform for cooperation with the state,
developing leadership institutions for the churches, providing a new translation of the Bible
and hymnbook, instituting a system of registration, and engaging in North and South dialogue
with the assistance of the WCC, for the external development of the revival. The institutional
efforts of the KCF as the vehicle for the revival of post-1972 Christianity in North Korea
proved successful. However, this revival was concentrated on quantitative rather than
qualitative growth.
When the revival was stabilized, northern Protestantism began to search for internal
qualitative renewal. The institutionally-revived northern churches sought to express their
theological identity through the Christian-Juchean dialogue. One of the distinctive results of
this dialogue was an increase of mutual understanding between the Christians and the
Jucheans. The northern Christians accepted that the Juche Idea is not merely an expressing
atheistic materialism, for it emphasizes that spiritual consciousness in what determines the
course of history. On the other hand, the Jucheans also recognized that Christianity is not
simply the opium of the people. Moreover, both found that there is a similarity between
northern Protestantism and North Korean Communism in that both have developed a minjung
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and a minjok-centered approach. This enabled the northern Christians to justify their presence
in North Korean Communist society theologically (notwithstanding the fact that this
theological work still needs to be deepened), while at the same time the Jucheans and the new
leadership of North Korea gradually moved towards a more positive reinterpretation of
Christianity.
While the former cooperation paradigm practiced by the NKCA and the KWP had merely
been a diplomatic one, the new revived cooperative paradigm was based on mutual
understanding through theological and ethical dialogue. The point of convergence between
the two different systems of thought was the similarity of their understanding of the minjung
as the subject of history. This similarity has served as a theological justification of the KCF's
cooperation with the Communist state. Consequently, the article of "anti-religious
propaganda," which had been the legal foundation of the Communists' discrimination towards
the Christians, was deleted from the constitution in 1992.
While the Christian-.Juchean dialogue motivated the minjung-centered theological renewal of
northern Protestantism, the development of Social Diakonia Mission was the practical
renewal of its minjung-centered mission. North Korean people have been suffering from
famine since 1993. In this context, the northern churches became committed to relief works
for the suffering people with the material support of the South Korean and world churches,
and through this experience the northern churches developed their diaconal identity. Although
it is too early to evaluate the Social Diakonia Mission, there can be no doubt that it has proven
itself as one of the chief characteristics of the revival of northern Protestantism.
The dialogue and diakonia brought about a positive change in the North Korean
understanding of Christianity. In this meaningful renewal, the minjung-centered cooperative
approach emerged as a new paradigm of church-state relations in North Korea. Northern
Protestantism introduced the minjung as the dynamic element in a revived understanding of
church-state relations.
Through the above summary and assessment, we can conclude that northern Protestantism has
developed diverse historical paradigms of church-state relations, and that each paradigm
decisively influenced the fate of the northern Protestant churches. The issue has not been
merely a legal and institutional debate on specific issues like religious education, religious tax,
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state church or free church etc. Rather, has been a response to the whole modern history of
North Korea, with its major themes of colonization, national construction, war, famine etc.
2. The M/rt/'«rtg-Centered Approach in Church-State Relations
Protestant Christianity in North Korea has experimented with a wide range of historical
paradigms of church-state relations, from opposition to cooperation, and each paradigm
influenced Protestant Christianity's success or failure in North Korea in different ways. In this
experience of success and failure, the notion of a wmywng-centered approach was a key issue,
which decided the appropriateness of each paradigm.
Through our examination of the various historical paradigms, we have identified that the
concept of the minjung has to be included in the bilateral relationship between church and
state for establishing a proper relationship. The Oxford Conference on Church, Community
and State had already argued in 1937 that the "community of people" remains an essential
criterion for proper relations between church and state. In the North Korean context, this
means that the notion of the minjung has to be the criterion for determining whether the
northern church should oppose the state or cooperate with it. If the state developed policies in
favor of the minjung, and the minjung support their government, the church can cooperate
with the state. However, if a government is tyrannical and oppresses the minjung, the church
cannot allow the legitimacy of the government, and must oppose the state. Therefore, the
triangular approach of church, minjung and state is a highly relevant analytical methodology
for the northern churches in critically assessing their church-state relations.
No single answer can be given to the theoretical question of what the best relationship
between the church and the state in North Korea would be, because the socio-political context
has always been changing. It all depends on the nature of the changes taking place. The
northern churches have experimented with diverse relationships between church and state,
offering different responses to different changes occurring in the context. Sometimes their
response has been appropriate and authentic, at other time not.
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Church-state relations are not simply a matter of defining the differences between the two
entities in such a way that each can fulfil its task without interference from the other.467
Rather, it is possible for the church to accompany and assist the state in the spirit of critical
solidarity, in order to embrace the welfare of God's creation. In this respect, the current
cooperation of the northern churches with the state is meaningful because there is remarkable
solidarity between the church and the state in serving the suffering minjung.
However, on the other hand, there are also increasing criticisms of the North Korean
totalitarian state both inside and outside North Korea. As well as the increase in the number of
economic refugees since the famine, political refugees too are dramatically increasing. Here,
although the current minjung-centered cooperation paradigm has been successful since 1972
for promoting the revival and renewal of northern Protestantism, the changes now happening,
which may be called the signs of the times, need to be read and interpreted carefully when
developing the paradigm of cooperation with the state. If the northern Christians simply
support their Communist state without critical assessment, when the political situation is
suddenly changed, for instance in the case of the Kim Jong-il regime collapsing, they might
lose the support of the minjung again. Therefore it is necessary to recognize that the current
cooperation paradigm is not a permanent one. It is not necessary to be content with the current
position because the context of the state and minjung is always changing, which is why a
renewed critical theological assessment of the situation is always required.
There is a principle of ongoing reformation in the Reformed tradition. The northern church,
which has generally preserved Korean Reformed tradition, must be reminded that ecclesia
reformanta semper reformanda e,v/.46X The church that is reformed is always in need of being
reformed. The origins of this famous slogan are obscure. It does not come from Calvin but a
later period.469 Nevertheless, it is an appropriate slogan for use among the anonymous
grassroots participants, the minjung in Korean conception, in the struggle for ongoing
reformation. As church-state relations in North Korea have been developed in diverse
paradigms due to changes in the socio-historical context, the current paradigm of church-state
relations cannot be regarded as permanent. The only permanent feature is that the church must
467 L. Vischer ed., Church and State: Opening a New Ecumenical Discussion, 10.
468
Concerning the study on semper reformanda, see the thorough study of Hungarian-Swiss scholar G.
Barczay, Ecclesia semper reformanda, Zurich, EVZ-Verlag, 1961.
469 1. J. Hesselink, On Being Reformed, New York, Reformed Church Press, 1988, 119.
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always identify itself with the suffering minjung for the ceaseless reformation of itself, and
must continually evaluate and reshape its relationship with the state accordingly.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has attempted to give a comprehensive account of the development of Protestant
Christianity in North Korea, with special reference to issues of church and state. It has been
argued that the issue of the church-state relationship decisively influenced the growth of
churches in North Korea. Five diverse paradigms of church-state relations have developed in
the history of Protestant Christianity in North Korea, and each paradigm brought different
results for the fate of northern Protestantism.
The research has demonstrated that whatever paradigm is developed, whether one of
opposition, criticism or cooperation, church-state relations, the minjung-centered approach is
a key factor. This approach needs to be considered in assessing the proper relationship to be
constructed between church and state at any point in the ongoing history of the North Korean
context. In this respect, the minjung-centered cooperation paradigm of church-state
relationship of the revived Protestant Christianity in North Korea since 1972 has not been a
compromise accommodation with the communist government, but rather an effective
articulation of church-state relations for the benefit of the suffering northern minjung, through
the renewal of its theological and diaconal identities.
In examining the history of Protestant Christianity in North Korea, this thesis hopes to have
made an original contribution to the study of Christianity in North Korea, as the first
academic thesis on the subject. This thesis has consulted primary sources relevant to the
whole history of northern Protestantism, focusing on its development after the Korean War
and its revival since 1972. It has also raised missiological awareness of the importance of the
KCF and the house churches. It has attempted to contribute to the development of Korean
theology through its arguments on the issues of church-state relations, and the Christian
dialogue with the Juche Idea.
The possible contributions of this research are not only academic, but also practical. It hopes
to contribute towards building up a "common ground" for mutual understanding,
reconciliation and cooperation between the South and North Korean churches.
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If this thesis succeeds in proving that the revival and renewal of northern Protestantism was
not a compromise accommodation with the communist government, but an effective
articulation ofminjung-centered Christianity within a communist context, it does not claim to
be a final work; rather it hopes to stimulate further academic interest in studies of Christianity
in North Korea. It must be recognized in this conclusion that there are several areas in which
research on Christianity in North Korea needs to be taken further. Four areas merit brief
elaboration.
The first recognizes that the study of Christian-Juchean dialogue must be fully developed as
an independent research project by theologians. One of the teachings of history through the
research of this thesis is that when northern Protestantism carried on its renewal in the
communist context without proper theological work, it failed to justify the significance of
Christian existence in North Korea to the communist society. This led the grassroots
Christians being unable to participate fruitfully in that society. Therefore, the Christian-
Juchean dialogue needs to be continued and deepened, with active research on the topic.
A second area of research arises in regards to the history of local Christian communities, with
special interest in the house churches. The house churches are the main centers of the
religious life of northern Christians, and have directly interacted with local communist
societies. The experiences of Christians within these churches provide highly important
empirical and historical data for the development of North Korean theology. However,
unfortunately, the author's fieldwork for two weeks in North Korea was too limited to collect
primary sources in relation to this topic. A systematic effort to collect this data through oral
sources, from the people themselves, is now urgently needed.
A third area for further studies that has to be examined is the history of Roman Catholicism in
North Korea. When the communist regime was established, northern Catholicism shut the
doors of its cathedrals because it was not able to be in contact with the Vatican. However,
surprisingly, the Jangchoong Cathedral in Pyongyang has reopened, and the Chosun
Cheonjukyo Hyuphoi or North Korean Catholic Christian Association was formed in 1988.
This association reports that there are about eight hundred Roman Catholic Christians in
North Korea. This suggests that there must have been same continuation of Roman Catholic
religious life during the decades in which the Roman Catholic church was officially absent
from North Korea. Therefore, it is important to examine the history of Roman Catholicism in
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North Korea, in order to give a fuller account of the diverse Christian traditions in North
Korea.
The fourth area for further research would be comparative studies with the historical
experiences of other religions in North Korea. North Korea, like South Korea, is a multi-
religious society. It is easy to generalize that other religions faced a similar fate to that of
Protestant Christianity, because the Communists opposed all religions. However, on the
contrary, for instance, Chandokyo the current name of Tonghak, has a larger
membership in North Korea than it has in South Korea. The Chundoists have also had their
political party since the end of 1940s. How Chundokyo has grown into a major religion in
North Korea, and why the Communists have allowed it and have been tolerant to its political
activities, are questions that merit careful research. Are there any co-relationships, common
experiences and mutual understanding between the nationalism of Chundokyo and the Juche
Idea? This kind of comparative research would be highly valuable not only out of academic
interest, but also for providing practical references for the future development of the Christian
mission in North Korean society.
Finally, it is predictable that the dramatic increase in the number of Christians in North Korea
will be continued, due to northern Protestantism's effective engagement with its communist
context. So far, the minjung-centered cooperation paradigm of church-state relationships has
successfully led to the revival and renewal of Protestant Christianity in North Korea. However,
it is also necessary for the northern Christians to be reminded that this paradigm is not a
permanent one, because a rapid political change in the state-axis, towards a new opening
towards the outside world, seems to be developing.
The future ecclesiological development of Protestant Christianity in North Korea will also be
of interest. Will it strengthen the house church-centered congregational model, or follow the
hierarchical model of southern Protestantism? Will it be possible for the KCF and the house
churches to continue developing an independent tradition, as the China Christian Council has
done? Or will it be absorbed as part of the southern tradition, as has happened to the former
eastern German church? Or will it return to the traditional model of church if the model
articulated in the socialist context collapses, or is no longer necessary, as likewise seem to




KOREAN PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE
Dated the 4252nd Year of the Kingdom ofKorea, 3rd Month, 1st Day (March 1, 1919)
We herewith proclaim the independence of Korea and the liberty of the Korean people.
We tell it to the world in witness of the equality of all nations, and we pass it on to our
posterity as their inherent right.
We make this proclamation, having in back of us a history of forty-three centuries and
20,000,000 united, loyal people. We take this step to insure to our children for all time
to come, life and liberty in accord with the awakening conscience of this new era. This
is the clear leading of God, the moving principle of the present age, the just claim of the
whole human race.
It is something that cannot be stamped out, or stifled, or gagged, or suppressed by any
means. Victims of an older age, when brute force and the spirit of plunder ruled, we
have come after these long thousands of years to experience the agony of ten years of
foreign oppression, with every loss of the right to live, every restriction of the freedom
of thought, every damage to the dignity of life, every opportunity lost for a share in the
intelligent advance of the age in which we live.
Assuredly, if the defects of the past are to be rectified, if the wrongs of the present are to
be righted, if future oppression is to be avoided, if thought is to be set free, if right of
action is to be given a place, if we are to attain to any way of progress, if we are to
deliver our children from the painful heritage of shame, if we are to leave blessing and
happiness intact for those who succeed us, the first of all necessary things is the
complete independence of our people. What cannot our twenty millions do, with hearts
consecrated to liberty, in this day when human nature and conscience are making a
stand for truth and right? What barrier can we not break, what purpose can we not
accomplish?
We have no desire to accuse Japan of breaking many solemn treaties since 1876, nor to
single out specially the teachers in the schools or the government officials who treat the
heritage of our ancestors as a colony of their own, and our people and our civilization as
a nation of savages, and who delight only in beating us down and bringing us under
their heel.
We have no wish to find special fault with Japan's lack of fairness or her contempt for
our civilization and the principles on which her state rests; we, who have greater cause
to reprimand ourselves, need not spend time in finding fault with others; neither need
we, who require so urgently to build for the future, spend useless hours over what is past
and gone. Our urgent need today is the rebuilding of this house of ours and not the
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discussion of who has broken it down or what has caused its ruin. Our work is to clear
the future of defects in accord with the earnest dictates of conscience. Let us not be
filled with bitterness or resentment over past occasions for anger.
Our part is to influence the Japanese government, dominated as it is by the old idea of
brute force which thinks to run counter to reason and universal law, so that it will
change and act honestly and in accord with the principles of right and truth.
The result of annexation, brought about against the will of the Korean people, is that the
Japanese are concerned only for their own gain, and by a false set of figures show a
profit and loss account between us two peoples most untrue, digging a trench of
everlasting deeper and deeper the farther they go.
Ought not the way of enlightened courage to be to correct the evils of the past by ways
that are sincere, and by true sympathy and friendly feelings make a new world in which
the two peoples will be equally blessed?
To bind by force twenty millions of resentful Koreans will mean not only loss of peace
forever for this part of the Far East, but also will increase the ever-growing suspicions
of four hundred millions of Chinese upon whom depends the safety of the Far East—
besides strengthening the hatred of Japan. From this all the rest of the East will suffer.
Today Korean independence will mean not only life and happiness for us, but also
Japan's departure from an evil path and her exaltation to the place of true protector of
the East, so that China too would put all fear of Japan aside. This thought comes from
no minor resentment, but from a large hope for the welfare and blessings of mankind.
A new era wakes before our eyes, the old world of force is gone, and the new world of
righteousness and truth is here. Out of experience and travail of the old world arises this
light on the affairs of life. Insects stifled by their foe, the snows of winter, are also
awakened at this time of the year by breezes of spring and the warn light of the snow
upon them.
It is the day of the restoration of all things, on the full tide of satisfaction in the way of
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and an opportunity to develop what is in us for
glory of our people. In this hope we go forward.
1. This work of ours is on behalf of truth, justice, and life, undertaken at the request of
our people, in order to make known their desire for liberty. Let no violence be done to
anyone.
2. Let those who follow us know every hour with gladness this same spirit.
3. Let all things be done with singleness of purpose, so that our behavior to the very end
may be honorable and upright.
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APPENDIX B
THE STATEMENT OF THE FIVE PROVINCE JOINT PRESBYTERY
20 October 1946
Five Province Joint Presbytery
The 2,000 churches and 300,000 Christians, for the preservation of the faith and the
progress of the Church, having approved the following five principles for the
government of the Church and as rules for Christian living, wish to inform the People's
Committee of these principles, hoping for their kind co-operation:
1. Keeping the Sabbath day holy is of the life of the Church, so there should be no
attendance at any activities except worship on the Lord's Day.
2. Politics and religion should be distinctly separated.
3. The respect for the Deity in the church building is the proper duty of the church,
so that the use of church buildings for purposes other than worship is forbidden.
4. In the event that an acting church minister entering the field of politics, he must
resign his office in the church.
5. The church stands for freedom of religion and of assembly.
APPENDIX C
THE STATEMENT OF THE NORTH KOREAN CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION
June 1946
The Preparatory Committee of the Christian Association
1. We fully support the Kim Il-sung government.
2. We do not recognize the South Korean regime.
3. The Church vows to be a leader for the minjung.
4. Therefore, the Church participates in the election on its own initiative.
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APPENDIX D
THE KOREAN SITUATION AND WORLD ORDER
July 13, 1950
Toronto, Canada
The Central Committee of the World Council ofChurches
The conflict in Korea reveals the precarious nature of peace and security in the world
today. The World Council of Churches expresses its deep concerns and calls upon its
members as a world-wide Christian fellowship to pray for Korea, where guilty and
innocent suffer or perish together, and to bear witness to Christ as Lord of all Life and
as Prince of Peace.
An act of aggression has been committed. The United Nations Commission in Korea,
the most objective witness available, asserts that "all evidence points to a calculated,
coordinated attack prepared and launched with secrecy" by North Korean troops.
Armed attack as an instrument of national policy is wrong. We therefore commend the
United Nations, an instrument of world order, for its prompt decision to meet this
aggression and for authorizing police measure which every member nation should
support. At the same time, governments must press individually and through the United
Nations for a just settlement by negotiation and conciliation.
The enforced division of a people in Korea or elsewhere is a bitter result of the divided
world. It violates fundamental rights and increases the threat to peace. The United
Nations has attempted to establish a free, united and independent Korea within
community of nations. Every opportunity which may arise from the present tragic
situation must be used to gain this end.
The Korean situation need not be the beginning of a general war. We must not regard
world-wide conflict as inevitable. Any tendency to irresponsible fatalism should be
resisted. We stand for a just peace under the rule of law and must seek peace by
expanding justice and by attempting to reconcile contending world powers.
Postwar totalitarianism replies not only on military pressures but also upon a policy of
exploiting the distress of the poor, the resentments of subject peoples, discriminations
on grounds of race, religion or national origin, the chaos of badly governed nations, and
the general disunity between nations. The Korean attack may well be one of a possible
series of thrusts at such weak points in world society. Since the world is still filled with
these injustices and disorders, a mood of complacency is both wrong and politically
dangerous. Overcoming these evils is therefore the most important means for rendering
the world morally impregnable to totalitarian infiltration.
Such methods of modern warfare as the use of atomic and bacteriological weapons and
obliteration bombing involve force and destruction of life on so terrible a scale as to
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imperil the very basis on which law and civilization can exist. It is therefore imperative
that they should be banned by international agreement and we welcome every sincere
proposal to this end. However, the "Stockholm Appeal", which demands the outlawing
of atomic weapons only, without effective international inspection and control, both
immediate and continuous, must be regarded as a strategy of propaganda rather than a
genuine peace proposal. We must seek peace by cultivating mutual confidence and work
for an increasing devotion to common moral principles.
We see the judgments and warnings of God in the things which are now being wrought.
As Christians it must be our purpose to "redeem the time because the days are evil."
Every temptation to ease and social indifference in so tragic an age, and every tendency
towards hysteria amidst the perils about us, must be resisted. We must encourage each
other to bear the burdens and face the tasks of our age in the faith of Him who abideth
faithful, leaving what lies beyond our power to Him Whose power ruleth and overruleth
the actions and passions ofmen and nations.
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APPENDIX E
Dr. W. A. Visser't Hooft,
General Secretary,
World Council ofChurches,





We are increasingly disturbed by the fact that the present day international tension has
driven our ecumenical cooperation within the World Council of Churches to a point
where it might becomes more and more problematic. It is not only we that have such a
grave feeling. Statements we have received from various parts of the world are
expressing an anxiety of many a member of the church lest the Ecumenical movement
hitherto represented, with such a dignity, by the World Council of Churches become an
instrument of one international power-group. We are, after earnest deliberations, writing
this letter to the Secretariats of the World Council of Churches with a wish that our
words help to solve some difficult problems of the Ecumenical movement, and to renew
the relations of mutual trust and genuine cooperation.
It was the statement of the Central Committee at Toronto, July 1950, that caused our
first serious doubt about the wisdom and prudence of the general attitude of the World
Council of Churches to the questions and troubles of international life. The great
mission of the World Council of Churches is to stay as a living conscience of nations
and countries, to peer, with the eyes of faith, into the depths of world tension, of social
diseases and of the war-danger resulting from them. A vast majority of the Christians
organized in the World Council of Churches comes from the traditionally Christian
countries, proud of their Christian civilization and looking upon themselves as the
defenders of Christian spiritual and moral treasures. It is precisely for this fact that they
should carefully watch the motives of their own nations international politics. The living
prophetic and apostolic word does not permit the church to pass judgment upon the
world before she has bowed her head under the judgment of the Lord; she is not
permitted to condemn other nations before she has most severely scrutinized the hearts
and minds of her own nations. This applies particularly to the Churches of the countries
which ostentatiously and officially adhere to the principles of the Christian civilization.
The Church has right and obligation to raise her voice in the matters of public and
international life. However, she must do it with the wisdom and prudence of a really
penitent and to Jesus Christ dedicated conscience. Today, when the peace of the world is
at stake, and every self-righteous word can strengthen the aggressive and destructive
forces in one's own nation, and prompt a catastrophy, the World Council of Churches
should speak in the way that does not pour oil into the fire, and does not encourage one
side to a self-righteous "crusade".
What really matters is not only the statement of Toronto in July 1950 but also, and
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above all, the mood and the spirit guiding the most important groups within the family
of the World Council of Churches. And against this background can be, it seems to us,
explained the unfortunate and fateful paragraph of the Toronto statement in which the
Central Committee commends the decision of the Security Council to carry out a
"Police action" in Korea. It is difficult to understand how a finding of the Korea
commission which represents just one power-group within the U.N.O. could have been
taken as a ground and justification of such a far-reaching statement. We are really
disturbed by the fact that, in one of the most decisive and tragic moments of world
history, the World Council of Churches identified itself, self-assuredly, with one side.
Instead of challenging the responsibility of all statesmen it condemned, in an out-spoken
and specific way, one of two groups. The whole structure of the Toronto statement is, in
this respect, remarkable. The condemnation was specific. But when the statement tried
to point to the deeper causes of the present conflict it got lost in general moral and
political considerations. It did not, with one single word, question the basis of the
decision which had broken the unanimity principle of great powers. And yet, it is
exactly this principle that is - and in our judgment for a long time shall stay - one of the
pillars of the U.N.O. We hear, to be sure, many people in the west criticizing the
unanimity principle as, in many ways, uncomfortable, slowing down the procedure of
quick decision and action. However, any responsible and realistic person and observer
of the world events well knows that the times are abnormal and that we have to suppress
our impatience, to deny ourselves and to go, step by step, to the deepest motives of
whom we consider the most responsible in the fateful perils of our days. Only in that
way can we lay foundations for a new social and international order. If statesmen are not
in a position to do it, the Church should stand on the watch. The Toronto statement did
not, with one single word, raise criticism of the effort to keep the Democratic China out
of the General Assembly and the Security Council, and to solve the problem of Korea
without Democratic China and the Soviet Union. Look at the map of Asia and visualize
what it means! This procedure of self-will, prestige and power irritates, and will in the
future irritate more and more, the Asiatic peoples to resist. The way in which the new
China has been treated by the U.N.O. is - in our judgment - one of the causes of the
Korean convulsion. Moreover, we have missed any specific warning against the bloody
suppression of the peoples of Vietnam and Malaya fighting for their political freedom
and social self-determination. All words the Toronto statement said about the
exploitation of human misery, about the wrong treatment of some races are not much
more than pious phrases - and even they are actually directed against those who fight,
in their way, with human misery. The days of the end of June and the beginning of July
were mortally serious. It was paramount to speak clearly, specifically and without
"respecting persons in judgment".
It was also essential to lay fingers upon the fact that economic expansion tends always,
sooner or later, tangibly or intangibly, to military aggression. The Church groups are apt
to overlook it since the economic expansion does not look, at first sight, as dangerous as
a direct political and military domination. Economic expansion tends always, we respect,
to a war peril; consequently, also the economic expansion of Western nations is, at
present, a breeding place of military aggression which can be ignored or even denied
only by those who are self-complacently sure of their own goodness and the depravity
of "the others".
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But let us repeat: what really matters is not only the Toronto statement; we have, with
uneasiness, read some pronouncements of outstanding representatives of Western
Christianity. They draw attention to the spiritual and moral shortcomings of Western
Christianity, they call to repentance, and yet, do it in such a way that the penitent
Christians have in the end a feeling of self-satisfaction because the real culprit appears
"on the other side" of the international front. Confer e.g., the statement of Federal
Council of Churches in USA issued to the "World Order Day" of October 22, 1950:
"The Churches ofChrist in America see in the aggressive imperialism of the police state
the most virulent form of man's disobedience to God. Communist leaders, in seeking
world domination, appear to risk the catastrophy of another general war to achieve their
ends..." The present social world revolution is treated here in a rather cheap way.
However, what is more distressing is the silence about the accumulated wealth in one
nation as the dangerous, although hidden, motive of political aggression as well as of
stubborn resistance to social revolution which may be the Lord's judgment upon
selfishness and exploitation, pride and self-righteousness of nations.
World Council of Churches must not be made responsible for all pronouncements and
actions of its member churches. Our words are rather a warning against many dangers
encroaching upon it from the side of the most outstanding church groups, and their
theologians. We are not inclined to be anybody's advocate. We raise, in all humanity,
our voice to say our friends and fellow-workers if our distress. We are afraid of the road
the World Council of Churches might walk if it yielded to the mood of one side of the
present world.
This letter was written by Professor Hromadka as a member of the Central Committee
after he discussed the matter with Dr. V. Hajek, Synodical Senior of the Evangelical
Church ofCzech Brethren. It represents the view of both of them.
With many fraternal greetings,
Faithfully yours,
(Sig.) Josef L. Hromadka Viktor Hajek
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APPENDIX F
THE PLATFORM OF KOREAN CHRISTIAN FEDERATION
1972, Pyongyang
The Central Committee of the Korean Christian Federation
1. With patriotism, we will make efforts for the prosperity of the country upholding the
constitution and policy of the Republic government.
2. We will strive to eliminate all sorts of discrimination based on gender, nation, religion,
property and class, and to establish a free, equal society founded on the spirit of
Christian Charity.
3. The KCF will work to defend the freedom of faith and religious life for the
development of Christianity in Chosun (North Korea), including work for evangelism,
and the rights and demands of the Christians.
4. The KCF will eagerly participate in the nation-wide National United Front through
remaining strongly united with the patriotic and democratic parties and social
organizations, which work for the prosperity of the nation and love of our fatherland.
5. We will struggle for the complete independence of the fatherland, supporting the
independent reunification policy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We
oppose any moves to foster national separation and division carried out by the
imperialists and their agents.
6. We will promote fellowship and solidarity with the Christians and those people all
over the world who love justice and peace, and respect the independence of our country.
We will contribute to world peace and the welfare of all humanity.
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APPENDIX G
PEACE AND THE REUNIFICATION OF KOREA: POLICY STATEMENT
July 1989, Moscow
The Central Committee of the World Council ofChurches
I. In its "statement on Peace and Justice", the World Council of Churches' sixth
Assembly affirmed that
"The churches today are called to confess anew their faith, and repent for the
times when Christians have remained silent in the face of injustice or threats to
peace. The biblical vision of peace with justice for all, of wholeness, of unity for
all God's people is not one of several options for the followers of Christ. It is an
imperative in our time."
The yearning for peace, justice and unity converges most poignantly and in a unique
manner in the case of Korea. The Korean people have been divided by foreign forces,
and remain divided by force and have been submitted to coercive systems of control
which perpetuate this division and are justified by it. Opposing conceptions of justice
have been created and systemized in Korea, where "security" imposes a continual state
of confrontation. A so-called "peace" is maintained at the cost of the largest
concentration ofmilitary force in the world. Peculiar notions ofjustice are maintained at
the cost of the right of the Korean people to decide their own destiny. Korea remains
technically at war, and so long as millions of families remain separated, there can be no
claim that justice has been achieved.
The Gospel of Jesus Christ compels Christians and churches in the ecumenical
community to engage every effort to overcome division and bring about shalom, a true
peace where righteousness and well-being prevail. The biblical passage found in
Ephesians 2:14-16 reflects clearly the hopes and promise of the long-suffering Korean
people:
"He is our peace, who has made us both one, and has broken down the dividing
wall of hostility, by abolishing in his flesh those commandments and ordinances
that divided human beings. That he might create in himself one new human being
in place of the two, so making peace, and might reconcile us both to God in one
body through the cross, thereby bringing the hostility to an end."
The WCC confesses that it has not always dealt equitably with the Korean question.
Mistakes of the past should weigh on the conscience of the ecumenical community and
intensify our determination to struggle for peace and the reunification of Korea. As the
WCC's Tozanso consultation on "Peace and Justice in North-East Asia" states,
"The churches are called to provide hope, to witness for peace, justice and unity.
They must become a model of dialogue and participation for all who have been
affected by the tragedy of division. Christians must surround one another in love,
supporting one another in the fellowship of the Holy Spirit."
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II. Reaffirming the Tozanso principles of ecumenical coordination in these pursuits, the
WCC commends the efforts of many churches and ecumenical organizations which
have already engaged themselves actively and responsibly in pursuing contacts with
Christians in the DPRK, while at the same time maintaining intimate liaison with
partner churches and NCCK in the ROK.
The WCC also commends its Korean member churches and the NCCK for their
courageous pursuit of human rights and democratization in Korean, as well as their
eagerness, despite severe difficulties, to encourage the WCC's contacts with North
Korea and to participate in the two historic Glion meetings involving delegations from
both North and South. The WCC warmly welcomes the NCCK historic "Declaration of
the Churches of Korea on National Reunification and Peace", of February 1988 and the
"Message of the International Christian Consultation on Justice and Peace in Korea" of
April 1988, which constitute important stages in the Tozanso process. It also commends
the initiatives taken by women in the Korean churches.
The WCC commends the Korean Christians Federation for its active participation in the
ecumenical efforts for peace and the reunification of Korea. It welcomes the new
opportunities that the Christian community in the North has for wider ecumenical
contacts as well as for public worship.
The WCC pledges to continue to work in the spirit of the Tozanso process to facilitate
contacts and to act as a channel of communication between the Christian communities
ofNorth and South Korea, as long as this communication cannot be carried on directly.
It recognizes the special role of the Christian Conference of Asia and churches in Japan,
the USA, the USSR and the People's Republic of China and Korean Christian
communities abroad in this regard. Considering the crucial role of the USA in Korea,
the work of the NCCCUSA including the policy statement on "Peace and Reunification
ofKorea" provides a positive example of ecumenical solidarity and cooperation.
The WCC instructs the CCIA to continue to monitor and analyze the situations in both
parts of Korea, as well as developments in the region, and in the international
community of nations, as far as the Korean issue is concerned. The CCIA is requested
to work closely with inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations and to
engage itself actively in the United Nations for the promotion of peace and the
reunification of Korea.
III. In this context, the WCC encourages all member churches and related agencies and
councils to initiate or redouble efforts to persuade their respective governments to
review their Korean policies and bring them in line with the objectives of peace, justice
and reunification. The WCC commends the following elements as priority
considerations:
1. The people of Korea should be the ultimate subjects in decisions affecting their
future, without outside interference or tutelage. The reunification of Korea should
be carried out through a process of democratic participation by all members of
the Korean nation.
2. All parties concerned should be called upon to commit themselves to the
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principles contained in the joint North-South declaration of 4 July 1972, namely
"independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity". The USA, USSR,
Japan and China in particular should be pressed to state clearly their intention to
pursue the reunification of Korea as a matter of national policy.
3. The reunification process should respect and recognize the reality of the two
existing autonomous systems in the spirit of peaceful co-existence, with the
objective of building up one united country. Any proposal implying the
permanent division of Korea should be rejected.
4. A radical reduction ofmilitary forces, facilities and weapons should be sought on
the Korean peninsula in order to eliminate one of the major threats to regional
and world peace. The scaling-down of military exercises and the signing of non-
aggression declarations could be useful contributions to such force reductions.
5. As contribution to the reduction of tensions and a sign of good faith, the USA
should be urged to remove immediately all nuclear weapons from Korean soil,
and both the USA and the USSR should be urged also to remove all nuclear
weapons aimed at Korea. This would open the way for the creation of a nuclear-
free zone in Korea.
6. The USA, which along with the DPRK is co-signatory of the 1953 Armistice
Agreement, should be encouraged to cooperate in negotiating a peace treaty
which could create conditions leading towards the withdrawal of its military
forces from the peninsula.
7. A fresh, truly impartial initiative should be launched by the United Nations in an
effort to rectify its historical legacy of bias and complicity in Korea's division.
Serious consideration should be given to the proposal that the United Nations
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea oversee a mutual troop
reduction by North and South Korea.
8. Both North and South Korea should be pressed to find solutions to outstanding
humanitarian problems, foremost the tragic situation of millions of separated
families. With due recognition that this is an extremely complex problem, open to
political misuse and whose solution should not contribute to the perpetuation of
division, all parties to the conflict must be urgently reminded of the humane and
moral imperative of findings appropriate mechanisms to open many and varied
forms of contact between the two parts of the country.
IV. Reaffirming the "Glion Declaration on Peace and the Reunification of Korea", the
WCC supports the decision of churches in both North and South Korea to observe 1995
as the "Year of Jubilee for Unification" and recommends that all WCC member
churches and associate ecumenical councils and conferences join in prayer with the
Korean churches by observing the Common Day of Prayer.
As one step towards the Jubilee Year, the WCC should explore the possibility of direct
reciprocal ecumenical visits between North and South Korea.
The WCC urges all member churches and ecumenical bodies to help Korean Christians
in their struggle for peace and the reunification of their people by engaging in activities
of solidarity which may include the following elements:
1. Establish or maintain contact with churches and Christians in both parts of Korea.
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Such contacts should promote the building of confidence between North and
South by providing first-hand information, thus contributing to an atmosphere of
trust and reconciliation.
2. In planning contacts and visit to North Korea, it is important to respect the non-
denominational character of Christian life there. The Tozanso guidelines, which
state that all such visits undertaken in consultation with the WCC and the CCA,
should be observed. Visits should be ecumenical both in composition and
sponsorship. Visits should be followed up, where possible, with reciprocal
invitations to North Korean Christians. Churches in socialist countries carry a
special burden in helping North Korean to overcome their isolation.
3. The production and wide dissemination of information about Korea, both within
the churches and where possible to the wider public, continues to be essential,
given the fact that general knowledge about the Korean situation is grossly
inadequate. Such information should include the NCCK "Declaration of the
Churches of Korea on National Reunification and Peace" and the "Glion
Declaration on Peace and the Reunification of Korea" as well as the text of this
WCC Policy Statement and background paper.
4. In view of the fact that Koreans have been made victims of global Cold War, all
efforts to halt the East-West confrontation and arms race will lighten the burden
of the Korean dilemma. Churches everywhere must participate in the breaking
down of enemy images and the ideological walls which divide both the world
and Korea. The overcoming of hatred and hostility is not only a political task but
also centrally a task of biblical and theological peace education.
5. Efforts should be made to determine at least the status of separated family
members, and explore the possibility of communication. Caution must be
exercised that such efforts always remain within the context of reunification for
all Korean people. In the words of the "Message" of the International Christian
Consultation on Justice and Peace in Korea at Inchon, "It is essential that efforts
for the reunion of Korean families be responsibly inter-related among Koreans
living inside and outside Korea, to ensure that these deeply emotional desures are
not exploited for negative political ends."
V. There has been good progress in the struggle for peace and the reunification of Korea
during the years since the Tozanso Consultation. It is a credit to the Korean churches
and solidarity shown by ecumenical partners that so many positive steps have been
successfully taken. But there is yet a long way to go. The immense tragedy of the
division of Korea is still little known. The disproportionate human cost paid by the
Korean people for the Cold War and geopolitics is little known. The continuing agony
of the separation of millions is little known. The potential for escalation of the conflict
even to a nuclear conflagration is little known.
It is in highlighting these concerns for world-wide recognition that the World Council of
Churches and the ecumenical community can make a unique contribution. The Korean
division is in microcosm a symbol of the division of the world. If this wound in the
human community can be healed, there would emanate from Korea a hope for all of
humankind. We pray that the cross of the Korean people can lead to an Easter for us all.
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APPENDIX H
DECLARATION OF THE CHURCHES OF KOREA ON NATIONAL
REUNIFICATION AND PEACE
February 29, 1988
The National Council of Churches in Korea
The following statement was unanimously adopted with a standing ovation by the
delegates attending the 37th general meeting of the National Council of Churches in
Korea held in the Yondong Presbyterian Church, Seoul on 29 February 1988.
We first offer our praise and thanksgiving for the grace and love ofGod, for sending the
Gospel of Christ to the Korean peninsula, making it possible for us to know of the death
and Resurrection of Jesus Christ, and for granting us salvation and adoption as children
of God. We offer our thanks also for the work of the Holy Spirit in the history of Korea
among all the sisters and brothers of the community of faith, uniting the whole church
in service to the mission of the liberation and salvation of our people. We confess the
one God, Creator of the heavens and the earth (Genesis 1:1), and we believe that all
people are invited to become children of God (Romans 8:14-17; Galatians 3:26, 4:7).
Jesus Christ came to this land as the "Servant of Peace" (Ephesians 2:13-19), to
proclaim within division, conflict and oppression God's Kingdom of peace,
reconciliation and liberation (Luke 4:18; John 14:27). Jesus Christ suffered, died upon
the Cross, was buried, and rose in the Resurrection to reconcile humanity to God, to
overcome divisions and conflicts, and to liberate all people and make them one (Acts
10:36-40). Jesus Christ blessed the peacemakers and called them the children of God
(Matthew 5:9). We believe that the Holy Spirit will reveal to us the eschatological
future of history, will make us one, and enable us to become partners in God's mission
(John 14:18-21; 16:13-14; 17:11).
We believe that all of us who are members of the churches of Korea have been called to
labor as apostles of peace (Colossians 3:15). God has commanded the Korean churches
to undertake the mission of overcoming today's harsh reality of our one people divided
north and south in confrontation, and we are thus obligated to work for the realization of
unification and peace (Matthew 5:23-24).
With this confession of our faith as a foundation, the National Council of Churches in
Korea hereby declares its position on peace and the reunification of our nation before
the churches of Korea and the world ecumenical community, at the same time directing
an appeal in the spirit of prayer to all our Korean compatriots and to the leaders of
government in both north and south.
The Mission Tradition of the Korean Churches for Justice and Peace
The Protestant churches of Korea have proclaimed the Gospel of Jesus Christ in this
land for more than a century, and have committed many errors before the people of
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Korea during that time, yet these same churches, in their proclamation of the Kingdom
of God, have devoted great efforts toward realizing the liberation and independence
which have been the great hope of the Korean people. Our forebears in the faith
received the Holy Spirit, and following the command of the Scriptures (Luke 4:18-19),
they preached the Gospel to the poor, gave hope of liberty and independence to our
oppressed people, and as they shared the suffering of the Korean people in their slavery
under Japanese imperial rule, they resolutely pursued the mission of national liberation
and independence.
The Christians of Korea could not, however, find the true meaning of peace within any
ease or security they might be granted so long as they remained bowed like slaves in
submission. Peace must be the fruit of justice (Isaiah 32:17), and a peace which did not
include national independence or humane liberty could only be a false peace (Jeremiah
6:13-14). The peace movement of the Korean churches during Japanese imperial
colonial rule was necessarily a movement for national independence which shared in the
pain of our enslaved people, while preaching faith and the Kingdom of God inevitably
implied the realization of those realities within history through the movement for
national liberation.
The Christians of Korea marched in the forefront of March First Independence
Movement of 1919, resisted the Japanese imperial policy of annihilating Korean culture,
and shed martyrs' blood in defiance of the Japanese deification of nationalism in the
enforcement of Shinto worship.
After Korea was divided in 1945, the Christians of South Korea helped minister to the
needs of those victimized by the national separation, especially the suffering refugees,
orphans, and others dislocated by war. The churches welcomed into their midst those
from the north separated from their families or churches, offering them love and support.
As the national division hardened into a fixed reality, dictatorial military regimes
emerged which repressed human rights in the name of security, and oppressed laborers
and farmers under the logic of economic growth. The churches of Korea mounted
resistance to such oppression through a faith which sought justice and peace. The
Korean churches' movement in behalf of human rights and democratization in the
1970's and 1980's has thus been the direct heir to the enduring tradition of a mission
movement for justice and peace.
The Reality of a Divided People
The division of the Korean peninsula is a sinful result of the present world political
structure and existing ideological systems. The Korean nation has been forced to suffer
as a sacrificial lamb at the hands of the world's superpowers as they pursue their
involved struggles within their military and ideological confrontations.
The Korean people were liberated from their slavery under Japanese imperial colonial
rule in 1945 at the end of the Second World War, but were immediately bound in the
new fetters of division into north and south. The line of demarcation established in the
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name of disarming the aggressive Japanese imperial forces became fixed due to the
Cold War structure between the Soviet Union and the United States. The northern and
southern parts of Korea separately established different governments, and for over 40
years their mutual military, political and ideological conflicts and antagonisms have
become ever more severe.
The Korean Conflict which began on June 25, 1950 brought about a tragic internecine
war on the peninsula which intensified the international conflict. More tonnage in
bombs was dropped on Korea than on the whole of Europe in the Second World War,
reducing the entire peninsula to ashes. The Korean War resulted in 220,000 South
Korean, over 600,000 north Korean, 1,000,000 Chinese, 140,000 American, and over
16,000 other United Nations military casualties, and if the number who died from
disease during the war is included, some 2,500,000 soldiers' lives were sacrificed. If the
500,000 south Korean and 3,000,000 north Korean civilian casualties are added to that,
the blood of six million persons was spilled upon the earth of this land (statistics from
the Encyclopedia Britannica, 1970 edition). In addition, three million refugees and ten
million separated family members remained after this conflict.
In the time both preceding and following the Korean Conflict, the Christians of north
Korea have endured suffering and death in their confrontation with the North Korean
communist regime, leading hundreds of thousands of Christians from the north to leave
their home communities and churches to endure the hardships of refugee life in their
flight to the south. During the War a considerable number of South Korean Christians
were kidnapped or subjected to cruel, tragic executions. Communist sympathizers
became victims of ideological warfare and were ostracized from society, labeled as
"traitors."
The Korean peninsula, which had been reduced to ashes in war, continued to live
entangled in the international political conflict of the east-west Cold War structure, and
as a result there was a steady escalation between the north and south in military
competition, mutual distrust, reciprocal vilification and hostility. Peace on the peninsula
was destroyed, and it became generally accepted that national reconciliation would be
impossible for the Korean people.
The demarcation begun as an "armistice line" following the signing of the Armistice
Agreement in 1953 soon hardened into a permanently unchangeable "border of
division." As this wall of separation loomed ever higher, the two systems in north and
south continued to become ever more aggressively hostile within this separation and
confrontation. The military rivalry between north and south accelerated, until the state
of armed readiness stood at 840,000 troops in the north, with 600,000 in the south, or
nearly 1,500,000 troops on the peninsula. The nuclear weapons deployed here or
targeted upon the peninsula alone constitute a destructive force more than sufficient to
annihilate completely the people of Korea.
The prolongation of this division has led to abuses of human rights in both systems in
the name of security and ideology, thus we have seen the repression of the freedoms of
speech, press, assembly and association. The complete suspension by both sides of
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postal service, travel, visitation and all other communication has resulted in the ironic
situation of the two sections of one small land area becoming the two most distant and
different countries on earth. The educational systems and propaganda of north and south
share in mutual vilification, each setting the two systems in competition in order to
weaken and destroy the other, always perceived as the most hated enemy. As a result
the people of both north and south are not only kept in ignorance about the life and
culture of their Korean compatriots, but have been trained to believe they must not
know about one another. Thus both systems teach their people to believe that their
blood brothers and sisters are the enemy most to be feared.
Dialogue between north and south was begun in 1972, and the July 4th Joint
Communique of that year raised hopes that this would become an opening leading to
further dialogue, cooperation and exchange. Red Cross talks between north and south
were reopened in 1985, and although some separated families were able to visit their
home areas, the numbers involved were extremely limited, and as yet dialogue and
negotiations remain completely at a standstill.
As late as the early 1980's the Christians of South Korea were not able so much as to
verify the existence of a church or Christian believers in the north. The deep-seated
mistrust and enmity toward the communist regime engendered during the hardening of
the state of division continued unabated, and Christians remained blindly attached to a
rigid anti-Communist ideology.
A Confession of the Sin of Hatred within Division
As we Christians of Korea publish this declaration for peace and reunification, we
confess before God and our people that we have sinned; we have long harbored a deep
hatred and hostility toward the other side within the structure of division.
1. The division of the Korean people has been the result of the structural evil reflected
in the east-west confrontation of the world's superpowers in their Cold War system, and
this reality has also been the root cause of the structural evil present within the societies
of both north and South Korea. Within this state of division we have been guilty of the
sin of violating God's commandment, "You shall love your neighbor as yourself'
(Matthew 22:37-40)
Because of the division of our homeland, we have hated, deceived and murdered our
blood compatriots, and have compounded this sin through political and ideological
justification. Division has led to war, yet we Christians have committed the sin of
endorsing the reinforcement of troops and further rearmament with the newest and most
powerful weapons in the name of preventing another war (Psalms 33:16-20; 44:6-7).
Through this process the Korean peninsula has become dependent upon outside powers
not only militarily, but also in the political, economic and other spheres, and has been
incorporated into and subjugated under the east-west Cold War structure. We Christians
confess to having sinned during the course of this subjugation by abandoning our sense
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of national pride and betraying our people through forfeiting our spirit of national
independence (Romans 9:3).
2. We confess that during the course of our national division the churches of Korea have
not only remained silent and repeatedly ignored the ongoing movement for the
autonomous reunification of our people, but have further sinned by trying to justify the
division. The Christians of both north and south have made absolute idols of the
ideologies imposed by their respective systems. This is a betrayal of the ultimate
sovereignty of God (Exodus 20:3-5), and is a sin, for the church must obey the will of
God rather than the will ofpolitical regimes (Acts 4:19).
We confess that the Christians of the south especially have sinned by making a virtual
religious idol out of anti-communist ideology and have thus not been content merely to
treat the communist regime in the north as the enemy, but have gone further and
damned our northern compatriots and others whose ideology differs form our own (John
13:14-15; 4:20-21). Not only does this sin violate the commandment, it has also become
the sin of indifference toward those neighbors who have suffered and continue to suffer
because of our national division. It is furthermore the sin of failure to ameliorate their
suffering through the love of Christ (John 13:17).
The Basic Principles of the Churches of Korea for National Reunification
We Christians must practice the Gospel of peace and reconciliation so that the just and
peaceful Kingdom of God may come (Ephesians 2:14-17), and to bring this about we
must share in the suffering of our people. Such participation is the only way our nation's
reconciliation and reunification can be realized, thus concern and efforts in behalf of
reunification are a matter of faith for us. By overcoming the division which threatens
the life of the Korean people and endangers world peace, reunification becomes the way
leading us from conflict and confrontation to reconciliation and coexistence, and finally
to one peaceful community for our people.
The National Council of Churches in Korea has, through a series of consultations
beginning in 1984, established the following basic principles for the churches as we
look toward national reunification.
The National council of Churches in Korea affirms the three broad principles articulated
in the first north-south negotiated Joint Communique of July 4, 1972 namely (1)
independence, (2) peace, and (3) a national unity transcending differences in ideas,
ideologies and systems, and believes that these should provide the guiding spirit
informing our nation's reconciliation and reunification. In addition, we Christians
believe that the following two further principles should also be honored in all dialogue,
negotiation, and action for reunification.
1. Reunification must bring about not only the common good and benefit of the people
and the nation, it must also provide the maximum protection of human liberty and
dignity. Since the people and the nation both exist to protect human freedom and
welfare, while ideologies and systems also exist to serve humanity, primary
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consideration must always be given to humanitarian concerns and humane measures,
and these must never be withheld by any government.
2. In every step of the formulation of proposals for reunification the full democratic
participation of all members of society must be guaranteed. Most importantly,
participation must be assured for the minjung (common people), who have not only
suffered the most in the situation of division, but have been continuously alienated and
excluded from the decision-making processes of society, despite their constituting the
majority of the population.
Proposals of the Churches of Korea to the Governments of North and South
Following the above principles, the National Council of Churches in Korea urges the
responsible authorities in the governments of both north and south to exert their utmost
efforts to enable dialogue so that the following may be accomplished as soon as
possible.
1. For the healing of the wounds caused by division
a. First of all, those separated families who have suffered in so many ways for over 40
years as victims of the division must be reunited and allowed to live together, and they
must be guaranteed the right to move freely and locate wherever they choose to live.
b. Even before reunification is achieved, everyone living in separation from family
members in north or south must be allowed to visit freely their relatives and home areas
at definite times on an annual basis, perhaps at Chusok (the Korean autumn harvest
festivaljor some other holiday season.
c. The unjust social discrimination which still prevails against some persons because
of their momentary errors or the past records of their family or relatives, problems
inevitably arising during the solidifying of the national division, must be abolished at
once.
2. For the promotion of the people's genuine participation in overcoming the division
a. Neither government, north or south, has the right to exercise a monopoly on
information about the other nor to monopolize the discussion on reunification. Freedom
of speech must be guaranteed so that the citizens of both north and south may
participate freely in the discussion for establishing a policy of reunification, while there
must be realistic, institutional guarantees of the activities of civilian organizations in the
research and discussion of the reunification issue.
b. Both North and South Korea must permit maximum freedom for people who
oppose either system or ideology to criticize freely according to their conscience and
faith, and both must abide by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
United Nations' International Human Rights Covenants.
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3. For a wider national unity of the Korean people transcending differences in ideas,
ideologies and systems
If Korea is to realize true national sovereignty, the people of both north and south will
have to transcend their differences in ideas, ideologies and systems, and both
populations must clearly confirm to their own satisfaction that they are one people
sharing a common fate. Based upon such a mutual acknowledgment North and South
Korea must together build a firm trust in one another. It follows that those things which
enable mutual trust constitute the basic starting point for all efforts directed toward
reunification. To foster such trust those factors which give rise to mistrust and hostility
must be eliminated, while mutual exchanges should be expanded, both to broaden
mutual understanding and to restore rapidly our sense of common ethnic identity.
Because all such measures aimed at fostering trust are the most essential condition for
overcoming division, even if progress is not made toward discussion between the
official representatives of the two governments and agreements are not forthcoming,
there must also be non-governmental channels through which citizens themselves may
seek progress.
a. Both North and South Korea must terminate their mutual hostility and aggressive
inclinations, and must eliminate the exclusivism which leads to the slandering and
vilification of one other. In addition, each must modify its extreme, emotional censure
of the other's differing ideology and system and offer in its place constructive criticism.
b. To promote mutual understanding north and south must each have unprejudiced,
objective information about the other, so exchanges, visits and communications must be
opened.
c. In order to restore the sense of common national identity, north-south exchanges and
joint research should be promoted in such areas as language, history, geography,
biology, and natural resources; while exchanges should take place in other areas such as
culture, the arts, religion and sports.
4, For reducing tensions and promoting peace between North and South Korea
a. In order to prevent war and reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula it is necessary
to conclude a peace treaty and terminate the existing state ofwar. To this end it is urgent
that the governments of north and south Korea, the United States, china, and others who
participated in the Korean Conflict open negotiations designed to replace the Armistice
Agreement with a peace treaty which includes a non-aggression pact.
b. At such time that a peace treaty is concluded, a verifiable state of mutual trust is
restored between north and south Korea, and there are international guarantees of the
peace and security of the entire Korean peninsula, then United States troops should be
withdrawn and the United Nations Command in Korea should be dissolved.
c. The excessive military rivalry between north and south Korea is the greatest
obstacle to peaceful reunification and is moreover inimical to economic progress.
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Therefore a parallel reduction in military strength must follow mutual negotiations
between north and south, and the reductions in military preparations must be reflected
in a greater commitment to industrial production for peace.
d. Nuclear weapons must never be used under any circumstances, and as a matter of
principle North and South Korea must unite to prevent any possibility of their use on the
Korean peninsula. All nuclear weapons deployed on the peninsula or targeted in its
direction must be removed.
5. For the realization of national independence
a. It is imperative that the Korean people protect their independence and self-
determination, so there must be no outside interference or dependency upon
neighboring nations or the superpowers in negotiations, conferences, of international
agreements between North and South Korea.
b. Both North and South Korea must either revise or abrogate all diplomatic
agreements and treaties which undermine rather than promote the life and interests of
the Korean people. North and south Korea must also reach mutual agreement in regard
to all international alliances and associations, examining them to make certain that the
common good of all Koreans is their primary objective.
The Task of the Churches of Korea for Peace and Reunification
We believe that Jesus Christ is the "Lord of Peace" (Colossians 1:20), and that God's
mission of salvation and liberation for humankind is being realized also within societies
which have ideas and systems which differ from our own. Even though the confessions
of faith and outward forms of the churches of Christians living in other societies may
differ from ours, we believe that they are united in the one God and one Lord and are
thereby joined with us as members of the one Body (I Corinthians 12:12-26).
In an astonishing way, the world ecumenical community has, within the last few years,
greatly strengthened our conviction of this reality by bringing information about our
sisters and brothers who live in North Korea and even enabling us to have direct contact
with them.
Once again we offer our thanks for God's continuing work of liberation in the history of
the Korean peninsula, and pray for God's grace and blessing upon our sisters and
brothers who steadfastly endure in their faith even under difficult circumstances.
With this confession as the basis, the National council of Churches in Korea, in order to
fulfill its mission calling for peace and reconciliation, and in response to the historic
summons to overcome the division of our people through sharing the suffering it has
caused, in a spirit of repentance and prayer plans to launch the following movement for
a Jubilee Year for Peace and Reunification.
372
1. The National Council of Churches in Korea proclaims the year 1995 to be the
"Jubilee Year for Peace and Reunification."
"The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to preach good news to
the poor. He has sent me to proclaim release to the captives and recovering of sight to
the blind, to set at liberty those who are oppressed, to proclaim the acceptable year of
the Lord." (Luke 4:18-19)
The "jubilee year" is the fiftieth year following the completion of a 49 year cycle of
seven sabbatical years (Leviticus 25:8-10). The jubilee year is a "year of liberation."
The proclamation of the jubilee year is an act of God's people which reveals their
unshaking trust in God's sovereignty over history and their faithfulness in keeping God's
sovereignty over history and their faithfulness in keeping God's covenant. The jubilee
year is a time during which the covenant community of unity and peace is restored
through the establishing of shalom based upon God's justice. This is seen in the
liberation of the enslaved through the overcoming of all social and economic conflicts
resulting from internal or external repression and absolutist power: indebtedness is
forgiven, sold land is restored to its original tillers, and seized homes are returned to
their original inhabitants (Leviticus 25:11-55).
The Korean churches proclaim 1995, the fiftieth year of our Liberation, as a Jubilee
Year. This expresses our belief that the God who rules all history has been present
within these fifty years of our history, and proclaims our firm resolution to bring about
the restoration of the covenanted community of peace in the history of the Korean
peninsula today. As we march forward with high aspirations toward this Jubilee Year,
we should anticipate a revitalizing of our faith in the sovereign God who works within
the history of our people, together with a renewing of our commitment to God's mission
calling.
2. As a part of the "Great March toward the Jubilee Year" the Korean churches will
carry forward a vigorous church renewal movement aimed toward peace and
reunification.
a. In order to fulfill their mission responsibility for peace and reunification the Korean
churches need to overcome their local self-centeredness and their preoccupation with
ecclesiastical power, while greatly strengthening mission cooperation for church unity.
b. As they proclaim the Jubilee Year the churches of Korea must reform those internal
structures which have restricted broad participation. Thus the churches must resolutely
open and expedite a full participation in lay mission activity which will include women
and youth.
c. In order to bring about economic and social justice in our society, the churches of
Korea must continue to perform a prophetic role.
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3. As a part of the proclamation of the Jubilee Year the churches of Korea, as a
community of faith committed to the realization of peace and reunification, will carry
out a broad program of education for peace and reunification.
a. The churches of Korea will widely disseminate Biblical and theological peace
studies and peace education materials, and will promote research and the exchange of
information among the various theological and Christian education institutions.
b. To increase concern about national reunification the Korean churches will promote
reunification education that heightens awareness of the historical, social and theological
validity of national reunification. A deepened perception of the structure and history of
national division will be sought, together with a deeper understanding of the theological
dimensions of the state of division.
c. Building upon theological reflection and steadfast commitment to the Christian
faith, the Korean churches will seek a broader scientific understanding of communist
ideology, and will promote the research and education on ideology required for
substantial conceptual dialogue.
4. Through the proclamation of the Jubilee Year festival and the creation of a liturgy for
peace and reunification, the Korean churches will seek to bring about a renewal of faith,
true reconciliation, and unity.
a. The churches of Korea will establish a "Sunday of Prayer for Peace and
Reunification" to observe the Jubilee Year, and will develop a form of worship for this
purpose. Included will be prayers for reunification, a confession of sin within division, a
call to commitment for reunification, prayers of intercession for the victims of division
and our divided people, a confession of faith for national reconciliation, the
proclamation of the Word (proclaiming the Jubilee Year), hymns and poetry, and a
sacrament for peace and reconciliation.
b. Until the time when direct communication between the churches of north and south
becomes possible, we will seek the cooperation of the world churches to enable the joint
proclamation in both north and south of the Jubilee Year, will promote the common
observance of the "Sunday of Prayer for Peace and Reunification," and will seek the
joint preparation and use of "prayers for peace and reunification."
c. With the cooperation of the world churches, the Korean churches will search for
ways to confirm the status of separated family members, explore the possibility of
exchanging letters, and develop a movement for searching out relatives, church
members and friends separated north from south.
5. The Korean churches will work unceasingly to build a movement for solidarity in the
cause of peace and reunification.
a. The proclamation of the Jubilee Year for Peace and Reunification, proceeding from
the churches' confession of faith, will be developed as a continuously widening
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"solidarity movement for peace and reunification." This must be a comprehensive
movement, embracing all the churches on the local, denominational, and ecumenical
levels. The National Council of Churches in Korea especially will exert efforts to
include not only its member churches, but also non-member denominations and the
Roman Catholic Church in this movement for confessional action and practice seeking
peace and reunification.
b. As the mission calling to peace and reunification is the universal task of all
Christians on the Korean peninsula, the churches of South Korea will pray for the faith
and life of the Christian community in the north, and will work for north-south
exchanges between our churches.
c. Because peace and reunification on the Korean peninsula are crucial to peace not
only in Northeast Asia but throughout the world, the Korean churches will seek to
consult closely and to develop movements for solidarity with the churches of the four
powers in the region, the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan, as well as
with churches throughout the world.
d. The churches ofKorea will expand and deepen dialogue with other religious groups
and movements, and through joint research and cooperative activity will seek to
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